Campbell v. Hooper et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 6/14/2011. (lid)

IN THE lT1'-TITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELA WARE

JAMARR L. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

DR. HOOPER, et aI.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 11-091-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Jamarr L. Campbell ("Campbell"), an inmate at the Plummer Community
Corrections Center ("PCCC"), Wilmington, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. I (D.I. 2.) At the time he filed the complaint, Campbell was housed at the James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware. He appears pro se and was granted
permission to proceed in Jorma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915. (D.I. 6.) The court now
proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND
Campbell filed this complaint against medical personnel and prison administrators,
pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, alleging the Crest Program is an ineffective treatment program?
More particularly, Campbell alleges that: (1) the program is supposed to be a six to nine month
program, but it takes one to two years to complete; (2) completion of the program should not rely

When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
I

2The Crest program is the second part of a three-step substance abuse treatment program.
Key is the first phase of the program and Aftercare is the third phase. www.doc.delaware.gov.

upon full-time employment given the fact that it is difficult to obtain employment due to the
recession; and (3) the Crest Program harms, more than helps.
Campbell further alleges a breach of contract and violations of the right to due process
and the double jeopardy clause. According to the complaint, a breach of contract occurred when,
upon arrival at the Crest program, inmates are told that they may voluntarily discharge
themselves from the Crest program but, when an inmates tries to discharge himself, he is told by
Department of Correction ("DOC") personnel that he is not allowed to voluntarily sign out of the
program.
Campbell claims violations of due process/double jeopardy occurred when he was
sanctioned and sent to the Sussex Violation of Probation Center to serve the sanction but, upon
his return to the Crest Program, a second sanction for the same offense was imposed. Campbell
seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.c. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to apro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007). Because Campbell proceeds pro se, his pleading is
liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
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standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94
(citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a

court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327­
28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67

F .3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court
must grant Campbell leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at
1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part

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analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and
legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The court must accept all of the complaint's wellpleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id at 210-11. Second, the court
must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Campbell
has a "plausible claim for relief."3 Id at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than
allege Campbell's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts.

Id "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Treatment Program
Most of Campbell's claims revolve around his displeasure with the Crest Program.
Prisoners have no constitutional right to drug treatment or other rehabilitation. Groppi v. Bosco,
208 F. App'x 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2006) (not published); Abdul-Akbar v. Department o/Corr., 910
F.Supp. 986,1002 (D. Del. 1995); see also Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1978);

Fiallo v. de Batista, 666 F.2d 729, 730 (1st Cir. 1981); Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955 (2d Cir.
1971). Accordingly, the Crest Program claims have no basis in law and are dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

3A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of' entitlement to relief.'" Id
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B. Due ProcesslDouble Jeopardy
Campbell alleges that wrongful or unjustified "set backs" occur when an inmate is
disciplined twice for the same offense in violation of the right to due process and prohibition
against double jeopardy. He also claims defendants breached the terms of the Crest Program
contract.
The Due Process Clause itself confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action
taken "within the sentence imposed." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,480 (1995) (quoting

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983)). More so, state created liberty interests protected by
the Due Process Clause are generally limited to restraints on prisoners that impose an "atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Griffin
v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). As previously
discussed, Campbell has no constitutional right to a substance abuse treatment program. A delay
in the completion of the program does not impose an atypical and significant hardship on
Campbell in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Further, Campbell's double jeopardy claim is without merit because a disciplinary
hearing is not a prosecution for double jeopardy purposes and because sanctions imposed as a
result of such hearings do not bar future criminal prosecution. United States v. Newby, 11 F .3d
1143, 1144 (3d Cir. 1993). Prison disciplinary proceedings are used to determine whether prison
rules have been broken and to maintain institutional order, rather than a prosecution for criminal
conduct. Id. Because disciplinary sanctions are not prosecutions for criminal conduct, Campbell
fails to state a meritorious double jeopardy claim.

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Finally, the breach of contract claim does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim,
and the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over said claim. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c). Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1867 (2009); De
Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).
For the above reasons, the court will dismiss as frivolous the claims regarding "set
backs," due process, double jeopardy, and breach of contract pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the complaint will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.c.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Amendment of the complaint would be futile. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004);
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); Borelli v. City ofReading,
532 F.2d 950,951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).
An appropriate order will be entered.

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