Robinson v. Beckles et al
Filing
235
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sherry R. Fallon on 1/11/2019. (lih)
IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
GREGORY F. ROBINSON
Plaintiff,
V.
SGT. WILFRED BECKLES, et al.
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 10-362-SRF
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
In this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff Gregory F. Robinson
("Robinson") seeks relief for alleged civil rights violations committed by Angelina DeAllie
("DeAllie"), Veronica Downing ("Downing"), and Wilfred Beckles ("Beckles") (collectively,
"defendants"). Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 filed by defendants. 1 (D.I. 189) For the following reasons,
defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. 2
II.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On April 29, 2010, Robinson, a former inmate incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 3 (D.I. 2) Plaintiff alleged constitutional violations, including violations of the First,
1
Defendants' opening brief in support of their motion for summary judgment is D.I. 228,
plaintiff's reply memorandum following remand is D.I. 232, plaintiff's opening brief following
remand is D.I. 229, and defendants' reply brief in support of their motion for summary judgment
is D.I. 231.
2
The parties consented to jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge on July 7, 2017. (D.I. 222)
3
Robinson was released from prison in 2016. (D.I. 229, Ex. 10 at 2)
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as
well as state tort claims. (D.I. 2); see also Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672-73
(D. Del. 2010).
On August 6, 2010, the court dismissed thirty-seven defendants and deemed the majority
of the claims frivolous. (D.I. 18); Robinson, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 689. On January 21, 2011,
plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to correct pleading deficiencies identified by the court,
and the court granted this motion to amend on April 27, 2011. (D.I. 34; D.I. 54)
On December 16, 2010, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to submit completed
service forms. (D.1. 27) Plaintiff then moved for leave to file an amended complaint and two
motions for the appointment of counsel. (D.I. 29; D.I. 31; D.I. 33) The court reopened the case
on February 2, 2011, and granted plaintiff thirty days to serve the complaint. (D.I. 36)
On October 24, 2012, the court referred the case to the Federal Civil Panel for
representation and stayed the case. (D.I. 154) The stay was lifted on December 7, 2012 upon the
entry of appearance by counsel ofrecord. (D.I. 155)
On August 15, 2014, defendants moved for summary judgment. (D.I. 189) Judge
Robinson granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on July 24, 2015 and directed that
judgment be entered in defendants' favor. (D.1. 209; D.I. 211); Robinson v. Beckles, 117 F.
Supp. 3d 528 (D. Del. 2015).
Plaintiff timely appealed Judge Robinson's decision, and the Third Circuit issued its
Opinion on December 19, 2016. See Robinson v. Danberg, 673 F. App'x 205 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. See id. at 208.
Specifically, the Third Circuit: (1) reversed the entry of summary judgment on Robinson's
Eighth Amendment claim against DeAllie for allegedly macing his cell, (2) vacated this court's
2
grant of summary judgment for Beckles on Robinson's pretrial Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim for allegedly injuring his hand while removing handcuffs and remanded
the claim for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, and (3) vacated this court's grant of
summary judgment for Downing on Robinson's post-conviction Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim for allegedly striking Robinson in the face and remanded the claim for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 210-12.
B. Facts
On remand, this court reviews Robinson's pretrial Fourteenth Amendment excessive
force claim against Beckles ("the Beckles incident") and his post-conviction Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Downing ("the Downing incident").
i.
The Beckles Incident
Robinson claims that on June 20, 2008, Beckles injured his foot and hand while
uncuffing him in his cell, and therefore raises a pre-trial excessive force claim. (D.I. 229 at 8)
Robinson claims that when Beckles returned Robinson to his cell after a disagreement regarding
which shower Robinson should use, Beckles attempted to hit him in the back with the door, but
instead closed the steel cell door onto his foot. (Id. at 3; Ex. 3 at 36:22-24) Beckles uncuffed his
right hand and, while uncuffing his left hand, Beckles allegedly put both hands on the cuff and
his foot on the door before yanking the handcuff, "split[ting] the top of [Robinson's] hand." (Id.
at 37:1-15)
Beckles, on the other hand, testified that after he walked Robinson back to his cell and
shut the door, he opened the flap to uncuffRobinson, but Robinson walked away from the flap.
(D.I. 228, Ex. A at 49:24-50:2) Beckles reported that after several direct orders, Robinson
finally came back to flap to be uncuffed. (Id. at 50:2-4, 50: 16-24) After Beckles uncuffed one
3
hand and as he was uncuffing the other, Robinson allegedly tried to jerk his hand away from
Beckles. (Id at 50:4-6, 51 :3-6) Beckles pulled back on the handcuffs as they were starting to
open and secured the flap. (Id at 50:6-8) Beckles also testified that having only one handcuff
open and one hand loose posed a security concern because an inmate could use the open
handcuff as a weapon. (D.I. 228, Ex. A at 51 :17-24)
ii.
The Downing Incident
Robinson claims that Downing filed false reports to cover up an incident on September
14, 2009, in which she hit Robinson in the mouth. (D.I. 229 at 6) During this incident,
Robinson contends that backup was called to investigate a missing food cup from Robinson's
tray. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 59:18-21) Robinson testified that an officer handcuffed Robinson
behind his back before he walked out of his cell. (Id at 59:21-23, 62:16) As Robinson was
walking out of his cell, Downing allegedly hit him in the mouth. (Id at 59:23-60:1) Robinson
cannot recall whether he was hit with an open hand or closed fist, but upon further questioning,
ultimately agreed that it was a "slap to the mouth." (Id. at 60: 17-61 :6) He testified that his
mouth was left bloody and his tongue was split open. (Id. at 61:5-10) Robinson also testified
that Major Scarborough was present and directed that Robinson be taken to see the nurse. (Id. at
61 :21-24)
Downing denies slapping Robinson and argues that even if the court were to construe
facts in the light most favorable to Robinson, Robinson's own testimony reveals that, at worst, he
was slapped once by Downing. (D.I. 231 at 3; D.I. 228 at 4; D.I. 229, Ex. 17 at 26: 10-22)
III.
LEGAL ST AND ARDS
A. Summary Judgment
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
4
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the proceeding, and "a
dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely disputed
material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial, and the court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458,
460-61 (3d Cir. 1989); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). An assertion that a fact cannot
be--or, alternatively, is-genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing to "particular
parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the
motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) &
(B). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;" rather, there must be
enough evidence to enable a jury to reasonably find for the non-moving party on the issue. See
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see
also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. If the non-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an
essential element of its case on which it bears the burden of proof, then the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment." Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 13 5 S. Ct.
2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,395 n.10 (1989)). To demonstrate
a due process violation, a detainee must prove "that the force purposely or knowingly used
against him was objectively unreasonable," meaning "that the actions [were] not 'rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose." Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 561 (1979)). The reasonableness of the force used is determined by the Kingsley factors:
[1] the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used; [2] the extent of the plaintiffs injury; [3]
any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of
force; [4] the severity of the security problem at issue; [5] the
threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and [6] whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). While the Supreme Court noted that this list is not
exhaustive, the Kingsley factors provide a guide for types of objective circumstances that are
"potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force." Id.
C. Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment.
Force is considered "cruel and unusual punishment" when it is applied "maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm" instead of "in a good faith effort to maintain or
6
restore discipline." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether actions taken inflicted unnecessary and
wanton pain and suffering instead of in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, the
court should consider the following factors:
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship
between the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] ...
the extent of injury inflicted, ... [4] the extent of the threat to the
safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials ... , and [5] any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). The Court in Hudson noted that "the extent of
injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could
plausibly have been thought necessary." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the Court also noted that "[t]he absence of serious injury is ... relevant to
the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it." Id.
D. Qualified Immunity
"Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability for any action that
'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."' Salerno v. Corzine, 449 F. App'x 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982)); see also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 196
(3d Cir. 1999). Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156,
161 (3d Cir. 2001). In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the court "'must first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so,
proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation."' Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F .3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Conn v.
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Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)).
Qualified immunity is a question oflaw determined by the court. 4 Monteiro v. City of
Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006). The "inquiry is an objective, fact-specific pursuit."
Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,491 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
"The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is
whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted." Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,442 n.5 (2007) In assessing this prong, courts
will routinely look to existing case law (from both within and outside this jurisdiction) to assess
whether a right was "clearly established." Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587, 598 (3d Cir.
2011). Additionally, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Therefore, "defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is
obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that [the action was lawful];
but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be
recognized." 5 In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 961-62 (3d Cir. 1995) (alteration in
original) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,341 (1986)).
4
However, "when qualified immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues must be
determined by the jury." Monteiro, 436 F.3d at 405 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,313
(1995); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485,491 (3d Cir. 1995)).
5
In other words, qualified immunity may be available where "reasonable officials in the
defendants' position at the relevant time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided
case law, that their conduct would be lawful." Good v. Dauphin Cty. Soc. Servs. for Children &
Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989).
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IV.
DISCUSSION
A. Pre-Trial Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force Claim Against Beckles
The Third Circuit concluded that the District Court erred by "focusing exclusively on the
severity of Robinson's injury at the expense of the other Kingsley factors." Robinson, 673 F.
App'x at 209. Hereinafter, the court analyzes the Beckles incident under all six Kingsley factors:
"[1] the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; [2] the
extent of the plaintiffs injury; [3] any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount
of force; [4] the severity of the security problem at issue; [5] the threat reasonably perceived by
the officer; and [6] whether the plaintiff was actively resisting." Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
Viewing the record in light of these factors, the court finds that a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the force used against Robinson was objectively unreasonable.
a. The relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount
of force used
Robinson testified that Beckles took him back to his cell after a disagreement over which
shower to use. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 36: 16-24) Robinson and Beckles dispute whether Robinson
was cooperative once he was in his cell. (Compare D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 36:16-37:15 with D.I. 228,
Ex. A at 49:22-51 :6) Beckles testified that Robinson was uncooperative and posed a security
risk that required a use of force. (D.I. 228, Ex. A at 51 :3-24) However, on a motion for
summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to Robinson and
take into account his deposition, which stated that Robinson was cooperative and securely locked
in his cell. See Gonzalez v. Sec '.Y of Dep 't of Homeland Sec., 678 F .3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 2012);
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F .3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the factfinder could determine
there was no need for the use of force, and therefore the amount of force utilized exceeded the
9
need. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 36:16-37:8) Therefore, this factor weighs against granting judgment for
defendant Beckles as a matter of law.
b. The extent of the plaintiff's injury
Robinson testified that the top of his hand was split and contemporaneous medical
records describe "bleeding from hand, abrasion still present, [and] edema noted." (D.I. 229, Ex.
6) An x-ray report conducted approximately one month after the incident showed "soft tissue
swelling" on Robinson's left hand. (Id., Ex. 7) Additionally, a June 13, 2017 medical report
noted that Robinson has a "[t]raumatic right wrist contusion with strain/sprain" and "traumatic
induced chronic pain relative to left hand/ankle." (Id., Ex. 9 at 2) At the defense medical
examination on November 1, 2017, defendant's medical expert opined that "[h]is physical
examination in regard to the left hand is entirely within normal limits. He does not report
weakness and on examination has a wide variation in grip strength testing[,] suggesting
diminished voluntary effort." (Id., Ex. 10 at 3) Consequently, there is a dispute between the
plaintiffs and defendants' medical experts on the permanency and severity of plaintiffs hand
injury which must be resolved at trial precluding summary judgment in favor of defendants on
this point.
As for Robinson's claim that Beckles slammed the steel door of his cell onto his foot,
contemporaneous medical records did not note any injuries to Robinson's foot. (See id., Ex. 6)
Indeed, this foot injury is not recognized until a separate x-ray report approximately four months
later, on September 26, 2008. (See id., Ex. 6; Ex. 7; Ex. 8) This September 2008 x-ray report
noted for the first time that "[t]here are mild osteoarthritic changes present" in Robinson's left
foot. (Id., Ex. 8) Robinson also pointed to a medical report from June 2017, which discussed a
"left ankle contusion/strain/sprain, traumatic left foot osteoarthritis, ... [and] traumatic induced
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chronic pain relative to left hand/ankle." (Id., Ex. 9 at 2) The June 2017 medical report further
noted Robinson "would have permanent restrictions of no high impact activities, repetitive stress
activities to these regions." (Id.) Based upon the defense medical examination on November 1,
2017, defendant's medical expert concluded "[b]ased on the presence of his mild objective soft
tissue swelling, there is evidence to support a mild permanent impairment in regard to the ankle."
(Id., Ex. 10 at 4) Further, the November 2017 medical report attributed these symptoms to the
incident. (Id. at 3) Judge Robinson did not believe this to be a severe injury, questioning
whether the beginning signs of osteoarthritis were related to the Beckles incident. Robinson, 11 7
F. Supp. 3d at 536-37. However, upon further medical expert discovery, plaintiff has produced
medical evidence that his foot and ankle injuries are permanent and there is a causal relationship
to the Beckles incident. (D.I. 229, Ex. 9; Ex. 10) Defendants have not addressed plaintiffs foot
and ankle injury in their briefing. (See D.I. 228; D.I. 331) Robinson's ankle and foot injury
persists and there is an issue of fact regarding whether this injury was proximately caused by the
Beckles incident. This factor weighs against granting summary judgment for defendant Beckles.
c. Any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force
While Beckles avers that there is no evidence that he permitted a situation to escalate,
there is also no evidence that he attempted to temper or limit the amount of force he used. (D.I.
229, Ex. 3 at 36:16-37:8; D.I. 228, Ex. A at 49:22-51:24) Therefore, this factor weighs against
granting summary judgment for defendant Beckles.
d. The severity of the security problem at issue
In determining the severity of the security problem at issue, the facts must be viewed in
the light most favorable to Robinson. See Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 257; Giles, 571 F.3d at 326.
Accordingly, there was no severe security problem at the time of the incident because Robinson
11
alleges he was securely locked in his cell and he alleges he was cooperative. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at
36:16-37:8) Therefore, this factor weighs against granting summary judgment.
e. The threat reasonably perceived by the officer
As for the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, Beckles testified that if he was
dealing with an inmate that was struggling or was particularly unruly, protocol stated to leave the
inmate with the handcuffs and, depending on the situation, call another officer. (Id., Ex. 16 at
48:6-9) Beckles noted he should not need to pull on an inmate's handcuffs because he "would
injure the inmate." (Id. at 48:9-11) However, Beckles further testified "[t]he minute one hand is
loose, he could use an open cuff as a weapon. If I am holding it, I try to get it off. If he have
[sic] both cuffs on and he don't [sic] come, then it is a different case. But having one cuff to his
hand and one end open, inmates use that as a weapon. So if I have that, my intention is to get
that before he get [sic] it from me." (D.I. 228, Ex. A at 51 :17-24) However, Robinson argues
that Beckles could not have reasonably perceived a threat from Robinson because he was in a
maximum security cell. This factor weighs against granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant.
f.
Whether the plaintiff was actively resisting
In determining whether the plaintiff was actively resisting, the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to Robinson. See Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 257; Giles, 571 F.3d at 326.
Robinson contends he was securely locked in his cell and was not actively resisting Beckles
during the incident. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 36:16-37:8) Beckles testified that Robinson refused to
come to the flap to be uncuffed, and when he was being uncuffed, Robinson jerked away from
him. (D.1. 228, Ex. A at 50: 16-51 :6) This factor weighs against granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant.
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The Third Circuit indicated that when the facts are viewed in the light favorable to
plaintiff, "a reasonable factfinder could conclude Beckles' s use of force was excessive. " 6 See
Robinson, 673 F. App'x at 210. Therefore, upon considering the Kingsley factors, the court
denies defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Robinson's pretrial excessive
force claim against Beckles. The aforementioned material issues of fact are required to be
resolved by the jury at trial.
B. Post-Conviction Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim Against Downing
The Third Circuit determined that the District Court's opinion was "devoid of any
consideration of Robinson's Eighth Amendment claim, i.e., that Downing's alleged act of
striking Robinson was an Eighth Amendment violation in the first place." Robinson, 673 F.
App'x at 211. Hereinafter, the court analyzes the Downing incident under the relevant factors
enumerated in Whitley: "[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between
the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] ... the extent of injury inflicted, ... [4] the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials ... , and [5] any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Whitley,
475 U.S. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
Viewing the record in light of these factors, the court finds that a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the force used against Robinson was objectively unreasonable.
a. The need for the application of force
In determining the need for the application of force, the facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff. See Gonzalez, 678 F.3d at 257; Giles, 571 F.3d at 326. Here, Downing
6
In a footnote, Chief Judge Smith stated that he would affirm the grant of summary judgment
against Beckles because he did not believe a reasonable factfinder could conclude the force used
against Robinson was objectively unreasonable. Robinson, 673 F. App'x at 210 n.1.
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denies ever slapping Robinson in the face, or initiating any physical contact that was threatening
while he was handcuffed. (D.I. 229, Ex. 17 at 26:10-22) Robinson, however, testified that when
he walked out of his cell handcuffed behind his back, Downing hit him in the face. (Id., Ex. 3 at
59:23-60:1, 62:15-16) Viewing facts in favor of plaintiff for purposes of the pending motion for
summary judgment, there was no threat posed and no need for the application of force. Thus, a
reasonable factfinder could determine that the use of force occurred and that it was inherently
excessive. This weighs against granting defendant Downing's motion for summary judgment.
b. The relationship between the need and the amount of force that was
used
According to the plaintiff, there was no need for the use of force because he walked out
of his cell handcuffed behind his back. (Id.) Accordingly, the factfinder could determine there
was no need for the use of force and therefore the amount of force utilized exceeded the need.
This factor weighs against granting defendant Downing's motion for summary judgment.
c. The extent of injury inflicted
Robinson testified that his mouth was bloodied and contemporaneous medical records
show "a small laceration" on the side of his tongue. (Id. at 61 :5-8; Ex. 11) The nurse who
treated Robinson immediately following the injury noted "pain minimal," and "no swelling and
no bleeding" before giving Robinson a Motrin. (Id., Ex. 11) Robinson's medical records do not
detail any pain, discomfort, or abnormalities as a result of this injury. (See id., Ex. 9; Ex.10)
However, "[t]he absence of serious injury" is "relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but
does not end it." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. This factor is neutral.
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d. The extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials
Robinson testified that he was handcuffed behind his back and neither Robinson nor
Downing have testified to or provided evidence of a threat to staff or inmates, as reasonably
perceived by the responsible officials. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 59:23-60: 16, 62: 11-19; Ex. 17 at
26:10-22; D.I. 231 at 3; D.I. 228 at 8-9) Therefore, this factor weighs against granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant.
e. Any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response
There is no evidence that Downing attempted to temper or limit the severity of a forceful
response. (D.I. 229, Ex. 3 at 59:23-61: 19; Ex. 17 at 26:4-22) This factor weighs against
granting defendant Downing's motion for summary judgment.
Downing argues that while a slap to the face is inappropriate, this behavior is deserving
of internal discipline and does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. (D .I. 228
at 8-9) Instead, Downing argues that not every push or shove violates the Constitution. (Id at 9
(citing Johnson, 481 F .2d at 103 3) ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.").
Downing does not address the factors identified in Whitley. (See D.I. 228; D.I. 231) The cases
Downing cites are inapposite. In Monroe v. Phelps, 520 F. App'x 67 (3d Cir. 2013), the force
used against plaintiff was deemed reasonable because he admittedly refused to hand over a white
object when commanded to and while in a drug rehabilitation program. Monroe, 520 F. App'x at
70. Similarly, in Reyes v. Chinnici, 54 F. App'x 44 (3d Cir. 2002), it was undisputed that
plaintiff was being unruly, uncooperative, and provoking the defendant. Reyes, 54 F. App'x at
4 7. Here, it is disputed as to whether plaintiff acted in an uncooperative or unruly way, and
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viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a jury issue exists as to whether the
plaintiff was being cooperative during this incident.
Therefore, based upon the Whitley factors, the court denies defendants' motion for
summary judgment with respect to Robinson's post-conviction excessive force claim against
Downing.
C. Qualified Immunity
The Third Circuit did not instruct this court to consider qualified immunity. See
generally Robinson, 673 F. App'x 205. Defendants previously raised this issue in their original
opening and reply briefs in support of their motion for summary judgment. (D.I. 190 at 17-18;
D.I. 203 at 10) It was unnecessary for Judge Robinson to reach the issue of qualified immunity
based on her decision granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. See generally
Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 3d 528. Defendants raise this, again, in their opening brief in support of
their motion for summary judgment on remand. (D.I. 228 at 9-11) The court can consider the
issue on remand because it was not an issue on appeal and it was preserved in defendants'
opening and reply briefs before the court. (D.I. 190; D.I. 203) See Avocent Redmond Corp. v.
Raritan Computer, Inc., 2005 WL 612722, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2005).
As previously discussed, the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged issues of material fact as to
whether Downing and Beckles used excessive force in two separate incidents, in violation of
plaintiffs constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively.
Additionally, the Third Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment on Robinson's Eighth
Amendment claim against DeAllie, finding that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that DeAllie maced Robinson, and the use of force was more than de
minimis. Robinson, 673 F. App'x at 212. Therefore, whether any of the three defendants should
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be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity turns on whether each defendant
violated a clearly established right at the time of the alleged constitutional misconduct. In this
regard, the court must determine whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have
understood that he was violating plaintiffs Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Third
Circuit's guidance is: "some but not precise factual correspondence to precedent is necessary for
the defendant to be charged with knowledge of the unlawfulness of his or her actions." Good v.
Dauphin County Soc. Serv. For Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal
quotations marks omitted) (quoting Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720,
726 (3d Cir. 1989)).
a. Alleged Eighth Amendment Violations
i. Spraying capstun under a cell door
Defendants argue that a reasonable officer would not have known that they were
violating plaintiffs constitutional rights by "spray[ing] capstun under a cell door." (D.I. 228 at
11) The court in Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996) noted that "[i]t is generally
recognized that 'it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace, tear
gas or other chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of
infliction of pain."' Williams, 77 F.3d at 763 (quoting Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1984)). See also Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,240 (4th Cir. 2008) (denying qualified
immunity because the right to be free from excessive use of pepper spray was clearly
established). Here, DeAllie allegedly maced Robinson while he was in his cell and Robinson's
"shirt had to be tied around his face." Robinson, 673 F. App'x at 211. Therefore, based on
established precedent, summary judgment is denied as the court finds it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that her conduct was unlawful in the situation she confronted.
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ii. Slapping a handcuffed inmate
Defendants contend that a reasonable officer would not have known that they were
violating plaintiffs constitutional rights by "slap[ping] a handcuffed inmate resulting in no
injury." (D.I. 228 at 11) Defendants argue that the Downing incident allegedly occurred in
2009, and that at that time, it was not clearly established that such action would constitute an
Eighth Amendment violation. However, the court in Santiago v. Fields, 170 F. Supp. 2d 453,
459-460 (D. Del. 2001) denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding defendants
were not entitled to qualified immunity where plaintiff claimed he was handcuffed behind his
back when defendants allegedly used excessive force. Santiago, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 458-59.
Similarly, here, plaintiff was handcuffed behind his back when Downing allegedly struck him.
Therefore, based on established precedent, summary judgment is denied as the court finds it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that her conduct was unlawful in the situation she
confronted.
b. Alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation by yanking on handcuffs or
hitting inmate's foot with a cell door
Defendants contend that a reasonable officer would not have known that they were
violating plaintiffs constitutional rights by "yank[ing] on handcuffs or hit[ting] an inmate's foot
with a cell door." (D.I. 228 at 11) Further, defendants argue that Kingsley was not decided until
2015, seven years after the Beckles incident, thus, no sufficient precedent existed at the time of
the alleged incident to put defendant on notice that such conduct is constitutionally prohibited.
(Id) While Kingsley was not decided until several years after the Beckles incident, the idea that
"the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts
to punishment" was already established in Graham and expressly cited in Kingsley. Kingsley,
135 S. Ct. at 2473 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (1989)). Moreover, there were other
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cases that were analogous to the case at hand, such that a prison official would know that
slapping a cooperative inmate who is handcuffed behind his back, hitting an inmate with a door,
or yanking on the handcuffs of a secured, cooperative inmate would not be lawful. See Jones v.
Hadsall, 2000 WL 554460, at *2 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding district court erred in dismissing an
excessive force claim against officers who slammed plaintiffs hands in slot door); Davidson v.
Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding material questions of fact as to whether
excessive force was used where plaintiff was compliant but potentially an escape risk, but
handcuffs were shackled so tightly to cause severe pain and permanent injury); Caridi v. Forte,
967 F. Supp. 97, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding excessive force was not used where plaintiff
was resisting while being uncuffed). Therefore, based on established precedent, summary
judgment is denied as the court finds it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.
Although the qualified immunity inquiry involves disputed issues of fact (i.e., whether
DeAllie, Beckles, or Downing committed the alleged acts), the immunity issue itself is
necessarily subsumed in plaintiffs Section 1983 claims. See Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490,
1503 (3d Cir. 1993). For example, if a jury finds that plaintiff has proven all the elements
necessary to recover on his constitutional claims, it could not at the same time conclude under
the facts of this case that DeAllie, Beckles, and Downing did not violate a "clearly established"
constitutional right of which "a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 1504. Similarly, if
a jury finds that plaintiff cannot recover on his constitutional claims, then the immunity issue
would become moot. See id. at 1503-04.
The court concludes that, viewing the facts favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable
correctional officer in DeAllie's, Beckles's, or Downing's position at the time of the alleged
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conduct would have concluded that his or her actions were lawful. Consequently, qualified
immunity is not available to each of the defendants as a matter of law and there are material
issues of fact to be resolved at trial concerning plaintiffs claims of excessive force in violation
of the plaintiffs rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Dated: January .1.L_, 2019
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