Rollins v. Phelps et al
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 3/19/14. (mdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DUANE ROLLINS,
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Petitioner,
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V.
Civil Action No. 11-1 09-GMS
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DAVID PIERCE, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents. 1
Duane Rollins. Pro se petitioner.
Maria T. Knoll, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
f1...-l. L1
,2o14
Wilmington, Delaware
1
Warden David Pierce replaced former Warden Perry Phelps, an original party to this case. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Pending before the court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 filed by petitioner Duane Rollins ("Rollins"). (D.I. 2) For the reasons discussed, the court
will deny the petition.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts leading to Rollins' arrest and conviction are as follows:
Rollins and Demond Laws engaged in a verbal dispute on June 8, 2006. The argument
took place on the street near Rollins' house and was witnessed by Laws' girlfriend. The
argument escalated when Rollins retrieved something from a nearby vehicle and
approached Laws with what appeared to be a handgun. When Laws' girlfriend called the
police, Rollins retreated into the house.
Wilmington Police Detective Patrick Conner arrived at the scene to find other officers
securing the premises and trying to get Rollins to come out of the house. Detective
Conner left the scene to apply for a search warrant. By the time Conner returned with the
warrant, Rollins had surrendered to the police and was in custody.
As a result of his search of the house, yard and vehicle, Detective Conner seized several
rounds of ammunition, an electronic scale, clear plastic bags in various sizes, a pot of
marijuana plants, and two different substances that he suspected were cocaine or heroin.
Conner also recovered a handgun.
Rollins v. State, 7 A.3d 485 (Table), 2010 WL 4320376 (Del. Nov. 1, 2010).
Rollins was arrested and subsequently indicted on charges of trafficking in cocaine (1 050 grams), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, possession of a firearm by
a person prohibited, manufacturing marijuana, aggravated menacing, and resisting arrest. A
Delaware Superior Court jury convicted Rollins of the drug charges and resisting arrest.
However, a mistrial was declared for the remaining charges (weapon/ammunition and aggravated
menacing) because the jury was unable to reach an unanimous verdict. !d. The Superior Court
sentenced Rollins to a total of sixteen years incarceration suspended after six years for varying
levels of supervision. See Rollins v. State, 945 A.2d 595 (Table), 2008 WL 637782 (Del. Mar.
10, 2008). Rollins' conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. ld.
In March 2009, Rollins filed a prose motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion"), alleging he was constructively
and/or actually denied the right to counsel for three reasons: (1) the Public Defender's policy
and procedures prevented trial counsel from providing effective representation; (2) trial counsel
erred by admitting to the jury that Rollins was growing marijuana in a potted plant in his back
yard; and (3) trial counsel was replaced by appellate counsel on direct appeal. See Rollins, 201 0
WL 43203 76, at *1. The Delaware Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion. The Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment and also denied Rollins motion for
rehearing. !d.
II.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A")
"to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences ... and to further the
principles of comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206
(2003)(intemal citations and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to AEDPA, a federal court may
consider a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner only "on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
AEDP A imposes procedural requirements and standards for analyzing the merits of a habeas
petition in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are
3
given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see
Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206.
B. Standard of Review Under AEDPA
If a federal court determines that a claim is not procedurally defaulted and the state court
adjudicated the federal claim on the merits, the court can only grant habeas relief ifthe state
court's adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l), (2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250
F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2001). A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ifthe state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its
substance, rather than on a procedural or some other ground. Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105,
115 (3d Cir. 2009). In determining whether the Federal law is "clearly established," the focus is
on Supreme Court holdings, rather than dicta, that were clearly established at the time of the
pertinent state court decision. See Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 201 0).
If a state's highest court adjudicated a federal habeas claim on the merits, the federal
court must review the claim under the deferential standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas relief may only be granted if the state court's
decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or the state court's decision was
an unreasonable determination ofthe facts based on the evidence adduced in the trial. 28 U.S.C.
4
§ 2254(d)(l) & (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Appel v. Horn, 250
F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2001).
A claim has been "adjudicated on the merits" for the purposes of28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) if
the state court decision finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a
procedural or some other ground. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 115. The deferential standard of§
2254(d) applies even "when a state court's order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the
reasons relief has been denied"; as recently explained by the Supreme Court, "it may be
presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication
or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784-85
(2011). The Supreme Court recently expanded the purview ofthe Richter presumption in
Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088 (Feb. 20, 20 13). Pursuant to Johnson, if a petitioner has
presented the claims raised in a federal habeas application to a state court, and the state court
opinion addresses some but not all of those claims, the federal habeas court must presume
(subject to rebuttal) that the state court adjudicated the unaddressed federal claims on the merits.
!d. at *7. The consequence of this presumption is that the federal habeas court will then be
required to review the previously unaddressed claims under § 2254( d) whereas, in the past,
federal habeas courts often assumed "that the state court simply overlooked the federal claim[ s]
and proceed[ed] to adjudicate the claim[s] de novo." !d. at *3.
Finally, when reviewing a habeas claim, a federal court must presume that the state
court's determinations of factual issues are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of
correctness applies to both explicit and implicit findings of fact, and is only rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l); Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d
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280, 286 (3d Cir. 2000); Mil/er-E! v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003)(stating that the clear
and convincing standard in§ 2254(e)(1) applies to factual issues, whereas the unreasonable
application standard of§ 2254(d)(2) applies to factual decisions).
III.
DISCUSSION
Rollins asserts four ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his petition: (1) the
policies and procedures of the Delaware Public Defender's Office resulted in the actual and/or
constructive denial of counsel for Rollins during critical stages of his proceeding; (2) trial
counsel failed to investigate the merits of his case; (3) trial counsel failed to challenge the State's
case against him at trial and conceded Rollins' partial guilt in summations; and (4) counsel failed
to follow through on Rollins' appeal and subsequent counsel provided ineffective assistance on
direct appeal. Given the Delaware Supreme Court's adjudication of these claims on the merits,
habeas relief will only be warranted if the Delaware state court decisions 2 were either contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
The clearly established Supreme Court precedent governing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is the two-pronged standard enunciated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) and its progeny. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). Under the first
Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness," with reasonableness being judged under professional
norms prevailing at the time counsel rendered assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Under the
second Strickland prong, a petitioner must demonstrate "there is a reasonable probability that,
2
The Delaware Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Superior Court's denial of Rollins'
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Therefore, the court will refer to both the Superior
Court and the Delaware Supreme Court during its analysis.
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but for counsel's error the result would have been different." Id at 687-96. A reasonable
probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id at 688.
In order to sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must make
concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. See
Wells v. Petsock, 941 F.2d 253,259-260 (3d Cir. 1991); Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 891-92
(3d Cir. 1987). Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding and
leads to a "strong presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Turning to the first prong of the§ 2254(d)(l) inquiry, the court notes that the Delaware
state courts identified Strickland as governing Rollins' claims of ineffective assistance. As such,
the Delaware state courts' denial ofthe four claims was not contrary to clearly established
federal law.
The court must also determine if the Delaware Supreme Court reasonably applied
Strickland to the facts of Rollins' case. When performing this inquiry, the court must review the
Delaware state court decisions with respect to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
through "doubly deferential" lens. See Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788. In other words, "the
question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable, [but rather], whether there is any
reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." !d.
A. Claim One: Constructive and Actual Denial of Assistance of Counsel
In claim one, Rollins contends that the policies and procedures employed by the Public
Defender's Office "effectively creates a pattern of actual and constructive denial of the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments." He asserts that he was
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actually and/or constructively denied representation during his preliminary hearing and
arraignment because "surrogate counsel" represented him rather than the attorney who later
represented him throughout his criminal trial. To support this contention, Rollins states that the
"Public Defender has steadfastly complained to the powers that be, that his office is understaffed
and overworked."3 (D.I. 2 at 18)
Rollins presented this same argument to the Superior Court in his Rule 61 motion, and
that court rejected it for failing to satisfy either prong of Strickland. Referring to defense
counsel's Rule 61 affidavit, the Superior Court found that Rollins was represented by a
competent and experienced attorney in the Public Defender's Office during his preliminary
hearing and arraignment. In tum, given his failure to supply any concrete examples regarding
the effects of alleged budgetary problems, the Superior Court also concluded that Rollins failed
to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different but for the alleged "failures" of the Public Defender's Office and for the representation
by "surrogate counsel." On post-conviction appeal, Rollins argued that the Superior Court
should have analyzed claim one under the presumed-prejudice standard set forth in United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984) because there was a "complete breakdown ofthe
adversary process" in his case. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument as belied by
the record and applied the Strickland standard to claim one.
As an initial matter, the court concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court reasonably
rejected Rollins' assertion that the Superior Court should have reviewed claim one under the
presumed-prejudice standard articulated in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659-60 (1984).
3
Rollins also contends that the manner in which his trial counsel "abandoned" him on direct
appeal and let another attorney represent him amounted to actual and/or constructive denial of
representation. The court will address this argument in its discussion of claim four, which
concerns the representation of Rollins on direct appeal.
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In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court articulated a very limited exception to Strickland's
prejudice requirement, holding that there are three situations in which prejudice caused by an
attorney's performance will be presumed: where the defendant is completely denied counsel at a
critical stage; where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful
adversarial testing"; or where the circumstances are such that there is an extremely small
likelihood that even a competent attorney could provide effective assistance, such as when the
opportunity for cross-examination has been eliminated. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 & n.25. With
respect to exception two, the Cronic presumption of prejudice only applies when counsel has
completely failed to test the prosecution's case throughout the entire trial. See Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 697 (2002). The premise of Rollins' complaint appears to be that he was
constructively denied counsel because "surrogate counsel" was not the same assistant public
defender who represented him during the rest of his criminal proceeding. As a general rule,
representation of a defendant by multiple members of a public defender's does not, in and of
itself, violate defendant's right to counsel or deny a defendant counsel. See Siers v. Ryan, 773
F.2d 37,44 (3d Cir. 1985). Moreover, the record in this case demonstrates that Rollins' specific
situation does not fit within any of the three Cronic circumstances. Rollins was represented by
an assistant public defender during his preliminary hearing and arraignment, and Rollins himself
concedes this fact and refers to the attorney as "surrogate counsel." Thus, Rollins has failed to
establish the factual predicate that defense counsel was completely absent during a critical stage
of the proceeding. As such, the court construes Rollins' true issue to be whether the
representation provided by different attorneys in the public defender's office denied hi!ll
effective assistance, and this issue is governed by Strickland.
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Although an indigent defendant has a right to the appointment of counsel and effective
representation, he does not have an absolute right to be represented by counsel of his own
choosing. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006). Moreover, a criminal
defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to a "meaningful relationship" with counsel.
See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). "[T]he essential aim ofthe [Sixth] Amendment is
to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a
defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers." Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Considering that Rollins was represented by an assistant
public defender during his preliminary hearing and arraignment, and given Rollins' failure to
assert any specific allegations of deficient performance or prejudice with respect to the
representation provided by "surrogate counsel," the court cannot conclude that "surrogate
counsel" provided ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Delaware
Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland in denying claim one.
B. Claim Two: Trial Counsel Failed to Investigate
In claim two, Rollins contends that counsel failed to conduct a reasonable pre-trial
investigation and, as a result, refused to file a suppression motion. Rollins asserts that a
reasonable investigation would have revealed that the search warrant lacked probable cause and
that this information would have provided the basis for a successful suppression motion.
Rollins also contends that counsel failed to interview witnesses and failed to investigate the
circumstances and evidence involved in the case.
Turning to Rollins' first contention regarding counsel's failure to file a suppression
motion, the Superior Court concluded that there was no record support for Rollins' conclusory
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assertion that the search warrant lacked probable cause. In tum, the Superior Court accepted
counsel's explanation in his Rule 61 affidavit that he refused Rollins' request to file a
suppression motion only after reviewing the record and applicable precedent and deciding there
was no basis for a suppression motion. Finally, the Rule 61 affidavit asserts that counsel
explained the information and caselaw to Rollins, and explains that the police obtained the
search warrant after Rollins became engaged in an armed hostage situation with the police.
Rollins has not provided any clear and convincing evidence in this proceeding to rebut
the Superior Court's determination that Rollins' assertion regarding the lack of probable cause
for the search warrant was merely a conclusory and unsupported opinion. Rollins also has not
provided anything to dispute counsel's statement that he decided there was no basis for a
suppression motion only after reviewing the record and caseleaw. It is well-settled that
"[ s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible
options are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. As such, the court
concludes that the Delaware state courts reasonably applied Strickland in denying Rollins' first
ineffective assistance allegation in claim two.
As for Rollins' contention that trial counsel failed to interview several witnesses, trial
counsel's Rule 61 affidavit explains that Rollins failed to provide counsel with information about
the individuals who were present during the incident. In fact, Rollins insisted that the entire
incident never took place. Counsel also explains that he supervised an investigator who
unsuccessfully attempted to contact potential witnesses, including Rollins' girlfriend. Given the
inconsistency between Rollins' assertion that the incident never took place and his assertion that
counsel should have interviewed witnesses who were present during the incident, the court
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cannot conclude that the Delaware state courts' denial of allegation two involved an
unreasonable application of Strickland.
Finally, counsel's Rule 61 affidavit disputes Rollins' contention that counsel did not
investigate the incident and seizure of evidence. Counsel specifically describes how he visited
the scene and took the photographs that were introduced as evidence during the trial. The court
has found no record support for Rollins' assertion that counsel lied in his Rule 61 affidavit about
his investigation into the facts. Accordingly, the court concludes that this third allegation of
claim two does not warrant relief.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the court will deny claim two for failing to satisfy
§ 2254(d).
C. Claim Three: Ineffective Assistance During Trial
In his third claim, Rollins contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance during
the trial by: (1) allowing him to wear prison clothing in front of the jury; (2) admitting Rollins'
guilt to the marijuana charge during the closing argument; (3) failing to properly question
witnesses; (4) failing to subject the State's case to adversarial testing; (5) failing to present a
defense; (6) failing to move to suppress the gun; and (7) failing to request a judgment of
acquittal. The Delaware state courts denied claim three as meritless after considering counsel's
Rule 61 affidavit and the record, and concluding that trial counsel's tactical decisions were
reasonable and benefitted Rollins. For the following reasons, the court concludes that Rollins'
unsupported contentions in this proceeding fail to demonstrate that the Delaware state court
decisions involved an unreasonable application of Strickland.
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Starting with Rollins' contention that trial counsel should not have permitted him to
appear before the jury in prison clothing, counsel's Rule 61 affidavit explains that Rollins did not
request or provide different clothing for trial, or raise an objection about his clothing to the state
court. Notably, although a defendant cannot be compelled to wear prison clothes before a jury, a
defendant's failure to object to the court about being tried in prison clothes is "sufficient to
negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation." Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976). As such, Rollins has failed to demonstrate that counsel's
act of permitting him to appear at trial in prison clothing amounted to deficient performance. In
addition, considering that the jury actually failed to convict him on several charges, Rollins
cannot demonstrate prejudice caused by counsel's permitting him to wear prison clothing
As for Rollins' complaint that counsel erred by admitting that Rollins was growing
marijuana in a large pot in his backyard, counsel's Rule 61 affidavit explains that he conceded
this issue because it was undisputed. The fact that Rollins did not testify meant that there was no
basis in the record to argue that Rollins was not growing marijuana. Given this situation, counsel
made the tactical decision that it was best to avoid compromising Rollins' credibility with the
jury on the more serious charges by trying to deny that Rollins was growing marijuana. This
strategy was somewhat successful, given that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict to
convict on the charges of aggravated menacing, possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, possession of a weapon by a person prohibited, or possession of ammunition by a
person prohibited. Once again, viewing Rollins' contention in context with the record and
through the doubly deferential lens governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court
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concludes that the Delaware state courts reasonably applied Strickland in holding that Rollins'
contention did not rebut the strong presumption that counsel's strategic decision was reasonable.
Finally, none of Rollins' remaining five complaints about counsel's trial performance
persuade the court that the Delaware state courts' denial of these allegations involved an
unreasonable application of Strickland. Rollins merely re-asserts the same arguments regarding
counsel's trial decisions that he presented to the Superior Court in his Rule 61 motion. The
Superior Court thoroughly analyzed each contention within the context of the record and
pursuant to the Strickland standard, and rejected Rollins' complaints because Rollins' conclusory
statements failed to demonstrate prejudice and failed to rebut the strong presumption that
counsel's actions were professionally reasonable. In this proceeding, Rollins has provided the
same conclusory and unsupported contentions rejected by the Superior Court. As such, the court
cannot conclude that the Delaware state courts unreasonably applied Strickland in denying
Rollins' remaining complaints in claim three.
D. Claim Four: Constructive and Actual Denial of Representation on Direct
Appeal and Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In his final claim, Rollins asserts three reasons as to why he believes he was
constructively and/or actually denied representation on direct appeal. The Superior Court denied
all three claims as meritless, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that decision. For the
following reasons, the court concludes that those decisions involved a reasonable application of
Strickland.
Rollins' first contention is that trial counsel abandoned him by not perfecting his appeal.
The record clearly disputes this claim, because it shows that Rollins' appeal was transferred to
another attorney in the Public Defender's Office who then proceeded to file Rollins' appeal.
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Rollins has not provided, and the court has not found, any caselaw holding that transferring a
client's appeal to another attorney in the Public Defender's office amounts to the actual or
constructive denial of representation. Thus, this contention lacks merit.
Next, Rollins contends that his new appellate counsel did not have the authority to perfect
his appeal. He argues that "the Public Defender surreptitiously sent in a surrogate counsel to
satisfy [Rollins'] right to appellate counsel, contrary to Delaware Supreme Court Rules." (D.I. 2
at 19) Rollins contends that he would not have accepted surrogate counsel as his counsel if his
trial counsel had filed a motion to withdraw. Id. Once again, the court notes that the Sixth
Amendment does not guarantee Rollins representation by an attorney of his choosing. In tum,
Rollins has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from new appellate counsel's perfection
of his appeal. As such, this contention of claim four lacks merit.
Finally, Rollins contends that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by filing a
"no merits" brief pursuant to Delaware Supreme Court Rule 26 without conscientiously
examining the record. However, in his Rule 61 affidavit, appellate counsel explains that he
examined the record and consulted with Rollins and determined that there were no arguably
appealable issues. In addition, when presented with appellate counsel's Rule 26 "no merits"
brief and motion to withdraw on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court conducted its own
review of the record and concluded that appellate counsel "made a conscientious effort to
examine the record and properly determined that Rollins could not raise a meritorious claim on
direct appeal." Rollins, 2008 WL 63 7782, at *1. Relying on that finding by the Delaware
Supreme Court in its review of Rollins' Rule 61 motion, the Superior Court concluded that
appellate counsel's conduct was objectively reasonable and that Rollins did not demonstrate
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prejudice. Given these circumstances, the court concludes that the Delaware state courts
reasonably applied Strickland in denying Rollins' complaint about appellate counsel's "no
merits" brief.
For all of these reasons, the court will deny claim four in its entirety.
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
When a district court issues a final order denying a § 2254 petition, the court must also
decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (20 11 ). A
certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment ofthe constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The court concludes that Rollins' petition does not warrant federal habeas relief.
Reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Consequently, the court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Rollins' petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is
denied. An appropriate order shall issue.
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