Rahim v. Delaware Board of Parole et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 6/22/12. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
MU'MIN RAHIM,
Plaintiff,
v.
DWIGHT HOLDEN, et aI.,
Defendants.
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) Civ. No. 10-551-SLR
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Mu'min Rahim, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware. Pro Se
Plaintiff.
Ryan Patrick Connell, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dated: JuneJd-, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware
RJNsct,
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mu'min Rahim ("plaintiff'), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit alleging deprivation of
his right to due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and was granted leave to proceed without
prepayment of fees. (See 0.1. 4) Presently before the court is defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs amended complaint. (0.1. 37) The court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons discussed, the court will deny the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
The court screened the case and dismissed all claims against the Delaware
Board of Parole ("Board of Parole") and all claims against defendants in their official
capacities seeking monetary damages. (See 0.1. 6) Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss, it was granted on December 22, 2011, and plaintiff was given leave to file an
amended complaint only as to the claims raised against the Department of Correction
defendants ("State defendants").' (0.1. 34, 35)
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 23.2012. (0.1. 36) The
amended complaint includes the allegations contained in the original complaint as well
as additional allegations against State defendants Carl Danberg ("Danberg"), Perry
Phelps ("Phelps"), and Ronald Hosterman (HHosterman").2 Plaintiff alleges that he was
'When the clerk's office docketed the memorandum opinion and order, it failed to
terminate defendants Dwight Holden, William C. Pfeifer, James C. Justice, George H.
Williamson, III, and Joe F. Garcia.
2The court has dismissed all claims against the Board of Parole and its members
as immune from suit. Therefore, it does not consider any renewed claims raised
denied parole for arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible reasons on September 17,
1991, June 24, 2003, February 22, 2005, August 8, 2006, and September 18, 2008.
The amended complaint alleges that State defendants violated plaintiffs right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and raises two counts. Count one alleges
that State defendants, in concert with Board of Parole members, unlawfully applied new
and harsher sentencing laws and other arbitrary Department of Correction ("DOC")
administrative regulations, policies, and procedures, all to plaintiffs detriment. Count
two alleges that State defendants denied plaintiffs family members and community
supporters an opportunity to attend parole board hearings and speak on his behalf. The
amended complaint states that there is no grievance procedure available to plaintiff, that
parole decisions are non-grievable, and that plaintiff has appealed to the Board of
Parole. (D.1. 36)
On February 6,2012, State defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R .Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative
remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e,
prior to filing this action. (D.I. 37, 38)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007);
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). A court may consider the pleadings,
against them.
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public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint, and documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308,322 (2007); Oshiverv. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380,1384-85
n.2 (3d Cir. 1994). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant[s] fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8{a» (internal
quotations omitted). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations; however,
"a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Id. at 545 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true." Id. Furthermore, U[w]hen
there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). Such a determination is a context-specific task requiring the
court "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
IV. DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (UPLRA") provides that "[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement
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applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances
or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.").
Defendants have the burden of pleading and proving failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as an affirmative defense in a § 1983 action. Ray v. Keries, 285 F.3d 287,
295-96 (3d Cir. 2002). Defendants may also raise this defense via a motion to dismiss
in appropriate cases. Id. at 295 n.8.
Under § 1997e(a), "an inmate must exhaust [administrative remedies]
irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative avenues."
Booth
V.
Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001). Exhaustion means proper exhaustion,
that is, "a prisoner must complete the administrative review process in accordance with
the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in
federal court." Woodford
V.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006).
'''[P]rison grievance procedures supply the yardstick' for determining what steps
are required for exhaustion." Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004». A prisoner must complete
the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules in
order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA. Nickens
V.
Depariment of
Corr., 277 F. App'x 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2008) (not published) (citing Williams, 482 F.3d at
639; Spruill, 372 F.3d at 228,231). Perfect overlap between the grievance and a
amended complaint is not required by the PLRA as long as there is a shared factual
basis between the two. Jackson
V.
Ivans, 244 F. App'x 508,513 (3d Cir. 2007) (not
published) (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95 ("The benefits of exhaustion can be realized
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only if the prison grievance system is given a fair opportunity to consider the
grievance.").
A futility exception to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement is
completely precluded. Banks v. Roberts, 251 F. App'x 774,776 (3d Cir. 2007) (not
published) (citing Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000). The exhaustion
requirement is absolute, absent circumstances where no administrative remedy is
available. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-28; Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 67. A grievance
procedure is not available, even if one exists on paper, if the defendant prison officials
somehow prevent a prisoner from using it. Mitchell v. Hom, 318 F.3d 523 (3d Cir.
2003). If prison authorities thwart the inmate's efforts to pursue the grievance,
administrative remedies may be presumed exhausted, as no further remedies are
"available" to him. Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002).
State defendants contend that plaintiff did not follow the state prisoner grievance
procedure required to resolve the issues he raises against them. They argue that
plaintiff sues them for their own actions or involvement in allegedly violating plaintiffs
constitutional rights during the parole process and, hence, plaintiff is subject to the
PLRA exhaustion requirements as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Attached to plaintiffs opposition is a grievance form that provides instructions for
submitting a "regular" grievance. The form has a section for "return of unprocessed
grievance" and lists a parole decision as a non-grievable issue. Plaintiff also provides a
form memorandum used by the DOC when returning grievances. The memo provides
guidance for the return of grievances for Board of Parole decisions and indicates that
the inmate must write a letter to the Board of Parole within thirty days of the Board of
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Parole's decision, expressing the desire to appeal the decision and listing the reasons.
In addition, an inmate cannot request or demand disciplinary action on staff. Plaintiff
provided letters he sent to the Board of Parole dated September 30, 1991, December 3,
2004, June 13, 2005, and May 28, 2008, as well as letters from the Board of Parole, the
most recent dated November 19, 2008, denying plaintiffs request for parole. (0.1. 39)
Plaintiff states that he has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to
all claims, that he filed a grievance and took every appeal available to him at the
departmental level, and points to his appeals to the Board of Parole. It appears that
plaintiff believes his appeals to the Board of Parole served to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to due process claims raised against State defendants. In addition, plaintiff
points to his exhibits that, as set forth in prison grievance forms, parole decisions and
grievances requesting or demanding disciplinary on staff are non-grievable. Therefore,
he argues that he is not required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
unavailable to him. Finally, plaintiff contends that he followed the rules of the prison
procedure for proper exhaustion to the high-level DOC defendants by appealing and
calling to their attention the problem.
Inmates are required to exhaust administrative remedies when alleging violations
of constitutional rights with regard to the parole process. See Jones v. Maher, 131 F.
App'x 813, 815 (3d Cir. 2005) (not published) (inmate failed to exhaust administrative
remedies on issue that he was subjected to discriminatory parole consideration and
retaliatory conduct); see also Hawkerv. Consovoy, 198 F.R.D. 619 (D.N.J. 2001);
Salaam v. Consovoy, 2000 WL 33679670 (D.N.J. Apr. 14,2000). Plaintiff raises due
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process claims against State defendants and, therefore, he must exhaust his
administrative remedies as required under the PLRA.
The instructions for submitting a "regular" grievance specifically state that parole
decisions are "non-grievable." Nonetheless, defendants expect plaintiff, who appears
pro se, to submit a grievance based upon the legal distinction between procedural
complaints against State defendants in the parole process and sUbstantive complaints
against the Board of Parole in making its parole decision. Notably, plaintiff followed
other DOC instructions and sent letters to the Board of Parole regarding its decision.
State defendants have not met their burden to show that plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies. The grievance instructions for submitting a "regular
grievance" are confusing at best, and indicate that parole issues are non-grievable. The
court finds that the exhibits upon which plaintiff relies support his position that the DOC
grievance procedure was unavailable to him with regard to the issues he raises.
Accordingly, the court will deny State defendants' motion to dismiss.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court will deny State defendants' motion to
dismiss. (D.I. 37)
An appropriate order will be entered.
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