Watson et al v. Department of Services for Children, Youths and Their Families DE et al
Filing
72
MEMORANDUM OPINION re pending motions. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/26/13. (ntl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JIMMY WATSON and SONJA L.
TAYLOR-BRAY,
Plaintiffs,
CONSOLIDATED
Civ. No. 10-978-LPS
v.
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, YOUTHS AND THEIR
FAMILIES DELAWARE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Jimmy Watson, Newark, Delaware and Sonja L. Taylor-Bray, Harrington, Delaware, ProSe
Plaintiffs.
Janice R. Tigani and Kevin R. Slattery, Deputy Attorneys General, Delaware Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Delaware Department of Services for
Children, Youths and Their Families.
Lance M. Geren, Esquire, Freedman and Lorry, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, and Michael L.
Artz, Esquire, Washington, DC. Counsel for Defendants American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, Pat Bailey, and Cameron Henry.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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March 26, 2013
Wilmington, Delaware
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Jimmy Watson ("Watson") and Sonja L. Taylor-Bray ("Taylor-Bray") (together
"Plaintiffs") filed Civ. No. 10-978-LPS on November 15, 2010, alleging discrimination pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Taylor-Bray then filed a second case, Civ. No. 12-019-LPS, alleging
discrimination. The cases were consolidated. Plaintiffs appear pro se and have been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 47, 49, 62);
Defendant American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees International's
("AFSCME Int'l") Motion to Clarify Order (D.I. 56); Taylor-Bray's Motion for Summary
Judgment (D.I. 66); and Defendants' Motion for Extension of Time to Answer the Motion for
Summary Judgment (D.I. 67) and Motion to Stay regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment
(D.I. 68).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant AFSCME Int'l's Motion to Dismiss,
grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Dismiss filed by Delaware Department of Services
for Youth and Their Families' ("DSCYF"), grant AFSCME Int'l's Motion to Clarify Order, grant
the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Pat Bailey ("Bailey") and Cameron Henry ("Henry"),
deny without prejudice as premature the Motion for Summary Judgment, and deny as moot the
Motion to Extend Time to Answer the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Motion to Stay
regarding the Motion for Summary Judgment. In addition, the Court will withdraw the
consolidation ofCiv. No. 10-978-LPS and Civ. No. 12-019-LPS and the cases will proceed under
their individual captions.
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II.
BACKGROUND
Watson and Taylor-Bray were formerly employed as youth rehabilitation counselors in
facilities operated by the DSCYF. They were both members of American Federal of State,
County and Municipal Employees Local2004 ("Local2004"). (D. I. 44, D.I. 49 Ex. D) Local
2004, not AFSCME Int'l, is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the DSCYF. (D.I.
49 Ex. D) Prior to consolidation of the cases, the Court dismissed the Complaint (D.I. 3) and its
Amendment (D.I. 10) in Civ. No. 10-978-LPS and gave Plaintiffs leave to amend. (See D.I. 41,
42) The original pleadings attempted to raise claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. An
Amended Complaint ("Second Amended Complaint") (D.I. 44) was filed on April12, 2012, but
contains no mention of Taylor-Bray. It names only Watson as a plaintiff and is signed only by
Watson. Named as defendants are DSCYF with Vivian Rapposeli ("Rapposelli"), Karen Smith
("Smith"), Susan Jones ("Jones"), Mitch Rock ("Rock"), and Ben Garrison ("Garrison") in their
official capacities for the DSCYF and AFSCME Int'l/Council 81 with Pat Bailey ("Bailey"),
Cameron Henry ("Henry"), and Janice Williams ("Williams")' in their official capacities for
AFSCME Int'l. The Second Amended Complaint raises the following claims: (1) Title VII race
discrimination and retaliation; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) violations of procedural and
substantive due process. (!d.) It does not contain a prayer for relief.
Watson, who is black, alleges race discrimination and retaliation occurred when he was
accused by Rock, who is white, of sexually harassing female students. Rock suspended Watson
on May 29, 2009, pending an investigation. (See D.I. 44 at Charge ofDiscrimination 17C-2020-
'Williams was dismissed as a defendant in the original Complaint. (See D.I. 52, 53) She
has not been served with the Second Amended Complaint.
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00069) Following the investigation, Watson returned to work and Rock required Watson to
undergo new employee training despite his twelve-year employment with DSCYF. Watson was
discharged on September 29, 2009 after he witnessed an incident and failed to write an incident
report.
Watson reported Rock's harassment to his supervisor and the union. Watson alleges that
Rock engaged in systemic racism in the workplace; that DSCYF failed to follow proper
procedures or investigate his claims prior to his discharge; and that Rock failed to follow
DSCYF's procedures or the collective bargaining agreement in his discharge. Watson filed a
charge of discrimination on December 23, 2009. A notice of right to sue was mailed to him on
August 26, 2010.
Prior to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Taylor-Bray initiated Civ. No. 12019-LPS, solely on her behalf. She raised claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and§ 1983, and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq., alleging gender
discrimination and unfairlaborpractices. (Civ. No. 12-019-LPS at D.I. 2) The Court screened
the Complaint and allowed Taylor-Bray to proceed with a Title VII claim against DSCYF and an
unfair labor practices claim against AFSCME, Bailey, and Henry, and dismissed all other
claims. 2 (D .I. 5)
Presently before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (D.I. 47, 48, 62) pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) and AFSCME Int'l's Motion to Clarify Order (D.I. 56).
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Taylor-Bray was ordered to provide the Court with a copy of the charge of
discrimination claiming gender discrimination at the same time she submitted service dockets.
Although the Court docket reflects receipt of the charge of discrimination, it is not contained in
the file.
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Plaintiffs did not file responses to the Motions to Dismiss of AFSCME Int'l, Bailey, and Henry,
but Watson filed an opposition to DSCYF's Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 51). Recently, Taylor-Bray
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 66), which will be denied without prejudice as
premature.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
DSCYF filed its Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(l) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which
reliefmaybe granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). When a court is faced with 12(b)(l) and
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, as a general rule, the correct procedure is to consider dismissal on
the jurisdictional ground first, "for the obvious reason that if the court lacks jurisdiction to hear
the case then a fortiori it lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass 'n, 549 F.2d 884, 895 n.22 (3d Cir. 1977).
A.
Rule 12(b)(l)
A 12(b)(l) motion to dismiss attacks the complaint either factually or facially. "The latter
concerns 'an alleged pleading deficiency' whereas a factual attack concerns 'the actual failure of
[a plaintiffs] claims to comport [factually] with the jurisdictional prerequisites."' CNA v. United
States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S. ex rei. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co.,
473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007)); see also Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891 (explaining that 12(b)(l)
attack may be directed at "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact").
In a facial attack, the Court must consider the allegations of the complaint as true. But in
a factual attack, "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence
of its power to hear the case." Mortensen, 549 F .2d at 891. In a factual attack, "no presumptive
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truthfulness attaches to plaintiffs allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not
preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover,
the plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." !d.
When the issue of a court's jurisdiction and the merits of the case are intertwined, "a
court may determine subject matter jurisdiction without reaching the merits, so long as the court
'demand[s] less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage."'
Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mortensen, 549
F.2d at 891) (permitting evaluation of jurisdiction for claim under Sherman Act where merits and
jurisdiction closely intertwined).
B.
Rule 12(b)(6)
Evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires
the Court to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat
Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, a court may grant such a motion to dismiss only if, after "accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481-82 (3d Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that 'raise a right to
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).'" Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F .3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)). While heightened fact pleading is not
required, "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" must be alleged.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. "The complaint must state enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [each] necessary element" of a plaintiffs
claim. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315,321 (3d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is the Court obligated to accept as true "bald assertions,"
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted), "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences," Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997), or allegations that are
"self-evidently false," Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 69 (3d Cir. 1996).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Watson names as defendants DSCYF with its employees in their official capacities. "[A]
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather
is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State
itself." Will v. Michigan Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citations
omitted); see also Ali v Howard, 353 F. App'x 667, 672 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2009).
A.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
DSCYF moves for dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims raised in Count II by reason
of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. As previously determined by this Court, Watson's § 1981
claim against the DSCYF is barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See MCI
Telecom. Corp. v. Bell Atl. ofPa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001); D.I. 41, 42.
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Although he does not mention the statute, in Count III Watson raises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim against DSCYF by reason of his allegations that DSCYF' s employees, in their official
capacities, violated his procedural and substantive rights to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Similar to the§ 1981 claim, DSCYF
has Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the § 1983 claims.
Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss the § 1981 claim in Count II
raised against the DSCYF' s employees in their official capacities and will sua sponte dismiss the
§ 1983 claims in Count III raised against DSCYF's employees in their official capacities. 3
B.
Title VII
Count I raises Title VII race discrimination4 and retaliation5 claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, et seq. Watson filed an EEOC charge against DSCYF asserting discrimination and
retaliation by reason of race. DSCYF moves for dismissal of Watson's Title VII claim on the
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The Court has the authority sua sponte to dismiss the claims against Williams pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will not address the merits of the procedural and
substantive due process claims raised against DSCYF's employees as they are immune from suit.
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Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire ... any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ...
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a).
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The elements of a retaliation claim are that: ( 1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity;
(2) the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the employer's action. See LeBoon v. Lancaster
Jewish Comty. Ctr. Ass 'n, 503 F.3d 217, 231 (3d Cir. 2007).
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grounds that Count I fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. AFSCME Int'l also
moves for dismissal of the Title VII claims. 6
The Title VII claims against DSCYF employees in their official capacities are actually
claims against the DSCYF. See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061,
1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII);
Clarke v. Whitney, 907 F.Supp. 893, 895 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[A] suit against a defendant in his or
her official capacity is simply another way to sue the defendant's employing entity.").
Accordingly, Watson's Title VII claims against the DSCYF employees in their official capacities
will be dismissed.
DSCYF contends that the Title VII claims must be dismissed because Watson failed to
allege a prima facie case of discrimination. A complaint in an employment discrimination
lawsuit need not contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas, but it must contain at least a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
Watson has met that burden.
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Section 2000e-2(c) provides that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization to: (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) limit,
segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse
to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) cause or attempt to cause
an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
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Attached to the Second Amended Complaint is the charge of discrimination Watson
submitted to the EEOC. A district court may consider facts alleged in the complaint and its
attachments on a motion to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, 0 'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d
1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). The Court may also take into consideration a "document integral to
or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at
1426. The factual assertions in the charge of discrimination attached to the Second Amended
Complaint include Watson's race; the race of his principal antagonist; the acts of initial
discrimination that allegedly occurred on, and after, May 29, 2009; references to Watson
informing his employer of alleged race discrimination; and Watson's subsequent discharge on
September 29, 2009, after reporting the discrimination.
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The Court concludes that Watson has raised sufficient factual assertions to withstand
DSCYF's Motion to Dismiss the Title VII claims. Therefore, the Court will deny DSCYF's
Motion to Dismiss the Title VII claims raised against it in Count I.
To the extent that Watson attempts to raise a Title VII claim against AFSCME Int'l, the
clam fails. Under Title VII, a union is barred from discriminating against its members based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Martinez v. International Broth. ofElec.
Workers- IBEW Local Union No. 98, 352 F. App'x 737, 740 (3d Cir. Nov. 19, 2009) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) andAnjelino v. New York Times, 200 F.3d 73,95-96 (3d Cir 1999)).
Watson alleges that AFSCME Int'l "was aware of conflict of interest issues which
immensely affected the efficiency of representation which Council 81 provided to Local 2004
members who were predominately minority ... in comparison to other members such as those of
various Local 3384 members." (D.I. 44 at~ I) Watson further alleges that he was racially
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discriminated against and the discrimination was "sustained thru conflict of interest/collusion
with management by the state mandated employee organization tasked to provide
representation." (Id.
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I.A) Finally, Watson's charge of discrimination states that Watson
reported Rock's harassment to the union. (D.I. 44 Ex.)
Count I contains no facts to support a claim against AFSCME lnt'l. Instead, the
allegations are directed towards Watson's employer and the local unions, not AFSCME Int'l.
Even were the Court to consider the allegations as directed towards AFSCME Int'l, the
allegations fail to demonstrate that AFSCME Int'l itself committed any unlawful employment
practices. Finally, as discussed below, the Second Amended Complaint fails to allege any basis
for holding AFSCME Int'l vicariously liable for the alleged acts of its local affiliates. Therefore,
the Court will grant AFSCME lnt'l' s Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Second Amended
Complaint.
c.
42 u.s.c. § 1981
AFSCME Int'l moves for dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim raised in Count II on
the grounds that it contains no allegations directed towards it, other than a misidentification of a
local union official.
Section 1981(a) provides:
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(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
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To state a claim under section§ 1981, a plaintiff"must allege facts in support ofthe
following elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to discriminate
on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the
activities enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to make and enforce contracts."
Brown v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789,797 (3d Cir. 2001).
Count II alleges that Donald Mcilvain ("Mcilvain"), a non-defendant, is: (1) a nonminority; (2) an AFSCME International Officer; (3) a DSCYF supervisor; and (4) an individual
who maintained control over Locals 3384 and 2004. (D.I. 44 at~~ II.A) It further alleges that
Mcilvain was not terminated when he left the control room unmanned while Watson, a minority,
was terminated for failure to report a critical incident. (!d.
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II.A.3, B) Watson alleges that
.DSCYF employees Rock and Zuka showed premeditation to fabricate violations against him and
that Local 2004 minority members were disproportionately impacted when disciplined.
After considering the allegations, the Court concludes that Watson has failed to
demonstrate the elements of a§ 1981 claim against AFSCME Int'l. Watson's claims of
discrimination are directed towards Rock, an employee of DSCYF, not AFSCME Int'l. In
addition, the alleged acts by Mcilvain do not include any acts of discrimination. Finally, the
references to Mcilvain, while confusing, lead the Court to conclude that Mcilvain is incorrectly
identified as having an affiliation with AFSCME Int'l. For these reasons, the Court will grant
AFSCME Int'l' s Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Second Amended Complaint.
D.
14th Amendment Due Process
AFSCME Int'l moves for dismissal of the due process claims on the basis that it is not
legally responsible for its affiliate organizations. AFSCME Int'l is not mentioned in Count III.
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In Count III, Watson alleges that he was removed from duty and suspended from his
position in violation of procedural due process and public policy. Watson alleges that:
(1) DSCYF Deputy Superintendent Garrison removed him from duty in violation of the Local
2004 collective bargaining agreement, Article 10; and (2) he received an intercom call from
DSCYF Superintendent Rock, DSCYF Supervisor Hollis, and Local 2004 Treasurer/Secretary
Williams in violation ofhis Weingarten rights. 7 Watson was advised that he was suspended
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indefinitely.
Two weeks later, DSCYF Supervisor Faust informed Watson that he would return to
work once Rock "figured out how to bring him back." (D.I. 44 at~ liLA) Watson was
terminated on September 23, 2009, when he was handed a notice of termination from Local2004
President Henry and then escorted into a room with Rock and Jones. Watson requested a posttermination hearing and it was conducted by Darryl Dawson. He alleges that he did not receive a
written decision or copy of an institution abuse finding.
When determining the vicarious liability of an international union for the discriminatory
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actions of its local union affiliates and their officers, common law agency principles apply. See,
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e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979); Berger v. Iron Workers
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Reinforced Rodmen Local201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A principal-agent
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relationship may not be inferred solely from affiliation between an international union and a local
union. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 217; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 268 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1925); United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S.
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"The Supreme Court's decision inNLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975),
entitles employees who are union members to union representation during investigatory
interviews." Dennis v. County ofAtl. Cnty., 863 F. Supp. 2d 372, 387 (D.N.J. 2012).
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344, 395 (1922). "The test to determine whether an agency relationship exists is essentially one
ofbalancing the character of the business affairs subject to the International's control and
supervision against those left to the discretion of the local." Alexander v. Loca/496, Laborers
Int'l Union ofN Am., 778 F.Supp. 1401, 1420 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (citing Berrigan v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 560 F.Supp. 165, 169 (D.Mass. 1982)). In addition, "[t]o be held liable for the
actions of individuals, a union must be shown to have 'instigated, supported, ratified or
encouraged' the particular activities in question." Feather v. United Mine Workers ofAm., 711
F.2d 530, 539 (3d Cir. 1983).
Even accepting all well-pled facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
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ofWatson, the Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege facts sufficient
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to state a plausible right to relief on the grounds that AFSCME Int'l in any way violated
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Watson's due process rights. Accordingly, the Court will grant AFSCME Int'l's Motion to
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Dismiss Count III of the Second Amended Complaint.
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E.
Unfair Labor Practices and the Duty of Fair Representation
Plaintiffs have named as defendants Bailey, Henry, and Williams. Bailey is a staff
representative with Council 8, Henry is the former president of Local 2004, and Williams is the
treasurer/secretary for Local 2004. 8 Bailey and Henry move for dismissal for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. (See D.l. 62) As noted, Williams has never been
served. In addition, AFSCME Int'l moves for clarification of the Court's previous order that
allowed Taylor-Bray to proceed against it. (See D.l. 57)
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According to Bailey and Henry, Local 2004 is a subordinate body to Council 81. (D .I.
62 at 2)
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The Court has liberally construed the claims of Taylor-Bray as alleging unfair labor
practices or a breach of duty of fair representation claim against AFSCME, Bailey, and Henry.
See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 185. In the Second Amended Complaint, Watson attempts to raise similar
claims against Bailey, Henry, and Williams in their official capacities.
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against individual union officials. See Carino v. Stefan, 376 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[A]
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damage claim may not be maintained against an individual union officer even if the individual's
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Plaintiffs, however, may not bring actions for the breach of the duty of fair representation
conduct was unauthorized by the union and was in violation of an existing bargaining
agreement.")). In addition, for the reasons discussed above, Taylor-Bray may not raise claims
against AFSCME Int'l based on vicarious liability for the acts oflocal unions.
For the above reasons, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 62) filed by
Bailey and Henry, will grant AFSCME Int'l's Motion to Clarify (D.I. 56), dismiss AFSCME Int'l
as a defendant, and will dismiss the claims against Williams sua sponte. 9
V.
CONSOLIDATION OF CASES
The Court consolidated the Complaints in Civil Action Nos. 10-978-LPS and 12-019-
LPS. Having considered the Second Amended Complaint filed solely by Watson and the
Complaint filed solely by Taylor-Bray, the Court concludes that the actions no longer involve
common questions of fact. The only viable claims are the discrete Title VII claims of each
Plaintiff against their former employer, DSCYF. Therefore, the Court will withdraw the
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The Court has the authority sua sponte to dismiss the claims against Williams pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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consolidation of Civil Action Nos. 10-978-LPS and 12-019-LPS. Each case will proceed under
its individual caption.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will: (1) grant in part and deny in part DSCYF's Motion
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to Dismiss (D.I. 48); (2) grant AFSCME Int'l's Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 47); (3) grant the Motion
to Dismiss (D.I. 62) filed by Bailey and Henry; (4) grant the Motion to Clarify (D.I. 56); (5) sua
sponte dismiss Williams as a defendant; (6) deny without prejudice as premature the Motion for
Summary Judgment (D.I. 66); (7) deny as moot the Motion to Extend Time to Answer the
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 67); (8) deny as moot the Motion to Stay regarding the
Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 68); and (9) withdraw the consolidation of Civil Action No.
12-019-LPS and Civil Action No.l0-078-LPS.
An appropriate Order follows.
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