King v. Doe et al
Filing
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OPINION: For the reasons set forth, the Court converts, inpart, Defendants Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. However, the Court provides Plaintiff with an opportunity to submit opposition to Defendants evidence attached to motion. An appropriate Order will be issued. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/6/2011. (dlk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
WAYNE A. KING,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-573 (JBS/AMD)
v.
SGT. JOHN DOE, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Wayne A. King
SBI# 274612
Sussex Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 500
Georgetown, DE 19947
Plaintiff Pro Se
Ryan P. Connell, Esq.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPT. OF JUSTICE
Carvel State Building, 6th Floor
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Attorney for the Defendants N. Hollingsworth and John Spray
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
[Docket Item 19.]
Plaintiff, Wayne A. King proceeding pro se, is an inmate in the
custody of the Delaware Department of Corrections.
Plaintiff
filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants N. Hollingsworth and John Spray1, both sergeants at
the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JVTCC).
2.]
[Docket Item
Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, arguing that (1) Plaintiff failed to
exhaust all available administrative remedies before initiating
his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) Defendants are
shielded from suit by qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity
doctrines.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will convert
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56 with respect to the exhaustion issue only, and
Plaintiff will have twenty-one (21) days to adduce admissible
evidence in opposition to the motion, which demonstrates his
exhaustion of administrative remedies in accordance with §
1997(e).
At this stage, the Court will not address the immunity
arguments raised by Defendants in support of dismissal.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff brings this civil action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, against Sgt. John Spray and Sgt. N. Hollingsworth,
Correctional Sergeants with the Delaware Department of
Corrections.
As Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.
1
This Defendant was initially identified as Sgt. John Doe;
however, Plaintiff subsequently amended his Complaint to reflect
this individual’s identity as Sgt. John Spray.
2
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must, at this stage, take all facts
alleged by the Plaintiff as true.
Plaintiff alleges the
following facts:
On July 8, 2008 Plaintiff was being held at the JVTCC for a
probation violation.
(Compl. 3.)
Upon his arrival at the
facility, King informed the sergeant on duty in the “receiving”
department, Defendant Sgt. Spray, that he had an “ongoing
problem” with another inmate.
(Id.; Amend. Compl. 1.)
King
asked to speak to a lieutenant about safety concerns and the
possibility of being moved to a “safe environment away from” the
inmate with whom King had a conflict.
(Compl. 3.)
Sgt. Spray
denied this request, telling King that he “would be fine because
that inmate was on the compound.”2
(Id. at 3.)
King persisted,
explaining to Sgt. Spray that the threatening inmate’s
affiliations with the Bloods street gang meant that this inmate
had “allies” among the pre-trial population.
(Id.)
Plaintiff
alleges that these fears were “brushed off” and that he was
placed among the pre-trial population despite his safety
concerns.
(Id. at 3, attach.)
Two days later, on July 10, 2008, while in the yard of the
facility, King was attacked by two fellow inmates.
attach.)
(Id. at
There were no guards present in the yard at the time
2
Plaintiff does not explain his meaning in using the term “the
compound,” but the Court interprets him to mean that the inmate was
being held in a different portion of the facility.
3
of the assault, so third-party inmates “banged on the door,”
alerting officers to the attack and to King’s subsequent
injuries.
(Id.)
King was taken to the JVTCC infirmary and
provided medical attention. (Id.)
King notes that he was later
moved to a “safe environment” where he posted bail. (Id.)
At the time of the attack, King alleges Defendant Sgt.
Hollingsworth was supervising the unit.
(Id.)
No officer was
present in the yard, although King claims that a guard should
have been present in that location at the time of his attack.
(Id.)
The nature of King’s claim is not entirely clear from his
Complaint.
However, the Court construes his claim as a failure-
to-protect claim arising under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.3
The allegations suggest that Defendants’
failure to heed the danger to King’s safety and adequately
protect him from attack while in custody violated King’s liberty
interest in his personal security and well-being.
King seeks an
unspecified sum in compensatory damages and plaintiff’s costs.
He also seeks injunctive relief ordering Defendants to “take more
3
Although the Complaint does not clearly delineate the nature of
the claim, Plaintiff characterizes the allegation in his brief in
opposition to this motion as a deliberate indifference claim
arising under the Eighth Amendment. Because the pleadings suggest
that Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee rather than a sentenced
prisoner at the time of the events described in the Complaint,
however, the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment
will apply. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir.
2005).
4
steps to ensure an inmate’s safety and well-being while
incarcerated."
(Id. at 3.)
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In assessing the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful that “however inartfully pleaded,” a pro se
complaint is “to be liberally construed” and “must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)
(internal quotations omitted).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must “accept
as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Court
is not required, however, to accept “bald assertions” or “legal
conclusions” pleaded in a pro se complaint.
Id.
In addition, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a
complaint need only provide “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
The
Supreme Court, in its decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, has identified two working principles
underlying the failure to state a claim standard: first, the
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tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009).
Indeed, threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.
Second, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief
in order to survive a motion to dismiss; where the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has
not “show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
To
prevent a dismissal, therefore, civil complaints must allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is facially
plausible.
This “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
Id. at 1948.
After Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit now requires that
a district court presented with a motion to dismiss conduct a
two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal: first, the factual and
legal elements of a claim should be separated.
The district
court must accept all the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions.
1949-50.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
Second, a district court must then determine whether
the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”
Id.
This
“plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task
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that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.”
Id.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Claim
Defendants argue that dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is
appropriate because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required before initiating a lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), part of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner may not bring a suit
under § 1983 with respect to prison conditions “until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Indeed,
“there is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA
and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007).
Jones
Exhaustion is mandatory even
where the inmate believes administrative remedies would be
ineffective or where the available administrative process does
not allow for the desired remedy.
731, 739-41 (2001).
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
The Third Circuit has recognized that the
procedures outlined in a prison’s administrative grievance policy
determine whether an inmate has exhausted his administrative
remedies because there “is no express federal law describing the
procedural requirements with which prisoners must comply in
satisfying § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement.” Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F. 3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004).
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While Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff must have
exhausted administrative remedies before seeking relief has
merit, it is generally unavailing in the context of a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.
Failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense under the PLRA and, consequently, “inmates are not
required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their
complaints.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. at 216; see, e.g., Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that inmate was
not required to allege that he had exhausted all administrative
remedies in his complaint to survive dismissal).
However, while pleading exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required, the Third Circuit has declined to
“suggest that defendants may not raise failure to exhaust as the
basis for a motion to dismiss in appropriate cases.”
Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d at 295 n.8; see Flight Sys., Inc. v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1997) (“On a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, an affirmative defense. . . is appropriately considered
only if it presents an insuperable barrier to recovery by the
plaintiff.”).
In the present case, taking the facts alleged in the
Complaint as true, there does not appear to be an insuperable
barrier to recovery evident on the face of the pleadings.
Plaintiff has not, in this case, stated in the Complaint that he
failed to exhaust administrative remedies available to him.
See,
e.g., Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 09-1177, 2010 WL 2600728 at 213 (3d
8
Cir. June 30, 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of
Plaintiff’s claims where Plaintiff “conceded, on the face of her
Complaint, that she had not completed the grievance process at
the prison”).
On the contrary, even given that he was not
required to plead exhaustion, the Complaint nonetheless appears
to allege that Plaintiff did, in fact, fully exhaust all
available administrative remedies.
On the second page of the
form complaint, under a section entitled “Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies,” Plaintiff checked “Yes” in response to
the question: “Have you fully exhausted your available
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administrative remedies regarding each of your present claims?”4
(Compl. 2.)
Defendants challenge the veracity of Plaintiff’s claim to
have fully exhausted all available administrative remedies,
attaching to the motion to dismiss two documents relating to
matters outside the pleadings.5
When considering a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court
generally relies only upon “the complaint, attached exhibits, and
4
Notably, the Complaint is not entirely clear regarding the extent
to which Plaintiff claims to have exhausted available
administrative remedies. While Plaintiff checked “Yes” in response
to the question as to whether he had exhausted administrative
remedies, when asked to detail steps taken to exhaust grievance
procedures, Plaintiff wrote on the form only: “Filed a grievance.”
(Compl. 2.) When asked to explain the result of steps taken,
Plaintiff wrote: “Was told by Lt. Savage and Lt. Peck that incident
would be handled by internal affairs.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not
detail additional steps taken to appeal unsatisfactory grievance
decisions, in accordance with grievance procedures. See Spruill v.
Gillis, 372 F. 3d at 231 (looking to state prison grievance
procedures to serve as the guide for whether an inmate has
exhausted his administrative remedies). However, given that it is
not evident from the face of the pleadings that the failure to
exhaust affirmative defense presents an insuperable barrier to
Plaintiff’s recovery, the affirmative defense raised here is not
properly considered on a motion to dismiss. The Court notes,
however, that if the steps taken to exhaust administrative remedies
detailed by Plaintiff in the Complaint are meant to be
comprehensive and the Plaintiff has not, in fact, fully exhausted
all administrative remedies in accordance with the prison’s inmate
grievance procedures, a failure to exhaust affirmative defense may
well turn out to be fatal to Plaintiff’s claim.
5
Defendants support their motion to dismiss by attaching the
following matters outside the pleadings: (1) the affidavit of a
Delaware Department of Corrections legal services administrator
indicating that King failed to file a grievance related to the
allegations in his Complaint (Def.’s Br., Ex. B), and (2) the State
of Delaware Bureau of Prisons Procedure Manual, Chapter 4 (Def.’s
Br., Ex. A).
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matters of public record.” Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268
(3d Cir. 2007).
The Court may also consider documents which are
not physically attached to the pleadings but whose contents are
alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity is not contested.
Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560
(3d Cir. 2002).
In addition, documents the defendant attaches to
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which are referred to in the plaintiff’s
complaint and are central to the claim, are considered part of
the pleadings and therefore properly considered on a motion to
dismiss.
Id.
Defendants’ submissions in the present case were
neither attached nor referred to in Plaintiff’s Complaint and,
thus, must be excluded on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Where such matters are relied upon, the Court must convert a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Rule 12(d) stipulates: “If on
a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). . . matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”
In addition, Rule 12(d) provides: “All parties must be given
a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.”
Indeed, a district court’s conversion
of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary
judgment is reversible error “unless the court provides notice of
its intention to convert the motion and allows an opportunity to
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submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or
allows a hearing.”
1989).
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir.
A lack of discovery may direct the Court against
conversion.
Aruanno v. Booker, Civ. No. 08-305, 2008 WL 5070540
at *3 (D.N.J. November 24, 2008) (“Given that the plaintiff is
proceeding pro se and that no discovery has yet taken place, the
Court looks only to the face of the complaint and evaluates the
present motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”).
In the present case, Plaintiff’s opposition brief does not
address the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Although Plaintiff’s opposition alludes to the fact that he is
currently in maximum security confinement, and that he hopes to
prove the substance of his allegations that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his safety, it does not appear
Plaintiff needs discovery from Defendants to prove whether or not
he fully exhausted all available administrative remedies.
Plaintiff either followed the three-step Inmate Grievance
Procedure outlined in the State of Delaware Bureau of Prisons
Procedure Manual, Chapter 4, (Def.’s Br., Ex. A), or he failed to
do so.
Indeed, Plaintiff is in a position to demonstrate his
compliance with this threshold requirement without the need for
discovery, since he has personal knowledge of whatever grievance
procedure and appeal process he has followed.
Therefore, the Court will convert this Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 with respect to
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the exhaustion issue only.
Plaintiff will be given a period of
twenty-one (21) days to submit his opposition to Defendants’
evidence that he failed to initially submit an inmate grievance
pertaining to this incident and, furthermore, to exhaust the two
levels of appeal stipulated under the Inmate Grievance Procedure
before filing this case about conditions of his confinement, all
as required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).
Such opposition, under
Rule 56(c)(1), must include admissible evidence, such as
Plaintiff’s affidavit and true copies of documents demonstrating
that he exhausted his administrative remedies in accordance with
grievance procedures and received a final denial.
Until this
threshold issue is resolved, the Court will not address
Defendants’ remaining grounds for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court converts, in
part, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56.
However, the Court provides Plaintiff
with an opportunity to submit opposition to Defendants’ evidence
attached to this motion.
July 6, 2011
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
Jerome B. Simandle
U.S. District Judge
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