Damiani v. Morgan et al
Filing
7
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 7/14/2011. (lid)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
PABLO A. DAMIANI,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHILIP MORGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action
11-213 (RMB-AMD)
O P I N I O N
APPEARANCES:
PABLO A. DAMIANI, Plaintiff pro se
Howard R. Young Correctional Institution
Wilmington, Delaware 19809
Renée Marie Bumb, District Judge
Plaintiff Palbo A. Damiani (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial
detainee at the Howard R. Young Correctional Institution
(“HRYCI”), Wilmington, Delaware, who proceeds pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his
constitutional rights.
At this time, the Court must review the
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
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relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
that the Complaint should be dismissed.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, was housed on a pod with
sentenced inmates.
Plaintiff and a sentenced inmate “got into a
fight” as they “should not have been housed on the same pod.”
Plaintiff had not experienced physical and emotional abuse prior
to the incident and now experiences emotional distress.
Plaintiff named Warden Philip Morgan (“Morgan”) and Deputy Warden
Mark Emig (“Emig”) as Defendants because they are in charge of
properly running the institution.
He names Major Phil Parker
(“Parker”) as a Defendant because he is in charge of the security
of the institution.
Plaintiff seeks one million dollars in
compensatory damages and a transfer to a different institution.
(D.I. 3.)
II.
STANDARDS FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
The Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time,
certain prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to
state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(in forma
pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
(prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions).
The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as
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true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se
plaintiff.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229
(3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally
construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be
held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations
omitted).
An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.”
(1989).
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or
“fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-
28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see,
e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials
took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standards for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) are
identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6)
motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999)(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for
failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
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However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2(B) and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment
would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels
and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –U.S.–, 129 S.Ct. 1937
(2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Id. at 1949.
When
determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts
a two-part analysis.
(3d Cir. 2009).
are separated.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
Id.
The Court must accept all of the complaint’s
well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions.
Id. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”1
1
Id. at 211.
A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops
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In other words, the Complaint must do more than allege
Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; rather it must “show” such an
entitlement with its facts.
Id.
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff appears to have filed suit against Defendants
based upon their supervisory positions.
For example, he alleges
that Morgan and Emig are in charge of the institution and Parker
is in charge of security.
“Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of
respondeat superior.”
omitted).
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1944 (citations
“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”
Id.
The Iqbal Court ultimately
observed that “[i]n a § 1983 suit — where masters do not answer
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.
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for the torts of their servants — the term ‘supervisory
liability’ is a misnomer.”
Id. at 1949.
In addition other than alleging that they are responsible
for running and overseeing the HYRCI, the allegations fail to
allege personal involvement on behalf of Defendants.
As
discussed above, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must
have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot
be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
The claims against Defendants claims are not viable under §
1983 and will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
and § 1915A(b)(1).
B.
Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges unlawful conditions of confinement based
upon his housing assignment.
“[W]hen pretrial detainees
challenge their conditions of confinement, the Court considers
whether there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
(3d Cir. 2008).
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 231
The “proper inquiry is whether those conditions
amount to punishment of the detainee.”
520, 535 (1979).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
To determine whether challenged conditions of
confinement amount to punishment, the Court considers that “if a
particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it
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does not, without more, amount to punishment.’”
Bell, 441 U.S.
at 539; Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that, as a pretrial detainee, he should
not have been housed on a pod with sentenced inmates.
District
Courts in the Third Circuit have found that unless the State has
an intent to punish, or displays deliberate indifference toward
potential harm to an inmate, pre-trial detainees have no liberty
interest in being housed separately from sentenced inmates.
See
Yelardy v. Green, Civ. No. 03-1032-GMS, 2010 WL 2382455 (D. Del.
June 14, 2010); Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia, 18 F. Supp. 2d
537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Chapman v. Guessford, 924 F.Supp. 30,
33 (D. Del. 1996); Hoover v. Watson, 886 F.Supp. 410, 417 (D.
Del. 1995), aff'd, 74 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1995).
In other words,
prison officials may not place a pretrial detainee in certain
housing conditions if their intent is to punish the detainee, or
if they are deliberately indifferent to the safety of the
detainee in making their decision.
See Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 269 (D.N.J. 2000).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that because he was housed on a pod
with sentenced inmates, he “got into a fight” with a sentenced
inmate.
He does not allege that he was physically injured in the
altercation, although he now suffers from emotional distress.
Nor does he allege that Defendants had any advanced knowledge
that the sentenced inmate might harm Plaintiff, that Defendants
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intended to punish Plaintiff by housing him on a pod with
sentenced inmates, or that Defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to the risk that he might suffer serious harm.
Even when reading the Complaint in the most favorable light
to Plaintiff, he fails to state an actionable constitutional
claim against Defendants.
Accordingly, the Complaint will be
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b)(1).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, the Complaint
will be dismissed in its entirety as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Amendment of the
Complaint is futile.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
United States District Judge
Date: July 14, 2011
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