Brown v. Aiello et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 6/8/12. (dzs, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JERON D. BROWN,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civ. No. 11-1 08-LPS

MR. TOM AIELLO, et aI.,
Defendants.

Jeron D. Brown, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

June 8, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

, U.S. District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jeron D. Brown ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging violations of his constitutional rights. I At the time he filed the Complaint, Plaintiff was
incarcerated at the Central Violation of Probation Center in Smyrna, Delaware. He has since
been released. Plaintiff appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(D.L 5, 9) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and § 1915A.

II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges unreasonable and unnecessary delay in mental health services and an

inadequate and arbitrary classification process in violation of his constitutional rights. He also
raises supplemental state claims. More partiCUlarly, Plaintiff alleges that, as of June 2010, he met
the statutory criteria as well as prison policy and regulatory requirements to substantiate and
grant his request for reclassification to serve the last six months of his sentence at Level 4 of the
Crest work release program.
Plaintiff was notified on July 19,2010 that he would be placed in the program and
received a mental health evaluation on August 26,2010. As of September 21,2010, Plaintiff had
not been reclassified and was informed that the mental health evaluation was the likely reason for
the delay. Plaintiff wrote numerous letters regarding the delay, to no avail.

lPursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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Plaintiff filed a medical grievance and was informed that the person who had conducted
the mental health evaluation "had been relieved of his duty" and no one had followed up.
Plaintiffs grievance was denied and he appealed.
Plaintiff underwent a second mental health evaluation on November 22, 20 I 0, but it was
forwarded to the wrong classification personnel. On December 20, 2010, Plaintiff received the
classification committee's decision denying his request as "not being eligible." Plaintiff
appealed the denial, but as ofthe date the Complaint was filed had not received a response.
Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, having been released in late February 2011. (See D.l.
6, 7) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and

prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e )(2) (in forma pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Phillips v.

County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

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Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and § 1915A(b)(1), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327­

28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F .3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a
two-part analysis. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The Court must accept all ofthe
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id at 210-11.

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Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211. In other words, the
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show"
such an entitlement with its facts. Id. A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief. '" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV.

DISCUSSION

A.

Classification

Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully denied classification to the Crest work release
program. It is well established that an inmate does not possess a liberty interest arising from the
Due Process Clause in assignment to a particular custody level, security classification, or place of
confinement. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-222 (2005); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461
U.S. 238,245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976). Moreovcr, the custody
placement or classification of state prisoners within the State prison system is among the "wide
spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison
administrators rather than of the federal courts." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225.
Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of constitutional dimension with respect to his
custody level classification, and the claim will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
B.

Medical

Plaintiff alleges unreasonable delay in administering him a mental health examination.
Plaintiff alleges that he was eligible for a new classification in June 2010, was examined on
August 26, 2010 and

when no action was taken

a second mental examination took place on

November 22,2010.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103-105 (1976). However, in order to set forth a cognizable claim, an inmate must allege (i) a
serious medical need and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate
indifference to that need. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d
Cir. 1999). A prison official is deliberately indifferent ifhe knows that a prisoner faces a
substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid the harm. See Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). A prison official may manifest deliberate indifference by
"intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
Allegations of negligence or medical malpractice are not sufficient to establish a constitutional
violation. See White v. Napa/eon, 897 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (1986) (stating negligence is not compensable as constitutional
deprivation).
Even when reading the Complaint in the light most favorable light to Plaintiff, he fails to
state an actionable constitutional claim against Defendants for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff underwent a mental health

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examination for reclassification purposes, action thereafter was not taken, and Plaintiff
underwent a second mental health examination after the error came to light. At the most, the
Complaint contains allegations of negligence in failing to act on the first mental health
examination. It does not, however, allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
For the above reasons, the claim will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

C.

Grievances

Plaintiff makes reference to the grievance procedure and complains of the delay in the
mental health examination. To the extent that Plaintiff bases his claims upon dissatisfaction with
the grievance procedure or denial of his grievances, the claims fail because an inmate does not
have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure. Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F.
App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. Apr. 27, 2009) (not published) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729
(8th Cir. 1991)). The denial of his grievance appeal does not in itself give rise to a constitutional
claim as Plaintiff is free to bring a civil rights claim in District Court. See Winn v. Department of

Corr., 340 F. App'x 757, 759 (3d Cir. July 28,2009) (citing Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d at 729).
Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional claim based upon his perception that his
grievance was not properly processed or that the grievance process is inadequate. Therefore, the

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Court will dismiss the grievance claim as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
§ 1915A(b)(1).

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to

28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Amendment of the Complaint is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.

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