Cooke v. Moody et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 11/14/2011. (ksr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JAMES E. COOKE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 11-030-LPS
v.
SGT. MARY MOODY, et aL,
Defendants.
James Cooke, Jr., l-loward R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.
Ryan Patrick Connell, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
November 14,2011
Wilmington, Delaware
STARK, U.S. District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff James E. Cooke, Jr. ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. I Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, is currently housed
at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution ("HRYCI") in Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff
appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.l.6) The Court
proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and§ 1915A.
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is housed at the HR YCI, awaiting retrial of criminal charges, following the
reversal of his conviction of rape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, arson in the first
degree, two counts of murder in the first degree, and resultant death sentence. Cooke v. State,
977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009).
Plaintiff has filed numerous grievances. He alleges that Defendant Sgt. Mary Moody
("Moody"), grievance chairperson, does not respond to his grievances and denies his grievances
as "non-grievable:' Plaintiff alleges that on December 13, 20 I 0, Ms. Minelle Young ("Young")
wrote a fraudulent report stating that Plaintiff had engaged in sexual misconduct and that
Defendant Mr. R. Charles ("Charles") conducted an improper investigation. Plaintiff alleges that
Charles allowed his supervisor to approve a report that was not supported by facts. Plaintiff was
sent to "the hole" for the write-up.
IPursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Plaintiff appears to allege that Charles' alleged failure to properly investigate was
retaliatory because Charles was mentioned in an incident report wherein he vouched for the acts
of another correctional officer who allegedly assaulted Plaintiff on May 22, 20 I O.
Plaintiff sues Moody and Charles for conspiracy to deprive him of his rights. Plaintiff
also sues Commissioner Carl Danberg ("Danberg") for endangering Plaintiff's life at the HRYCI.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.c. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.c. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to apro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007); Phillips v.
County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cif. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and § 1915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327
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28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. lvfcCuliough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the screening provisions 01'28 US.c. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless anlendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F .3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcrofi v. Iqbal, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a
two-part analysis. See Fowler v. UPlvfC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintitT has a "plausible claim for relief." Id at 211. In other words, the
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show"
such an entitlement with its facts. Id A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
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allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff names Commissioner Danberg as a defendant, but other than the prayer for relief
the Complaint contains no allegations referencing him. Hence, it appears that Plaintiff names
Danberg based upon his supervisory position.
"A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged
wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she
neither participated in nor approved." Baraka v. lVfcGreevey, 481 F.3d 187,210 (3d Cir. 2007).
"Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). The
Third Circuit has reiterated that a § 1983 claim cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat
superior and that, in order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a party
must show personal involvement by each defendant. See Brito v. United States Dep 'f ofJustice,
392 F. App'x 11, 14 (3d Cir. Aug. 18,201 0) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49) (not published);
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
"Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated
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the Constitution." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court emphasized that "[i]n a
§ 1983 suit ~ here masters do not answer for the torts of their servants
~ the
term' supervisory
liability' is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Iqbal. 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "Thus,
when a plaintiff sues an official under § 1983 for conduct 'arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities,' the plaintiff must plausibly plead and eventually prove not only that the
official's subordinates violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct
and state of mind did so as well." Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (loth Cir. 2010)
(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). The factors necessary to establish a § 1983 violation will vary
with the constitutional provision at issue. See id.
Under pre-Iqbal Third Circuit precedent, "[t]here are two theories of supervisory
liability," one under which supervisors can be liable if they "established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm," and another under which
they can be liable if they "participated in violating plaintifrs' rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person[s] in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] subordinates'
violations." Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 127 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between the supervisor's
directions and the constitutional deprivation must be sufticient to demonstrate a plausible nexus
or affirmative link between the directions and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at
issue." Id. at 130.
The Third Circuit has recognized the potential efrect that Iqbal might have in altering the
standard for supervisory liability in a § 1983 suit but, to date, has declined to decide whether
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Iqbal requires narrowing of the scope of the test. See Santiago, 629 F.3d 130 n.8; Bayer v.
A1onroe County Children and Youth Servs., 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating in light
of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of personal knowledge, with nothing more, provides
sufficient basis to impose liability upon supervisory official). Hence, it appears that, under a
supervisory theory of liability, and even in light of Iqbal, personal involvement by a defendant
remains the touchstone for establishing liability for the violation of a plaintiffs constitutional
right. 2 Williams v. Lackawanna County Prison, 2010 WL 1491132, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2010).
Facts showing personal involvement of the defendant must be asserted; such assertions
may be made through allegations of specific facts showing that a defendant expressly directed the
deprivation of a plaintiffs constitutional rights or created such policies where the subordinates
had no discretion in applying the policies in a fashion other than the one which actually produced
the alleged deprivation; e.g., supervisory liability may attach if the plaintiff asserts facts showing
that the supervisor's actions were "the moving force" behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
See Sample, 885 F.2d at 1117-18; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-54; City o.lCanton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989); Heggenmiller v. Edna lo.1ahan Corr. Inst. for Women, 128 F. App'x 240 (3d
Cir. Apr. 11, 2005) (not published).
2"Supervision entails, among other things, training, defining expected performance by
promulgating rules or otherwise, monitoring adherence to performance standards, and responding
to unacceptable performance whether through individualized discipline or further rulemaking."
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir. 1989). "For the purpose of defining the standard
for liability of a supervisor under § 1983, the characterization of a particular aspect of
supervision is unimportant." Id. at 1116-1 7.
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Plaintiff provides no facts describing how Commissioner Danberg allegedly violated his
constitutional rights, that Commissioner Danberg expressly directed the deprivation of his
constitutional rights, or that Commissioner Danberg created policies under which subordinates
had no discretion but to apply them in a fashion which actually produced the alleged deprivation.
PlaintifIhas alleged no facts to support personal involvement by Commissioner Danberg.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss as frivolous all claims against Commissioner Danberg
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
B.
Grievances
Plaintiff complains that Moody ignored and/or denied grievances he submitted. The
filing of prison grievances is a constitutionally protected activity. See Robinson v. Taylor, 204 F.
App'x 155, 157 (3d Cir. Nov. 7,2006) (not published). However, to the extent that Plaintiff
bases his claims upon his dissatisfaction with the grievance procedure or denial of his grievances,
his claims fail because an inmate does not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance
procedure. See Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. Apr. 27, 2009) (not
published) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991 )).
It is clear from the allegations that Plaintiff was allowed to submit grievances. Plaintiff
cannot maintain a constitutional claim based upon comments made to him, or his perception that
his grievances were not properly processed, investigated, or that the grievance process is
inadequate. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the grievance claims as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(l).
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C.
Failure to Investigate
Plaintiff alleges that Charles conducted an inadequate investigation. There was no
mandatory duty upon Charles to investigate the charges. See Schaeffer v. Wilson, 240 F. App'x
974,976 (3d Cir. July 18,2007) (citing Inmates o.fAttica Carr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d
375,382 (2d Cir. 1973) (inmates failed to state claim against state officials for failing to
investigate or prosecute civil rights violations). Accordingly, the claim will be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(b)(1).
D.
Retaliation
PlaintitI alleges retaliation by Charles. "Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under
§ 1983." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). Proofofa retaliation claim
requires that Plaintiff demonstrate (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected to
adverse actions by a state actor; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor
in the state actor's decision to take adverse action. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d
Cir. 2001); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
Here, there is no claim of protected activity. Rather, Plaintiff claims that Charles was
mentioned in an incident report and vouched for the actions of another correctional oUicer.
Plaintiff's conclusory retaliation allegations are frivolous and the claim will be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
E.
Conspiracy
PlaintitI alleges that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy. For a conspiracy claim, there
must be evidence of (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and (2) actions
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taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate that right. See Williams v.
Fedor, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649, 665-66 (M.D. Pa.), aird. 211 F.3d 1263 (3d Cir. 2000); see also
Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City ofPhila.. 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating plaintiff must
show that two or more conspirators reached agreement to deprive him or her of constitutional
right under color oflaw); Kelley v. A.1yler, 149 F.3d 641, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
agreement or understanding to deprive plaintiff of constitutional rights must exist).
The allegations are conclusory. In addition, the Complaint does not contain sutlicient
allegations to indicate a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights or that Defendants reached
an agreement to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the conspiracy claim
will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(l).
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(l). Amendment of the Complaint is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.
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