Thomas v. Morgan et al

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/21/12. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DEL AWARE
WAYNE THOMAS,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 1O-907-LPS

v.

WARDEN PHILIP MORGAN and
MAJOR PHILLIP PARKER,
Defendants.

Wayne Thomas, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.
Joseph Clement Handlon, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

March 21,2012
Wilmington, Delaware

i~\:, ~

STARK, U.S. District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Wayne Thomas ("Plaintiff"), a pretrial detainee at the Howard R. Young

Correctional Institution ("HRYCl") in Wilmington, Delaware, filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 (D.1. 2) He appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. (D.L 4) The Court screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1915 and

1915A and allowed Plaintiff to proceed against Defendants on identifiable cognizable and nonfrivolous claims. (See D.L 6) Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Philip Morgan ("Morgan") and Phillip Parker ("Parker")

(together Defendants,,).2 (DJ. 11) Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion. For the reasons
that follow, the Court will deny the Motion.

II.

BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was removed from the general population and placed

in isolation on September 11,2010. On September 13,2010, Plaintiff received a disciplinary
sanction of one year in isolation for four disciplinary write-ups. Parker imposed the sanction,
which was approved by Morgan. At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff had been in
administrative segregation for six weeks. He alleges that the conditions placed upon him impose

When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988).
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2A third defendant, Deputy Warden Paul Emig, was dismissed for failure to serve
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). (See D.L 13)

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materially greater restrictions that those imposed on convicted inmates at the HYRCI and they
qualify as punishment.
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that: (1) it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; (2) the claims fail because they are based upon respondeat
superior; and (3) they enjoy qualified immunity.

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires

the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. aillis, 372
F.3d 218,223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Court may grant such a motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
However, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a
right to relief above the speCUlative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact). '" Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially
plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqba/,_U.S._,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). At bottom, "[tJhe complaint must state enough facts to raise a

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reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a
plaintiffs claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F .3d 315, 321 (3d Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is the Court obligated to accept as true "bald
assertions," Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Schuylkill
Energy Res., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405,417 (3d Cir. 1997), or
allegations that are "self-evidently false," Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63,69 (3d Cir. 1996).
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim
based on well-settled law that pretrial detainees may be punished for violation of prison rules and
regulations. However, unlike sentenced inmates, pretrial detainees also have a liberty interest in
being free from punishment for the crime that led to their detention prior to conviction under the
Due Process Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-36 (1979). "Absent a showing of
an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials," determining whether a
restriction constitutes punishment "generally will tum on whether an alternative purpose to
which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]." Id. at 538. Therefore, "if a
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restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal - if it is arbitrary or
purposeless - a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is
punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Id. at 539.
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective
components. See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,68 (3d Cir. 2007). The objective
component requires an inquiry into whether "the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious" and the
subjective component asks whether "the officials act [ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind." Id (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).
Construing the Complaint liberally in favor of Plaintiff, as the Court must in evaluating a
motion to dismiss a pro se Complaint, the Court concludes that while it is possible Plaintiff was
sent to isolation and administrative segregation for disciplinary reasons rather than punishment,
taking all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff leads to the conclusion that Plaintiff has
adequately alleged he was given an undue and impermissibly lengthy punishment. Thus, the
Court concludes that the Complaint meets the pleading requirements of Iqbal and Twombly. See

Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 66 (allegations by pretrial detainees that they were being punished prior to
being sentenced by being placed in restrictive confinement were sufficiently factual to raise
detainees' rights to relief above speculative level). Therefore, the Court will deny the Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim.

B.

Respondeat Superior

Morgan argue that the claims against him seem to be based upon his status as the
supervisor of Parker and, therefore, the claims against him fail. The Complaint alleges that
Morgan approved Plaintiffs one year in isolation.

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A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs
to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither
participated in nor approved. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007).
"Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A
§ 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior; hence, in order to
establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party must show personal
involvement by each defendant. See Brito v. United States Dep '( ofJustice, 392 F. App'x 11, 14
(3d Cir. Aug. 18,2010) (not published) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49); Rode, 845 F.2d at
1207.
Here, the Complaint clearly alleges that Morgan had actual knowledge and approved of
Plaintiff being sent to isolation for one year. The claims are not based upon a theory of
respondeat superior but, rather, are based upon Morgan's alleged personal involvement.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss based upon respondeat
supenor.

c.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants contend that the claims against them should be dismissed because Plaintiff
has failed to plead any facts challenging their entitlement to qualified immunity and immunity
pursuant to Delaware's State Tort Claims Act, 10 Del. C. § 4001. 3 They take the position that
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to establish an alleged violation of clearly established law.
The two-step test when analyzing qualified immunity as set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533

3However, the Complaint does not raise supplemental State claims.

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U.S. 194 (2001), is often appropriate. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
Under Saucier, the Court first examines whether the alleged conduct, taken in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, violated a constitutional right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "Ifno
constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no
necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." ld. If the alleged conduct would
amount to the violation of a constitutional right, the Court proceeds to the second inquiry and
determines if the right was "clearly established in the specific context of the case." Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (noting that officer is
entitled to qualified immunity unless "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted"). Courts have the discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first, in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
Here, whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights is very much at issue,
and a matter on which the Court cannot grant dismissal. Thus, in the present procedural posture,
the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the first step of the Saucier test. As
for the second step of the test, it is well-established that pretrial detainees have a liberty interest
in being free from punishment for the crime that led to their detention prior to conviction under
the Due Process Clause. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36. Accordingly, the Court determines that
the Motion to Dismiss based upon qualified immunity must be denied.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss. (D.!. 11) An

appropriate Order follows.

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