Bey v. City Of Wilmington et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 1/6/2012. (lih)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

SHARIF MOZAAR MUSTAFA EL BEY
fonnerly known as Alton Cannon,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WILMINGTON, et aI.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. No. 11-602-GMS
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MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Sharif Mozaar Mustafa EI Bey ("EI Bey"), fonnerly known as Alton
Cannon filed a complaint on July 7, 2011. (D.I.2.) EI Bey is a frequent filer in this court. He
appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons
discussed below, the court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the instant complaint, El Bey cites to what appear to be numerous federal statutes,
although many of the citations are to non-existent statutes. It may be that EI Bey, who proceeds
as a Free Moorish National, attempts to cite to authority regarding a foreign tribunal. The
complaint states that jurisdiction rests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332, and 1333. EI Bey
names as defendants the City of Wilmington, New Castle County Sheriff Trinidad Navarro, as
well as private individuals.

The complaint refers to eminent domain, a fraudulent sales transaction, and a "Notice of
Complaint(s)" apparently filed by EI Bey (as a "mortgagee/leinee") with the City of Wilmington.
Attached to the complaint is a "(Tubal-Cain)" "Mortgagee's Lien", prepared by EI Bey and
recorded by the New Castle Recorder on July 6, 2011.
The complaint contains no claim for relief.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis actions
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89,93 (2007). Because El Bey proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 at 327-28;
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).

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The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant EI Bey leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part
analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 FJd 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and
legal elements of a claim are separated. Id The court must accept all of the complaint's well­
pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id at 210-11. Second, the court
must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that EI Bey has
a "plausible claim for relief." Id at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege

EI Bey's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id.
"To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the
court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id
The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's
liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of'entitlement to relief. '"
Id The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id "[W]here the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
IV. DISCUSSION

Try as it might, the court is unable to discern from the complaint what EI Bey's attempts
to allege or what his claims might be. EI Bey seeks no relief. His complaint is unintelligible,
"clearly baseless" and presents a classic example of a frivolous lawsuit containing allegations
that are wholly fanciful, unbelievable, and which fail to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. Even though EI Bey may believe that his factual allegations are "real," this does not
preclude dismissal on the basis of frivolity. Other courts have arrived at the same difficult
conclusion when reviewing unintelligible complaints. See, e.g., Christian v. Moore, 2010 WL
3418390, at *1-2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 30,2010); Calhoon v. San Diego Police Dep't, 2010 WL
3184254, at *1-2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10,2010); Hix v. Bush, 2010 WL 2560446, at *1 (RD. Mich.
June 16,2010); Lignell v. Catholic Church, 2010 WL 2521452, at * 3-5 (D. Utah May 6, 2010).
Because EI Bey's allegations are totally implausible, attenuated, and devoid of merit,
the court will dismiss the action as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1

IWhile not clear, it may also be that this Court must abstain under the Younger abstention
doctrine or that it lacks jurisdiction by reason of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Amendment of the Complaint would be futile.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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Wilmington,

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