Shahin v. State of Delaware Department of Finance

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 6/21/2011. (lid)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELA WARE

NINA SHAHIN,

)

)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) Civ. Action No. 1O-188-GMS
)
STATE OF DELA WARE DEPARTMENT )
OF FINANCE,
)
)
Defendant.
)

MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Nina Shahin ("Shahin"), who proceeds pro se, filed this lawsuit on March
8, 2010, alleging employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). (D.I.2.) She also raises claims under the
Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act ("DDEA") and the Delaware Handicapped Persons
Employment Protection Act ("DHPEPA,,).l
Before the court is the Department of Finance's motion to dismiss complaint or, in the
alternative, motion for more definite statement. (D.I. 10, 11.) Shahin did not file a response to
the motion. Instead, she filed a motion for a hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). (D.I. 12.)
The Department of Finance opposes the motion. (D.I. 13.) For the reasons that follow, the court
will grant the Department of Finance's motion to dismiss and will deny Shahin's motion.

lWith the exception of Title VII, the complaint sets forth the names of the acts but does
not provide a specific statutory citation of the sections allegedly violated.

II. BACKGROUND

Shahin has filed numerous lawsuits in this court against different agencies of the State of
Delaware alleging employment discrimination. She makes similar allegations in this case.
Shahin filed charges with the Department of Labor of the State of Delaware and the Equal
Opportunity Commission of the United States ("EEOC") on July 1,2009. In the instant
complaint, Shahin alleges discrimination by reason of sex, national original, age, disability, and
retaliation occurred in June 2008 when the defendant, the State of Delaware Department of
Finance ("Department of Finance") did not employ her, failed to hire her, and failed to provide
her a copy of the response it sent the Delaware Department of Labor. The EEOC issued a Notice
of Right to Sue letter, received by Shahin on December 10,2009.
The Department of Finance moves for dismissal or, in the alternative, for a more definite
statement pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (b)(6), and (e). (D.I. 10, 11.) Shahin moves for a
hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). (D.l. 12.)
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b )(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim. Motions
brought under Rule 12(b)(I) may present either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject
matter jurisdiction. In reviewing a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(I), the standards relevant to
Rule 12(b)(6) apply. In this regard, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true, and the court may only consider the complaint and documents referenced in or attached
to the complaint. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In
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reviewing a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not confined
to the allegations of the complaint, and the presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the
allegations in the complaint. Mortensen v. First Fed Sav. and Loan Ass 'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891
(3d Cir. 1977). Instead, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including
affidavits, depositions and testimony, to resolve any factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. Gotha
v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997). Once the court's subject matter jurisdiction
over a complaint is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)( 6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 93 (2007). Because Shahin proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part
analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and
legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The court must accept all of the complaint's well­
pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id at 210-11. Second, the court
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must detennine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Shahin has
a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211; see also Iqbal, 129 S.C!. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege Shahin's entitlement to relief;
rather, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. A claim is facially plausible when its
factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility
standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
"Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. "[W]here the well­
pleaded facts do not pennit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
C. Rule 12(d)

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a motion to dismiss is filed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by
the court, the matter shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). All parties must be given
a reasonable opportunity to present all material that is pertinent to the motion. Id.

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D. Rule 12(e)
The decision whether to grant or deny a defendant's motion for a more definite statement
rests within the sound discretion of the court. Holmes v. Colonial Sch. Dist., Civ. No. 09-795­
GMS, 2010 WL 4918721 (D. Del. Nov. 24, 2010) (citation omitted). Rule 12(e) allows a party
to move for a more definite statement when a pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that the party
cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see

Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ 'n Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967). The rule has been
interpreted to grant a motion for a more definite statement only where the pleading is
unintelligible,see CFMT, Inc. v. YieldUpInt'l Corp., No. Civ. A. 95-549,1996 WL 33140642,
at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 1996), or the issues cannot be determined, see Fischer & Porter Co. v.

Sheffield Corp., 31 F.R.D. 534,536 (D. Del. 962); Container Co. v. Carpenter Container Corp.,
8 F .R.D. 208, 210 (D. Del. 1948). Motions for a more definite statement are generally viewed
with disfavor, particularly "where the information sought by the motion could easily be obtained
by discovery." See CFMT, 1996 WL 33140642, at * 1 (internal citations omitted).2

IV. DISCUSSION
The Department of Finance moves to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice, on the
grounds that the complaint fails to offer details as to the nature of the alleged violations, except
that Shahin was not hired and she did not receive a copy of the Department of Finance's response
to the Delaware Department of Labor. Shahin responds by seeking a hearing pursuant to Fed. R.

2As discussed below, the court will give Shahin leave to amend. The complaint is not
intelligible. It is evident that Shahin raises employment discrimination and retaliation claims,
however, the complaint does not meet the pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twombly.
Therefore, the court will deny the motion for a more definite statement.
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Civ. P. 12(d). Shahin explains that she used the standard form for filing complaints provided the
District Court. 3
Initially the court notes, that Shahin did not attach a copy of the charges she filed with the
EEOC as required by paragraph 12 of the complaint form provided to her. Paragraph 12 states
that the copy of the charges "is submitted as a brief statement of the facts of plaintiffs claim."
(D.!. 2.) The complaint, as it now stands, fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
It is evident in reading the complaint that it must be dismissed because Shahin has pled

no facts that would support adverse employment actions based on her sex, national origin, age, or
disability. Indeed, the complaint does not indicate Shahin's age, her national origin, or alleged
disability. Nor does it contain the basic elements for failure to hire based upon discrimination.
For example, the complaint fails to adequately allege that Shahin: (1) is a member of a protected
class; (2) sought and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3)
that despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) under circumstances that raise an
inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with
qualifications similar to Shahin's to fill the position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802;
Sarullo v. United States Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789 (3d Cif. 2003); accord Jyer v. Everson, 238 F.

App'x 834 (3d Cif. 2007) (not published).

3Shahin's reliance upon Rule 12(d) is misplaced. She "demands" a hearing to discuss
changes to the court's complaint form, so that changes can be made for her to refile her
complaint on a "new, improved form." Shahin states that the Delaware Department of Labor
denied her information related to the identity of the person hired for the accountant position. She
"demands" she be provided information about the person hired. Rule 12(d) provides for the
conversion of a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. It is not a means for
changing this court's forms, nor a discovery tooL
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Similarly, the complaint states "retaliation" as another alleged discriminatory act, but
pleads no facts to support the elements of retaliatory conduct. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took a
materially adverse action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the employer's action. LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Comty. Ctr. Ass 'n, 503
F.3d 217, 231 (3d Cir. 2007).
While not required to prove the elements of discrimination and retaliation at the pleading
stage, a plaintiff must plead facts that "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element[s]." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). Shahin has not pled facts related to the elements discussed hereinabove
and, therefore, her discrimination and retaliation claims cannot succeed. 4
For the above reasons, the court will grant the motion to dismiss. However, the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice and Shahin is given leave to amend for "if a complaint
is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236. This rule applies "even if
the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594

4The court will grant the motion to dismiss the disability discrimination claims raised
pursuant to Title I of the ADA and age discrimination ADEA claims inasmuch as the Department
of Finance, as an agency of the State, is immune from suit. Under the Eleventh Amendment, the
State is immune from suit for damages brought pursuant to Title I of the ADA. See Board of
Trustees ofUniv. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Benn v. First Judicial Dist. ofPa.,
426 F.3d 233,241 (3d Cir. 2005). The State is also immune from suit for damages under the
Eleventh Amendment for Shahin's age discrimination claim under the ADEA. See Kimel v.
Florida Bd. ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Shahin v. Delaware Dep'tofFin., 344 F. App'x 765
(3d Cir. 2009) (not published). The court finds premature the motion to dismiss the DDEA and
DHPEPA claims.
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F.3d 238,256 n. 10 (3d Cir. 2010). Shahin will be given twenty-one (21) days to amend her
complaint. Failure to amend the complaint within this time-frame will result in dismissal with
prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will grant the motion to dismiss complaint or, in the
alternative, motion for more definite statement, to the extent that the ADEA and Title I ADA
claims will be dismissed with prejudice, the remaining claims will be dismissed without
prejudice, and the motion will be denied in all other respects. Shahin will be given leave to file
an amended complaint. (D.1. 10.) Shahin's motion for a hearing will be denied. (D.l. 12.)
An appropriate order will be issued.

~

,J ~ f:

1,2011
Wilmington, Dela*are

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