Miller v. Biden et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 11/29/2011. (lih)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
LEONARD MILLER, JR.,
Plaintiff,

v.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, III, et aI.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 11-707-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Leonard Miller, Jr. ("Miller"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (0.1. 3.)
He appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915. (0.1.6.) The court now proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND
Miller filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State of
Delaware possesses DNA evidence that, if test, will conclusively establish whether he committed
a crime, but that the DNA testing is arbitrarily denied him. (0.1.3.) The DNA evidence has
been gathered and preserved. Miller states that he has availed himself of all possible
postconviction avenues for relief in State court. I

lIn July 1992, Miller was found guilty by the Delaware Superior Court jury of two counts
of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and was sentenced to a total of thirty-five
years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after thirty years for decreasing levels of
probation. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, Miller v. State, No. 471, 1992 (Del.
Nov. 1, 1993), and two post conviction motions were denied as untimely, Miller v. State, No.
145, 1996 (Del. Apr. 22, 1996) and Miller v. State, 879 A.2d 602, 2005 WL 1950222 (Del. July
18, 2005) (table decision).

Miller seeks injunctive relief to compel DNA testing of crime scene evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informa pauperis
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,93 (2007). Because Miller proceeds pro se, his pleading is
liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94
(citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § I 915A(b)(l), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-

28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67
F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
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12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court
must grant Miller leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare
~.

recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at
1949. When detennining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part
analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and
legal elements ofa claim are separated. Id. The court must accept all of the complaint's wellpleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court
must detennine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Miller has
a "plausible claim for relief.,,2 Id. at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than
allege Miller's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id.
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not pennit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of

2A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief. '" Id.

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misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION
Miller names as defendants Public Defender Brendan O'Neill ("O'Neill") and Assistant
Public Defender Lisa M. Schwind ("Schwind"). Public defenders do not act under color of state
law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in criminal
proceedings. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The claims against them fail as a
matter oflaw. Inasmuch as the claims against O'Neill and Schwind have no arguable basis in
law or in fact, and they will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and

§ 1915(A)(b)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the claims against O'Neill and Schwind will be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Miller may proceed with his
due process claim the Attorney General of the State of Delaware Joseph R. Biden, III?
An appropriate order will be entered.

fJo,./ )1

,2011
Wilmington, Delaware

3See Skinner v. Switzer, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct.1289 (2011) (A convicted state prisoner
seeking DNA testing of crime scene evidence may assert the claim in a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.); Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672 (3d Cir. 2010) (Where a prisoner files a § 1983
claim to request access to evidence for DNA testing, that claim is not barred by the principles
outlined in Heck v. Humphrey, because even if the plaintiff prevails on his § 1983 claim, he will
merely gain access to biological evidence, which in and of itself cannot invalidate or undermine
his conviction.).
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