Miller v. Coning et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER that the Court has identified what appear to be cognizable claims against Defendants Christine Coning and Blake Warnick for labeling Plaintiff a snitch. All remaining claims are DISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to state a c laim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff is given leave to amend the sexual harassment and retaliation claims. Plaintiff is given thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint within the thirty (30) days, the case will proceed in the labeling as a snitch claim against Defendants Christine Coning and Blake Warnick. Plaintiff is placed on notice that an amended complaint that does not abide by the preceding Memorandum Opinion will be stricken.( Notice of Compliance deadline set for 8/12/2011.). Signed by Judge J. Curtis Joyner on 7/12/2011. (dlk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOHN E. MILLER,
:
:
:
:
:
:
v.
C.O. CHRISTINE CONING,
et al.,
CIVIL ACTION
No. 11-CV-377
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOYNER, C.J.
July 12, 2011
Plaintiff John E. Miller (“Plaintiff”), a pro se prisoner
currently confined at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in
Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit alleging violations of his
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
Because
Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis and many of his allegations
are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the Court will dismiss the complaint and give
Plaintiff leave to amend.
Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
According to Plaintiff, Defendants Correctional Officer
Christine Coning (“Coning”) and Blake Warnick (“Warnick”) labeled
Plaintiff a snitch after Plaintiff relayed a conversation to a
lieutenant that he overheard regarding a lawsuit and because
Plaintiff turned down Coning’s sexual advances.
1
Plaintiff
When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that
some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the
person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
alleges Coning “retaliated against [him], sexually harassed
[him], was cruel and unusual to [him], and deliberately
indifferent to/for [his] safety.”
Correctional Officer Blake
Warnick (“Warnick”) labeled Plaintiff a snitch “over the Coning
incident.”
Because of the snitch label, Plaintiff was attacked
and beaten by inmates and harassed by correctional officers.2
Plaintiff alleges Warnick “retaliated against [him], was cruel
and unusual to [him], and deliberately indifferent to/for [his]
safety.”
As a result of the “Coning incident,” Defendant Sergeant
William McGinnis (“McGinnis”) threatened to fabricate a rule
infraction and made statements that implicate officers in an
“overall conspiracy to make [Plaintiff’s] time/life hard over the
Coning thing.”
Plaintiff received a disciplinary write-up on
November 23, 2010, for violations of several prison rules.
Plaintiff alleges the write-up is a fabrication.
He was found
guilty of all charges and sanctioned to seven days of loss of all
privileges.
Plaintiff alleges Warnick “retaliated against [him],
was cruel and unusual to [him], and violated [his] substantive
rights to due process.”
Defendant Correctional Officer Raymond Hannum (“Hannum”)
threatened Plaintiff over the “Coning incident” and harassed
Plaintiff with multiple cell shakedowns.
2
Plaintiff alleges
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit with similar facts in Miller v.
Danberg, Civ. No. 08-271-JCJ. Coning and Warnick, who were named
defendants, were voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff.
2
Hannum “retaliated against [him], was cruel and unusual to [him],
and deliberately indifferent.”
Defendant Correctional Officer Corporal Schaffer
(“Schaffer”), who is Coning’s boyfriend, stared at Plaintiff with
a look Plaintiff describes as “grit,” told Plaintiff that he is
well-connected, and inmates are helpless against him.
Schaffer
“shouldered into” Plaintiff on the tier and taunted Plaintiff to
“do something about it.”
Schaeffer told other inmates that
Plaintiff is a snitch, and instigated them to jump Plaintiff
without worrying “about getting into trouble for it.”3
Plaintiff
alleges Schaffer “retaliated against [him], was cruel and unusual
to [him], and deliberately indifferent to/for [his] safety.”
Plaintiff made Defendant Warden Perry Phelps (“Phelps”)
aware of the harassment by correctional officers and physical
attacks that occurred as a result of Coning labeling Plaintiff a
snitch.
Plaintiff wrote to Phelps each time something happened
and asked him to intervene.
Plaintiff references numerous
motions for injunctive relief he filed in Miller v. Danberg, Civ.
No. 08-271-JCJ, responded to by Phelps.
Plaintiff alleges Phelps
was deliberately indifferent.
3
Plaintiff raised the same claims in a motion for an
injunction to compel a transfer to a different correction
facility. See Miller v. Danberg, Civ. No. 08-271-JCJ, D.I. 165,
176).
3
Plaintiff seeks expungement of all disciplinary reports from
his prison file relating to the incidents alleged in this
lawsuit, as well as compensatory damages.
Standard for Sua Sponte Dismissal
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time,
certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. §
1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions
brought with respect to prison conditions).
The Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips
v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007).
Because Plaintiff
proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.”
(1989).
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or
4
“fantastic or delusional” factual scenario.
Neitzke, 490 at 327-
28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see,
e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir.
1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials
took an inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1)
is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6)
motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.
1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal
for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening
provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant
Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels
and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –U.S.–, 129 S.Ct. 1937
(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action
supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Id. at 1949.
When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court
conducts a two-part analysis.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
5
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
of a claim are separated.
First, the factual and legal elements
Id.
The Court must accept all of the
Complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
Id. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must
determine whether the facts alleged in the Complaint are
sufficient to show that Plaintiff has a “plausible claim for
relief.”4
Id. at 211.
In other words, the Complaint must do
more than allege Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; rather it
must “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Id.
“[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than
a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but
it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
4
A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal,129 S.Ct.
at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that
are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id.
6
Discussion
A.
Sexual Harassment
Plaintiff alleges sexual harassment by Coning because he
turned down her sexual overtures.
The Complaint does not
indicate when or where the alleged sexual advances occurred.
Allegations of sexual harassment of a prisoner by a
corrections officer may state an Eighth Amendment claim under §
1983 so long as two elements are met.
See Walker v. Taylorville
Corr. Ctr., 129 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1997); Mathie v. Fries,
121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335,
1338-39 (8th Cir. 1997); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d
Cir. 1997).
The objective element requires severe or repetitive
sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer.
Harris v. Zappan,
Civ. No. 97-4957, 1999 WL 360203, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 28, 1999)
(citation omitted).
The subjective element is whether the
official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.
(citation omitted).
Id.
However, a single isolated incident of
sexual harassment that is not in and of itself severe, is not
sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an
Eighth Amendment claim.
See Boddie, 105 F.3d at 857 (male
prisoner's allegations that female officer touched his penis and
said, “[Y]ou know your [sic] sexy black devil, I like you,” later
bumped into him, and pressed her whole body against his body were
not sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component);
Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (male
7
inmate's claims that two officers grabbed his buttocks for a
moment did not meet the objective component of Eighth Amendment);
see also Wright v. O'Hara, Civ. No. 00-1557, 2004 WL 1793018, at
*7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2004).
Here, Plaintiff provides no facts with regard to the alleged
sexual advances other than to state that they occurred.
The
allegations do not allege conditions that are sufficiently
serious to satisfy the component to state an Eighth Amendment
claim.
Accordingly, the sexual harassment claim will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and §
1915A(b)(1).
However, since it appears plausible that Plaintiff
may correct his pleading deficiencies, he will be given an
opportunity to amend the claim.
See O’Dell v. United States
Gov’t, 256 F. App’x 444 (3d Cir. 2007) (not published) (leave to
amend is proper where the plaintiff’s claims do not appear
“patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption”).
B.
Snitch
Plaintiff alleges that he was labeled a snitch by Coning and
Warnick and, as a result, he was attacked and beaten by inmates
and harassed by correctional officers.
Schaffer has also labeled
him a snitch.
“[A] prison official may be held liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he
knows that inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and
8
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
Indeed,
“prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Id. at 833 (citations
omitted).
This Court has recognized the serious implications of being
labeled a “snitch” in prison.
Blizzard v. Hastings, 886 F.Supp.
405, 410 (D. Del. 1995)(being labeled a snitch “can put a
prisoner at risk of being injured”).
See also Hendrickson v.
Emergency Med. Services, Civ. No. 95-4392, 1996 WL 472418 at *5
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1996)(denying defendants’ motion for summary
judgment because of factual issue as to whether a guard call a
prisoner a snitch in front of other inmates); Thomas v. District
of Columbia, 887 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1995) (being “physically
confronted by and threatened by inmates” after a guard started a
rumor that prisoner was a snitch was “sufficiently harmful to
make out an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim”).
Other Circuits have also held that a correction officer’s
calling a prisoner a “snitch” in front of other inmates is an
Eighth Amendment violation.
See Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d
1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992) (overturning Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
of complaint alleging that prisoner was beaten by inmates because
a guard told them the prisoner was a “snitch”; allegation that
guard intended harm to prisoner by inciting other inmates to beat
him states a claim); Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1088 n.*
9
(“It is impossible to minimize the possible consequences to a
prisoner of being labeled a ‘snitch.’”); Valandingham v.
Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir.
1989)(reversing grant
of summary judgment for defendants because “whether [the guards]
called [a prisoner] a ‘snitch’ in the presence of other inmates
is ‘material’ to a section 1983 claim for denial of the right not
to be subjected to physical harm by employees of the state acting
under color of law.”); Harmon v.
Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409
(11th Cir. 1984)(reversing the district court’s dismissal as
frivolous of prisoner’s claim the “prison officials have labeled
him a snitch and are exposing him to inmate retaliation.”).
Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with this claim against
Coning and Warnick
He alleges that once they labeled him a
snitch, he was beaten by inmates.
With regard to Schaeffer,
there are no allegations that Plaintiff suffered any physical
injuries as a result of Schaffer labeling him a snitch.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claim against Schaffer as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1).
10
C.
Threats and Harassment
Plaintiff alleges he was harassed by Hannum who conducted
multiple cell shakedowns due to the “Coning incident.”
He
alleges that Schaffer stared at him and told him that inmates are
helpless against him.
In addition, Schaffer “shouldered him” and
then dared Plaintiff to do something about it.
Taunts and threats are not Eighth Amendment violations.
McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2001).
In
addition, verbal harassment does not violate an inmate's
constitutional rights.
Prisoners’ Legal Ass’n v. Roberson, 822
F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.N.J. 1993).
Similarly, allegations that
prison personnel have used threatening language and gestures are
not cognizable claims under § 1983.
Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d
825 (10th Cir. 1979) (defendant laughed at prisoner and
threatened to hang him).
See also Aleem-X v. Westcott,
347 F. App’x 731 (3d Cir. 2009) (not published) (verbal abuse of
a prisoner, even of the lewd variety, is not actionable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983)
Plaintiff’s claims of
1983.
harassment are not cognizable under §
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the claims as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
D.
False Reports
Plaintiff alleges that McGinnis wrote a false disciplinary
reported that resulted in a finding of guilt and Plaintiff’s loss
of all privileges for seven days.
11
The filing of a false disciplinary charge and related
disciplinary sanctions, without more, does not violate
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause.
See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002).
Rather, plaintiff’s due process rights are triggered by a
deprivation of a legally cognizable liberty interest.
For a
prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the prison “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Sandin v. Conner, 515
Lesser restraints on an inmate’s freedom
are deemed to fall “within the expected parameters of the
sentence imposed by a court of law.”
Id.
Thus, "[a]s long as
the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is
subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause
does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison
authorities to judicial oversight.”
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480
(quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)).
The loss of a privileges for seven days “falls within the
expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.”
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d
Cir. 1997) (prisoner’s confinement in administrative segregation
for fifteen months did not impose an atypical and significant
hardship on prisoner).
Here, Plaintiff’s loss of all privileges
for seven days, even if the result of alleged false disciplinary
12
actions, did not trigger the protections of the Due Process
Clause.
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the false
disciplinary report and due process claim as frivolous pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
E.
Conspiracy
Plaintiff makes a vague claim that McGinnis conspired to
make Plaintiff’s “time/life hard over the Coning thing.”
To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must
show that “persons acting under color of state law conspired to
deprive him of a federally protected right.”
Ridgewood Bd. of
Educ. V. N .E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1999).
Accord Perano v. Township Of Tilden, No. 10-2393, 2011 WL 1388381
(3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2011).
In addition, there must be evidence of
actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent
to violate that right.
Williams v. Fedor, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649,
665-66 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 211 F.3d 1263 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1999)).
The Complaint fails to allege that McGinnis actually
deprived Plaintiff of any federally protected right or that he
acted in concerted with others.
Hence, Plaintiff has failed to
state a § 1983 conspiracy claim.
Therefore, the conspiracy claim
will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b)(1) as frivolous.
F.
Grievances and Letters to the Warden
13
Plaintiff alleges that he submitted grievances and wrote
letters to Phelps each time something happened and asked him to
intervene, to no avail.
Participation in the after-the-fact review of a grievance is
not enough to establish personal involvement.
See, e.g., Brooks
v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (not published)
(allegations that prison officials and administrators responded
inappropriately to inmate’s later-filed grievances do not
establish the involvement of those officials and administrators
in the underlying deprivation).
See also Bobko v. Lavan, 157 F.
App’x 516, 518 (3d Cir. 2005) (not published) (Individuals who
were not personally involved in events underlying his prisoner's
claims or who merely failed to respond to his letters about his
grievance were not liable under § 1983 in action in which
prisoner alleged he was denied parole because he refused to
participate in a religious-based drug program); Cole v. Sobina,
Civ. No. 04-99J, 2007 WL 4460617 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2007); Ramos
v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., Civ. No. 06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148
(M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006); Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943, 947
(E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1998) (prison
officials’ failure to respond to inmate’s grievance does not
state a constitutional claim).
Furthermore, it is well established that liability under §
1983 cannot be predicated solely on a theory of respondeat
superior.
See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976).
14
Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional claim because
Phelps did not respond to his grievances or letters when Phelps
had no personal involvement in the events underlying Plaintiff’s
complaints.
Therefore, the claims against Phelps will be
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and
§ 1915A(b)(1).
G.
Retaliation
Plaintiff makes several conclusory allegations of
retaliation because of the “Coning incident.”
The “Coning
incident” is not fully described, and it is unclear when the
“incident” occurred.
Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the
Constitution actionable under § 1983.”
F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990).
White v. Napoleon, 897
To state a claim for
retaliation, Plaintiff must show that: (i) he engaged in
constitutionally protected conduct; (ii) an adverse action was
taken by prison officials “‘sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights;’”
and (iii) there was a causal relationship between the two.
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah
v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)).
“[O]nce a
prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right
was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged
decision, the prison officials may still prevail by proving that
15
they would have made the same decision absent the protected
conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.”
Id. at 334.
The Complaint fails to allege that the “”Coning incident”
is the type of adverse action “‘sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights.’”
In addition, the claims as currently pled, provide insufficient
facts to allow Defendants to adequately respond to the claim.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss the retaliation claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the retaliation claims.
Conclusion
With the exception of the “snitch” claim against Coning and
Warnick, the Court will dismiss the claims as frivolous for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Plaintiff will be given leave to amend the sexual harassment and
retaliation claims.
An order follows.
16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JOHN E. MILLER,
:
:
:
:
:
:
v.
C.O. CHRISTINE CONING,
et al.,
CIVIL ACTION
No. 11-CV-377
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of
July, 2011, for the reasons set
forth in the preceding Memorandum Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1.
The Clerk of the Court shall cause a copy of this Order
to be mailed to Plaintiff.
2.
The Court has identified what appear to be cognizable
claims against Defendants Christine Coning and Blake Warnick for
labeling Plaintiff a snitch.
3.
All remaining claims are DISMISSED as frivolous and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
4.
Plaintiff is given leave to amend the sexual harassment
and retaliation claims.
Plaintiff is given thirty (30) days from
the date of this Order to file an amended complaint as set forth
in the preceding Memorandum Opinion.
Should Plaintiff fail to
file an amended complaint within the thirty (30) days, the case
will proceed in the labeling as a snitch claim against Defendants
Christine Coning and Blake Warnick.
Plaintiff is placed on
notice that an amended complaint that does not abide by the
preceding Memorandum Opinion will be stricken.
BY THE COURT:
s/J. Curtis Joyner
J. CURTIS JOYNER,
2
C.J.
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