Miller v. Biden et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM - Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 7/2/2014. (snb, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

LENARD MILLER, JR.,
Plaintiff,

v.
JOSEPH R. EIDEN, III,
Defendant.

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) Civ. Action No. 11-707-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
I. INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Lenard Miller, Jr. ("Miller"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DJ.3.)
He appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.c. § 1915. The court dismissed the original complaint on February 5, 2013 and gave Miller
leave to amend to cure his pleading defects. (D.I. 17, 18.) An amended complaint was filed on
March 1,2013. (D.l. 19.) Before the court is the defendant Joseph R. Biden, Ill's motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. (D.l. 21.) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the
motion.

II. BACKGROUND
The amended complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that the State of
Delaware possesses DNA evidence that, if tested, will conclusively establish whether Miller
committed a crime. The DNA evidence has been gathered and preserved. Miller alleges the State
arbitrarily denied DNA testing of a fitted bed sheet, although it did perform DNA tests on certain
other unnamed materials. (D.I. 19.) The amended complaint appears to reinstate Delaware

Public Defender Brendan O'Neill ("O'Neill"), who was previously dismissed as a defendant.
Miller takes exception to legal representation provided him by the Office of the Public Defender
of the State of Delaware with regard to DNA testing. Miller alleges that both defendants denied
him procedural due process for access to Delaware's State law procedures for DNA testing, and
that they deprived him of his liberty interest for all procedures including initial collateral review
procedures under State Criminal Rule 61. Biden moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and (b)(6) on the grounds that: (I) this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to
review the decisions of state courts; (2) the amended complaint fails to allege that Miller
sustained a procedural due process violation; and (3) the amended complaint fails to allege the
requisite personal involvement on behalf of Biden.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(l)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( I) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring his claim. Motions
brought under Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or factual challenge to the court's subject
matter jurisdiction. In reviewing a facial challenge under Rule 12(b)(1), the standards relevant to
Rule 12(b)(6) apply. In this regard, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true, and the court may only consider the complaint and documents referenced in or attached
to the complaint. Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). In
reviewing a factual challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court is not confined
to the allegations of the complaint, and the presumption of truthfulness does not attach to the
allegations in the complaint. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass 'n, 549 F.2d 884,891

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(3d Cir. 1977). Instead, the court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, including
affidavits, depositions and testimony, to resolve any factual issues bearing on jurisdiction. Gotha
v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997). Once the court's subject matter jurisdiction
over a complaint is challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to Miller. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002). A complaint

must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not
need detailed factual allegations, although, "a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of
his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1965 (citations omitted). The "[fJactual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
that all of the complaint's allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id.
(citations omitted). Because Miller proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

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C. Discussion
Once again Miller alleges that the State law remedy of the existing system violates his
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. "[P]rocedural due process does
not require that a district attorney disclose all potentially exculpatory evidence for postconviction
relief." Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672,678 (3d Cir. 2010). A procedural due process claim will
only lie where a State's procedures for postconviction relief (particularly procedures for DNA
testing requests) are so flawed as to be "fundamentally unfair or constitutionally inadequate."

See Spuck v. Pennsylvania, 456 F. App'x 72, 73 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citations omitted);
seealsoSkinnerv. Switzer,_U.S._, 131 S.Ct.1289, 1293 (2011)(notingthatDistrict
Attorney's Office/or Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009), "left slim room for the
prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process"),
The original complaint failed to describe how Delaware's postconviction procedures for
disclosure of alleged exculpatory are inadequate as a matter of law. Miller was given leave to
amend to cure the pleading defects but, similar to the original complaint, the amended complaint
fails to contain allegations explaining how Delaware's postconviction procedures for disclosure
of alleged exculpatory are inadequate as a matter of law. Even liberally construing the amended
complaint as the court must, Miller has failed to raise procedural due process claims. Therefore,
the court will grant the motion to dismiss.
In addition, the claims against reinstated defendant O'Neill fail as a matter of law. Public
defenders do not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as
counsel to a defendant in criminal proceedings. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
Hence, the § 1983 raised against him fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will dismiss
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the claims against O'Neill as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915(A)(b)(I).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will grant the motion to dismiss the amended complaint
(D.!. 21) and will dismiss the claims against O'Neill as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A)(b)(I). Miller was provided an opportunity to amend to cure his
pleading defects, yet he failed to do so. Because Miller did not remedy the defects in his
complaint, despite notice and his familiarity with the pleading requirements, granting him an
opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile. Jones v. Camden City Bd. ofEduc., 499 F.
App'x 127, 129 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962)).

An appropriate order will be issued.

...J
~~ )..

,2014

Wilmingto ,Delaware

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