Dickens et al v. Danberg et al

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 6/8/12. (dzs, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
KEVIN L. DICKENS,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 10-786-LPS

V.

COMM. CARL DANBERG, et al.,
Defendants.

Kevin L. Dickens, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, ProSe Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

June 8, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
PlaintiffKevin L. Dickens ("Plaintiff'), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. 1 Plaintiff is an inmate housed at the James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center "(VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware. He appears prose and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.I. 13) The Court proceeds to review and screen
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and§ 1915A. 2

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff raises numerous claims including excessive force, failure to protect or intervene,

medical needs, retaliation/ conspiracy, and deprivation of property for alleged acts occurring
from May 6, 2008 through May 10, 2010. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well
as injunctive relief.

1

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
2

The Complaint named additional plaintiffs Roman Shankaras ("Shankaras") and Thomas
Gordon ("Gordon"). Because Shankaras' and Gordon's claims were unrelated, new cases were
opened for them. The Court does not consider, and strikes, Shankaras' and Gordon's allegations
found at paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Complaint. (D.I. 2)
3

Plaintiff alleges numerous times that Defendants retaliated against him, but uses the term
in a conclusory manner. "Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself
a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under§ 1983." White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). Proof of a retaliation claim requires that Plaintiff
demonstrate (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected to adverse actions by a
state actor; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the state actor's
decision to take adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Mt.
Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs sparse and conclusory retaliation allegations are frivolous and will
be dismissed.
1

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and

prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a prose plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Phillips v.

County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds prose, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and§ 1915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 32728; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772,774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and§ 1915A(b)(l) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
2

before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F .3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a
two-part analysis. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. !d. The Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. !d. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." !d. at 211. In other words, the
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show"
such an entitlement with its facts. !d. A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." !d. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" !d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

3

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Statute of Limitations

Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 raise claims that occurred on May 6 and 11, 2008 and in July
and August 2008. These claims are time-barred.
For purposes of the statute of limitations, § 1983 claims are characterized as personal
injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,275 (1983). Hence, in Delaware,§ 1983
claims are subject to a two-year limitations period. See 10 Del. C. § 8119; Johnson v. Cullen,
925 F.Supp. 244,248 (D. Del. 1996). Section 1983 claims accrue "when plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury that forms the basis of his or her cause of action." !d. Claims not
filed within the two-year statute of limitations period are time-barred and must be dismissed. See
Campanella v. Port Auth. ofNew York & New Jersey, 590 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (D.N.J. 2008).
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised by the
defendant, and it is waived if not properly raised. See Benak ex rei. Alliance Premier Growth
Fundv. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., 435 F.3d 396,400 n.14 (3d Cir. 2006); Fassettv. Delta
Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir. 1986). However, when the statute oflimitations
defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the factual record is
required to determine whether dismissal is appropriate, sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 is permissible. See Smith v. Delaware Cnty. Court, 260 F. App'x 454, 455 (3d Cir. Jan.
10, 2008) (not published).

4

Plaintiffs Complaint was signed on September 12,2010, and is postmarked September
15, 2010. 4 In paragraphs 1 through 4, the Complaint raises claims for actions that took place on
May 6 and 11, 2008, and in July and August 2008. With regard to these claims, Plaintiff filed his
Complaint after the expiration of the two-year limitations period. Thus, it is evident from the
face of the Complaint that the claims pled in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 are barred by the two-year
limitations period. Therefore, the Court will dismiss these claims as time-barred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

B.

Personal Involvement/Respondeat Superior

Plaintiff raises claims against certain defendants based upon their supervisory positions,
for allegedly implementing unconstitutional policies and enforcing them. Plaintiff alleges that he
spoke to Warden Perry Phelps ("Phelps") about a September 2008 beating by Sgt. Beckles
("Beckles"), and Phelps told Plaintiff "to be patient." (D.I. 2 at~ 6) Plaintiff alleges that instead
of ordering an investigation, Phelps and Deputy Warden Pierce ("Pierce") gave Beckles a "slap
on the wrist" by removing Beckles as the building sergeant. 5
Plaintiff alleges that there is a "get Dickens" policy and that Phelps, two majors, and all
of the captains and lieutenants were notified that, as part of the policy, Plaintiff could not dictate

4

The computation of time for complaints filed by pro se inmates is determined according
to the "mailbox rule." See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d
109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998). This district has extended the mailbox rule to prose§ 1983 complaints.
See Gibbs v. Decker, 234 F. Supp. 2d 458,463 (D. Del. 2002). Plaintiff's Complaint was signed
on September 12, 2010 and, therefore, must have been delivered to prison authorities for mailing
on or after that date. Thus, the Court finds that the Complaint was filed no earlier than
September 12, 2010.
5

Plaintiff alleges that because Beckles was allowed to have contact and direct supervision,
he could continue to retaliate against Plaintiff.
5

prison policy or who cuffed him and to assemble a Quick Response Team ("QRT") to assault
Plaintiff when he refused to allow a particular guard to handcuff him. (D.I. 2 at~ 14) The policy
was continued by Captain Hazzard ("Hazzard") and Captain Henry ("Henry"). As part of the
policy, Captain Rispoli ("Rispoli") ordered area lieutenants to initiate assaults by spraying
Plaintiff with mace whenever he refused a verbal order. QRT would be called "to finish" the job.
"A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she
neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
"Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). The
Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat
superior and that, in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party
must show personal involvement by each defendant. See Brito v. United States Dep 't ofJustice,
392 F. App'x 11, 14 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2010) (not published) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Rode,
845 F.2d at 1207).
"Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[i]n a
§ 1983 suit -here masters do not answer for the torts of their servants -the term 'supervisory
liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Thus,
when a plaintiff sues an official under § 1983 for conduct 'arising from his or her superintendent

6

responsibilities,' the plaintiff must plausibly plead and eventually prove not only that the
official's subordinates violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct
and state of mind did so as well." Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (101h Cir. 2010)
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). The factors necessary to establish a§ 1983 violation will vary
with the constitutional provision at issue. See id.
Under pre-Iqbal Third Circuit precedent, supervisory personnel are liable under § 1983 if
they participated in, or had knowledge of, violations; if they directed others to commit violations;
or if they had knowledge of and acquiesced in subordinates' violations. See Baker v. Monroe
Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1191 (3d Cir. 1995). More recently, the Third Circuit reiterated that a

§ 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior and, that in order to
establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal
involvement by each defendant. See Brito, 392 F. App'x at 11. The Third Circuit noted that
personal involvement may be established through: (1) personal direction or actual participation
by the defendant in the misconduct; or (2) knowledge of and acquiescence in the misconduct
See id. The Third Circuit has recognized the potential effect that Iqbal might have in altering the

standard for supervisory liability in a§ 1983 suit. See, e.g., Bayer v. Monroe County Children
and Youth Servs.,577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating, post-Iqbal, it is uncertain whether

proof of personal knowledge, with nothing more, provides sufficient basis to impose liability
upon supervisory official). The Third Circuit has recognized the potential effect that Iqbal might
have in altering the standard for supervisory liability in a § 1983 suit but, to date, has declined to
decide whether Iqbal requires narrowing of the scope of the test. See Santiago v. Warminster
Twp, 629 F.3d 121, 130 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Argueta v. United States Immigration and

7

Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) ("To date, we have refrained from answering

the question of whether Iqbal eliminated- or at least narrowed the scope of- supervisory
liability because it was ultimately unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal then
before us."). Hence, it appears that, under a supervisory theory ofliability, and even in light of
Iqbal, personal involvement by a defendant remains the touchstone for establishing liability for

the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional right. 6 See Williams v. Lackawanna County Prison,
2010 WL 1491132, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2010).
Facts showing personal involvement of the defendant must be asserted; such assertions
may be made through allegations of specific facts showing that a defendant expressly directed the
deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights or created such policies where the subordinates
had no discretion in applying the policies in a fashion other than the one which actually produced
the alleged deprivation; e.g., supervisory liability may attach if the plaintiff asserts facts showing
that the supervisor's actions were "the moving force" behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1117-18; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-54; City ofCanton v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378 (1989); Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst.for Women, 128 F. App'x 240 (3d
Cir. Apr. 11, 2005) (not published).
Plaintiff's allegations that the supervisory defendants created, approved, and implemented
policies are similar to the allegations to Iqbal that were determined to be facially insufficient.

6

'" Supervision' entails, among other things, training, defining expected performance by
promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring adherence to performance standards, and responding
to unacceptable performance whether through individualized discipline or further rulemaking."
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir. 1989). "For the purpose of defining the standard
for liability of a supervisor under § 1983, the characterization of a particular aspect of
supervision is unimportant." !d. at 1116-1 7.

8

See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged supervisory officials violated his
rights, in that one official was the "principal architect" of the policy, and another was
"implemental" in adoption and execution ofthe policy. See id. at 1944. Here, Plaintiffs
allegations are so vague and conclusory that they clearly do not satisfy the Iqbal requirement. He
provides no specific facts as to how the supervisory officials violated his constitutional rights;
rather he refers to the "get Dickens" policy that apparently went into effect whenever Plaintiff
flouted prison rules and disobeyed orders. In addition, there are no allegations that subordinates
lacked discretion in applying the alleged policy in a fashion other than the one which actually
produced the alleged deprivation. Finally, prison officials require broad discretionary authority
as the "operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking."
Woljfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Hence, prison administrators are accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to
preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
527 (1979). It appears from reading the Complaint that the actions taken were to preserve
internal order and to maintain institutional security and would be accorded deference.
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss as frivolous the claims discussed above in
paragraphs 6 and 14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and§ 1915A(b)(l).
Ei~:hth

Amendment

1.

C.

Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff raises numerous claims relating to his conditions of confinement, including food
tampering, denial of exercise, infrequent showers, constructive starvation, and reduced
environmental stimulation.

9

A condition of confinement violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is so reprehensible
as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary standards or such that it deprives an inmate of
minimal civilized measure ofthe necessities oflife. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8
(1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,298 (1991). When an Eighth Amendment claim is
brought against a prison official it must meet two requirements: (1) the deprivation alleged must
be, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the prison official must have been deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard in that the prison official must actually have
known or been aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256
F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff alleges that on January 2, 2009, C/Os Rebecca ("White"), Weber ("Weber"), and
Thomas Keefer ("Keefer") retaliated against him by "playing" with his food, as his food tray was
missing dessert, cornbread, and a spork. (D.I. 2 at~ 9) When Plaintiff held his tray to protest the
tampering, Lt. Furman ("Furman") threatened Plaintiff with the QRT. 7
In March 2009, Plaintiff complained to Lt. Smith ("Smith") about Della Boone ("Boone")
and other officers tampering with his food. Boone denied tampering with the food, Plaintiff
called her a liar, and Boone threatened to strike and mace Plaintiff. Plaintiff warned Boone that
if she came to his cell door or flap "he would have something for her." (D.I. 2 at~ 9) The next

7

Allegations of threats do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See McBride
v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 (lOth Cir. 2001) (stating taunts and threats did not constitute
Eighth Amendment violation); Prisoners' Legal Ass'n v. Roberson, 822 F.Supp. 185, 189
(D.N.J. 1993) (stating verbal harassment does not violate inmate's constitutional rights).
Similarly, allegations that prison personnel have used threatening language and gestures are not
cognizable claims under§ 1983. See Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825 (lOth Cir. 1979) (involving
allegations that defendant laughed at prisoner and threatened to hang him).
10

day, Rispoli, Major James Scarborough ("Scarborough"), Major Michael Costello ("Costello"),
Lt. Karen Hawkins ("Hawkins"), and Smith allegedly ordered the QRT to escort Plaintiff from
his cell to intimidate him. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Boone tampered with his food and
contaminated it so that it was inedible. (Id)
Plaintiff fails to state a constitutional claim. See Jackson v. Kane County, 201 0 WL
333695, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2010) ("Drawing on judicial experience and common sense, a
lack of running water in a particular prison cell block, although uncomfortable by itself, is not a
serious deprivation of a basic human need.") (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs allegations
that his tray was missing some food items and that on one day his food was inedible do not
amount to cognizable claims and, therefore, the claims will be dismissed as frivolous.
Plaintiff alleges that Scarborough, Costello, Rispoli, and Hawkins punished him by
ordering no exercise for three months. (D.I. 2 at~ 10) "[M]eaningful recreation 'is extremely
important to the psychological and physical well-being of the inmates."' Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855
F.2d 1021, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir. 1979)).
However, lack of opportunity to exercise can only rise to a constitutional level "where movement
is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy, [and] the health ofthe individual is threatened."
Spain, 600 F.2d at 199. Thus, while a constitutional violation may occur when the deprivation of
exercise extends for a prolonged period of time and tangible physical harm resulting from the
lack of exercise is demonstrated, here there are so such allegations. Therefore, the exercise claim
will be dismissed as frivolous.
Plaintiff alleges that he was informed by Lt. Wiley ("Wiley"), Lt. Chris Cessna
("Cessna"), and Lt. Sennett ("Sennett") that he would only be permitted a fifteen minute shower

11

\
'

three times per week. (D .I. 2 at ~ 10) On one occasion, Plaintiff asked Sennett and Cessna for a
towel, soap, and clean clothes, but the items were not given to him and then Plaintiff was advised
that his time was up. Plaintiff refused to come out of the shower and was threatened with bodily
harm.

Plaintiff had the opportunity for regularly scheduled showers, but on one occasion his
shower did not take place. The deprivation Plaintiff allegedly suffered on this one occasion does
not constitute a denial of"the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities." See, e.g.,
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442,444--47 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation

where prisoner was placed in strip cell without clothes, water in cell was turned off and mattress
removed, and prisoner's bedding, clothing, legal mail, and hygienic supplies were withheld); see
also Adderly v. Ferrier, 2011 WL 816204 (3d Cir. Mar. 10, 2011 ). The shower claim is

frivolous and will be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that he was "constructively starved" through a conspiracy by the
Correctional Medical Services ("CMS") staff, Dr. Brown ("Dr. Brown"), Dr. Dresoro ("Dr.
Desrosiers"), 8 Nurse Betty Bryant ("Bryant"), Cris Senato ("Senato"), and the VCC staff when he
was placed on a nutra-loaf diet for five straight weeks. (D.I. 2 at~ 10) Plaintiff was placed on
the diet for throwing food and storing feces in his cell. Plaintiff lost weight and Dr. Desrosiers
recommended that Plaintiff be given regular meals, but Deputy Warden Klein ("Klein") refused
to take Plaintiff off the nutra-loaf sanction. Plaintiff was taken off the nutra-loaf only after
frequent blackouts, low blood pressure, and losing over sixty pounds in one month.
Prisoners must receive adequate nutrition to maintain normal health; the food need not be

8

The correct spelling is Dr. Desrosiers.
12

tasty or aesthetically pleasing. See Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653,659-60 (6th Cir. 1977).
A food loaf diet does not violate the Eighth Amendment because nutritional and caloric
requirements are met. See, e.g., Ostrander v. Trippett, 71 F. App'x 565, 566 (6th Cir. Aug. 11,
2003) (not published); see also LeMaire v. Maas, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (providing
nutra-loaf, a nutritionally adequate blend of fresh ingredients designed to be given to inmates
without eating utensils, is not deprivation serious enough to violate Eighth Amendment).
With regard to the CMS staff, Dr. Brown, Dr. Desrosiers, Bryant, Senato, and the VCC
staff, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment. The
allegations as to Klein, however, are that medical indicated Plaintiff should be taken off the
nutra-loaf diet, the recommendation was not followed, and Plaintiffs health suffered. See
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that prisoner who lost
forty-five pounds on nutra-loaf diet might have had Eighth Amendment claim); Adams v.
Kincheloe, 743 F.Supp. 1385, 1391 (E.D. Wash. 1990) (placing inmate on disciplinary five-day
diet of "nutra-loaf' did not violate Eighth Amendment in part because inmate did not suffer from
any weight loss or medical conditions). Accordingly, Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed against
Klein on the nutra-loaf claim.
Plaintiff alleges that Costello and Rispoli tortured him by placing him in a cell with
reduced environmental stimulation, by covering his windows so he could not see outside of his
cell. (D.I. 2 at~ 10) Plaintiff did not know the time of day and was not in touch with his
surroundings. He does not indicate how long this condition lasted or that he was harmed, but
alleges the reduced environmental stimulation was meant to cause harm.
"As a general matter, the mere placement in solitary confinement, despite its

13

accompanying extreme social isolation and reduced environmental stimulation - and the
likelihood of some degree of psychological trauma that it entails - is not enough to rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation." Washington-£/ v. Beard, 2011 WL 891250, at *3
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Administrative segregation, and its
associated risk of psychological deterioration, "is not per se violative of the Eighth Amendment
with respect to all potential inmates." !d. Plaintiffs allegations do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. Moreover, there are no allegations of injury. Therefore, the claims will
be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(l).

2.

Excessive Force/Failure to Protect/Failure to Intervene

Plaintiff makes numerous claims of excessive force, failure to protect, and failure to
intervene.
When analyzing an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, the Court must
determine "whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline
or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 475
U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986). Use of force is actionable under§ 1983 when it exceeds "that which is
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances." Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 827 (3d
Cir. 1984). The Court must determine whether the force was applied in good faith by weighing
the following factors: (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used, (3) the extent ofthe injury inflicted, (4) the threat
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (5) the efforts made to temper the severity
of a forceful response. See Davis v. Carroll, 390 F. Supp. 2d 415,419 (D. Del. 2005) (citing

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).

14

The Eighth Amendment "does not protect an inmate against an objectively de minimis use
of force." Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 2002). Allegations of far more force
than Plaintiff has alleged have been deemed de minimis and dismissed. See, e.g., Reyes v.

Chinnici, 54 F. App'x 44, 48 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 2002) (not published) (involving corrections
officer punching inmate in shoulder to avoid being spit on); Wilson v. Reinhart, 2003 WL
21756393 (D. Del. Jul. 29, 2003) (spraying inmate in face with mace was in proportion to need to
stop plaintiff from causing disturbance in prison). But see Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270
(7th Cir. 1984) ("[l]t is a violation ofthe Eighth Amendment for prison officials to use mace or
other chemical agents in quantities greater than necessary or for the sole purpose of punishment
or the infliction of pain."); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 701-02 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating
application of pepper spray when inmate is being compliant can constitute Eighth Amendment
violation).
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim, a plaintiff is required to
show that (1) he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm (the
objective element); and (2) prison officials acted with deliberate indifference, i.e., that prison
officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety (the subjective
element). See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994); see also Griffin v. DeRosa, 153

F. App'x 851 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2005) (not published).
With regard to paragraph 9, Plaintiff alleges that he hit Keefer and that Keefer pulled
Plaintiff away during an altercation. He alleges that when White "went for her mace," Plaintiff
tackled her and attempted to stop her from macing him. In each instance, Plaintiff was the
aggressor. The claims are frivolous and will be dismissed.

15

With regard to paragraph 10, Plaintiff alleges that Rispoli ordered staff to initiate contact
with Plaintiff to justify an assault. Plaintiff alleges this began with mere touching or holding his
arms and wrists while he was handcuffed and escalated to grabbing and yanking on Plaintiff in
order to cause injury. The allegations do not rise to the level of excessive force, are frivolous,
and will be dismissed.
With regard to paragraph 11, Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Michael Bryan ("Bryan") slammed
him into a wall as Plaintiff was talking to Lt. Daum ("Daum"), and Daum did not intervene or try
to protect him. Plaintiff demanded that Bryan no longer be allowed to handcuff him, but
Scarborough, Costello, and Rispoli ordered Plaintiff to allow Bryan to handcuff him. When
Plaintiff refused, Lt. Paul Harvey ("Harvey"), Daum, Smith, and Lt. Stanley Baynard
("Baynard") allegedly fabricated incident and disciplinary reports that Plaintiff refused orders. 9
In order to deter Bryan from cuffing him, Plaintiff spread feces on his arms and wrists, which
resulted in an appearance by the QRT and placement in twenty-four hour restraints.
Plaintiff alleges that on two other occasions in late March, Bryan slammed him to the
floor; and on one occasion, Beckles joined the QRT members and thumbed Plaintiff in the eye.
Plaintiff alleges that each time Bryan worked in his area it was clear he would be harmed, but the
VCC staff, Phelps, Pierce, Klein, Internal Affairs, the Commissioner, and administration were
deliberately indifferent despite his complaints to them. The allegations do not speak to injury to
Plaintiff and indicate that acts taken by Defendants were in response to Plaintiffs behavior. The

9

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' actions resulted in the filing of false disciplinary
charges, without more, does not violate his constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause.
See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002).
16

allegations in paragraph 11 do not rise to the level of excessive force, are frivolous, and will be dismissed.
In paragraph 12, Plaintiff alleges that when Bryan and C/0 Nicholas Mohr ("Mohr")
approached his cell he threw urine and feces on them. Smith assembled the QRT. During the
incident, C/0 William Morris ("Morris") shocked Plaintiff and Beckles broke Plaintiffs finger.
Bryan waited in the hallway, grabbed and spat upon Plaintiff. Smith watched while Bryan
ranted. Except for the allegations against Morris and Beckles, the allegations fail to state
cognizable claims of excessive force.
Paragraph 13 alleges that on April15, 2009, Rispoli sent Harvey and Bryan to Plaintiffs
cell and ordered Plaintiff to allow Bryan to handcuff him. Plaintiff refused and spread feces on
his arms and hands. An altercation with the QRT ensued. The allegations against the foregoing
Defendants do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
In paragraph 14, Plaintiff alleges that on April 21, 2009, Henry yanked on his cuffs from
behind while Plaintiff was cuffed and shackled. At one point, Henry threatened Plaintiff.
Plaintiff complained to Baynard and told him that the QRT would be needed to cuff him because
he would not allow Henry to cuff him. Baynard did not comply with Plaintiffs demands. Later,
Rispoli arrived with the QRT and they left Plaintiff in the shower for five hours. Henry then
cuffed Plaintiff and threw Plaintiff into the shower door. Plaintiff does not allege injury. None
of the foregoing allegations rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
Thus, the Court will dismiss the claims discussed above as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(l)
Plaintiff has alleged what appear to be cognizable and non-frivolous excessive force and
failure to protect/intervene claims in paragraph 5 against Beckles; in paragraph 6 against Beckles,

17

Guy Fowler ("Fowler"), Lt. Salas ("Salas"), and Sgt. Angelina DeAllie ("DeAllie"); in paragraph
9 against Rispoli, Weber, Lt. Trader ("Trader"), and Cpl. McGinnis ("McGinnis"); in paragraph
12 against Morris and Beckles; in paragraph 13 against C/0 Charles Stevens ("Stevens"), C/0
Greg Turner ("Turner"), C/0 Daynene Scott, ("Scott"), and Bryan; in paragraph 14 against
Morris; in paragraph 15 against Harvey, Henry, Mohr, Morris, and Scott; in paragraph 16 against
Smith, Henry, Cpl. Parsons ("Parsons"), and Morris; 10 and in paragraph 17 against Baynard,
Rispoli, Morris, Henry, Hawkins, Sgt. Steve Floyd ("Floyd"), and Bryant.

3.

Medical Needs

Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 14 that Bryant did not give him medical care to see if he
was injured when was in the shower and shocked by Morris on April 21, 2009.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103-105 (1976). However, in order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a
serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir.
1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial
risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by
"intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.

10

Photos taken of Plaintiffs injuries were displayed by certain defendants but ultimately
taken down after complaints by another inmate. The display did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. (D .I. 2 at ~ 16)
18

However, "a prisoner has no right to choose a specific form of medical treatment," so
long as the treatment provided is reasonable. Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 138-140 (2d
Cir. 2000). An inmate's claims against members of a prison medical department are not viable
under § 1983 where the inmate receives continuing care, but believes that more should be done
by way of diagnosis and treatment or maintains that options available to medical personnel were
not pursued on the inmate's behalf. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. "[M]ere disagreement as to the
proper medical treatment" is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Paragraph 14 alleges that Bryant saw Plaintiff but she did not take his pulse or vitals to
see whether the voltage had caused damage. Plaintiff was seen by Bryant, but did not receive the
care he thought he needed. Plaintiff is not entitled to the treatment of his choosing, nor does his
disagreement with Bryant's treatment implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss as frivolous the medical needs claims against Bryant.
Plaintiff may proceed with the medical needs claim raised against Wiley in paragraph 9.

D.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that Commissioner Carl Danberg ("Danberg"), Deputy Commissioner
Thomas Carroll ("Carroll"), Bureau Chief Rick Kearney ("Kearney"), Phelps, Pierce, Klein,
Scarborough, Costello, Rispoli, and Hawkins began a conspiracy to harm and injure Plaintiff
following a January 2, 2009 incident. (D.I. 2 at~ 9) Plaintiff alleges "[t]he need for extreme

19

punishment to 'get Dickens' was made more urgent by the fact" that Plaintiff had assaulted a
female guard who was involved in relationships with male staff and administration. 11
For a conspiracy claim, there must be evidence of (1) an actual violation of a right
protected under § 1983 and (2) actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to
violate that right. See Williams v. Fedor, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649, 665-66 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 211 F.3d
1263 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phi/a., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached agreement to deprive
him or her of constitutional right under color oflaw); Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641,648-49 (7th
Cir. 1998) (stating agreement or understanding to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights
must exist).
The allegations are conclusory and do not adequately indicate how the defendants acted in
concert to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the conspiracy claim is
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).

E.

Personal Property

Plaintiff alleges that Floyd, Hawkins, and Baynard confiscated his television on May 6,
2010 without a disciplinary report. (D.I. 2 at ,-r 17) Plaintifflater discovered that Henry,
Baynard, and Floyd had conspired to take his television. Plaintiff took the cuffs and cuff key
from Floyd after the foregoing Defendants would not return the television, resulting in an
altercation with the QRT.

11

As punishment for the assault, Plaintiff was placed on twenty-four hour black box
restraints and strip cell status. Orders were given for Plaintiff to be escorted by QRT members
whenever he left his cell. Plaintiff alleges that the acts were meant to cause harm and for
retaliation. (D.I. 2 at ,-r 9) The allegations are frivolous and will be dismissed.
20

A prisoner's due process claim based on random and unauthorized deprivation of
property by a state actor is not actionable under § 1983, whether the deprivation is negligent or
intentional, unless there is no adequate post-deprivation remedy available. See Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981), overruled on other grounds by, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiffhas available to him the option of filing a common
law claim for conversion of property. Inasmuch as Delaware law provides an adequate remedy
for Plaintiff, he cannot maintain a cause of action pursuant to§ 1983. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at
535; Nicholson v. Carroll, 390 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D. Del. 2005); Acierno v. Preit-Rubin, Inc.,
199 F.R.D. 157 (D. Del. 2001).
The claim lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact and will be dismissed as frivolous See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff may proceed with: (1) the nutra-loaf claim found at

paragraph 10 of the Complaint against Klein; (2) the excessive force and failure to
protect/intervene claims found in paragraph 5 against Beckles; in paragraph 6 against Beckles,
Fowler, Salas, and DeAllie; in paragraph 9 against Rispoli, Weber, Trader, and McGinnis; in
paragraph 12 against Morris and Beckles; in paragraph 13 against Stevens, Turner, Scott, and
Bryan; in paragraph 14 against Morris; in paragraph 15 against Harvey, Henry, Mohr, Morris,
and Scott; in paragraph 16 against Smith, Henry, Parsons, and Morris; and in paragraph 17
against Baynard, Rispoli, Morris, Henry, Hawkins, Floyd, and Bryant; and (3) the medical needs
claim found at paragraph 9 of the Complaint against Wiley. The Court will strike paragraphs 7
and 8 of the Complaint. Finally, the Court will dismiss the remaining Defendants and claims as

21

l

frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and§ 1915A(b)(l). Amendment would be
futile.
An appropriate Order follows.

22