Trawick v. Phelps et al
Filing
28
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/13/12. (maw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
CHARLES B. TRAWICK,
Petitioner,
Civ. Act. No. 1O-374-LPS
v.
PERRY PHELPS, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELA WARE,
Respondents.
Charles B. Trawick. Pro se Petitioner.
James T. Wakley, Deputy Attorney General of the Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September 13,2012
Wilmington, Delaware
~~~Jtdge
I.
INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is an Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28
U.S.C. § 2254 ("Petition") filed by Petitioner Charles B. Trawick ("Petitioner"). (D.I. 1) For the
reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Petition as time-barred by the limitations period
prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
II.
BACKGROUND
In January 2002, Petitioner was charged by indictment with, inter alia, first degree
robbery and aggravated menacing. (D.I. 13 at 3) Following a three-day jury trial in September,
2002, Petitioner was convicted on all charges. On December 9,2002, Petitioner was sentenced
as an habitual offender to life imprisonment plus a term of years. (Jd.) On appeal, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on April 7, 2004. See Trawick v.
State, 845 A.2d 505 (Del. 2004).
On June 9, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"), which the Superior Court denied on June
26,2009. See Trawick v. State, 986 A.2d 1164 (Table), 2009 WL 4897743 (Del. Dec. 17,2009).
Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision on
December 17,2009. Jd.
Petitioner filed the instant § 2254 Petition in May, 2010. (D.I. 1) The State filed an
Answer, asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred. (D.I. 13)
III.
THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") was signed into
1
law on April 23, 1996. See 28 U .S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA prescribes a one-year period of
limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest
of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
reVlew;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA's limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling.
See Holland v. Florida, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2549,2560 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner's § 2254 Petition, docketed in May, 2010, is subject to the one-year limitations
period contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Because he
does not allege, and the Court does not discern, any facts triggering the application of
§ 2244(d)(1 )(B),(C), or (D), the one-year period of limitations in this case began to run when
2
Petitioner's conviction became final under § 2244(d)(l)(A).1
Pursuant to § 2244( d)( 1)(A), if a state prisoner appeals a state court judgment but does
not seek certiorari review, the judgment of conviction becomes final ninety days after the state
appellate court's decision. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1999);
Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, Petitioner's conviction became final
on July 6,2004, because he did not seek certiorari review of the Delaware Supreme Court's April
7, 2004 decision regarding his direct appeal. Applying the one-year limitations period to that
date, Petitioner had until July 6, 2005 to timely file his Petition. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d
653 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (e) applies to federal
habeas petitions). Petitioner, however, waited until April 19, 2010 2 to file the Petition, nearly
five full years after the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, his habeas Petition is timebarred and should be dismissed, unless the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably
tolled. See Jones, 195 F.3d at 158. The Court will discuss each doctrine in turn.
IThe Court notes that Petitioner filed a "Motion to Amend" his Petition, which seeks to
"add a constitutional violation that has just recently become available." (D.1. 16) To the extent
this motion constitutes an attempt to trigger a later starting date for the limitations period under
§ 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D), it is unavailing. The motion does not explain or identify the new
constitutional violation; nor do any of Petitioner's subsequent filings provide any further
information. (D.1. 17; D.1. 19; D.1. 21; D.1. 22; D.1. 24; D.1. 25; D.1. 26)
2Pursuant to the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner's habeas petition is deemed filed
on the date he delivers it to prison officials for mailing to the district court, not on the date the
application is filed in the court. See Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2003);
Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1998); Woods v. Kearney, 215 F. Supp. 2d 458,460
(D. Del. 2002) (date on petition is presumptive date of mailing and, thus, of filing). Applying
this rule to the instant case, the Court adopts April 19, 2010 as the date of filing, because that is
the date on the Petition.
3
A. Statutory Tolling
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed state post-conviction motion tolls AEDPA's
limitations period during the time the action is pending in the state courts, including any postconviction appeals, provided that the motion was filed and pending before the expiration of
AEDPA's limitations period. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417,420-24 (3d Cir. 2000); Price
v. Taylor, 2002 WL 31107363, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2002). Although Petitioner filed a Rule
61 motion in the Superior Court, that motion has no statutory tolling effect because it was filed in
June 2009, almost four years after the July 2005 expiration of the one-year federal habeas
limitations period. Accordingly, the Petition is time-barred, unless equitable tolling applies.
B. Equitable Tolling
AEDPA's limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons in appropriate cases. See
Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2560. However, a petitioner can only qualify for equitable tolling by
demonstrating "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing" Id. at 2562. Mere excusable neglect
is insufficient. See Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 77 (3d Cir. 2004). Consistent with these
principles, the Third Circuit has limited equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period to the
following circumstances:
(1) where the defendant (or the court) actively misled the plaintiff;
(2) where the plaintiff was in some extraordinary way prevented
from asserting his rights; or
(3) where the plaintiff timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the
wrong forum.
Jones, 195 F.3d at 159; see also Thomas v. Snyder, 2001 WL 1555239, at *3-4 (D. DeL Nov. 28,
4
2001).
Here, Petitioner has not alleged, and the Court cannot discern, that any extraordinary
circumstances prevented him from timely filing the Petition. To the extent Petitioner made a
mistake or miscalculation regarding the one-year filing period, that mistake does not warrant
equitably tolling the limitations period. See Simpson v. Snyder, 2002 WL 1000094, at *3 (D.
Del. May 14, 2002). Additionally, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he exercised the level
of diligence in pursuing relief that is necessary to warrant equitable tolling. Significantly,
Petitioner waited approximately five years after his conviction to file his Rule 61 motion, and
then waited another five months after the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his
Rule 61 motion to file his § 2254 Petition. Therefore, the equitable tolling doctrine does not
apply in this case.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Petition as untimely.
v.
PENDING MOTIONS
During the pendency of this proceeding, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend the Petition
(D.I. 16), and two Motions to Appoint Counsel (D.I. 21; D.L 24). In his Motion to Amend,
Petitioner states that he wants to add a "constitutional violation that has just recently become
available," but he does not describe the alleged "new" constitutional violation. (D.!. 16)
Although a district court may, in its discretion, permit an amendment to a habeas petition that
clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory raised in the original petition, such an amendment is
permissible only if the original petition itself was timely filed and the proposed amendment does
not seek to add an entirely new claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); United States v. Thomas, 221
F.3d 430, (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, both the Petition and the Motion to Amend were filed after
5
the expiration of the federal habeas limitations period. Accordingly, the Court will deny the
Motion to Amend.
In tum, having determined that it must deny the Petition as time-barred, the Court will
deny the two Motions for Appointment of Counsel as moot.
VI.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether
to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of
appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing ofthe denial of a
constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). A federal court denying a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims is not required to issue
a certificate of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason would find it
debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. See id.
The Court has concluded that Petitioner's habeas Petition does not warrant relief because
it is time-barred. In the Court's view, reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be
debatable. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
VII.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Petitioner's Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. An appropriate Order will be entered.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?