Douglas v. Johnson et al

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/14/15. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

LAMAR DOUGLAS,
Petitioner,
Civ. Act. No. 11-622-LPS

v.

G.R.JOHNSON, Warden, andJOSEPH
R. BIDEN, III, Attorney General of the
State of Delaware,
Respondents.

Lamar Douglas. Pro se Petitioner.
Maria T. Knoll, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department ofJustice, Wilmington, Delaware.
Attorney for Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 14, 2015
Wilmington, Delaware

~~J,~

STARK, U.S. District Judge:

Pending before the Court is an Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28
u.S.c. § 2254 ("Petition") ftled by Petitioner Lamar Douglas ("Petitioner"). (D.l. 1) The State ftled
a Motion for Leave to File a Motion to Dismiss (D.l. 12), which the Court granted (D.l. 13). For
the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the Motion to Dismiss. (DJ 12-1)
I.

BACKGROUND
In May 2007, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to deliver

marijuana, and one count each of possession of a firearm during the commission of a fIrearm by a
person prohibited and endangering the welfare of a child. See Doug/as v. State, 3 A.2d 1096 (Table),
2010 WL 3262724, at *1 (Del. Aug. 18,2010). The Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to an
aggregate of twenty-eight years of incarceration, with the May 2007 Sentence Order explicidy stating
the two three-year sentences for his possession with intent to deliver convictions were mandatory.

Id.; see a/so D.l. 12-1 at 1, 7-9.
In 2009, several clerical errors were found in Petitioner's May 2007 Sentence Order. (D.I.
12-1 at 1) The Superior Court held a re-sentencing hearing on September 25, 2009, after which
Petitioner's May 2007 sentence for the crime of possession of a flrearm by a person prohibited was
reduced from eight years of incarceration suspended after three years for probation to three years of
incarceration with no probationary sentence to follow. (Id.) In January 2010, Petitioner's counsel
ftled a Letter Motion in the Superior Court requesting that good time credits be applied to
Petitioner's sentence. (D.l. 12-1 at 27, Entry No. 45) In a Letter Order dated January 29, 2010, the
Superior Court denied the Motion, explaining:
[t]he [3] year sentences [that were imposed for the delivery convictions] were enhanced by
virtue of lPetitioner's] prior record under 16 Del. C. § 4763(a)(2). This enhancement statute
provided for a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment, not subject to suspension and
without probation or parole eligibility during the minimum term. However, good time credit

is not available because sentences without probation or parole eligibility cannot be reduced
for good time. Young v. State, 981 A.2d 1174 (fable), 2009 WL 3286026 (Del. 2009); Johnson
v. State, 472 A.2d 1311, 1314 (Del. 1983). The sentencing order has been modified to reflect
(more specifically on the notes section) the result.
(D.l. 12-1 at 22) The Notes section of the January 2010 Corrected Sentence Order states that "all 4
charges on this order are mandatory with no goodtime. All other terms remain in effect." (D.l. 12­
1 at 17) Petitioner appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's
decision. See Douglas, 2010 WL 3262724, at *1.

II.

DISCUSSION
In his sole claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the Superior Court's 2010 Corrected

Sentence Order, which explicitly prohibits the application of good time credits, violates the Ex Post

Facto and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution because it unforeseeably and
retroactively increased his term of imprisonment. (D.l. 1 at 17-18) The State contends that the
Court should dismiss the Petition because it merely asserts a claim that the Delaware state courts
misinterpreted state law and, therefore, fails to present an issue cognizable on federal habeas review.
(D.1. 12-1 at 3)
To the extent Petitioner attempts to obtain relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause, his attempt
is unavailing. The Ex Post Facto Clause bars a retroactive legislative enactment that increases the
punishment for a crime after it has been committed! and, "by its own terms, does not apply to
courts." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,458-60 (2001). The Supreme Court has explained that
judicial ex postfacto claims must be analyzed under the Due Process Clause, cein accordance with the
more basic and general principle of fair warning." Id. at 452. Consequently, "a judicial alteration of
a common law doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and

0 must not be

ISee Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 249 (2000).
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given retroactive effect, only where it is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which
had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." !d. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to Petitioner's claim and, instead, the Court will treat
Petitioner's contention regarding the alleged unconstitutionality of the retroactive application of the
2010 Corrected Sentence Order as alleging a violation of Petitioner's due process rights.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain fundamental rights.

See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). The ftrst step in analyzing if a prisoner's Due
Process rights have been violated is determining if the prisoner has been deprived of an existing
liberty or property interest. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859,861 (2011). "A liberty interest may
arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty', or it may
arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies."! Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209,221 (2005). If a petitioner has been deprived of a liberty interest, the Court must then engage
in a further inquiry to determine if the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally
sufftcient. See Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 861.
Notably, "the Constitution itself does not guarantee good time credit for satisfactory
behavior while in prison. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974); Shocklry v. Hosterman,
2007 WL 1810480, at *3 (D. DeL June 22, 2007). Rather, a state prisoner will only have a
"constitutionally protected interest in good time credit" if a state statute creates a right to such

I Although the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects certain liberty interests created under
state law, including state laws governing the method for calculating the credit an inmate has earned
toward release, Federal law does not dictate any speciftc methodology for calculating sentencing
credit for state prisoners. See, e.g., Sup't, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)
(holding that inmates cannot be deprived of "good time credits" without at least minimal due
process because state statutes created liberty interest in such credits). Consequently, the role of the
federal courts in such circumstances is limited to the enforcement of due process rights created by
state law. See Creenholtz v. Inmates tfNeb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).

3

credit. See Wolf, 418 U.S. at 556-57. When a state prisoner is statutorily entitled to good time
credits, he possesses a liberty interest in a reduced sentence under the Due Process Clause, and
those credits cannot be revoked arbitrarily or without minimwn procedural guarantees. !d.
In Delaware, the "allowance of good time to an inmate is strictly a matter of statute." S'!Yder

v. And,7lws, 708 A.2d 237, 242 (Del. 1998). At the time of Petitioner's conviction in 2006 and his
sentencing in 2007, well-settled Delaware precedent interpreting the applicable Delaware sentencing
statutes dictated that minimwn mandatory sentences could not be reduced for good time credit. See

Richmond v. State, 446 A.2d 1091 (Del. 1982). As a result, Petitioner never had a protected liberty
interest in earning good time credit for his mandatory sentences. Thus, the new language in the
2010 Corrected Sentence Order regarding the unavailability of good-time credit for Petitioner's
mandatory sentences merely reiterated and clarified a pre-existing situation; it did not arbitrarily or
unforeseeably increase the length of Petitioner's imprisonment by abrogating or removing any credit
(or credit opportunity) that was rightfully his. 2 See Douglas, 2010 WL 3262724, at *1. Accordingly,
Petitioner's argwnent that his Due Process rights have been violated necessarily fails.
Hence, the Court concurs with the State's assertion that Petitioner's argwnent simply
challenges the Delaware state courts' interpretation and application of Delaware law. Given that a

2When afftrming the Superior Court's decision that good-time credit was not available, the Delaware
Supreme Court also explained that a recent legislative amendment regarding good-time credits did
not entitle Petitioner to good time credit, stating that,
[a]lthough the General Assembly has recently changed Section 4381 to allow good time
credits for certain mandatory sentences, it has expressly excluded sentences imposed prior to
the enactment of this amendment, which occurred on July 15,2010. The Superior Court did
not err when it denied [petitioner's] motion to apply good time credit to his mandatory
sentences.

Douglas, 2010 WL 3262724, at *1.
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claim alleging an error of state law fails to assert an issue cognizable on federal habeas review,3 the
Court will grant the State's Motion to Dismiss and deny the Petition for failing to assert a proper
ground for federal habeas relief.

III.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to

issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cit. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of appealability is
appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"
by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.c. § 2253(c)(2); see also Slack

11.

McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473,484 (2000).
The Court has concluded that the Petition does not warrant relief. In the Court's view,
reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court declines to
issue a certificate of appealability.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the State's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's Application For A Writ

Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.c. § 2254 is granted, and the Petition is dismissed. An
appropriate Order will be entered.

3See Mullanry 11. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("State courts are the ultimate expositors of state
law."); Estelle 11. McGuin, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (holding that claims based on errors of state law
are not cognizable on habeas review).
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