Robinson-Jones v. Astrue

Filing 33

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CASE CLOSED); adopting Report and Recommendations re 30 Report and Recommendations.; denying 21 Motion for Summary Judgment (CASE CLOSED); granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment (CASE CLOSED). Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/26/2012. (rpg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
LESHIA I. ROBINSON-JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.

C.A. No. 10-588-LPS-MPT

MICHAEL J. AS TRUE,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this 26th day of March, 2012, upon consideration of the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment (D.I. 21; D.I. 26), and following review of the Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") issued by United States Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge on July
19, 2011 (D.I. 30), the objections by PlaintiffLeshia I. Robinson-Jones to the R&R (D.I. 31), and
the response ofDefendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security, to the objections
(D.I. 32),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons that follow, the objections filed by
Plaintiff are OVERRULED.
1.

Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Thynge erred in: (1) finding that the

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") properly credited the opinion of Dr. Ronald Goodman,
Plaintiff's primary care physician; (2) failing to address newer diagnostic testing, reflecting
Plaintiff's worsening symptoms; and (3) failing to address evidence which was credible, yet not
considered by the ALJ- namely, the opinion of Ms. Brenda Rodriguez, a vocational
rehabilitation specialist. (See D.I. 31 at 1) Defendant, in tum, offers that Plaintiff fundamentally

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and impermissibly asks this Court to re-weigh the medical evidence of record, and further
submits that the ALJ did not overlook, but rather appropriately considered and addressed,
diagnostic testing and vocational evidence. (See D.I. 32 at 3-5)
2.

When reviewing the decision of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter, the

Court conducts a de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A
motion for summary judgment is considered a dispositive matter and, therefore, the conclusions
ofthe magistrate judge in connection with such a motion are reviewed de novo. The Court may
accept, reject, or modify the recommendations ofthe magistrate judge. The Court may also
receive further evidence or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions for further
proceedings.
3.

Having undertaken the required de novo review, the Court concludes that

Magistrate Judge Thynge committed no factual or legal error in reaching her conclusions and in
determining that substantial evidence existed to support the ALJ' s conclusions.
a.

First, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Thynge's determination that

the ALJ attributed proper credit to the opinion of Dr. Goodman. As the R&R states:
Dr. Goodman has been plaintiffs primary treating physician. Over
twelve consultations with Dr. Goodman occurred since 2004.
Most documented consultations with other doctors showed direct
communication with Dr. Goodman as the referring physician. In
addition, a residual functional capacity questionnaire ("RFC") was
completed by Dr. Goodman on June 26, 2007, wherein he noted
that within a normal workday plaintiff could sit and stand for two
hours, but required at least a three minute break every thirty
minutes ....
(D.I. 30 at 7-8; see also Tr. at 405-09) Although Dr. Goodman may have treated Plaintifffor
several years and been privy to additional medical information, as pointed out by Defendant, "Dr.

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Goodman's treatment notes were not extensive and consisted primarily of treatment for general
medical complaints (Tr. 375-89, 475-85)." (D.I. 32 at 2) As even Plaintiff acknowledges, "Dr.
Goodman's office notes do not specifically provide restrictions regarding her ability to work."
(D.I. 31 at 3) As appropriately noted by Magistrate Judge Thynge, the ALJ considered Dr.
Goodman's opinion, but "stated that he discounted Dr. Goodman's opinion in part because no
medical evidence supported the findings." (D.I. 30 at 21) For example, "[n]othing in Dr.
Goodman's notes indicated a limitation of two hours sitting and standing per day. While Dr.
Goodman was plaintiffs treating physician, the treatment for back and neck pain was referred to
specialists Dr. Y alamanchili (neurological) and Dr. Beneck (physical rehabilitation), who never
imposed similar limitations." (Id. at 20-21; see also Tr. at 20 ("[B)ecause the opinion provided
by the claimant's treating primary care physician, Ronald Goodman, M.D., found in the record at
Exhibit 19F ... discounts the claimant's exertional abilities to an extent not warranted by the
evidence, the undersigned has accorded [it] little weight in determining the claimant's reasonable
residual functional capacity."); id. at 405-09) The Court finds that the ALJ's decision to accord
little weight to the 2007 assessment was reasonable.
b.

Second, the ALJ did not ignore the diagnostic tests relating to Plaintiffs

impairments. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ neglected to consider newer diagnostic testsMRis ofthe cervical spine- conducted in 2006 and 2007. (See D.I. 31 at 3) Specifically, an
August 2006 MRI "showed a rather large disc herniation that was causing some cord
compression at C4-5. (Tr. 439-440)," and a June 2007 MRI "showed a moderate to large size
central right paracentral disc herniation at C4-5 slightly enlarged with concurrent to mild
compression of the right ventral spinal cord. (Tr. 457)." (Id.)

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As Defendant points out, however, to the extent such later tests "confirmed that [Plaintiff]
had impairments of her cervical and lumbar spines, these test results were adequately accounted
for in the ALJ's RFC finding." (D.I. 32 at 3) Defendant correctly notes that the ALJ "recognized
that Plaintiff had degenerative disc disease of her cervical and lumbar spines," which the ALJ
attempted to account for with specific restrictions. (!d. at 2-3; see also, e.g., Tr. at 14, 19, 22)
While Plaintiff emphasizes the severity of her pain and its impact upon her ability to work, the
ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff experienced some degree of pain and physical and mental
limitations as a result ofher impairments, and the ALJ imposed restrictions accordingly. (See
D.I. 32 at 3; Tr. at 19, 22)
c.

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the "ALJ committed a legal error in failing

to address why the opinion of Ms. Rodriguez was not consider[ ed] when assessing the credibility
ofher pain level and its impact on her ability to sustain employment." (D.I. 31 at 6) However,
the ALJ did not neglect to consider appropriate evidence from Ms. Rodriguez - whom the parties
agree is a vocational rehabilitation counselor and non-medical source -or the services rendered
to Plaintiffby the Division ofVocational Rehabilitation (D.I. 32 at 5). Both the ALJ and the
magistrate judge referenced Plaintiff's "continued schooling, vocational rehabilitation, and
internship activities"- activities with which Ms. Rodriguez assisted Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Tr. at
20; D.I. 30 at 9-10; D.I. 32 at 5-7)
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs objections are OVERRULED.

2.

The Report and Recommendation regarding the cross-motions for summary

judgment (D.I. 30) is APPROVED and ADOPTED.

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3.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 26) is GRANTED; and

4.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 21) is DENIED.

5.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor ofDefendant and against

Plaintiff.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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