Trice v. City of Harrington Police Department

Filing 99

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 7/20/15. (klc)

FOR THE DISTRICT
WILLIAM R. TRICE,
Plaintiff,

v.
LT. ERIC MALONEY, et al.,
Defendants.

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DELAWARE

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liv. Action No. 11-767-GMS

MEMORANDUM

The plaintiff, William R. Trice ("Trice"), whol proceeds prose and has been granted
leave to proceed without prepayment of fees, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Trice is currently confined at the James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware. Plnding before the court is the motion for
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summary judgment of the defendants Lt. Eric Malondy ("Maloney") and Officer Earl K. Brode
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("Brode") (together "the defendants") and Trice's opposition thereto. (D.I. 86.)

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.

Amended Complaint

The amended complaint with exhibits (D.I. 8, 13) alleges that Maloney accused Trice of
violating a no contact order imposed as a condition ofrelease in Criminal Case No. 1004011070

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that was pending in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County. Trice
alleges that Maloney signed a false affidavit in poliJ complaint No. 5510001652 (assigned
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Criminal Case No. 1006018519) that charged Trice -o/ith noncompliance with conditions of
recognizance bond or conditions violation when Tricb entered the property of Ronald Messick

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("Messick") in violation of the no contact order that was issued by the Kent County Superior
Court. Trice claims that the location he entered was ~ot Messick's property. The amended
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complaint alleges that, on June 30, 2010, Trice was arrested by Brode and taken into custody for
violating the no contact order. Trice had been charge1 with several other crimes and, on March

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22, 2011, he entered a Robinson plea to rape in the third degree, strangulation, and tampering
with a witness. The remaining charges were nolle prlssed, including the charge for violating the
no contact order in Criminal No. 1006018579. See Ttice v. State, 36 A.3d 351 (Del. 2012) (table
decision); (D.I. 26, ex. Superior Court Criminal Dock'.et Nos. 1004011070 and 1006018519.)
Trice alleges that the defendants' actions violated hislrights under the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitltion and prohibited his access to liberty,
property, and equal protection of Delaware laws whJh state that one cannot be ousted or
excluded from one's home without due process oflal. (D.I. 13.) He seeks compensatory

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damages.

B.

Facts Presented by the Parties

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The April 16, 2010 "Na-Contact Provisions/CConditions of Release/Order during
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Commitment in Lieu of Bail" issued as a result of Trice's arrest for arson and burglary states, as

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follows:

You [Trice] are to have no contact, direct or indirect with Ronald R. Messick,
Mary M. Szczytkowski ("Szczytkowski") 11 IRose Haven Drive (hereinafter the
"Alleged Victim"), or with the alleged victim's property, residence, place of
employment, school, church or at any other ~lace. No direct or indirect contact
means that you are not to be in the physical p,resence of the alleged victim ....
You will at all times stay 100 or more yards *way from the alleged victim, the
alleged victim's residence and workplace.
(D.I. 85, A3, A18.)
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The manufactured housing community knoJn as Cozy Woods in which 11 Rose Haven
Drive is located, is owned by Messick's Manufacturld Housing Community LLC ("MMHC").
(Id. at A5.) The streets in the manufactured housinJ communities owned by MMHC are private

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streets that belong to MMHC and are not maintained by the City of Harrington or the Delaware
Department of Transportation. (Id.)
On June 20, 2010, Szczytkowski's father, Ivan Chapman ("Chapman"), saw Trice at 52
California Parkway, Harrington, Delaware, an addresi yi'ocated in Messick's Manufactured
. Housing Community. (Id. at A3-4.) Chapman lived hext door to 52 California Parkway. (D.I.
85, A3.) Trice's

m~ther, Mary J. Trice ("M. Trice") tsides at 51 California Parkway and has
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leased the property since October 1994. (D.I. 92, B28.) According to M. Trice, her son shared
the residence. (D.I. 93,

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6.) Trice was at his mother's residence on June 20, 2010, when he

waved and spoke to Chapman. (D.I. 85, A3; D.I. 92, B24.)
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Szczytkowski contacted the Harrington PoliJ Department to report what her father had
seen. (Id.) Maloney interviewed Chapman and

Szcz.~kowski and was advised there was a no

contact order and that Trice was not allowed on MesLck property. (Id.) Maloney confirmed the
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existence of the no contact order through the Delawate Criminal Justice Information System (i.e.,

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DELJIS). (Id.)

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Maloney understood and believed that the m~nufactured home parks wherein Rose
Haven Drive and California Parkway are located wele owned by Messick. (Id. at A14.) He
states that Rose Haven Drive and California Parkwa} are less than 100 yards apart. (Id.)
Maloney applied for a warrant charging Trice with Joncompliance with conditions of
recognizance bond. (Id. at Al3.) The affidavit in s+port of the warrant lists the location of the
offense as 51 California Boulevard, Harrington, Delhware. (Id. at A3.) Maloney states that, at
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the time he submitted the documents to the Justice Jthe Peace Court, he believed the

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information contained therein was true. (Id. at Al5.D On June 21, 2010, a Justice of the Peace at
Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 issued a warrant fol Trice's arrest. (Id. at Al.)

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On June 23, 2010, Trice appeared at the Harrington Police Department, surrendered, and
was processed by Brode. (D.I. 85, A16-17; D.I. 92, J5.) Upon his arrest, Trice stated that "he
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stopped by his mother's to get clothing ... thought

th~ no contact order only meant when the

subjects are present ... that because he went to his mbther's house he thought it was OK." (D.I.
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92, B35.) Trice was arraigned by videophone and rel~ased on $5,000 unsecured bond. (D.I. 85,
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Al 7, D.I. 92, B25.) The charges against Trice in criJinal action No. 1006018519 were nolle
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prossed on their own merits and not as part of an omtjibus plea agreement. (D.I. 92, B27.)
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In Trice's declaration, he states that he was arrested because he entered the residence he
shared with his mother who has a rental unit and she las in full possession of the property. (D.I.
92, Pl.'s decl.

~~ 4-5.) Trice states that the no contaJ order applies to Messick, Szczytkowski
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and solely to the property at 11 Rose Haven Drive in Harrington, Delaware. (Id.

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6.) He

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states that Maloney relied on Szczytkowski's statemebt who was not a witness and that Maloney
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distorted Chapman's statement and placed Trice at 52 California Parkway when he was at 51
California Parkway. (Id.

at~ 10.) Trice states that tJe no contact order fails to address any

property owned or divested by and through MMHC, 1hat MMHC conducted business at a
location 100 yards or greater from 51 California

Par~lay, and that Messick resided at an address
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100 yards or greater from 51 California Parkway. (Id.

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11-13.)

The defendants move for summary judgment rn the grounds that: (I) Maloney' s
affidavit in support of the application for an arrest warrant is presumptively valid; (2) Trice
. cannot provide specific proof of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth;

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(3) Brode merely processed Trice when Trice surrendered at the Harrington police station;

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(4) Brode complied with the terms of the warrant;

an~

(5) the defendants have qualified

immunity. Trice contends that there remain genuine /issues of material fact and that the
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court shall grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the mo1ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter
oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party be'1-fS the burden of proving that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. ln1us. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 n.10 (1986). When determining whether a lenuine issue of material fact exists, the
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court must view the evidence in the light most favora!ble to the nonmoving party and draw all

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reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Wishkin

Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007).

If the moving party has demonstrated an absence of laterial fact, the nonmoving party then
"must come forward with 'specific facts showing thal there is a genuine issue for trial.'"

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quotinl Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). However, a party
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opposing summary judgment "must present more thJnjust 'bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions' to show the existence of a kenuine issue." Podobnik v. United States
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Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
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325 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter oflaw. See Celotex Corp., 471 U.S. at 322.

III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Arrest Warrant/False Arrest

Trice has sued Maloney for his role in obtaining the arrest warrant and Brode for

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arresting him. An arrest warrant issued by a judge does not, in itself, shield an officer from
liability for false arrest. See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 1113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). "A
plaintiff may succeed in a§ 1983 action for false ~est made pursuant to a warrant ifthe plaintiff
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shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the police officer 'knowingly and

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deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth,I made false statements or omissions that
create a falsehood in applying for a warrant;' and (2) lhat such statements or omissions are
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material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cau~e."' Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 213
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(3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)). An omission in
the warrant application is made with reckless disregJd for the truth when an officer withholds a
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fact that a reasonable person would have known was the kind of thing the judge would want to
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know. Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788. An assertion is madb with reckless disregard for the truth "when
viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertLned serious doubts as to the truth of his
statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accurLy of the information he reported." Id
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Probable cause exists where there are "facts ahd circumstances sufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the suspect had commilted or was committing an offense." Beck v.

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Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The court considers tlie facts available at the time of the alleged
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unlawful conduct, that is, when Maloney applied for ~he arrest warrant. Sharrar V. Fe/sing, 128
F.3d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1997). Hence, the issue is whether, at the time he applied for the
warrant, Maloney reasonably believed that Plaintiff liad committed the crime in question. See
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Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (Bd Cir. 1988).

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The defendants argue that Maloney' s affidavit in support of the application for the arrest
warrant is presumptively valid and that Trice cannot !provide specific proof of deliberate
falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Trice Jsponds that the defendants engaged in
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negligent and/or reckless intentional acts to prohibit his access to the property. He also argues
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that he shared his mother's domicile and that she maintained a leasehold over the property at
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issue. The defendants argue that summary judgment is proper on behalf of Bode on the grounds

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that Bode merely did what the warrant commanded.

In the amended complaint, Trice alleges that Maloney published a sworn affidavit that

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contained fallacious information with the intention of placing Trice in the custody of the State of
Delaware. Trice presents no evidence suggesting thjt Maloney's affidavit of probable cause
contained either false statements or omissions of a Jaterial nature. Instead, Trice discusses his
mother's lease and the provisions of the no contact older in positing his theory that he did not
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violate the provisions of the order. However, Trice's interpretation of the no contact order is not
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evidence that Maloney did not believe the statementS in his affidavit to be true or that Maloney
proceeded in reckless disregard of the truth. The evJdence of record is that Maloney spoke to

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witnesses who identified Trice and indicated that Trice was present in an area prohibited by the

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no con1act order, that Maloney verified there was a t contact order, and that Maloney had
personal knowledge of the property owned by Messick. Trice did not refute these facts.
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Trice seems to argue thatthe Maloney "dist9rted" the evidence by placing Trice at 52
·California Parkway and not at 51 California

Parkwa~.

(See D.I. 92, Pl.'s decl.,

~ 10.) The court

notes that Maloney's affidavit lists the location oftJe offense as 51 California and not 52
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California. The affidavit also states that Chapman lived next door to 52 California when he saw
and spoke to Trice. Authorities are not required to lddress all conflicting pieces of evidence or
always accurately make determinations of

credibilit~. See Wright v. City ofPhiladelphia, 409

F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005). Police officers are iJtead entitled to draw reasonable inferences,
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based on their own personal knowledge and prior e*perience. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 897 (1975). Regardless of whether the alleged violation occurred at 51 or 52 California,
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based upon his personal knowledge, Maloney considered both addresses as Messick properties

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with regard to the no contact order, thus giving rise tol the conclusion that Maloney's affidavit
was supported by the evidence known to him at the tile he applied for the arrest warrant.
In addition, "[a]n officer who has probable cahse to arrest is not required to conduct
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further investigation for exculpatory evidence, or to Jursue the possibility that the suspected

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offender is innocent." Vassalo v. Timmoney, 2001W:L1243517, at *7 (E.D. Pa., Oct.15, 2001)
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(citations omitted). Even were the court to determind that Maloney was. negligent in failing to

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investigate the details of the no contact order, negligJnt police work cannot form the basis of a
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constitutional claim. "The issue is not whether the information on which police officers base
their request for an arrest warrant resulted from a pJfessionally executed investigation; rather,

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the issue is whether the information would warrant a (reasonable person to believe that an offense
has been or is being committed by the person to be atrested." Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police,
71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995).

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Finally, while the question of probable cause(in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the
jury, a district court may conclude that probable cau~e existed as a matter oflaw if the evidence,

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viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, cduld not reasonably support a finding that
there was no probable cause. Estate of Smith v. Marbsco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003)

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(citing Mulvihill, 113 F.3d at 401). In light of this standard, and even construing the facts in the
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light most favorable to Trice, the court finds there eJisted "facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect Jad committed

o~ was committing an

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offense" sufficient for a probable cause finding. Beqk, 379 U.S. at 91.
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As discussed, probable cause existed for issuance of a warrant for Trice's arrest. Trice

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surrendered and Brode processed Trice and caused Trice to be arraigned by video phone.
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Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the facts stated in the affidavit of
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probable cause, the court concludes that no genuine !issues of material fact exist as to whether
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there was probable cause to arrest Trice. Therefore, the court will grant the defendants' motion
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for summary judgment.

B.

Qualified Immunity
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The defendants also raise a qualified immunity defense. The doctrine of qualified

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immunity provides that certain officials, including police officers, performing "discretionary
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functions," are shielded from suit if their conduct didlnot violate a "clearly established statutory
or constitutional right []of which a reasonable persol would have known." Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 94, 200-01 (2001). The doctrine of
qualified immunity provides not only a defense to liapility, but immunity from suit. Hunter v.

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Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).

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When analyzing qualified immunity claims f9r law enforcement officers' alleged
violation of a constitutional right, the court may applt a two-step inquiry. Pearson v. Callahan,
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555 U.S. 223 (2009) (holding that the court may but is no longer required to first determine
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whether the facts make out a violation of a constitutJnal right). In "order to survive summary
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judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, a

plaint~ff must:
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(1) allege violation of a valid legal

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. right, and (2) demonstrate that 'it would be clear to al reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted."' Abdullahi

LCity ofMadison, 423 F.3d 763, 775 (7th

Cir. 2005) (quoting

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Sa~cier, 533 U.S. at 201-02).

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In the preceding analysis, the court determin~d that the defendants did not violate Trice's
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constitutional rights when an arrest warrant was obtained and Trice was arrested and, therefore,
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the court need not to address whether Trice's constitutional rights were clearly established.
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Assuming arguendo that the defendants did violate 1jrice's constitutional rights, they,
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nonetheless, would be entitled to qualified immunity) because it would not have been clear to a
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reasonable officer that their actions violated Trice's constitutional rights given that (1) it was
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reasonable to assume that Trice was in a location thaJ appeared to be prohibited by the no contact
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order; (2) Maloney obtained an arrest warrant and, uJder the circumstances, could reasonably
believe that there was probable cause for the issuancl of the warrant; and (3) upon Trice's

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surrender, Brode executed the warrant in a constituti~nal fashion. In addition, it would not have
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been clear to a reasonable officer that he violated Tribe's Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment rights

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in prohibiting Trice access to 51 California Parkway /property given that it was reasonable to
assume that the property was the subject of the no c1ntact order. Thus the defendants' actions
did not amount to a public taking or violate Trice's right to due process as he alleges.

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For the above reasons, the court finds that qu,~lified immunity applies to the defendants'
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actions. Therefore, the court will grant the defendajts' motion for summary judgment.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court will grant
judgment (D.I. 86).
An appropriate order will be entered.

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<.J
2- t2 '2015
Wilmillgt, Delaware

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defendants' motions for summary

,