King v. Doe et al
Filing
35
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 9/16/2011. (lid)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
WAYNE A. KING,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 10-573 (JBS/AMD)
v.
SGT. JOHN DOE, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Wayne A. King
SBI# 274612
Sussex Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 500
Georgetown, Delaware 19947
Plaintiff Pro Se
Ryan P. Connell
Deputy Attorney General
STATE OF DELAWARE DEPT. OF JUSTICE
Carvel State Building, 6th Floor
820 N. French Street
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
Attorney for the Defendants N. Hollingsworth and John Spray
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter came before the Court originally on the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
[Docket Item 19], arguing that Defendant had failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies.
On July 6, 2011, the Court
converted Defendants’ motion into a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 in an Opinion and Order, and gave
Plaintiff the opportunity to oppose summary judgment by
submitting admissible evidence that he had exhausted all
available administrative remedies prior to filing his Complaint
in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
Because the Court finds
that Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence raising a dispute of
fact that he fully exhausted his constitutional claim before
filing his Complaint in this action, the Court will grant
Defendants’ converted motion for summary judgment for failure to
exhaust.
II.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Wayne A. King was an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center (“JTVCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware, when he filed
this Complaint regarding an assault by fellow inmates.
The facts
alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint [Docket Item 2] and subsequent
Amended Complaint [Docket Item 11] were previously detailed in
this Court’s July 6, 2011 Opinion.
[Docket Item 30.]
King v.
Doe, Civ. No. 10-573, 2010 WL 2669221 at *1-2 (D.N.J., July 6,
2011).
In brief, Plaintiff alleges that on July 10, 2008, he was
assaulted by two other inmates while in custody as a pre-trial
detainee at the JTVCC.
He claims that this assault was the
result of the deliberate indifference of the Defendant prison
guards, who failed to protect him from his assailants, in
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.
His pro se
Complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
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On February 7, 2011, Defendants John Spray and N.
Hollingsworth, Correctional Officers at the JTVCC, filed their
motion to dismiss, which the Court converted into a motion for
summary judgment because the Defendants assert the affirmative
defense of failure to exhaust and rely on facts beyond those
alleged in the Complaint.
Specifically, Defendants attached the
Procedure Manual chapter covering the Inmate Grievance Procedure
(Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss Ex. A) and an Affidavit of Michael Little,
the Legal Services Administrator at the JTVCC, which states that
in 2008, Plaintiff filed only two grievances with the Delaware
Department of Corrections (“DOC”), and neither grievance
addressed Plaintiff’s alleged assault by other inmates.
Id. Ex.
B.
The Court’s July 6 Order converting Defendants’ motion gave
Plaintiff an opportunity to respond in opposition to the entry of
summary judgment by submitting admissible evidence that he had
fully exhausted his claim prior to filing his Complaint.
On July
20, 2011, Plaintiff submitted his evidence in opposition to
Defendants’ motion.
[Docket Item 32.]
In that submission,
Plaintiff included a signed and notarized affidavit describing
his efforts at exhaustion and attached three exhibits:
(1) a
Form #584 Grievance dated July 11, 2008 signed by Plaintiff (Ex.
A), (2) a signed letter from Plaintiff addressed to “Internal
Affairs” dated July 12, 2008 (Ex. B), and (3) a Delaware Superior
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Court Docket Sheet providing record of the date Plaintiff posted
bail and was presumably released (Ex. C).
Plaintiff’s affidavit states that after his assault on July
10, 2008, he was moved to the special housing unit (“SHU”) at the
JTVCC.
King Aff. ¶ 1.
The next day, “Plaintiff wrote a
grievance about the situation and kept a copy of the grievance.”
Id. ¶ 3; Pl.’s Ex. A.
He was also told on that day by a
Corrections Officer (“Lt. Peck”) that “the incident was going to
be handled by Internal Affairs.”
Id.
Plaintiff wrote a letter
the following day addressed to Internal Affairs asking about the
outcome of their investigation.
Id. ¶ 4; Pl.’s Ex. B.
He
learned, on July 14, 2008, from an Internal Affairs officer who
came to interview Plaintiff at his cell in the SHU, that
Plaintiff would not be charged with any disciplinary action as a
result of the fight, but that Internal Affairs would not
otherwise “disclose any information . . . because it’s sealed
information.”
Id. ¶ 5.
Plaintiff posted bail later that day and
was temporarily released from the Department of Corrections.
Id.
Plaintiff states that “the reason that the grievance was not on
file is because he was released from the Department of
Correction.”
Id. ¶ 6.
He concludes by summarizing that he “did
take the necessary steps to try to resolve this issue.”
Id. ¶ 7.
Plaintiff’s attached exhibits include a docket sheet
reporting that Plaintiff posted bail on July 14, 2008.
C.
Pls.’ Ex.
The Form #584 Grievance, dated July 11, 2008, reports that he
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was assaulted, that he had previously informed a corrections
officer that he “had problems with an inmate that was housed
there”, and that he had asked to speak to a lieutenant about it
but was denied.
In the portion of the form marked “action
requested by grievant”, Plaintiff wrote “To know what was the
outcome of I/A’s investigation.”
Pls.’ Ex. A.
In Plaintiff’s
July 12, 2008 letter to Internal Affairs, he asked about the
outcome of the investigation into the assault, including the
identity of the individuals who had assaulted him.
Pls.’ Ex. B.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
P. 56(a).
Fed. R. Civ.
A dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the
suit under the applicable rule of law.
Id.
Disputes over
irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of
summary judgment.
Id.
Summary judgment will not be denied based on mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings; instead, some evidence
must be produced to support a material fact.
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Fed. R. Civ. P.
A
56(c)(1)(A); United States v. Premises Known as 717 S. Woodward
Street, Allentown, Pa., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993).
The
nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
[Rule 56] mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In
such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as
to any material fact,” since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
However, the Court will view any evidence in favor of the
nonmoving party and extend any reasonable favorable inferences to
be drawn from that evidence to that party.
526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999).
Hunt v. Cromartie,
See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 378 (2007) (The district court must “view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the summary judgment motion.”).
B.
Exhaustion
Defendants seek summary judgment against Plaintiff’s §
1983 claim for failure to exhaust his available administrative
remedies at JTVCC.
Plaintiff opposes summary judgment, claiming
that he did exhaust his claim by writing a grievance.
For the
following reasons, the Court concludes that there is no material
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dispute in the record that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust his §
1983 claim because he did not appeal his grievance related to the
incident in question.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, governs particular aspects of litigation by prisoners
during the period of their incarceration.
Specifically, §
1997e(a) establishes the requirement of administrative
exhaustion:
[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional
facility
until
such
administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
Id.
Plaintiff’s claim falls within the ambit of the PLRA because
he seeks to challenge the conduct of prison officials and the
conditions of his confinement.
See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d
289, 294 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that suits by prisoners
challenging “conditions of confinement or the effects of actions
by government officials on the lives of persons confined in
prison” fall within the restrictions of the PLRA).
Thus, before
filing suit, Plaintiff was required to exhaust any available
administrative remedies.
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d
Cir. 2003).
“‘[P]rison grievance procedures supply the yardstick’ for
determining what steps are required for exhaustion.”
Williams v.
Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Spruill v.
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Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Thus, to determine
whether Plaintiff has raised a dispute over whether he exhausted
available remedies, the Court will consider the applicable
procedures at the JTVCC for exhausting a grievance.
Defendants attached to their motion the procedures required
to fully exhaust a grievance.
Defs.’ Ex. A.
Those procedures
detail a three-level exhaustion procedure wherein an inmate
initially files a grievance on a Form #584 to the DOC employee
responsible for inmate grievances (the “Inmate Grievance Chair”
or “IGC”).
Inmate Grievance Procedure at 5.
The IGC then
attempts to resolve the issue directly. If no resolution is
offered, the inmate’s grievance is “referred to Level II”, which
amounts to an investigation and hearing before a committee of
staff and inmates, who make a recommendation to the Warden on an
outcome.
Id.
The Warden then responds to the recommendation; if
the Warden, the committee and the inmate all agree, the grievance
is resolved.
Otherwise, the inmate must appeal the Warden’s
decision to the Bureau Grievance Officer, who then makes a
recommendation to the Bureau Chief of Prisons, who then makes a
final decision.
Id.
The procedure states that “[g]rievant
appeals must be signed, dated and state the specific reasons on
Form #584 Grievance Appeal.”
Id. at 7.
“Grievants shall have 3
calendar days upon receipt of their copy of the Warden/Warden’s
Designee decision to appeal . . .”
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Id.
The grievance procedures
do not explicitly require that the inmate/grievant identify
specific defendants in the grievance form.
Plaintiff argues that he complied with the exhaustion
requirement of § 1997e(a) because he filed a grievance regarding
his assault one day after it occurred, and he posted bail and was
released three days thereafter, apparently before he was able to
follow up on his grievance.
Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s affidavit does not state
that he “filed” his grievance, merely that he “wrote” a
grievance, and that therefore the record contains no dispute of
fact that any grievance regarding Plaintiff’s assault was ever
filed with the DOC.
The Court finds this argument unpersuasive.
While Plaintiff’s affidavit does not specifically say that he
“filed” his grievance, he does say that, after he wrote it, he
“kept a copy” thereby raising the reasonable inference that the
original was filed.
King Aff. ¶ 3.
Thus, the Court concludes
that there is a dispute of fact regarding whether Plaintiff
submitted his grievance on July 11, 2008.
Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff’s grievance,
even if filed on July 11, 2008 as Plaintiff claims, did not
exhaust his § 1983 deliberate indifference claim because the
grievance does not allege any misconduct on the part of the
Defendants or name Defendants Spray or Hollingsworth.
Plaintiff
responds that his grievance did not identify the Defendants in
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his grievance because he did not know their identities at the
time he completed his grievance.
The Supreme Court has held that the PLRA itself does not
establish the level of specificity that an inmate plaintiff must
include to fully exhaust his or her claim.
“The level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures
will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the
prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the
boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
218 (2007).
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
Thus, the Supreme Court held, a federal court cannot
require that an inmate name the individual defendants in his or
her grievance to fully comply with the PLRA unless the grievance
procedures at the relevant institution require that level of
specificity.
Id. (“As MDOC’s procedures make no mention of
naming particular officials, the Sixth Circuit’s rule imposing
such a prerequisite to proper exhaustion is unwarranted.”)
The Third Circuit has, for example, interpreted the
grievance procedures of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
require that a grievance identify specific defendants on pain of
procedural default.
Cir. 2004).
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d
The Circuit found that the language of the
Commonwealth’s Grievance System Policy specifically required the
identification of the defendants later named in a civil suit, but
also found that the language of the policy did not require that
an inmate explicitly request money damages in the grievance in
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order to pursue such relief after full exhaustion.
Id. at 233-
34.
Turning to the Delaware Inmate Grievance Procedure supplied
by Defendants, the Court can find no express requirement that the
inmate identify specific individuals, as the Pennsylvania policy
under consideration in Spruill did.
Similarly, the Delaware
Policy likewise is silent on whether the Plaintiff must specify
damages as a form of relief to properly exhaust such a claim.
While the Form #584 does have a field that asks “Action Requested
by Grievant”, this would not seem to fulfill the mandatory
requirement language deemed necessary in Jones and Spruill.
Thus, the Court concludes that Defendants have not demonstrated
that the Delaware Inmate Grievance Procedure requires a grievant
specifically to identify defendants or demand specific relief in
a grievance form to fully exhaust a § 1983 claim.
Additionally, to the extent that Defendants’ argument is
that Plaintiff’s grievance is not sufficiently related to his §
1983 failure-to-protect claim, the Court is similarly
unpersuaded.
“As long as there is a shared factual basis between
the two, perfect overlap between the grievance and a complaint is
not required by the PLRA.”
Jackson v. Ivens, 244 F. App’x 508,
513 (3d Cir. 2007) (reversing entry of summary judgment by
District Court of Delaware for failure to exhaust on the grounds
that grievance complaining of medical treatment did not
sufficiently raise “delay of treatment” claim).
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In the instant
case, Plaintiff’s grievance states that (1) he was assaulted by
other inmates while in the JTVCC on July 10, 2008, (2) he had
warned a corrections officer about the risk that he might be in
danger of attack, (3) he had asked to speak to a superior officer
about this risk and was denied.
King Form #584, Ex. A.
Thus,
while Plaintiff does not spell out the precise words “failure to
protect”, his grievance has a “shared factual basis” with his
Complaint.
However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has pointed to no
evidence in the record that his grievance was fully exhausted
through all required levels of appeal.
The Inmate Grievance
Procedure clearly states that a grievance is not final or fully
resolved until either the grievant is satisfied with the result
or the grievance has been denied by the Bureau Grievance Officer
and the Bureau Chief of Prisons.
The inmate’s appeal “must be
signed, dated and state the specific reasons on Form #584
Grievance Appeal” which “must be given to the IGC” within “3
calendar days upon receipt of their copy of the Warden/Warden’s
Designee decision”.
A.
Inmate Grievance Procedure at 7, Defs.’ Ex.
See also Davis v. Williams, 354 F. App’x 603, 607 n.6 (3d
Cir. 2009) (holding that Delaware Inmate Grievance Procedure
requires compliance with procedures for appeal, and “[b]ecause
Davis clearly did not exhaust administrative review on the claims
raised in this suit, his suit was subject to dismissal for that
reason, as well.”).
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In the instant case, the Affidavit of Michael Little,
attached to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, establishes that
Plaintiff did not appeal any grievance related to his assault in
July of 2008.
Defs.’ Ex. B.
Plaintiff’s affidavit and
supporting exhibits do nothing to raise a dispute about this
fact, as Plaintiff states that he was released from the JTVCC
shortly after he wrote or filed his grievance, and he does not
state that he subsequently pursued the grievance to finality.
Indeed, in Plaintiff’s Complaint, in the form section regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies, when asked “what steps did
you take?” Plaintiff wrote simply “Filed a grievance” but makes
no mention of appealing the result.
The Court therefore
concludes that the claim was not exhausted because it did not
comply with all relevant procedural requirements.
See Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-97 (2006) (holding that grievance is not
properly exhausted if not pursued through all available appeals.)
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court has concluded that the undisputed facts in the
record demonstrate that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his
available administrative remedy as required under 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) because he filed his Complaint in this action prior to
appealing and fully exhausting his prison grievance form.
Consequently, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary
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judgment and dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.
The
accompanying Order will be entered.
September 16, 2011
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
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