Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING AS MOOT 63 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person filed by H-S Tool & Parts Inc., DISMISSING AS MOOT 55 MOTION to Transfer Case to Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division filed by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., GRANTING 36 MOTION to Remand to State Court and Order filed by Susan Durkin Laugelle. Signed by Chief Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 2/20/2012. (asw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SUSAN DURKIN LAUGELLE, Individually
And as Personal Representative of the Estate
Of Joseph Laugelle, Jr. Deceased, and SUSAN
DURKIN LAGUELLE, as Next Friend of Anna
Grace Laugelle, and Margaret Grace Laugelle
Plaintiff,
v.
BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. eta!.
Defendants.
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Civ. A. No. 10-1080 (GMS)
MEMORANDUM
I.
INTRODUCTION
On December 7, 2010, the plaintiff Susan Laugelle ("Laugelle"), filed this suit based on
the Delaware Wrongful Death and Survival claims, and other violations of state law, in the
Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County. 1 One of the defendants,
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited ("Bell Canada"), removed the case on December 10,
2010. Laugelle asserts that this removal was improper, and that the court lacks jurisdiction over
this matter. Presently before the court is Laugelle's Motion to Remand.
II.
BACKGROUND
This lawsuit arises out of the crash of a Bell 206L-4 helicopter off the coast of Sabine
Pass, Texas on December 11, 2008. All aboard the aircraft were killed, including the decedent,
Joseph Laugelle Jr. On December 7, 2010 Laugelle filed this action alleging violations and
1
That case was captioned Laugelle, et al. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., et al., No. NlOC-12-054.
breaches of: the Delaware Wrongful Death and Survival acts; state negligence and strict liability
laws; express and implied warranties; and product liability laws against the manufacturers of the
helicopter, its engines and components, and entities that performed its maintenance. (D.I. 1, Ex.
A.) On December 10,2010, before the state court had issued the summonses-required for
proper service under the Delaware Rules of Civil Procedure-Bell Canada filed a Notice of
Removal in the United States District Court for the District ofDelaware. 2 (D.I. 37 at 3.) All
twelve defendants were properly joined and served by December 16,2010, and Laugelle is
presently seeking waivers of service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). (!d.)
Twelve of the named defendants reside in this forum and have been properly joined and
served, including two affiliates of Bell Canada: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. and Textron Inc. 3
Bell Canada, however, is a foreign corporate entity, incorporated under the laws of Canada, with
its principal place of business in Quebec.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bell Canada, as the party advocating removal, bears the burden of demonstrating that
removal was proper. Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392,396 (3D Cir. 2004);
Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, Ill (3d Cir. 1990). The Third Circuit has stated
that "removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of remand." Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006,
1010 (3d Cir. 1987); see also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09,61
S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941) (noting "Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the
2
Bell Canada subsequently filed a notice of Filing of Removal in the Superior Court action on December 13,2010.
(D.I. 42 at 1.)
3
All twelve defendants are: (1) Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.; (2) Textron Inc.; (3) Rolls-Royce Corporation; (4)
Rolls Royce North America, Inc.; (5) Honeywell International Inc.; (6) Honeywell Aerospace, a Group of
Honeywell International Inc.; (7) Honeywell Aerospace, Engines, Systems & Services; (8) Honeywell Engine
Control Systems, a Division of Honeywell Aerospace, Engines, Systems &Services; (9) The Bendix Corporation;
(9) AlliedSignal, Inc.; (1 0) Eaton Corporation; (11) Eaton
Aerospace Fuel Systems; and (12) The Bristow Group Inc.
2
federal courts on removal" and "calling for the strict construction" of removal statutes.)
Furthermore, if"there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, [the] case should not be
removed to federal court." Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 865 (3d Cir. 1996).
IV.
DISCUSSION
a. Diversity Jurisdiction
Generally, an action may be removed if it could have been originally filed in federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2011). When removal is predicated on diversity jurisdiction, there
must be complete diversity and the jurisdictional amount must be satisfied. In addition to these
prerequisites, an action removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction must satisfy the additional
requirements of the forum defendant rule.
The forum defendant rule comes from the language of28 U.S.C. §1441, the removal
statute. Section (b) of that statute states:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only
if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (emphasis added). Relevant to the analysis here is the second
sentence, which applies to cases where a federal question is not asserted as the basis for subject
matter jurisdiction. In those cases, the forum defendant rule provides that when one or more of
the "properly joined and served" defendants is a forum defendant-that is, a citizen of the state
in which the state court action is brought-the case may not be removed. Hurley v. Motor
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Coach Industries, Inc., 222 F.3d 377, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, however, Bell Canada removed
the case before any of the forum defendants had been served. Thus, it argues that removal was
proper. Laguelle contends that Bell Canada's interpretation ofthe statute cannot stand because
no defendant could have been properly served under Delaware law at the time of removal.
Furthermore, Laguelle contends that Bell Canada's reading undermines the purpose of the forum
defendant rule, and therefore should not be adopted. The court agrees.
"Many courts explain that the [forum defendant] rule reflects the belief that the purpose
for diversity jurisdiction, namely the potential that a local court and local jury may be prejudiced
against an out-of-state defendant, is not necessary when the defendant is a resident of the forum
state." "Removal Prior to Service: A New Wrinkle or a Dead End?" 75 Defense Counsel Journal
177, 178 (Apr. 2008) (citing DeAngelo-Shuato v. Organon USA Inc. 2007 WL 4365311 at *3
(D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007)). In order to further the goals of this policy, it makes no difference when
the forum defendant is joined: so long as there is a forum defendant, there is no concern that the
state court or jury will be biased against the defendant.
Here, it is undisputed that there are forum defendants. What is disputed is the meaning of
the term "properly joined and served as defendants." 4 Most courts agree that the language of this
rule acknowledges the potential for gamesmanship by a plaintiff who may join "as a defendant, a
resident party against whom it does not intend to proceed, and whom it does not even serve," in
an effort to block removal by an out-of-state defendant. !d. (quoting Holmstrom v. Harad, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16694, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2005)).
4
Unfortunately, there is no legislative history on this issue. See Sullivan v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F.Supp.2d
640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008) (noting that the court thoroughly searched for legislative history and was "able to locate
neither a specific statement from Congress nor from the advisory Committee on Revision of the Judicial Code ...
regarding the addition of the 'properly joined and served' language").
4
Laugelle argues that Bell Canada's interpretation of the removal statute encourages
defendants to "race to the courthouse," thereby contradicting the purpose of the rule and
allowing defendants in states with a built-in time lag for proper service to have unfettered access
to the federal courts. Furthermore, Laugelle points out that Bell Canada's reading of the statute
would promote inequitable application of the removal statute across the country due to the
varying rules on in-state service, and would wreak havoc in many jurisdictions where immediate
service is improper, including Delaware. 5 This argument is persuasive. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has stated, "The removal statute which is nationwide in its operation, was intended to be
uniform in its application, unaffected by local law definition or characterization of the subject
matter to which it is to be applied." Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104, 61
S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941). An interpretation of §1441(b) that allows for a non-forum
defendant to remove before forum defendants are served would foster non-uniform application of
the federal rules. 6
Other district courts that have considered this issue have concluded that Congress could
not have intended removability to hinge on the timing of service. See, e.g., Oxendine v. Merck &
Co. Inc., 236 F.Supp.2d 517, 526 (D. Md. 2002) ("[R]emovability can not rationally tum on the
timing or sequence of service of process"). This conclusion makes particular sense today given
the shift to electronic docketing and the increased potential for gamesmanship by savvy
5
Delaware rules of civil procedure do not pennit service of a praecipe and complaint until the court issues a
summons to be served upon the defendant by the sheriff, or private process server with court pennission. Del R.C.P.
4.
6
As noted above, Delaware rules require the sheriff to serve a defendant, only after the court issues a summons. In
New Jersey, litigants are not pennitted to serve an already-filed complaint upon a defendant until a Track
Assignment Notice is issued by the court clerk, which has ten days to do so. Ethington v. General Electric Co., 575
F.Supp.2d 855, 857 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2008); N.J.R.C.P. 4:5A-2.
Pennsylvania requires that original service of process in 66 of its 67 counties be made only by the county sheriff in
all but the most limited circumstances, and the sheriff has thirty days to effectuate service. Pa.R.C.P. 400(a).
However, in states like Missouri and West Virginia, a complaint may be served much sooner given the lack of any
governmental involvement in the service process. See Mo. Rule 54.01(a), Mo. Rule 54.13(a); WV RCP 4(b), WV
RCP 4(c)(2).
5
defendants who may monitor State Court dockets. Vivas v. Boeing Co., 486 F .Supp.2d 726, 73435 (N.D. Ill. 2007). Indeed, in a 2007 opinion, Judge Chesler made exactly this point when he
stated that "blindly applying the plain 'properly joined and served' language of§ 1441(b)
eviscerate[s] the purpose ofthe forum defendant rule" and "creates an opportunity for
gamesmanship by the defendants, which could not have been the intent of the legislature in
drafting the 'properly joined and served' language." Fields v. Organon USA Inc., 2007 WL
4365312 at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007).
The court also notes that a plaintiffs choice of forum is given deference. "Unless the
balance is strongly in favor of a transfer, the plaintiffs choice of forum should prevail." ADE
Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 138 F.Supp.2d 565, 567-68 (D.Del. 2001). The deference
afforded plaintiffs choice of forum will apply as long as a plaintiff has selected the forum for
some legitimate reason. CR. Bard, Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 997 F.Supp. 556, 562 (D.Del. 1998);
Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Integrated Circuit Sys., Inc., Civ. No. 01-199,2001 WL
1617186, at *2 (D.Del. Nov. 28, 2001); Padcom, Inc. v. NetMotion Wireless, Inc., Civ. No. 03983-SLR, 2004 WL 1192641, at *7 (D.Del. May 24, 2004).
Given the Third Circuit's clear preference for remand as articulated in Steel Valley and
Brown, and considering the purpose of the forum defendant rule and the deference afforded to
the plaintiffs choice of forum, the court finds that removal under §1441(b) was improper.
b. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Alternatively, Bell Canada argues that regardless of the forum defendant rule, removal
was proper because there is federal question jurisdiction. Section 1441(b) states, "Any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to
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the citizenship or residence ofthe parties." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2011). Bell Canada claims that
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") regulations preempt state law, and since Laugelle
alleges that the defendants knew of defects in the helicopter and failed to notify the FAA, federal
question jurisdiction exists. Laugelle contends that the asserted claims are no more than "garden
variety" state law claims of the type that have been litigated in state courts for decades, and that
state aviation tort law has not been preempted. See Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co., 484 F.3d
907 (7th Cir. 2007) ("For decades, aviation suits have been litigated in state court.") The court
agrees.
Federal question jurisdiction exists "only when the plaintiffs statement ofhis own cause
of action shows that it is based upon [federal] laws or the Constitution." Louisville & Nashville
R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). A claim is based on federal law when (1) federal law
creates the cause of action, or (2) the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on the
resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. Of the State of Cal. V
Canst. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). The "complete
preemption doctrine" creates an exception for federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
has concluded that the preemptive force of some federal statutes is so strong that they
"completely pre-empt" an area of state law. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64
(1987). "Thus, even if the claim is pled in state court as based solely on state law, it may
nonetheless be removable to federal court if the claim is in essence a federal claim due to the
preemptive reach of federal law touching on the topic of the state law claim." Webb v. Estate of
Cleary, 2008 WL 5381225 at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
Here, Laugelle's claims do not arise under disputed and substantial questions of federal
law. To the contrary, the complaint alleges violations of state negligence, warranty, and product
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liability laws. Furthermore, Bell Canada's argument that Laugelle's reference to the FAA in the
Complaint creates preemptive federal jurisdiction is unavailing. "Regardless whether the FAA
implicitly preempts state law in the area of aviation safety such preemption can only be raised as
a defense and is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction". XL Specialty Co., 2006 WL
2054386 at* 2 (emphasis added). 7
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court will grant Laugell' s motion to remand.
Dated: February ..1:::.__, 2012
E
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In fact, Congress specifically considered-and rejected-a federal regime of aviation tort liability proposed in
legislation titled General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1989. S. REP. NO. 101-303, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1990. In refusing to support this bill, Congress expressed concern that displacing the current state law regime
with a national system violated Constitutional principles of federalism:
The general aviation industry is one of many industries that are subject to limited
Federal safety controls. Further these minimal Federal safety standards should
not be used to negate the responsibility that this industry has to the American
public for maintaining safety in its products. The creation ofnational product
liability standards for the general aviation industry is contrary to historical
precedent and would establish a dangerous standard to follow. Unlike the
areas of patent or admiralty law, there is no special historical or constitutional
precedent that would support national standards for aviation law. Further, our
nation was founded upon the fundamental principle of federalism.
The establishment of a national tort compensation scheme was never
intended by the framers of the Constitution. History teaches that a long line of
common law, generally descended from old English law, has developed in the
individual States. To the extend that differences exist between the various tort compensation
schemes found in each of the States, these schemes should be an
issue of pride and a tower of strength for the U.S. legal system. A homogenized
legal system would not take into account the cultural and historical foundations in
each of the states. The step toward a unified system oftort compensation, as
suggested by this bill, is a dangerous precedent that might upset the delicate
balance ofpower that has been established over centuries between the
Federal Government and the several states. Thus, the enactment ofthis
legislation would violate fundamental principles upon which this Nation was
founded, and therefore would create unwise legislative precedent.
If the Federal Government steps into this area of traditionally State tort law,
on the State and local level may be severely disrupted.
S. REP. NO. 101-303, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1990 (emphasis added).
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balances established
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SUSAN DURKIN LAUGELLE, Individually
And as Personal Representative of the Estate
Of Joseph Laugelle, Jr. Deceased, and SUSAN
DURKIN LAGUELLE, as Next Friend of Anna
Grace Laugelle, and Margaret Grace Laugelle
Plaintiff,
v.
BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. et al.
Defendants.
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Civ. A. No. 10-1080 (GMS)
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum of the same date, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The plaintiffs Motion to Remand to State Court (D.I. 36) is GRANTED and this
matter is remanded to the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New
Castle County;
2. the defendant Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.'s Motion to Transfer (D.I. 55) is
DISMISSED as moot 1; and
3. the defendant H-S Tool & Parts Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for lack of per
jurisdiction is DISMISSED as moot2 •
Dated: February
1
--1:_, 2012
Since this lawsuit was improperly removed and the court therefore lacks jurisdiction over it, the court declines to
decide this motion to transfer that was filed after the motion to remand.
2
See footnote 1.
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