Lambda Optical Solutions LLC v. Alcatel Lucent SA et al

Filing 464

MEMORANDUM ORDER: The Report and Recommendation (D.I. 442 ) is ADOPTED IN PART. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity (D.I. 363 ) is DENIED IN PART AND RETURNED IN PART. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 9/30/2015. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

LAMBDA OPTICAL SOLUTIONS LLC,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 10-487-RGA

v.
ALCATEL LUCENT USA INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (D.I. 442) concerning
the motion for summary judgment of invalidity filed by Defendants. (D.I. 363). The
Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied. Objections were taken by
Defendants, to which Plaintiff has responded. (D.I. 446, 452).
I review the contested issues de nova.
The main issue decided by the Magistrate Judge is whether Plaintiff presented
sufficient evidence to raise an issue whether the asserted anticipatory prior art - the
MONET printed publications - are enabling. The Magistrate Judge held that Plaintiff
had presented sufficient evidence to raise the issue, and that was therefore a disputed
material issue of fact, with the consequence that anticipation could not be decided on
summary judgment.
Two preliminary points. One, the briefing before the Magistrate Judge barely
focused on the issue. (D.I. 365 [Alcatel's opening brief not addressing it at all]; D.I. 392
at pp. 7-8 [two paragraphs about the law] & at p. 14 [one paragraph about the facts of this
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case]; D.I. 414 at p.5 & n.5). Two, I suspect the thin briefing was because neither party
had focused on the issue. For example, it appears that with the possible exception of the
1996 MONET article, referred to by the parties as "Wagner," neither party's expert
offered an opinion on whether the MONET publications are enabling. (As to Plaintiff,

see D.I. 446, p. 6 n.3 (citing D.I. 395-4 at 11-13 [Plaintiffs expert's enablement opinion
only on Wagner]); as to Defendants, see D.I. 446 & 452, neither of which cites any expert
opinion from Defendants; see also D.I. 442 at 13 n.10).
As the Magistrate Judge held, and as I held in a prior case, see Robocast, Inc. v.

Apple, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 552, 565 (D. Del. 2014), I presume a prior art printed
publication is enabling. In Robocast, there were expert opinions that the prior art printed
publication at issue was not enabling. If Plaintiff raises a factual issue sufficient to create
a disputed issue about enablement, the accused infringer must prove the printed
publication is enabling by clear and convincing evidence. See id at 566.
Plaintiff cites In re Morsa, 713 F.3d 104 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct.
1317 (2014), in which the Federal Circuit described how the issue should be analyzed,
albeit in the context of patent prosecution rather than district court litigation. I do not
think the different venue makes any difference, however, to the analysis, with perhaps
one caveat, noted in footnote one infra The Court of Appeals held:
The presumption ... is a procedural one-designed to put the burden on
the applicant in the first instance to challenge cited prior art; the PTO need
not come forward with evidence of enablement before it may rely upon a
prior art reference as grounds for a rejection. Once an applicant makes a
non-frivolous argument that cited prior art is not enabling, however, the
examiner must address that challenge. While an applicant must generally
do more than state an unsupported belief that a reference is not enabling,
and may proffer affidavits or declarations in support of his position, we
see no reason to require such submissions in all cases. When a reference
appears to not be enabling on its face, a challenge may be ~odged without

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resort to expert assistance. Here, [applicant] identified specific, concrete
reasons why he believed the short press release at issue was not enabling,
and the Board and the examiner failed to address these arguments.
First, an examiner must determine if prior art is enabling by asking
whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could make or use the claimed
invention without undue experimentation based on the disclosure of that
particular document. While reference to the patent application is
appropriate for purposes of determining what the claimed invention is, i.e.,
what falls within the scope of the claims, the anticipation exercise must
assess the enabling nature of a prior art reference in light of the proposed
claims.

Id at 110-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
As Plaintiff notes, whether something is enabling depends upon whether one of
ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation. Elan

Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found For Med Educ. & Research, 346 F.3d 1051, 1054-55
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Factors relevant to this determination are the Wands factors. See In re

Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988):
Factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would
require undue experimentation ... include (1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance
presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature
of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those
in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the
breadth of the claims.
Thus, I think the dispositive issue for purpose of ruling on the objections is what
sort of showing Plaintiff raised about lack of enablement to create a disputed factual
issue. Without any relevant expert opinion on enablement, 1 what the record shows is

To me, a significant point in Morsa is that a POSITA (which, generally-speaking, patent
examiners are) was the person being asked to conduct the enablement analysis (of a twoparagraph press release, at that) without the benefit of any relevant expert opinions.
Here, the 2000 MONET article, besides for being lengthy, was published in the "Journal
of Lightwave Technology," which appears to be a scientific journal, and which currently
describes itself as "covering work in all aspects of optical guided-wave science,
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argument about possibly relevant facts. One possibly relevant fact is that the four
MONET articles were published in 1996, 1999, 1999, and December, 2000. (See D.I.
446, p. iii, citing to D.I. 370-1, 370-3, 370-4 & 370-5). The Wagner article, which is the
one that Plaintiffs expert opines is not enabling, is the 1996 article, and is seven pages
long. By contrast, the 2000 article, which is titled, The MONET Project -A Final

Report, is twenty-two pages long. The five accused products were "launched by" 2001,
2002, 2002, 2002, and 2004. (D.I. 222 at 20, if 64). 2
The Magistrate Judge concluded that since it was undisputed Defendants "had the
benefit of the 'information disclosed in the MONET articles' starting in November
1999," and yet did not launch a commercial product until 2002, that this was evidence of
"failures" by Defendants to be able to produce a "commercial optical networking
project," thereby suggesting that the disclosures in the MONET articles were nonenabling. (D.I. 442 at 13-14). The other piece of evidence cited by Plaintiff, and relied
upon by the Magistrate Judge, was the deposition testimony that, "As of October 301\
2000, [Lucent] did not have a reconfigurable optical networking product in answer to
[the] question [of whether Lucent then had a 'commercially available WDM optical net
product')." (D.I. 397-4 at 99).
In my view, we have an admission that Defendants did not have a particular
commercial product at the end of October 2000, a December 2000 document of what is

technology, and engineering." In my opinion, I cannot, and a jury could not, make sense
of the MONET articles on the enablement question without expert assistance.
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It appears that one of the accused products, the LambdaXtreme, was launched in March
2002. (D.I. 395-6 at 25). When the others were more precisely launched is not clear to
me. It is also not clear to me what happened to the accused 200 I product so as to make it
irrelevant to the enablement discussion. Both parties appear to accept that the 200 I
product is irrelevant to the enablement issue.
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claimed to be an anticipating disclosure, and the introduction of a commercial product in
March 2002. The subject matter is complex, and I do not think, under the circumstances
of this case, that attorney argument is an adequate substitute for an analysis by a qualified
expert. Expert testimony is, without a doubt, needed on the ultimate issue, should we get
there, but I think it is also needed to raise the issue.
Thus, on anticipation, I am not going to accept the Magistrate Judge's
recommended disposition. I will instead return the matter to the Magistrate Judge, for
such handling as he deems appropriate. One possibility would be to consider the
enablement challenge resolved, and proceed to the merits of the anticipation arguments.
Another possibility would be to allow the parties to amend their expert reports to address
the enablement issue. By suggesting these as possibilities, I do not mean to suggest a
preference for one or the other, particularly given the Magistrate Judge's greater
familiarity with the proceedings in this case.
The Magistrate Judge acknowledged, in connection with obviousness, "In light of
the complex technology at issue here, the Court is not prepared to jump to conclusions as
to what a [POSITA] would 'readily conclude' on attorney argument alone." (D.I. 442 at
18). I agree with the Magistrate Judge on this. Thus, on obviousness, I will accept the
Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition .
.Jtv
Therefore, this 30 day of September 2015, the Report and Recommendation

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(D.I. 442) is ADOPTED IN PART. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity
(D.I. 363) is DENIED IN PART AND RETURNED IN PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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