Rodriguez v. State Of Delaware et al
Filing
7
MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/13/11. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 11-574-LPS
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE, et aI.,
Defendants.
Roberto Rodriguez, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September 13,2011
Wilmington, Delaware
f ~__j, K
s~, u.s. District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Roberto Rodriguez ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. 1 Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution ("HRYCI") in Wilmington, Delaware. He appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D.1. 5) The Court proceeds to review and screen
the Complaint pursuant to 28 u.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.
II.
BACKGROUND
In May 2011, Plaintiff exited the shower area and fell. He alleges that there are no foot
grips, the area is slippery, and there is no railing in the area with a twelve inch step down.
Plaintiff alleges that the area is very dangerous without gripping or railings and his fall could
have been prevented. He seeks compensatory damages.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 u.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Phillips v.
1Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1
County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and § 1915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327
28; see also Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67
F .3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(l) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U. S.c. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must
grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _U.S._, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal,
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129 S.Ct. at 1949. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a
two-part analysis. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. See id. The Court must accept all of the
complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. See id. at 210
11. Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211. In other words, the
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show"
such an entitlement with its facts. Id. A claim is facially plausible when its factual content
allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Eleventh Amendment
The two named defendants, the State of Delaware and the HRYCI, are immune from suit
by reason of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Mel Telecom.
Corp. v. Bell At!. ofPa., 271 F .3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001). The Eleventh Amendment protects
an unconsenting state or state agency from a suit brought in federal court by one of its own
citizens, regardless of the relief sought. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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The State has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court. Although Congress can
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Brooks-McCollum v. Delaware, 213 F. App'x 92, 94 (3d Cir. Jan. 11,2007). In
addition, state correctional institutions are arms of the state and not persons subject to liability
under § 1983. See Green v. Howard R. Young Carr. Inst., 229 F.R.D. 99, 102 (D. Del. 2005).
Plaintiff s claims against Defendants have has no arguable basis in law or in fact. The claims are
frivolous and will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
B.
Ne~ligence
Plaintiff attempts to raise a conditions of confinement claim. Prison officials must
provide humane conditions of confinement by ensuring that inmates receive adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison
official violates the Eighth Amendment when the prison official is deliberately indifferent to
inmate health or safety and when this act or omission results in the denial of "the minimal
civilized measure of life's necessities." Id. at 834. Therefore, a prison official can be held liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement if he knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it. See id. at 847.
Claims of negligence, without a more culpable state of mind, do not constitute "deliberate
indifference." See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't OfCarr., 266 F .3d 186, 193 n.2 (3d Cir.
2001). "[W]hile [a] standing-water problem [is] a potentially hazardous condition, slippery
noors constitute a daily risk faced by members of the public at large. . .. Consequently, ... as a
matter of law, [] the hazard encountered by plaintiff was no greater than the daily hazards faced
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by any member of the general public ... , and [] there is nothing special or unique about
plaintiffs situation that will permit him to constitutionalize what is otherwise only a state-law
tort claim." Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028,1030,1032 (lOth Cir. 2004); see also Bacon v.
Carroll, 232 F. App'x 158, 160 (3d Cir. Apr. 30,2007) (slip and fall claim amounts merely to
negligence); LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[S]lippery prison floors ...
do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment"); Denz v. Clearfield
County, 712 F. Supp. 65,66 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation based on
slippery floor in prison cell, despite prison officials' alleged knowledge of hazard); Robinson v.
Cuyler, 511 F. Supp. 161, 162-63 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same for slippery prison dining hall).
Plaintiff alleges that there are no floor grips or railing in the shower area and the slippery
area is dangerous. As a result, he slipped, fell, and was injured. Although a wet shower floor
may pose a substantial risk, plaintiffs allegations do not reflect the deliberate indifference
required to impose liability under the Eighth Amendment. The claim is nothing more than
negligence. For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to
28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
v.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Amendment is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.
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