Cooper v. Mechanick et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 6/8/12. (maw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOE F. COOPER,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 10-1 118-LPS

v.
STEPHEN MECHANICK, et aI.,
Defendants.

Joe F. Cooper, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

June 8, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Joe F. Cooper. ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. 1 He also raises supplemental State claims.
Plaintiff is currently housed at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI") in
Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. (D.l. 8) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.c.
§ 1915 and§ 1915A?

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is housed at the HRYCI. Plaintiff alleges that his criminal defense attorneys,

Defendants Sean A. Motoyoshi ("Motoyoshi") and John S. Edinger ("Edinger"), coerced him
into "taking a plea." Plaintiff "wrote up" his attorneys for malpractice to the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, but Defendant Patricia B. Schwartz ("Schwartz") denied his claims. (D.l.
2)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dr. Mensch ("Dr. Mensch") told him he needed an
evaluation at a psychiatric center, but that prosecutors - Defendants Karin M. Volker ("Volker")
and Shawn E. Martyniak ("Martyniak") - and Superior Court Judge William C. Carpenter

IPursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
2The Complaint named an additional plaintiff, James Cooke ("Cooke"). Because
Plaintiffs and Cooke's claims were unrelated, a new case was opened for Cooke. The Court
does not consider, and strikes, Cooke's allegations found at paragraph IV.2. of the Complaint.
(D.l. 2)
1

("Judge Carpenter") allowed an improper evaluation to take place. 3 Plaintiff alleges that the
State used a biased expert, Defendant Dr. Stephen Mechanick ("Mechanick"). Plaintiff further
contends that his sentence and mental illness evaluation "needs to be done over the right way."
(D.I.2)
Plaintiff alleges: (1) malpractice by Edinger, Motoyoshi, the Public Defender's Office,4
and Mechanick; (2) violations of Canon law by Edinger, Motoyoshi, and Judge Carpenter;
(3) biased testimony by witness Mechanick; and (4) conspiracy.5 He seeks an investigation and
compensatory damages.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and

prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis

3It appears that the evaluation took place at the HRYCI.
4While not a named defendant, Plaintiff alleges that the Office of the Public Defender
committed malpractice in its hiring practices. The Office ofthe Public Defender is an agency of
the State of Delaware, created by the General Assembly to represent indigent defendants in
criminal cases. 29 Del. C. § 4602. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
protects an unconsenting state or state agency from a suit brought in federal court by one of its
own citizens, regardless of the relief sought. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Plaintiffs claim against the
Office of the Public Defender is barred by the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See MCl
Telecom. Corp. v. Bell At!. ofPa., 271 F.3d 491,503 (3d Cir. 2001).
5Plaintiff does not identify his theory of liability against Schwartz, who is an attorney
with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is an arm of the
Supreme Court of Delaware, which assists the Court in regulating the practice of law. See
http://courts.delaware.gov/odc/counsel.htm. Plaintiffs claim that Schwartz somehow violated
his rights when she denied the "malpractice" claims he filed against his defense counsel is
frivolous, and the Court will dismiss the claim against Schwartz.
2

actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.c. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to apro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007); Phillips v.
County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous ifit "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and § 1915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327­
28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(l) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.c. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F .3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

3

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a
two-part analysis. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id at 211. In other words, the
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show"
such an entitlement with its facts. Id A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief. '" Id (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Habeas Corpus

To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to challenge his conviction and/or sentence, his sole
federal remedy for challenging the fact or duration of his confinement is by way of habeas
corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Furthermore, a plaintiff cannot recover

4

under § 1983 for alleged wrongful incarceration unless he proves that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,487 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly
call into question the validity of a conviction or duration of a sentence, the plaintiff must first
achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the
underlying conviction or sentence. Considering Heck and summarizing the interplay between
habeas and § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court has explained that "a state prisoner's § 1983 action
is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no
matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the
confinement or its duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged or proven that his conviction or sentence was reversed or
invalidated as provided by Heck. To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages for his current
incarceration, his claim is frivolous and will be dismissed.
B.

State Actor

Plaintiff raises claims against Delaware Assistant Public Defenders Edinger and
Motoyoshi, State-retained witness/private psychiatrist Dr. Mechanick,6 and private

6Dr. Mechanick is immune from civil liability since, as a witness who provided
testimony, he is cloaked with absolute immunity from liability. See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Witnesses, including public officials and private citizens, are immune
from civil damages based upon their testimony."). To the extent Plaintiff claims Dr. Mechanick
committed malpractice, the Court finds the claim frivolous and it will be dismissed.

5

neuropsychologist Dr. Mensch.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege "the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). To act under "color of state law," a defendant must be "clothed with the authority
of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49. Public defenders do not act under color of state law when
performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings.
See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The other defendants are private individuals
who, in some fashion, have been involved in Plaintiffs criminal case. These private individuals
are not "clothed with the authority of state law." See Reichley v. Pennsylvania Dep 't ofAgric.,
427 F.3d 236,244-45 (3d Cir. 2005); Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206,216-17 (3d Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against Edinger, Motoyoshi, Dr. Mechanick, and
Dr. Mensch have no arguable basis in law or in fact. Therefore, these claims will be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A)(b)(I).
C.

Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Carpenter allowed an improper mental evaluation of Plaintiff.
"A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not
be liable for his judicial acts." Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court ofNew Jersey, 588 F.3d 180,
184 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here the allegations against Judge

6

Carpenter relate to actions he make in his judicial capacity. The Complaint contains no
allegations that Judge Carpenter acted outside the scope of his judicial capacity, or in the absence
of his jurisdiction See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,11 (1991). Judge Carpenter is immune
from suit. The claims against him lack an arguable basis in law or in fact and, therefore, will be
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

D.

Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff alleges that prosecutors Volker and Martyniak allowed an improper mental
evaluation of Plaintiff. A state prosecuting attorney is absolutely immune from liability pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the prosecutor's actions are related to the initiation and prosecution of
a criminal action. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This immunity extends to
responsibilities discharged in court, such as the presentation of evidence or legal argument, as
well as selected out-of-court behavior "intimately associated with the judicial phase[ s]" of
litigation. Id. at 430. "[T]he duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve
actions preliminary to the initiation of prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom." Id. at
431 n.33.
Courts confronted with claims challenging a prosecutor's actions must utilize a functional
analysis to determine whether or not the prosecutor acted within his or her "judicial capacity"
when attempting to apply absolute immunity. See Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir.
2008). Under the functional approach, a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for actions
performed in a judicial or "quasi-judicial" capacity. Id. Therefore, absolute immunity "attaches
to actions' intimately associated with the judicial phases of litigation,' but not to administrative
or investigatory actions unrelated to initiating and conducting judicial proceedings." Id. (internal

7

citations omitted). Further, actions that relate to the prosecutor's role as an advocate are
"judicial" actions. See Mancini v. Lester, 630 F.2d 990, 993 (3d Cir. 1980).
The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity also precludes conspiracy-based claims.
See, e.g., Savage v. Bonavitacola, 2005 WL 568045 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2005) (dismissing, based

on prosecutorial immunity, plaintiffs allegation that district attorney and other defendants acted
in concert and conspired to deprive him of federal constitutional rights); Hull v. Mallon, 2001
WL 964115 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2001) ("When the underlying activity is cloaked with
prosecutorial immunity, a conspiracy claim is similarly precluded ...").
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutors' actions violated his constitutional rights
during the change of plea and sentencing stages of his criminal case. As described, the alleged
acts occurred during judicial proceedings and required advocacy on the part of the prosecutors;
therefore, these acts are within the realm of prosecutorial functions. Hence, even if Plaintiff s
allegations are true, the prosecutors are immune from liability for their actions. Plaintiff s claims
have no arguable basis in law or in fact. Thus, the claims are frivolous and will be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

E.

Conspiracy

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Mechanick conspired with the State. For a conspiracy claim,
there must be evidence of (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and (2) actions
taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate that right. See Williams v.
Fedor, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649,665-66 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 211 F.3d 1263 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City ofPhila., 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating plaintiff must

show that two or more conspirators reached agreement to deprive him or her of constitutional

8

right under color of law).
The allegations are conclusory. In addition, the Complaint does not contain sufficient
allegations that indicate a deprivation of Plaintiff s constitutional rights or that Defendants
reached an agreement to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the conspiracy
claim will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

F.

Supplemental Claims

Because the Complaint fails to state a federal claim, the Court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs supplemental state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367; De Asencio v.

Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301,309 (3d Cir. 2003).

v.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).7 Amendment of the Complaint is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.

7There are Defendants listed in the caption of the Complaint in addition to those
discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. However, the Complaint makes no claims against these
other Defendants and, accordingly, they, too, will be dismissed.
9