Harris v. City of Wilmington Delaware et al
Filing
29
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 9/9/2011. (lid)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
AYN HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEBRA WOODEN, et aI.,
Defendants.
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) Civ. No. 11-035-SLR
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Ayn Harris, Gibbstown, New Jersey. Pro Se Plaintiff.
Daniel Foster McAllister, Esquire, Assistant City Solicitor, City of Wilmington Law
Department, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dated: September q ,2011
Wilmington, Delaware
Jmd;~dge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Ayn Harris ("plaintiff') filed this lawsuit alleging violations of her
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and
was granted leave to proceed without prepayment offees. (See 0.1. 3) Presently
before the court is the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6)
filed by defendants City of Wilmington ("the City"), Department of Revenue
("Department of Revenue"), Department of Police Records ("Department of Records"),
John Rago ("Rago"), and Debra Wooden ("Wooden") (together "City defendants"). (0.1.
26) Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. The complaint states that this court has
diversity and original jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed, the court will deny in part
and grant in part the motion.
II. BACKGROUND
This case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. It was transferred to this court on January 7, 2011.1 (See 0.1. 23)
On April 5, 2010, plaintiff, who resides in New Jersey, discovered that her
vehicle, parked on a street in Wilmington, Delaware, was immobilized through the use
of a device called a "boot." Plaintiff had recently purchased the car for $1,500.00 from a
Pennsylvania dealership and was waiting for the car's title to be mailed to her. As a
result, the car was unregistered.
A notice on the windshield of the car provided a phone number for the City and
instructions on how to retrieve the car. The notice states, "If you think there are valid
1The same order denied without prejudice plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief.
reasons why your vehicle should not have been immobilized, you may pay the total
amount due 'under protest,' at which time your vehicle will be released. You may pick
up the appeal procedures and form at the Revenue Department. ... The appeal must
be filed within 5 days after payment is made." (D.1. 1, ex. A) According to the
complaint, plaintiff called the number and spoke with a woman who informed her that
the car was mistakenly booted. The woman informed plaintiff that she would not be
charged any money. Plaintiff was told as well: (1) that the car would be towed but she
could retrieve it once she provided proof of ownership; (2) to check with the Department
of Revenue and the Records Department to ensure that she did not owe any money to
the City or that any warrants were outstanding before she attempted to reclaim the
vehicle; and (3) that, once she received a release, she could take possession of her car,
but she was required to have the vehicle towed to New Jersey. An employee with
defendant Swift Towing ("Swift Towing") arrived to remove the boot from plaintiffs
vehicle and towed it away.2 (D.1. 1)
On or about April 9,2010, plaintiff visited the Department of Revenue and the
Records Department and met with Wooden, a cashier supervisor with the Department
of Revenue, who refused to release her car. Next, plaintiff spoke with Rago, the
Director of Communications with the City. Plaintiff showed Rago her bill of sale as proof
of ownership of the vehicle, and Rago indicated that he would arrange for the release of
her car. Rago left and returned approximately forty-five minutes later. He refused to
release the car without giving a reason.
2Swift Towing has been served, but has not answered or otherwise appeared.
(See D.1. 6)
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Plaintiff filed the instant complaint asserting that the refusal to release her vehicle
violated her due process, equal protection, and property rights. According to plaintiff,
her car has been withheld from her without any explanation or opportunity to
demonstrate why it should not be released. Plaintiff seeks the return of her car and any
other injunctive or declaratory relief deemed fit by the court.
On January 18, 2011, City defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). More particularly, City defendants argue
that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to the extent jurisdiction lies in diversity
because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. In addition, they argue
that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff did
not respond to the motion.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may present
either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. In reviewing
a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the standards relevant to Rule 12(b)(6) apply. In
this regard, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and the
court may only consider the complaint and documents referenced in or attached to the
complaint. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In
reviewing a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not
confined to the allegations of the complaint, and the presumption of truthfulness does
not attach to the allegations in the complaint. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan
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Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Instead, the court may consider evidence
outside the pleadings, including affidavits, depositions and testimony, to resolve any
factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d
Cir. 1997). Once the court's subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint is challenged,
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. Mortensen, 549 F .2d at
891.
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6}. The court must accept
all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to
a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, her
pleading is liberally construed and her complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court
conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir.
2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id. The court
must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that plaintiff has a "plausible claim for
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relief." Id. at 211; see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In other
words, the complaint must do more than allege plaintiff's entitlement to relief; rather, it
must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. A claim is facially plausible when its
factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of 'entitlement to relief."· Id. The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions
or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." Id. "[WJhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has
not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
IV. DISCUSSION
The court turns first to the issue of dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Even if
the amount in controversy is below $75,000, thus divesting this court of diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the amount in controversy is irrelevant to plaintiff's
claims alleging violations of her constitutional rights vesting this court with original
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.3
3City defendants made the same argument before the Honorable Noel L. Hillman
("Judge Hillman") who ordered transfer of the case from the District of New Jersey to
the District of Delaware. In his order Judge Hillman opined, "Regardless of the merit of
Defendants' argument, federal question jurisdiction still exists." (0.1. 22, n.7)
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A. Constitutional Claims
The complaint alleges a violation of the right to due process in that plaintiff
received no notice or hearing before being denied her property rights and a violation of
the right to equal protection in that she was not provided reasons why she was treated
differently from others whose cars were towed in similar situations.
1. Due process
City defendants argue for dismissal by referring to the Wilmington City Code and
relying upon their position that the bill of sale for the vehicle at issue is not proof of
ownership. In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court should look to the face of the
pleadings and decide whether, taking all of the allegations of fact as true and construing
them in a light most favorable to the non-movant, the allegations state a legal claim.
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). The court may take
judicial notice of relevant city code sections. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99,
103 n.6 (3d Cir. 1984) ("To the extent [the court relies] on sources outside of the
complaint to reach [its] conclusions, such reliance is based only upon relevant state
statutes ... , of which judicial notice may be taken.").
The procedural component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that a state shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. This procedural aspect
mandates that individuals have a "meaningful" opportunity to contest significant
deprivations of liberty or property. Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146-47 (3d Cir.
1998). Advance notice is the constitutional norm, but post-deprivation notice meets due
process standards if it "guarantee[s] protection against erroneous or arbitrary seizures."
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Id. The adequacy of post-deprivation procedures depends on a balancing of the
government interests involved and the risk of an erroneous deprivation caused by a lack
of additional safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), quoted with
approval in City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716 (2003) (per curiam).
Accordingly, U[t]o establish a cause of action for a violation of procedural due process, a
plaintiff [must prove] that a person acting under color of state law deprived [her] of a
protected interest [and] that the state procedure for challenging the deprivation does not
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process." Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of
Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667,680 (3d Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff alleges a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her vehicle. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). It is clear from the allegations that, prior to
the towing of her vehicle, plaintiff was not provided a pre-deprivation hearing. Whether
a pre-deprivation hearing was warranted requires an analysis under the sliding-scale
approach promulgated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). The court declines to undertake such an analysis here given the need for
development of a factual record.
Nor does it appear plaintiff was provided with notice of her right to a postdeprivation hearing. The court takes judicial notice that the Wilmington City Code
provides a mechanism for a post-deprivation hearing when a fine is incurred. Section
37 -131 (b) provides that:
If such immobilization and/or towing and storage charges are paid under
protest, or if the fine on the violation for which the vehicle was towed or
immobilized is paid under protest, the offender shall be entitled to a
hearing before the municipal court for the city. Such hearings are held,
without appointment, on Friday mornings at 9:30 a.m. in the municipal
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court for the city. The notice placed upon the motor vehicle pursuant to
section 37-125, warning that the vehicle has been immobilized and should
not be moved, shall include a statement advising the motor vehicle
owner or his agent of the foregoing right to pay the fines and fees
under protest and to appear in the municipal court on the next Friday
morning at 9:30 a.m. to present his reasons why the motor vehicle
should not have been immobilized. When such fines and fees are paid
under protest, at which time the motor vehicle shall be released, such
fines and fees shall be held in escrow by the department of finance
pending the outcome of the municipal court hearing. If the municipal court
determines that the motor vehicle should not have been immobilized or
that such fines and fees or any part thereof need not have been paid, the
court shall so advise the department of finance which shall release such
fines or fees or part thereof from the escrow account to the motor vehicle
owner or his agent.
Wilmington City Code § 37-131(b) (emphasis added).
With regard to a post-deprivation hearing, the complaint alleges that plaintiff was
not required to pay a fine, was given no explanation why the vehicle would not be
released to her, and given no notice of her right to appear in municipal court for a
hearing as required by § 37-131(b).
City defendants rely upon Wilmington City Code § 37-131 (a)(1) and (2), as
follows:
Redemption of vehicles; civil penalties for abandoned vehicles.
(a) Before the owner or his agent shall be permitted to have an
immobilized vehicle released or to remove an impounded vehicle from any
pound provided for by this article, the following steps shall be taken:
(1) The owner shall pay by cash, money order, or certified
check only to the city any fines and immobilization fees due
and owing for the violations for which the vehicle was
immobilized or towed, as well as any other fines for any
other parking violations which the vehicle owner may owe to
the city. Upon payment of these fines, the department of
public works will provide a receipt. In the case of an
immobilized vehicle, the department of public works shall
cause the device to be removed from the vehicle and
release the vehicle to the owner forthwith.
(2) The owner shall present the department of public works
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receipt, as well as proof of ownership of the towed vehicle,
to the records division of the police department. The owner
will then be issued a release-of-vehicle form.
Wilmington City Code § 37-131(a) (emphasis added).
According to City defendants in their statement of facts, plaintiff was required to
tender a receipt from the City's Public Works Department for payment of any
outstanding fines along with proof of ownership and registration to the records division
of the police department. (0.1. 27 at 3) Defendants argue that the Wilmington City
Code requires a showing of proof of ownership and, because plaintiffs vehicle was
unregistered, she was unable to show that she was the lawful owner. The court notes
that § 37-131 (a)(2) speaks to "proof of ownership" and not registration of the vehicle. 4
City defendants equate proof of ownership with registration. The issue of whether a bill
of sale suffices to offer proof of ownership as required in § 37-131 (a)(2) is one better
suited to a summary judgment motion.
The court finds plaintiff has stated a claim for violations of her right to procedural
due process. Therefore, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the procedural due
process claims.
4Under Delaware law, "owner" means a person who holds the legal title of a
vehicle or in the event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale
or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in
the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional
vendee or lessee or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then
such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the
purpose of this title. See 21 Del. C. § 101 (45). "Registration" means the registration
certificate or certificates and registration plates issued under the laws of the State of
Delaware pertaining to the registration of motor vehicles. See 21 Del. C. § 101(54).
The general rule is that proof that a motor vehicle is registered in the name of a person
as owner creates a presumption which makes prima facie case of ownership of the
vehicle. Finkbiner v. Mullins, 532 A2d 609, 613 (Del. Super. 1987).
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2. Equal protection
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To state
a claim under the equal protection clause, plaintiff must show that she "received
different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated." Shuman v.
Penn ManorSch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141,151 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439(1985)).
The complaint does not adequately allege that plaintiff was treated differently
because of her membership in a protected class. Nor does it allege that the taking of
the vehicle occurred based upon race or for other discriminatory purposes. While the
complaint does allege that plaintiff was treated differently from others whose cars were
towed, it does so in a conclusory manner without supporting facts.
For these reasons the court finds that the complaint fails to state an equal
protection claim. Therefore, the court will grant the motion to dismiss the equal
protection claim.
B. Municipal Liability
The City moves for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint fails to allege any
facts to establish municipal liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 A municipality may
only be held liable under § 1983 when the "execution of a government's policy or
custom ... inflicts the injury." Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480
(3d Cir. 1990). While a government policy is established by a "decision maker
5The court considers the City and its Department of Revenue and Records
Department as one municipal defendant.
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possessing final authority," a custom arises from a "course of conduct ... so permanent
and well settled as to virtually constitute law." Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citing Monell
v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978».
Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking to recover from a municipality must: (1) identify an
allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom; (2) demonstrate that the municipality,
through its deliberate and culpable conduct, was the "moving force" behind the injury
alleged; and (3) demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
alleged deprivation of federal rights. Board of the Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397,404 (1997). Here, plaintiff seeks the return of her car. In order for a civil rights
plaintiff to successfully sue a municipal entity under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that
the injury was caused by municipal policy or custom, irrespective of whether the remedy
sought is money damages or prospective relief. Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries,
_U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 447 (2010).
Liberally construing the complaint, plaintiff alludes to unconstitutional policies or
customs (the taking of her property without notice or hearing) and resulting injury as a
result of the policies. The court finds these allegations sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Therefore, the court will deny the motion to dismiss the procedural due
process claims alleging municipal liability. As discussed above, the equal protection
claim will be dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court will deny in part and grant in part City
defendants' motion to dismiss. (0.1. 26)
An appropriate order will be entered.
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