Evans v. Seaford Police Department et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 4/3/2012. (lih)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
AUGUSTUS HEBREW EVANS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 11-195-LPS

v.

SEAFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT,
et aI.,
Defendants.

August Hebrew Evans, Jr., James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April 3, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff August Hebrew Evans, Jr. ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging constitutional violations and violations of Delaware law.! (D.!. 3,21) Plaintiff
is incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware. He
appears pro se and has paid the filing fee. The Court proceeds to review and screen the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

II.

BACKGROUND
On July 14,2006, Plaintiffs father, Augustus Hebrew Evans, Sr. ("Evans Sr."), was

struck by an automobile. He subsequently died from his injuries. Earlier on July 14, 2006,
Defendant Sgt. Thomas Lee ("Sgt. Lee"), a member of the Seaford Police Department, saw
Evans Sr., who was familiar to the Seaford police. Evans Sr. appeared to be intoxicated, and Sgt.
Lee gave him a ride to an apartment where he believed Evans Sr. resided. Sgt. Lee watched two
other individuals enter the apartment with Evans Sr. and Sgt. Lee drove away. Unbeknownst to
Sgt. Lee, Evans Sr. had been temporarily relocated to a motel due to flooding. When Evans Sr.
was struck by a vehicle later in the day, he was walking in the opposite direction from the motel.
On March 13,2007, Plaintiff filed a civil rights claim in the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware ("Superior Court"), Evans v. Sterner, No. SS07C-03-009 THG (the "State case"),
apparently on behalf of Evans Sr. The instant Complaint alleges that on April 17, 2007, the
Superior Court rejected the claim and directed Plaintiff to file an action under Delaware's

!Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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Wrongful Death Statute. The April 17,2007 docket entry for the State case states, "the motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted and this action is stayed until the sooner of 10112/07 or the
date Plaintiff establishes he is an executor or administrator of the Estate of Augustus Hebrew
Evans, Sr." (D.L 24 at 5) Apparently, when Plaintiff did not establish that he was the executor
or administrator of the estate of Evans Sr., he proceeded to file an Amended Complaint on his
own behalf where, as he states in a pending motion before this Court, he "abandoned the civil
rights tort" and, thereafter, raised claims under Delaware's Wrongful Death Statute, 10 Del. C.
§§ 3721-3725, and the County and Municipal Tort Claims Act, 10 Del. C. §§ 4001-4013, naming
as defendants the Seaford Police Department, Capt. Gary Flood ("Flood"), Cpl. Jason Sterner,
and PFC Chris Miller. 2 (See D.L 23 at 1) On March 27, 2008, the claims against the Seaford
Police Department and Flood were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
On October 24,2008, in the State case, Plaintiff was given leave to amend to add Sgt. Lee
as a defendant. On October 21, 2009, the Superior Court granted Sgt. Lee summary judgment
upon finding that Sgt. Lee was immune from suit pursuant to the County and Municipal Tort
Claims Act, 10 Del. C. § 40 11 (c). The Superior Court specifically noted that Plaintiff failed to
point to any evidence that could give rise to a jury finding that Sgt. Lee acted wantonly or that
Sgt. Lee's conduct was done with a willful and malicious intent as to the safety of Evans Sr.
(D.L 24 at ex. 1) Plaintiff appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed the
judgment on June 1,2010. See Evans v. Lee, 2010 WL 2179803 (Del. June 1,2010) (table).

2The Seaford Police Department, Flood, and Sgt. Lee (later added to the State case) are
named defendants in the instant complaint. Mayor Ed Butler, who is also named in the instant
Complaint, was not a named defendant in the State case.
2

Plaintiff's subsequent petitions for a writ of certiorari and for rehearing were denied by the
United States Supreme Court. See Evans v. Lee, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 913 (2011); Evans v.
Lee, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1562 (2011).
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint on March 7, 2011, followed by an Amended
Complaint on June 28, 2011. (D.I. 3, 21) He alleges that he has exhausted "all State court tort
causes and brings the rejected claims under the substantive due process rights of the United
States Federal Constitution that are ripe before the District Court." (D.I. 21 at ~ II) He asks this
Court to vacate the Superior Court's October 21,2009 judgment, and has filed a Rule 60(b)
Motion for Relief from Judgment in this Court, a Motion to Amend the Rule 60(b) Motion, a
conference hearing request, and a Rule 9 Special Pleading to address claim preclusion, res
judicata, and statute of limitations. (See D.I. 23,29,30,31)
The Amended Complaint alleges that, because the substantive due process claim was
dismissed by the Superior Court for want of jurisdiction on March 7, 2007 and, because Plaintiff
was directed to file his lawsuit under State statutes, he preserved his federal constitutional claim
for review by this Court. Plaintiff sues defendants in their individual and official capacities on
the grounds that the exercise of the municipality's "policy or custom" played a substantial part in
the violation of Evans Sf. 's substantive due process rights and liberty interest in personal security
under the "state created danger theory.,,3 Plaintiff alleges that: (I) Sgt. Lee abandoned Evans Sr.,
thus increasing the risk of harm to a visibly intoxicated individual to whom Sgt. Lee owed a duty

3The state created danger doctrine "places an affirmative duty under the due process
clause on an official to protect and care for an individual when the official has placed the
individual in a dangerous position that he would not have otherwise faced." Wyatt v. Krzysiak,
82 F. Supp. 2d 250,255 (D. Del. 1999); see also J.L. v. Barnes, 33 A.3d 902 (Del. Super. 2011).

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that he breached; (2) Flood failed to train against a widespread inadequate policy and/or custom;
and (3) as to Butler, the municipality's training of its police officers in handling intoxicated
persons is inadequate, and the deficiency in training actually caused Sgt. Lee to abandon Evans
Sr. in his visible state of inebriation and need for assistance. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and
punitive damages totaling twelve million dollars.

III.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Notwithstanding Plaintiff s payment of the filing fee, the Court must, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A, screen an inmate's complaint that seeks redress from a government defendant in
a civil action. See Williams v. Marino, 2008 WL 2247090, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2008) (citing

Vega v. Kyler, 90 F. App'x 437 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2004) (not published) (prisoner civil rights
complaint filed with fee paid is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) but not 28 U.S.c.
§ 1915(e)(2)).
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner
seeks redress from governmental defendant). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a
complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007); Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir.
2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint,
"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l), a court may dismiss a

complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d

Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915A(b)(l) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a

complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the
screening provisions of 28 U .S.C. § 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp.,293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a two-part
analysis. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual
and legal elements of a claim are separated. See id The Court must accept all of the complaint's
well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. See id. at 210-11. The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at

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1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient
to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. In other
words, the complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must
"show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id. A claim is facially plausible when its factual
content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts
that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short ofthe line between
possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction and have no authority to review
final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.4 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); see also Power v. Department of Labor, 2002 WL 976001 (D. Del. May 3,
2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in cases "brought by [a] state-court loser ...
complaining of injuries caused by the state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).

4Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests the court of subject matter jurisdiction, it
may be raised at any time by the court sua sponte. See Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d
72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003); Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411,419 (3d Cir.
2003).
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Plaintiff couches his claims as violations of Evans Sf. 's right to due process, pursuant to
42 U.S.c. § 1983 under the state created danger doctrine. It is evident, however, that he actually
seeks review and rejection of Delaware state court decisions in the wrongful death and municipal
tort liability lawsuit he filed on behalf of his deceased father. Of note is that Plaintiff filed a Rule
60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment for this Court to reverse the Superior Court's October 21,
2009 grant of summary judgment to defendants in the State case. (See D.L 23)
Plaintiffs claims come within the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and,
therefore, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction. Allowing Plaintiff s claims to proceed against
Defendants would allow him to use the federal courts to appeal state court judgments and, thus,
would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 413; District of

Columbia Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). Thus, to the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to have this Court invalidate the orders of the Superior Court of the State of
Delaware, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to do so.

B.

Claim PreclusionlIssue Preclusion

This Court may dismiss, sua sponte, claims barred by res judicata or claim preclusion.

See Kingv. East Lampeter Twp., 69 F. App'x 94 (3d Cir. July 2,2003) (not published)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel).
Under the doctrine of res judicata (also referred to as claim preclusion), a judgment in a prior suit
involving the same parties, or parties in privity with them, bars a subsequent suit on the same
cause of action. See Fairbank's Capital Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App'x 21,23 (3d Cir. May 10,
2007) (not published); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office ofAm., Inc., 292
F.3d 384,392 (3d Cir. 2002). "The rationale is that if the adjudication of an action is binding on

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parties in privity with the parties fonnally named in the litigation, then any claims against parties
in privity should be brought in the same action lest the door be kept open for subsequent
relitigation of the same claims." Transamerica Occidental, 292 F.3d at 392.
Collateral estoppel (also known as issue preclusion) refers to the preclusive effect of a
judgment on the merits of an issue that was previously litigated or that could have been litigated.
See Fairbank's Capital Corp., 234 F. App'x at 23. Issue preclusion occurs "[wJhen an issue of

fact or law is actually litigated and detennined by a valid and final judgment, and the
detennination is essential to the judgment," making the detennination "conclusive in a
subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Jean
Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L 'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). There are four requirements for the application of collateral estoppel:
(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the

previous detennination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from
relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action." See id
Plaintiff is barred by the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion from relitigating his
claims relating to the actions of the Seaford Police Department, its officers, and city officials
with regard to Evans Sr.'s death. See Burlington N R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63
F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff raised civil rights claims in his initial Complaint
filed in the State case, but he then abandoned the civil rights claims to pursue State claims. (See
D.l. 23 at 1) To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise additional claims that could have been raised in
his prior State case, said claims are also barred. See CoreStates Bank, NA. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176
F.3d 187,194 (3d Cir. 1994).

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C.

Statute of Limitations

Plaintiffs claims are also time-barred, presenting an alternative basis for dismissal. In a
filing with the Court, Plaintiff appears to invoke equitable tolling, contending that, because the
State court rejected his civil rights claim and directed him to file under Delaware laws, the statute
of limitations does not apply where he timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.
(See D.1. 31) Equitable tolling is an extraordinary form of relief and is appropriate only when:
(1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding his or her cause of action; (2) a plaintiff

has been prevented from asserting a claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or
(3) a plaintiff has timely asserted his or her claim in the wrong forum. See Lake v. Arnold, 232
F.3d 360, 370 n 9 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is no stranger to federal litigation, having filed
fourteen cases in this Court. The Court fails to see how either the State court's alleged rejection
of Plaintiffs civil rights claim and/or Plaintiffs abandonment of the civil rights claim in the
State case precluded him from timely filing his claims in federal court. Extraordinary relief is
not warranted.
The Amended Complaint raises claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges a statecreated danger occurred on July 14,2006. The § 1983 claims are subject to Delaware's two-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 189-90
(3d Cir. 1993); see also 10 Del. C. § 8119. When the affirmative defense of statute oflimitations
is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court
may dismiss a time-barred action sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to
state a claim. See Smith v. Delaware County Court, 260 F. App'x 454, 455 (3d Cir. Jan. 10,
2008) (not published); Wakefield v. Moore, 211 F. App'x 99 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2006) (not

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published). Plaintiff s claims arose in July 2006, but he only first filed them here in March 2011.
As is evident from the face of the Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claims are
barred by the applicable two-year limitations period.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the § 1983 claims as time-barred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and will decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs supplemental state
law claims. See 28 U.S.CO § 1367; De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301,309 (3d Cir.
2003).

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will deny as moot all pending motions (D.!. 18, 23, 29,

30,31), and dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Amendment is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.

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