USA v. Pearson

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: Defendant's 17 Objections are Overruled; granting 13 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 16 Report and Recommendation; the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendant and to close this case. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 8/7/12. (ntl)

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IN THE UNITED STATES

~ISTRICT COURT

J

FOR THE DISTRICT

F DELAWARE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
iv. No. 10-442-LPS-MPT

v.

JEFFREY S. PEARSON,
Defendant.

WHEREAS, Magistrate Judge Thynge issue a Report and Recommendation ("R & R")
(D.1.16), dated March 19,2012, recommending that t e Court grant the motion for summary
judgment filed by Plaintiff, the United States of Arne ica (the "Government") on September 7,
2011 (D.I.13);

WHEREAS, Defendant JeffreyS. Pearson(" earson") timely filed objections to the R &
Ron April 3, 2012 ("Objections") (D.I.17);

WHEREAS, the Court has considered the m tion de novo, as it is case-dispositive, see
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(b)(3); s e generally Tagayun v. Lever &

Stolzenberg, 239 Fed. Appx. 708 (3d Cir. Mar. 15, 2 07);
WHEREAS, the Court has considered the un erlying evidentiary rulings by Magistrate
Judge Thynge for whether they are "clearly erroneou or contrary to law," see 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a); see general

Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d

81 (3d Cir. 1992);

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY O,ERED that:

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The Objections (D.I.17) are OVERR LED.

2.

Magistrate Judge Thynge's R & R (D .. 16) is ADOPTED.

3.

The motion for summary judgment (D.I.l3) is GRANTED.

4.

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1.

Pearson presents nine issues in his Ob ections. None warrants denial of the

Government's motion for summary judgment.
a.

Pearson objects that Magistrat Judge Thynge erred in permitting the

Government to file a motion for summary judgment fter the deadline set in the Scheduling
Order. Pearson's suggestion that the Scheduling Ord r acts as a bar to a motion for summary
judgment is mistaken, as the Court always retains dis retion to modify the Scheduling Order.
See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 6(b)(l) ("When an act may or

ust be done within a specified time, the

court may, for good cause, extend the time .... ");Fe . R. Civ. Proc. 16(b)(4) ("A schedule may
be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.").
b.

Pearson objects that Magistrat Judge Thynge erred by failing to dismiss

this action pursuant to D. Del. LR 41.1. This was no error. Local Rule 41.1 allows the Court to
dismiss a pending case when no action has been take for three months. However, the rule is
permissive, not mandatory, stating that the Court "m y" dismiss a case based on inactivity on its
own motion or upon application of a party. Also, su
"reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard,"

dismissal must be preceded by
hich did not occur here. D. Del. LR 41.1.

In addition, Local Rule 1.1 (d) expressly recognizes t e Court's discretion to modify "application
of the Rules in any case or proceeding ... in the inte sts of justice."
c.

Pearson objects that the R &

erred in granting summary judgment for

the Government on the $656.60 NDSL/Perkins loan. Pearson asserts that the Government should
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not be permitted to obtain judgment for the $656.60

DSL!Perkins loan because this loan is not

included in the complaint. Pearson is incorrect, as

th~ complaint does seek to recover this

amount. (D.I. 1 at~ 4 & Ex. A)
d.

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Pearson objects that summary udgment cannot be granted on the basis of

his alleged factual admissions. He contends that the

overnment' s requests for admission

improperly sought conclusions of law. He further as erts that when a request for admission asks
for a legal conclusion, failure to respond to that requ st should be treated as a denial rather than
an admission.
A request for admission must pertain to matt s of fact. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36(a)(1).
Magistrate Judge Thynge's ruling that the Governme t's requests for admission were factual
(D.I. 16 at 8-9) was not clearly erroneous or contrary o law.
Pearson is further mistaken in his contention hat his failure to respond to the
Government's requests for admission should have be n treated as denials. When a party serves
requests for admission during the discovery period, t e receiving party has thirty days to respond.

See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36(a)(3). If no reply or object' on is made within thirty days, the requests
are deemed admitted. See id. When Pearson failed t respond or object to the Government's
requests for admission within thirty days, the matters therein were admitted. See id.; see also
D.l. 16 at 6-7. While the Court, upon motion, may a low a matter admitted under Rule 36 to be
withdrawn or amended, see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36(b), Pearson made no such motion.
It follows that there was no error in relying o Pearson's admissions as a basis for

granting the Government's motion for summary judg ent. See Anchorage Associates v. Virgin

Islands Bd. ofTax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 176 n.7 (3 Cir. 1990).
e.

Pearson objects that Magistrat Judge Thynge erred in denying Pearson's

request to respond to the Government's motion for s mmary judgment on the merits. Pearson

asserts that because Magistrate Judge Thynge all

owe~ the Government's motion after the

Scheduling Order deadline, Pearson should have bee allowed more time to respond on the
merits.
As discussed above, there was no error nor ab se of discretion in permitting the
Government to file its motion for summary judgment See

supra~

4.a. Pearson filed a timely

response to the motion, arguing that it was time-barr d, that the Court could not rely on his
admissions, and that, alternatively, he should be allo ed to respond to the Government's motion
on the merits. The first two of these contentions hav already been addressed. As for the third,
Magistrate Judge Thynge correctly determined that t e Government's motion was based solely
on Pearson's admissions and that a response based o the merits would not affect those
admissions. 1 Since it was not improper to hold Pears n to his admissions, it was also not
improper to refuse to give him additional time to atte pt to make a conflicting evidentiary
record.
f.

Pearson objects that the R &

erred in determining that Pearson failed to

make disclosures pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Pea son contends that Rule 26 does not require
disclosures when suit is brought by the Government

r the collection of student loans. Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(l)(B)(vii) exempts from in tial disclosure obligations "an action by the
United States to collect on a student loan guaranteed by t e United States," such as the instant action.
This does not, however, absolve a defendant in such a cas of his obligation to respond to discovery,

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See D.l. 16 at 8 ("Pearson has provided no e cuse for failing to respond to any discovery
propounded by the Government, nor has he ever requ sted relief from the court in that regard.
His solution, filing a brief on the merits, prejudices t e Government by denying it the
information sought in its outstanding discovery as w ll as any additional discovery, such as
depositions, that could reasonably flow from his orig nal responses. Further briefing is
unnecessary since the relevant facts have been admitt d.") (internal footnote omitted).

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including requests for admission governed by Rule 36.
g.

Pearson objects again that he sho ld have been given time to respond to the

Government's motion on the merits, because the Govern ent was allowed to file its motion after the
Scheduling Order deadline and because the Court itselft

k six months to rule on the Government's

motion. These contentions lack merit. The Court has air ady explained that there was no error in
denying Pearson's belated request to attempt to create an videntiary record contradicting his admissions.
And the amount of time the Magistrate Judge (or the und rsigned Judge) took to resolve issues presented
by the parties is utterly irrelevant.

h.

Pearson's objection that Magi rate Judge Thynge erred in concluding that

the Government would be prejudiced if he were gran ed extra time to file a response on the
merits is baseless. Pearson circumvented the discove

process. This prejudiced the

Government. Such prejudice would have been comp unded by permitting Pearson, belatedly and while still not having participated in discovery - o attempt to create an evidentiary record.
1.

Finally, Pearson objects that

agistrate Judge Thygne erred in

determining that Pearson caused delay and failed to a ide by the local and federal rules of civil
procedure. It follows from all that has been stated ab ve that the Magistrate Judge's conclusion
was correct.
5.

For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk o Court is directed to enter judgment FOR

the Government and AGAINST Pearson and to CL SE this case.

Dated: August 7, 2012

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