Rahim v. Delaware Board of Parole et al
Filing
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OPINION - Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 12/22/11. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
MUMIN RAHIM,
Plaintiff,
v.
DWIGHT HOLDEN, et aI.,
Defendants.
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) Civ. No.10-551-SLR
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Mumin Rahim, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware. Pro Se
Plaintiff.
Ryan Patrick Connell, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dated: December J}, 2011
Wilmington, Delaware
RW
,DIstrict Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mumin Rahim ("plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit alleging violations of
his constitutional right to due process. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and was granted leave
to proceed without prepayment of fees. (See D.I. 4) Presently before the court is
defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). (D.I. 23) The court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons discussed, the court will
grant the motion. Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint.
II. BACKGROUND
The court screened the case and dismissed all claims against the Delaware
Board of Parole and all claims against defendants in their official capacities seeking
monetary damages. (See D.I. 6) Count one of the complaint alleges that from
November 2, 1962 through November 18, 2008, Delaware Board of Parole ("Parole
Board") members, defendants William C. Pfeifer ("Pfeifer"), James C. Justice ("Justice"),
George W. Williamson, III ("Williamson"), and Joe F. Garcia ("Garcia") (collectively
"Parole Board members"), in concert with Delaware Department of Correction ("DOC")
Commissioner Carl Danberg ("Danberg"), VCC Warden Perry Phelps ("Phelps"), and
VCC treatment administrator Ronald Hosterman ("Hosterman") ("collectively DOC
defendants"), failed to follow proper procedures, sentencing laws, administrative
regulations, and policies and procedures in connection with parole denials, all in
violation of plaintiffs constitutional right to due process and ex post facto requirements.
Count two of the complaint alleges that plaintiffs family members and community
supporters are denied an opportunity to present and speak on his behalf at parole
hearings in violation of his right to due process. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Giv. P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept
all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to
a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Gir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Gt. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate,
the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowlerv. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Gir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id. The
court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a "plausible claim
for relief." Id. at 211; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Gt. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In
other words, the complaint must do more than allege plaintiffs entitlement to relief;
rather, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. A claim is facially plausible
when its factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely
consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal
conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported
by mere conclusory statements." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but
it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)).
Defendants move for dismissal on the grounds that: (1) the complaint fails to
allege personal involvement of DOC defendants necessary for § 1983; and (2) the
Parole Board members have quasi-judicial immunity.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Personal Involvement/Respondeat Superior
DOC defendants move for dismissal of the claims against them on the grounds
that the complaint fails to plead sufficient factual matter to show that they violated
plaintiff's constitutional rights. In addition, they argue that the claims are raised against
them on the basis of vicarious liability.
A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which
he or she neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187,
210 (3d Cir. 2007). "Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of
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personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim
cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and that, in order to establish
liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal involvement
by each defendant. Brito
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 392 F. App'x 11, 14 (3d Cir.
2010) (not published) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845
F.2d at 1207).
"Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948 (2009). In Iqbal, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "[i]n a § 1983 suit - here masters do not answer for the torts of
their servants - the term 'supervisory liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability,
each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Thus, when a plaintiff sues an official under §
1983 for conduct 'arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities,' the plaintiff
must plausibly plead and eventually prove not only that the official's subordinates
violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct and state of
mind did so as welL" Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10 th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2150 (2011) (quoting Iqbal 129 S.Ct. at 1949). The factors
necessary to establish a § 1983 violation will vary with the constitutional provision at
issue. Id.
Under pre-Iqbal Third Circuit precedent, "[t]here are two theories of supervisory
liability," one under which supervisors can be liable if they "established and maintained
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a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm," and
another under which they can be liable if they "participated in violating plaintiffs rights,
directed others to violate them, or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in [their] subordinates' violations." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d
121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A.M. ex reI. J.M.K.
V.
Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Oet.
Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004» (second alteration in original». "Particularly after
Iqbal, the connection between the supervisor's directions and the constitutional
deprivation must be sufficient to demonstrate a plausible nexus or affirmative link
between the directions and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue." Id.
at 130.
The Third Circuit has recognized the potential effect that Iqbal might have in
altering the standard for supervisory liability in a § 1983 suit but, to date, has declined to
decide whether Iqbal requires narrowing of the scope of the test. Santiago, 629 F.3d at
130 n.8; see, e.g., Argueta
V.
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643
F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) ("To date, we have refrained from answering the question of
whether Iqbal eliminated - or at least narrowed the scope of - supervisory liability
because it was ultimately unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal then
before us."); 8ayerv. Monroe County Children and Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5
(3d Cir. 2009) (In light of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of personal knowledge, with
nothing more, provides a sufficient basis to impose liability upon a supervisory official.)
Hence, it appears that, under a supervisory theory of liability and even in light of Iqbal,
personal involvement by a defendant remains the touchstone for establishing liability for
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the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional right.1 Williams v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison,
Civ. No. 07-1137, 2010 WL 1491132, at *5 (MD. Pa. Apr. 13,2010).
Facts showing personal involvement of the defendant must be asserted; such
assertions may be made through allegations of specific facts showing that a defendant
expressly directed the deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights or created such
policies where the subordinates had no discretion in applying the policies in a fashion
other than the one which actually produced the alleged deprivation; e.g., supervisory
liability may attach if the plaintiff asserts facts showing that the supervisor's actions
were "the moving force" behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff. See Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-54;
City of Canton
V.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Heggenmiller V. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst.
for Women, 128 F. App'x 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (not published).
Plaintiff provides no specific facts as to how or when DOC defendants violated
his constitutional rights, that they expressly directed the deprivation of his constitutional
rights, or that they created policies wherein subordinates had no discretion in applying
them in a fashion other than the one which actually produced the alleged deprivation.
The allegations in the complaint do not satisfy the Iqbal pleading requirements.
Plaintiff, however, provides additional facts in his opposition to the motion to dismiss
and asks the court for leave to amend.
1'''Supervision' entails, among other things, training, defining expected
performance by promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring adherence to performance
standards, and responding to unacceptable performance whether through individualized
discipline or further rulemaking." Sample V. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir. 1989).
"For the purpose of defining the standard for liability of a supervisor under § 1983, the
characterization of a particular aspect of supervision is unimportant." Id. at 1116-17.
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For the above reasons, the court will grant DOC defendants' motion for dismiss.
Plaintiff, however, will be given leave to amend his claims against DOC defendants.
B. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The Parole Board members move for dismissal of the claims against them on the
grounds that they have absolute immunity on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. The
complaint contains two claims against the Parole Board members: they failed to follow
proper procedure in connection with parole denials and they did not allow plaintiffs
supporters an opportunity to speak on his behalf at parole hearings.
Initially, the court notes that an inmate has no constitutional right to parole. See
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) ("A
state may ... establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so."); see also Eskridge
v. Casson, 471 F.Supp. 98, 101 (D. Del. 1979) ("[N]o prisoner can legitimately claim that
the Delaware Parole Statute confers ... a legally enforceable right to be paroled.").
"[O]nce a state institutes a parole system, all prisoners have a liberty interest flowing
directly from the due process clause in not being denied parole for arbitrary or
constitutionally impermissible reasons." See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir.
1980). Hence, plaintiff has a substantive due process right in being treated fairly during
the parole process. See Jubilee v. Hom, 975 F.Supp. 761, 764-65 (E.D. Pa. 1997),
aff'd, 151 F.3d 1025 (3d Cir. 1998); accord Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1069
(9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that "early release statutes can create 'a liberty interest
protected by due process guarantees." ') (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).
The key consideration in determining whether Parole Board defendants are
immune from suit is whether their actions occurred when they were "engaged in
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adjudicatory duties." Harperv. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir.1986). To the extent
plaintiff raises claims against the Parole Board members for their adjudicatory actions,
they are entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity. See Harper, 808 F.2d at 285;
Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1977).
It is evident from the complaint's allegations that the acts complained of are
adjudicatory functions. For example, plaintiff alleges that he was denied parole and that
certain individuals were not allowed to speak at his hearings, all adjudicatory functions.
Finally, to the extent that the complaint can be read to include claims against the Parole
Board members in their individual capacities, because they are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity, they are not subject to suit for injunctive relief. See Capogrosso v. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2009).
For the above reasons, the court will grant the motion to dismiss the claims
against the Parole Board defendants.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court will grant defendants' motion to
dismiss. (D.1. 23) Plaintiff will be given leave to file an amended complaint as to the
claims raised against the DOC defendants.
An appropriate order will be entered.
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