HSM Portfolio LLC et al v. Fujitsu Limited et al

Filing 1205

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 1037 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Noninfringement, 1039 MOTION for Summary Judgment of Invalidity, [1040 ]MOTION for Summary Judgment of No Indirect Infringement and 1055 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that U.S. Patent No. 5,030,853 is Not Anticipated and Not Indefinite. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 2/11/2016. (ksr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

HSM PORTFOLIO LLC and TECHNOLOGY
PROPERTIES LIMITED LLC,
Plaintiffs;
Civil Action No. 11-770-RGA

v.
ELPIDA MEMORY INC., et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., Esq., Brian E. Farnan, Esq., Michael J. Farnan, Esq., Farnan LLP,
Wilmington, DE; Jeffrey R. Bragalone, Esq. (argued), Patrick J. Conroy, Esq., Justin B. Kimble,
Esq., Daniel F. Olejko, Esq. (argued), James R. Perkins, Esq., Bragalone Conroy PC, Dallas, TX,
attorneys for Plaintiffs HSM Portfolio LLC and Technology Properties Limited LLC.
Frederick L. Cottrell, III, Esq., Travis Hunter, Esq., Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A.,
Wilmington, DE; Jared Bobrow, Esq. (argued), J. Jason Lang, Esq., Weil, Gotshal & Manges
LLP, Redwood Shores, CA; Melissa L. Hotze, Esq., Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Houston,
TX, attorneys for Defendant Micron Technology, Inc.

February

JL,

2016

AN~.~D~E:
Presently before the Court are Defendant Micron Technology, Inc. 's Motions for
Summary Judgment ofNoninfringement, Invalidity, and No Indirect Infringement (D.I. 1037,
1039, 1040) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that U.S. Patent No.
5,030,853 is Not Anticipated and is Not Indefinite (D.I. 1055). The issues have been fully
briefed. (D.I. 1043, 1087, 1113, 1056, 1082, 1122). Oral argument was held on December 8,
2015. (DJ. 1163). For the reasons set forth herein, Micron's motion for summary judgment of
non-infringement (D.I. 1037) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Micron's
motion for summary judgment of invalidity (D.I. 1039) is DENIED; Micron's motion for
summary judgment of no indirect infringement (D.I. 1040) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART; Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (D.I. 1055) is GRANTED
IN PART and DISMISSED AS MOOT IN PART.
I.

BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2011, HSM Portfolio and Technology Properties Limited LLC filed
this patent infringement suit against Defendant Micron Technology, Inc. and other defendants.
(D.I. 1). Micron is the only remaining defendant. (D.I. 1043 at 6). Plaintiffs allege that certain
Micron DRAM and CMOS Image Sensor products infringe US Patent Nos. 5,001,367 (the "'367
patent"), 5,030,853 (the '"853 patent"), 5,247,212 (the '"212 patent"), and 5,391,949 (the "'949
patent") (collectively "patents-in-suit"). (D.I. 859 ifi! 77, 82, 105, 110, 127-28, 136-37).
Plaintiffs further allege that Micron indirectly infringed the '853 and '949 patents by inducing
and contributing to others' infringement. (Id.

ifil 77-81, 105-09; D.I. 1087 at 8).

On September 2, 2015, Micron filed its motions, requesting summary judgment of noninfringement with respect to all asserted claims of the patents-in-suit, anticipation with respect to

2

certain claims in the '853, '212, and '949 patents, 1 no indirect infringement, 2 and no damages
with respect to certain products. (D.I. 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040). Also on September 2, 2015,
Plaintiffs filed their motion, requesting summary judgment that the '853 patent is not anticipated
with respect to certain prior art references and is not indefinite. 3 (D.I. 1055). On December 7,
2015, the Court denied Micron's motion for summary judgment of no damages. (D.I. 1038,
1161).

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
"The court shall grant summary judgment ifthe movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuinely
disputed material fact relative to the claims in question. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
330 (1986). Material facts are those "that could affect the outcome" of the proceeding, and "a
dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' ifthe evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury
to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The burden on the
moving party may be discharged by pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of
evidence supporting the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

1

While Micron originally sought summary judgment on anticipation of dependent claim 9 of the '853
patent (D.I. 1039, 1043), it has since withdrawn that position. (D.I. 1075).
2
Plaintiffs originally opposed summary judgment of both contributory infringement and induced
infringement. Plaintiffs informed the Court at oral argument, however, that after the Court's ruling with
respect to Toshiba (D.I. 854), they would no longer contest summary judgment on the issue of
contributory infringement. (D.I. 1163 at 112).
3
Micron has informed the Court that it no longer intends to rely on the A35A Design ID as a prior art
reference. (D.I. 1165). As a result, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment of non-anticipation
is dismissed as moot with respect to the A35A Design ID. (See D.I. 1166).

3

The burden then shifts to the non-movant to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue
for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986);

Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989). A non-moving
party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed must support such an assertion by: "(A) citing to
particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ... , admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish
the absence ... of a genuine dispute .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Wishkin v. Potter,
4 76 F .3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
A patent is infringed when a person "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States ... during the term of the patent." 35 U.S.C. §
271 (a). A two-step analysis is employed in making an infringement determination. See

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), ajf'd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996). First, the court must construe the asserted claims to ascertain their meaning and
scope. See id. The trier of fact must then compare the properly construed claims with the
accused infringing product. See id. at 976. This second step is a question of fact. See Bai v. L &

L Wings, Inc., 160 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

4

"Literal infringement of a claim exists when every limitation recited in the claim is found
in the accused device." Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998). "If
any claim limitation is absent from the accused device, there is no literal infringement as a matter
oflaw." Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2000). If an
accused product does not infringe an independent claim, it also does not infringe any claim
depending thereon. See Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1989). However, "[o]ne may infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim dependent
on that claim." Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 503 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(internal quotations omitted). A product that does not literally infringe a patent claim may still
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents if the differences between an individual limitation of
the claimed invention and an element of the accused product are insubstantial. See WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24 (1997). The doctrine of equivalents

must be applied to the "individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole." Id. at
29. An accused element is equivalent if the differences between the element and the claim
limitation are "insubstantial." Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
An accused element may be found to be equivalent if it performs substantially the same function
in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result as the claim limitation. See

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). The patent owner

has the burden of proving infringement and must meet its burden by a preponderance of the
evidence. See SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 889 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (citations omitted).
When an accused infringer moves for summary judgment of non-infringement, such
relief may be granted only if at least one limitation of the claim in question does not read on an

5

element of the accused product, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See Chimie

v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel
Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Summary judgment of noninfringement is ...
appropriate where the patent owner's proof is deficient in meeting an essential part of the legal
standard for infringement, because such failure will render all other facts immaterial."). Thus,
summary judgment of non-infringement can only be granted if, after viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine issue as to whether the accused
product is covered by the claims (as construed by the court). See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-

Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
"The presumption of a patent's validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 can be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence." Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A
patent claim is invalid as anticipated under 3 5 U.S. C. § 102 if "within the four comers of a
single, prior art document ... every element of the claimed invention [is described], either
expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention
without undue experimentation." Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (alterations in original). As with infringement, the court construes the claims and
compares them against the prior art. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325,
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). "While anticipation is a question of fact, it may be decided on summary
judgment ifthe record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact." Encyclopaedia Britannica,

Inc. v. Alpine Elecs. ofAm., Inc., 609 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

III.

ANALYSIS
A. '853 Non-Infringement

6

The '853 patent relates to a buffer, a chain of inverters which allows smaller circuit
elements to efficiently communicate with larger circuit elements. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 3 ii 101, Ex. 5

ii 15).

The asserted claims4 require that each inverter in this chain of inverters increase in size by

"less than a predetermined factor times the width of the N-channel of the immediately preceding
inverter stage." '853 patent at 27:65-28:2. In claim construction, the Court held that the
"predetermined factor" (also known as "K") is to be "calculated using Equation (3 7) in the
specification." (D.I. 729 at p. 1). The Court expressly found that "the patentee intended
Equation 37, and only that equation, to define the 'predetermined factor."' (D.I. 715 at p. 5).
For purposes of proving infringement, however, it is irrelevant whether Equation (37) was
actually used during the design process of an accused product. (See id.). The patent is directed
at an apparatus, not a method or process. 5 (See id.). The patent requires only that the
predetermined factor limitation is satisfied when one solves for K using Equation (37). Put
another way, after determining K using Equation (37), the predetermined factor limitation of
claim 1 is satisfied when the channel width of the N-channel field effect transistor is less than K
times the channel width of the N-channel field effect transistor in the immediately preceding
inverter stage. For purposes of the present motion, it is important to note that Equation (37)

4

Plaintiffs assert that Micron products embodying 26 Design IDs infringe claims 1-4 and 6-9. (D .I. 1047,
Ex. 4; D.I. 1043 at 8). Claim 1 is the only asserted independent claim. '853 patent at 27:49-28:52.
5
This is consistent with the Court's dicta from the claim construction opinion, which both parties
frequently cite. There, the Court noted that "a statement of how to design the chip does not limit the
claims to that design process" and "[t]he fact that the specification describes one method of ending up at
the final product does not limit the claims to using only that method." (D.l. 715 at p. 5). Whether a party
was even aware of Equation (37) is irrelevant to infringement. Without evidence of a desired rise time,
however, it appears to be difficult to prove infringement, given the nature of Equation (37). But, as the
Court noted at claim construction, "[t]here is no canon of claim construction that prefers an 'easy to prove
infringement' construction." (D.I. 715 at p. 5); see also White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) ("The
claim is a statutory requirement, prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely
what his invention is; and it is unjust to the public ... to construe it in a manner different from the plain
import of its terms.").

7

includes the variable Trise, which represents "desired rise time." '853 patent at 17:44-53. The
parties agree that "desired rise time" represents the goal or target of the designer. (D.I. 677 at 74,
D.I. 1088, Ex. B if 129; D.I. 1163 at 34).
To prove infringement, Plaintiffs do not use Equation (37) as it appears in the patent in
order to calculate K. Instead, Plaintiffs' infringement expert, Dr. Foty, uses a different equation:
the "algebraically-reduced expression for K." (D.I. 1087 at 10; D.I. 1047, Ex. 1if150). Dr. Foty
arrives at this equation by "substituting other equations from the '853 patent, canceling certain
variables, and making appropriate simplifications based on the particular characteristics of
Micron's products." (D.I. 1087 at 10; see D.I. 1047, Ex. 31at5-8). In his report, Dr. Foty
opines that his equation "is the same as, or mathematically equal to, Equation 37, but can be
solved using different variables." (D.I. 1047, Ex. 1if152).
Micron argues that Plaintiffs do not use Equation (3 7) to show literal infringement, and
therefore Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable juror could
conclude that Micron literally infringes. (D.I. 1043 at 9-10). Additionally, Micron contends that
no reasonable jury could conclude that the "algebraically-reduced expression for K" is equivalent
to Equation (37) under the doctrine of equivalents. (Id. at 10-13).
i. Literal Infringement

The '853 patent presents a peculiar problem. While the asserted claims are directed to an
apparatus-rather than a method or process-the predetermined factor limitation implies a
temporal limitation. That is, the prefix "pre-" in predetermined suggests that the factor must at
least be capable of determination before some other event occurs. Were it capable of being
determined at any time, the word "predetermined" would have no purpose at all. Since the
predetermined factor sets the maximum N-channel transistor widths in each inverter stage,

8

Equation (37) must be capable of solution (to arrive at the predetermined factor K) before
transistor channel widths are determined. It necessarily follows that the predetermined factor
must be capable of determination during the design phase of the circuit. See, e.g., Pause Tech.

LLC v. TiVo Inc., 419 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that a "predetermined
duration" of signals must be "determined prior to operation"). This temporal limitation is
confirmed by the existence of the Trise ("desired rise time") variable. The patent instructs a
designer to use a desired rise time (a prefabrication goal or objective) in the equation to arrive at
a factor, which then serves to set the maximum N-channel transistor widths in each inverter
stage.
In arriving at the algebraically-reduced expression for K, Dr. Foty-in step 2 of his
derivation-replaces desired rise time with the specification's Equation (15), which defines "rise
time (Seconds)" or actual rise time. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 31at5; D.I. 1088, Ex. B iii! 129-30); '853
patent at 11 :64-12:26. In justifying this substitution, Dr. Foty states that "once a circuit is
finished, the desired rise time becomes the actual rise time of the circuit" and that "[w]hether or
not Micron conceived of a specific desired rise time before designing its circuits is irrelevant
because all circuits have an actual rise time." (D.I. 1088, Ex. B iii! 128-130). That parties agree
that all circuits have an actual rise time. As Plaintiffs have before argued, however, that does not
necessarily mean that desired rise time and actual rise time are interchangeable. As Plaintiffs'
correctly argued during claim construction:
Equation (37) involves a number of variables that would be readily available during the
design process but that may not be available when analyzing a finished product. For
example, the Trise variable 'is the desired rise time.' ... Obviously, the desired rise time
could only be available to the designer of a finished product, whereas specific rise time
(i.e., actual rise time) could be determined from a finished product.

9

(D.I. 677 at 74 (emphasis omitted)). 6 If actual rise time were always equal to desired rise time,
this would be a distinction without difference. Further, Plaintiffs' invalidity expert-Mr.
Salmon-conceded that a desired rise time may not exist at all for a particular node in a circuit.
(D.I. 1047, Ex. 8 at 46). Indeed, Micron explains-and Plaintiffs apparently do not disputethat it does not use a desired rise time at all in its process. (D.I. 1113 at 7; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 ifif
22-23, 31). Because Dr. Foty's conclusion that desired rise time and actual rise time are always
identical fails to find any support in the record and contravenes previous representations made by
Plaintiffs to this Court, "no reasonable jury could accord [it] evidentiary weight" and it is
therefore disregarded. See Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253-55 (3d Cir.
2007); see also St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 2012
WL 1015993, at *12 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2012), aff'd, 522 F. App'x 915 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting
"expert affidavit" that conflicted with court's claim construction). In order for an accused
product to meet the predetermined factor limitation, it must satisfy K when K is calculated using
Equation (37). Because Plaintiffs' algebraically-reduced expression for K substitutes actual rise
time for desired rise time, it is not the same mathematical equation. Plaintiffs' infringement
theory is therefore inconsistent with the Court's claim construction order and fails to create a
genuine dispute as to whether Micron literally infringes.

Even putting aside the substitution of actual rise time for desired rise time, Dr. Foty's
algebraically-reduced expression for K fails to show literal infringement for another independent
reason. Dr. Foty-in step 10 ofhis derivation-declares that "[b]ecause the length of the

6

This does not mean that the desired rise time is only known to the designer. Dr. Foty concedes that
there are "a wide [number] of ways that engineers define their design goals that they're going to then
meet with their designs" and that the "desired rise time" may be recorded in "lab notebooks," "product
spec[ificiations]," or "an engineering meeting, transcript or result." (D.l. 1047, Ex. 6 at 133).

10

interconnect Les is negligible," the expression (1 +Lcs/aoLos) yields (1 +O/ aoLos). (D.I. 1047,
Ex. 31 at 8). Then, since zero over anything equals zero, the expression ultimately yields 1.
(Id.). In reaching this "simpliflication]," Dr. Foty opines that because the accused products have

an "interconnect length [that] is so small as to be negligible," one can "simplify" Equation (37)
by setting the interconnect length variable to zero. (D.I. 1088, Ex. C at 4). It is undisputed that
Dr. Foty takes a number with a positive value-that may be "very small"-and treats it as zero.
But the interconnect length is not zero, as Dr. Foty concedes, and therefore this "simplify[ing]"
step cannot possibly be described as merely an algebraic substitution, the result of which would
render the algebraically-reduced expression for K mathematically identical to Equation (37).
Therefore, Plaintiffs' infringement theory is inconsistent with the Court's claim construction
order for this additional reason.
The patent requires-as the Court has previously held-that for a product to infringe, it
must satisfy the predetermined factor limitation, when the predetermined factor is calculated
using Equation (37). As stated above, there are two independent reasons for concluding that the
algebraically-reduced expression for K is not Equation (37).

Plaintiffs' infringement theory

thus fails to create a genuine dispute of fact. Micron is entitled to summary judgment of no
literal infringement of the '853 patent.

ii. Doctrine ofEquivalents

While Plaintiffs contend that the algebraically-reduced expression for K is
mathematically identical to Equation (37), they argue in the alternative that the algebraicallyreduced expression for K is equivalent to Equation (37). (D.I. 1087 at 14-15). Plaintiffs argue
that a reasonable juror could conclude that the differences between calculating K with Equation
(37) and with the algebraically-reduced expression for Kare insubstantial, and therefore Micron

11

can be found to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. (Id.). Micron argues that Equation
(37) necessarily "require[s] the use of information that was generated before the circuit was
made, including the 'desired rise time' of the buffer," and an equation that "depends on
information that is available after the circuit was made" does not serve the same function, and is
therefore "substantially different." (D.I. 1043 at 10-11 (emphasis omitted)).
In support of its argument, Micron relies on cases pertaining to the "doctrine of vitiation."
(Id.). This doctrine, generally speaking, '"is nothing more than a conclusion that the evidence is

such that no reasonable jury could conclude that an element of an accused device is equivalent to
an element called for in the claim, or that the theory of equivalence to support the conclusion of
infringement otherwise lacks legal sufficiency."' Cadence Pharms. Inc. v. Exela PharmSci Inc.,
780 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek,
Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). "Claim vitiation applies when there is a 'clear,

substantial difference or a difference in kind' between the claim and the accused product." See
Trading Techs. Int'!, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

Micron argues an equation that determines a scaling factor after a circuit has been created
cannot be equivalent to an equation which determines a scaling factor before a circuit has been
created, as such a finding would vitiate the "predetermined" aspect of the predetermined factor
limitation. Put another way, Micron argues the algebraically-reduced expression for K cannot be
equivalent, because "after is opposite of before, not equivalent." See Planet Bingo, LLC v.
GameTech Int'!, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Micron is correct. Plaintiffs'

algebraically-reduced expression for K purportedly determines K, but actually arrives at a factor

12

entirely different in kind. The patent goes to great lengths to describe how to arrive at Equation
(3 7) and how its result-the predetermined factor-is used in the claimed invention. See, e.g.,
'853 patent at 7:56-18:17, 27:65-28:2. "[W]here the patent document expressly identifies a role
for a claim limitation, the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to capture subject matter that
does not substantially fill that role." K-2 Corp v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1999). An equation that arrives at a scaling factor based on information that is derived from a
completed circuit-though ideal for proving infringement-is not, as a matter oflaw, equivalent
to an equation which utilizes prefabrication information to arrive at a predetermined factor. This
would read "predetermined" out of the claims. With an equation that is not equivalent to
Equation (3 7), Plaintiffs reach a factor that is not equivalent to the predetermined factor
described in the patent. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to present evidence sufficient to show
that the accused products meet the predetermined factor limitation under the doctrine of
equivalents. Micron is entitled to summary judgment of no doctrine of equivalents infringement
of the '853 patent.

B. '853 Anticipation
Micron seeks summary judgment on anticipation of the '853 patent only "[i]f ... the
Court were to permit Plaintiffs to use Plaintiffs' Equation to prove infringement." (D.I. 1043 at
8). In other words, Micron contends there is no genuine dispute that the Proebsting reference
anticipates Claims 1, 7, and 9 of the '853 patent "under Plaintiffs' infringement theories." (D.I.
1043 at 14). "It is axiomatic that claims are construed the same way for both invalidity and
infringement." Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2003); see also Digital Reg a/Tex., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 4090550, at *11 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 19, 2014) ("[T]he same claim scope must be applied to infringement and validity."

13

(citing Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2002))). The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs infringement theory fails as a matter of
law. Therefore, the basis for Micron's summary judgment on anticipation is a nullity.
Accordingly, summary judgment is denied.
C. '212 Non-Infringement

The asserted claims 7 of the '212 patent are directed to a clocked latch. Generally, a
semiconductor latch stores a logical value after being set to do so by an input. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 5
at 15-16). Independent claim 22 requires an arrangement of field effect transistors ("FETs") in
which "the control electrodes of said third and fifth FETs [are] connected together for receiving a
clock input signal." '212 patent at 17:11-13. At claim construction, the Court construed "clock
input signal" as "a periodic signal with a constant frequency used for synchronization." (D.I.
729 at p. 3). Micron argues that its accused circuits do not include FETs capable ofreceiving a
"clock input signal" and also do not include the claimed complementary "inverter." (D.I. 1043 at
17). Therefore, Micron argues, it does not literally infringe as a matter oflaw. Micron also
contends that Plaintiffs have failed to show a dispute of material fact as to whether the accused
"clock input signal" and the accused "inverter" are equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.
(D.I. 1043 at 21-22, 23-24).

i. Literal Infringement
a. Clock Input Signal
The parties first dispute the meaning of"for receiving a clock input signal." (D.1. 1087 at
21-25; D.I. 1043 at 19-20; D.I. 1113 at 10-11); see '212 patent at 17:12-13. Plaintiffs argue that

7

Plaintiffs allege that products embodying twenty-seven Design IDs infringe claims 22 and 23 of the
'212 patent. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 10; D.I. 1043 at 17). Claim 22 is the only asserted independent claim. '212
patent at 16:63-17:26.

14

"[ e]ven if [the identified clock signals] are not, technically, clock input signals, all [they] needed
to do is show capability." (D.I. 1087 at 24-25; D.I. 1163 at 68-69). Micron responds that
"'capability' is not the standard" and even if it were, "[a]n argument that those circuits in the
abstract could be used in products with a 'clock input signal' ... is not sufficient to find
infringement." (D.I. 1043 at 19-20)
Plaintiffs are correct that "apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device
does." Paragon Solutions, LLC v. Timex Corp., 566 F.3d 1075, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To prove
infringement, Plaintiffs are not required to show that the accused circuits were actually used in
any particular way, or that they were even used at all. To infringe an apparatus claim that recites
capability, however, an accused device must be "capable of operating in the described mode."

Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted). In other words, the device, as made or sold, must be "reasonably capable of
satisfying the claim limitations." Id.; see also Fantasy Sports Props., Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc.,
287 F.3d 1108, 1117-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A "device does not infringe simply because it is
possible to alter it in a way that would satisfy all the limitations of a patent claim." High Tech

Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see
also Fantasy Sports, 287 F.3d at 1118.

Here, the "for receiving a clock input signal" limitation describes the capability of the
FETs. See Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1216-17 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(discussing how "for preventing," "for arranging," and "for obtaining" are examples of claim
limitations describing capabilities). That capability defines what the apparatus is, not merely
what rt does. See Paragon Solutions, 566 F.3d at 1090. For claims reciting capability, however,
it is not enough to say that the third and fifth FETs could, in some abstract configuration, receive

15

a clock input signal. See High Tech Med., 49 F.3d at 1555. An FET is not capable ofreceiving a
clock input signal if there is no clock input signal to receive. Therefore, in order to satisfy the
capability expressed in the claim, it must be that the case that a clock input signal exists in the
accused products. Without a clock input signal, the accused products could not possibly be
"reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations." Finjan, 626 F .3d at 1204.
Having established that, in order to infringe, the accused products must have a clock
input signal, the Court must determine whether the signals identified by Plaintiffs are indeed
clock input signals. Plaintiffs contend that "[a]ll of the signals connected to the third and fifth
FETs will be active at least once" and that during that period, "the signals have a constant
frequency and synchronize the output of the logic cell with the logic input signal and the clock
input signal." (D.I. 1087 at 24; D.I. 1089 iii! 27-29). Plaintiffs argue this is consistent with the
Court's construction of clock input signals, as that construction did not require that the clock
input signals "have multiple pulses." (D.1. 1087 at 24; D.I. 1089 if 28). In support of this
argument, Plaintiffs point to Figure 12B of the patent, which they posit is "the only embodiment
describing the operation of the asserted claims" and "which shows a clock as a single pulse
having a constant frequency over a single period." (DJ. 1087 at 24 (emphasis omitted)).
Plaintiffs' infringement theory is at odds with the Court's claim construction. The
existence of the terms "periodic" and "frequency" within the Court's construction requires that
there be more than one pulse. This was acknowledged by the parties during claim construction,
as they disputed only whether the patent required that the frequency of the pulses be constant and
whether they must be used for synchronization. (See D.I. 677 at 105-06, 108). If there is only
one pulse, there is nothing "periodic" at all. Without more than one occurrence (of a pulse),
there is no interval, and thus nothing to be constant or irregular. Even Dr. Foty concedes this in

16

his infringement report, stating that "[t]he word 'periodic' can be defined as 'occurring
repeatedly from time to time."' (D.I. 1088, Ex.Eat 22 n.217 (citing http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/periodic)). Plaintiffs' reference to Figure 12B is unavailing. See '212
patent fig.12B. Besides this being an attempt to reargue claim construction, it is clear that Figure
12B is a snapshot in time, of one pulse of the periodic clock signal. The patent itself notes
Figure 12B shows that "any positive signal applied to the input of this circuit is latched at the
output during the clock pulse interval regardless of whether the input signal drops during or after
the clock pulse interval." Id. at 11 :40-43 (emphasis added). An interval may be defined as
"[t]he period of time between two events, actions, etc." or "[t]he space of time intervening
between two points of time." interval, n., Oxford English Dictionary (Dec. 2015),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/98410. If the patentee considered 12B an embodiment with
only one pulse, this reference to intervals would be nonsensical. With this understanding in
mind, the Court held at claim construction that the interval of separation between pulses "must
have a constant frequency." (D.1. 715 at p. 13).
Plaintiffs further argue that "each of [the targeted] signals will activate during at least one
mode of operation of the accused products" and therefore "all of the signals ... will activate at
least once." (D.I. 1089 ,-i,-i 27, 29). Dr. Foty then opines that for any "non-fixed" signal, "a time
window can be defined as representing a time period for that signal; that window defines a
mathematical period for the signal - and the signal will repeat for multiple repetitions of that
window." (Id. ,-i 29). To put it modestly, this contorts the court's claim construction holding
beyond what is permissible. By virtue of requiring a periodic signal, the Court held that the
clock input signal must have multiple pulses with intervals between those pulses. (D.1. 715 at
pp. 11-13 ). Resolving a dispute between the parties, the Court held that these intervals occur at a

17

"constant frequency." 8 (Id. at p. 12). Plaintiffs have not identified a signal that satisfies this
construction and thus, necessarily, have not shown the capability of receiving it. Therefore,
Plaintiffs have not advanced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the
accused products have third and fifth FETs capable of receiving a periodic signal with a constant
frequency used for synchronization.
b. Complementary Inverters
For all but two 9 of the accused products, Micron moves for summary judgment on an
independent ground of non-infringement. (D.1. 1043 at 22-23). Micron contends that the
accused products do not contain the "complementary FET inverter" required by claims 22 and
23. (Id.).
For purposes of this issue, it is important to note that the "reasonably capable" standard
discussed above applies "only to claim language that specifies that the claim is drawn to
capability." Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Limited Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 994
(Fed. Cir. 2009). In the absence of a claim describing capability, infringement requires "specific
instances of direct infringement or that the accused device necessarily infringes the patent in
suit." ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When
"it is clear" that the accused device "does not necessarily have to be placed in the infringing

configuration," in order to prove infringement, there must be evidence that the device was
actually "placed in the infringing configuration." See Ball Aerosol, 555 F.3d at 995.

8

The claim construction opinion states: "Plaintiffs argue that a 'clock input signal' refers to periodic
signals sent by a clock circuit. Defendants agree. However, the parties dispute if the periodic signals
must have a constant frequency." (D.I. 715 at p. 12; see also D.I. 677 at 108).
9
Since Dr. Foty identifies an inverter within Design IDs F26A and F37Z, Micron does not pursue
summary judgment for those IDs. (D.I. 1043 at 22; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 at 21).

18

Here, Dr. Foty rests his opinion on the premise that an ordinary-skilled artisan "would
understand 'complementary FET inverter' to mean a 'circuit that is capable of performing an
inversion function' using CMOS (or an equivalently-'complementary') circuit technology."
(D.I. 1089 if 35). Dr. Foty then goes on to explain how, given certain circumstances, the NAND
and NOR gates identified in the accused circuits would function as an inverter. (Id.

iii! 35-39;

D.I. 1047, Ex. 1 iii! 542-44). His analysis, however, is contrary to the law. The asserted claim
comprises certain components, including an "inverter." Plaintiffs cannot make a showing of
infringement by merely asserting that the accused device is capable of comprising one of the
structural limitations. See Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293,
1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that where a claim does not express capability, but instead a
structural limitation, the plaintiff must show that the accused device "meet[ s] all of the structural
limitations"). Dr. Foty explains how the accused NOR and NAND gates could be configured to
perform an inversion function, but advances no evidence that the accused products necessarily
had this configuration. Since showing that the devices are capable of infringement is not
enough, Plaintiffs' infringement theory fails as a matter oflaw. See Ball Aerosol, 555 F.3d at
994-95. Therefore, since Plaintiffs' evidence does not create a disputed material fact in regard to
the "clock input signal" or the "complementary inverter" limitations, Micron is entitled to
summary judgment as to no literal infringement of the '212 patent.
ii. Doctrine of Equivalents

Plaintiffs contend that, even if the accused products do not literally infringe the "clock
input signal" or "complementary FET inverter" limitations, they infringe under the doctrine of
equivalents. (D.I. 1087 at 25-28). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the signals identified by
Plaintiffs are equivalent to "clock input signals" and that the identified NAND and NOR gates

19

are equivalent to "complementary inverters." (Id.). For both claim limitations, Micron argues
that Plaintiffs are precluded from advancing their doctrine of equivalents theory because of the
disclosure-dedication rule. (D.l. 1043 at 21-24).
The disclosure-dedication rule provides that "when a patent drafter discloses but declines
to claim subject matter, ... this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public."

Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en
bane). "[T]he disclosure must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could
identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed." PSC Computer Prods., Inc.

v. Foxconn Int 'l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, "before unclaimed subject
matter is deemed to have been dedicated to the public, that unclaimed subject matter must have
been identified by the patentee as an alternative to a claim limitation." Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva

Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The disclosure-dedication rule is a
question oflaw to be decided by the Court. See Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d
1326, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., 695 F.3d 1348, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2012). Therefore, whether the disclosure-dedication rule "legally foreclose[s] any
scope of equivalency" is an issue appropriate for determination on summary judgment. See

Zircon Corp. v. The Stanley Works, 713 F. Supp. 2d 881, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Micron argues that the patentee cannot assert that a "logic signal" is equivalent to a clock
input signal "because the 212 Patent discloses, but does not claim, circuits for receiving nonclock signals." (D.l. 1043 at 21). In so arguing, Micron relies on Figures 3 and 8 of the patent,
along with the patentee's statement that "[t]he clocked CLIP AND logic circuit 30 of FIG. 8 is
identical to the unclocked AND circuit of FIG. 3 except one of the inputs 12 is a 'clock' input,
for receiving a clock signal instead of a logic input signal." (Id.); '212 patent at 9:68-10:4.

20

According to the patent, Figure 3 shows "a schematic circuit diagram of a CLIP AND
logic circuit," and Figure 8 shows "a schematic circuit diagram of a clocked CLIP AND gate."
'212 patent at 4:36-37, 4:47-48. Claim 22, however, is directed at "[a] latching complementary
logic input parallel (CLIP) field effect transistor (FET) output logic cell." Id. at 16:63-64. The
only figure which embodies claim 22 appears to be Figure 12A, which the specification
describes as "a schematic circuit diagram of a latching CLIP output logic cell." Id. at 4:59-61.
The embodiments of Figures 3 and 8 seem to be claimed in claims 4 and 5, which are directed at
a "CLIP AND circuit" and a "clocked CLIP circuit," respectively. Id. at 15:5-16. Thus, the
"unclaimed alternative" embodiment may not be unclaimed at all. Even if this were not the case,
however, the specification provides no indication whatsoever that some aspect of the unclocked
"CLIP AND logic circuit" of Figure 3 serves as an alternative to the clock limitation of the CLIP
output logic cell of claim 22. The disclosure-dedication rule does not provide '"that any generic
reference in a written specification necessarily dedicates all members of that particular genus to
the public." PSC Computer Prods., 355 F.3d at 1360. The '212 patent does not identify the
unclocked circuit of Figure 3 as an unclaimed alternative to any limitation of claim 22. See
Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1379. Therefore, the disclosure-dedication rule does not apply.

Micron's disclosure-dedication argument pertaining to NAND and NOR gates fares no
better. In this instance, Micron notes that the specification discusses AND, OR, NAND, and
NOR gates, as well as inverters. (D.I. 1043 at 23); '212 patent at 2:41-46, 4:33-35, 4:43-46.
Relying on that fact, Micron contends that "[b]ecause NAND and NOR gates and inverter gates
are disclosed in the 212 specification, Plaintiffs cannot now seek to rewrite the claims to cover
NAND and NOR gates when the patentee chose to claim only an inverter gat~." (D.1. 1043 at
24).

21

The cited passages of the specification are nothing more than brief descriptions of the
specification's figures. All they show is that the patentee was aware ofNAND and NOR gates.
Micron has not identified any part of the specification which shows that a NAND or NOR gate
may be used as an alternative to the "complementary FET inverter" required by claim 22. This
appears to be the paradigmatic example of"generic references in [the] written specification."

See PSC Computer Prods., 355 F.3d at 1360. Since the specification does not disclose NAND
and NOR gates "as an alternative to the relevant claim limitation," the disclosure dedication rule
does not apply. See Pfizer, 429 F.3d at 1378.
For the foregoing reasons, Micron's motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is denied.

D. '212 Anticipation
Micron pursues summary judgment of anticipation "[t]o the extent that the Court permits
Plaintiffs to assert that Micron's accused circuits include a "clock input signal." (D.I. 1043 at
24). In other words, as was the case with the '853 patent, Micron contends that if Plaintiffs are
permitted to advance their literal infringement theory, the scope of the patent will be broadened
so as to encompass certain prior art (in this case, the Masuda reference). (Id.). Since the Court
has granted summary judgment on the issue non-infringement, there is no "extent that the Court

permit[ted] Plaintiffs" to advance their infringement theory. Therefore, the Court recognizes that
Micron has no basis for seeking summary judgment on anticipation of the '212 patent. Summary
judgment is denied.

E. '949 Non-Infringement

22

The asserted claims 10 of the '949 patent relate to an FET Differential Latching Inverter
("DLI") circuit. The DLI circuit includes two "complementary inverters." '949 patent at 23:528. The claims provide that each inverter includes both "a first input" and a "second input." Id.
The claims also provide that a first bit line is connected to the first input of the first inverter and a
second bit line is connected to the first input of the second inverter. Id. At claim construction,
the Court construed "bit lines" to mean "a pair of different conductive lines in a memory cell
array that are connected to memory cells for transferring the stored value of a selected memory
cell out of the memory array." (D.I. 729 at p. 2). Micron argues that the inverters in its accused
circuits do not include first and second inputs. (D.I. 1043 at 28). Additionally, for the Kl SL
Design ID, Micron argues that since the "lines" accused by Plaintiffs are connected to a
multiplexer and not to memory cells, it does not infringe as a matter oflaw. (Id. at 29).

i. First and Second Inputs
The central issue is whether Plaintiffs have produced evidence sufficient to show that the
accused products include a first and second input. Micron argues that the Plaintiffs cannot raise
a dispute of fact because the two inputs which Dr. Foty targets are merely "two locations along
the same input." (D.1. 1043 at 28; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 iii! 63-66). In other words, Micron argues
that because "both points are on the same line, have the same voltage, and are input into the same

transistors," they cannot constitute two separate inputs. (D.I. 1043 at 28; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 iii! 6366). Dr. Foty contends that inputs may be specific points (or "nodes") along each line. (D.I.
1087 at 30; D.I. 1089 iii! 44-45). To put it another way, "[e]ach 'line' can have multiple input

10

Plaintiffs allege that products embodying three Design IDs infringe claims 1 and 2 of the '949 patent.
(D.I. 1047, Ex. 16; D.I. 1043 at 26). Claim 1 is the only asserted independent claim. '949 patent at 23:541.

23

and output nodes, just as a highway can have multiple entrance and exit ramps." (D.I. 1087 at
30; D.I. 1089 ifif 44-45).
The disagreement between Plaintiffs and Micron is best characterized as a factual
dispute. Dr. Foty's opinion cannot be discarded merely because Micron disagrees with it.
Whether or not the accused products have one or two inputs (or what constitutes an input) is not
a question the Court can resolve. Plaintiffs have shown there is a genuine dispute as to whether
the accused products have the first and second inputs required by the claims.
ii. Bit Lines Connected to Memory

The Court construed "first bit line" and "second bit line" to mean "a pair of different
conductive lines in a memory cell array that are connected to memory cells for transferring the
stored value of a selected memory cell out of the memory array." (D.I. 729 at p. 2 (emphasis
added)). Micron argues that Plaintiffs cannot raise a genuine issue of infringement because the
"lines" that Plaintiffs target in the Kl5L Design ID are connected to a multiplexer, rather than to
memory cells. (D.I. 1043 at 29; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 ifif 70-72). Plaintiffs argue that the mere
existence of the multiplexer as an intermediary does not preclude the conclusion that the bit lines
are "connected to" memory cells for transferring the stored value of a selected memory cell out
of the memory array. (D.I. 1087 at 31 ). In so arguing, Plaintiffs rely on Figures 4A and 4B of
the '949 patent, which-according to Dr. Foty-demonstrate that bit lines need not be directly
connected to the memory cells. (D.I. 1089 if 50).
This is a factual dispute between the parties. The parties dispute whether "connected to"
requires a direct connection. Whether the presence of an intermediary negates the existence of a
"connection" is a factual question reserved for the jury. A reasonable juror could conclude that

24

the accused devices have bit lines connected to memory cells for transferring the stored value of
a selected memory cell out of the memory array.
There is a genuine dispute as to whether the accused products infringe the '949 patent.
Therefore, summary judgment is denied.
F. '949 Anticipation
Micron contends that "to the extent that Plaintiffs are permitted to advance" their
infringement theory for the '949 patent, "the 949 Asserted Claims are anticipated by prior art 6T
SRAM cells," such as the Annaratone reference. (D.I. 1043 at 30). Since Dr. Walker contends
that the '949 patent is only anticipated under Plaintiffs' infringement theory, he-in his
infringement analysis-compares Annaratone to the accused products. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 ifil 7579). Plaintiffs contend this is insufficient to show validity, as it constitutes "an improper
practicing the prior art defense." (D.I. 1087 at 32 (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. PD! Commc 'n
Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2008))). Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that

Annaratone does not disclose complementary FET inverters "producing an inverter transfer
function between said first input and said output which is skewed toward one of said first and
second reference voltages." (D.I. 1087 at 32); '949 patent at 23:12-17. Plaintiffs also assert that
the Annaratone reference fails to disclose the limitation that "the product of the square channel

saturation current and the ratio of width to length of said at least one FET of said first
conductivity type [is] greater than the product of the square channel saturation current and the
ratio of width to length of said at least one FET of said second conductivity type." (D.I. 1087 at
32); '949 patent at 23:4-39.
The parties dispute whether it is proper to compare the accused products to the prior art.

It is well-established that "the same test must be used for both infringement and anticipation."

25

Int'! Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To use
the Supreme Court's century-old maxim, "'[t]hat which infringes, iflater, would anticipate if
earlier."' Id. (quoting Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889)). The holding in PD!

Communications did not change that. In that case, the defendant "provided no evidence
whatsoever" that the prior art reference "satisfie[d] the final two limitations" of the relevant
claim, instead relying on the argument: "to the extent the [allegedly infringing] PDI P20LCD is
considered to practice [the limitations], then so did the RCA 120525 television." PDI Commc 'ns

Sys., 522 F.3d at 1363 (first alteration in original). The case is best understood as an affirmation
that anticipation requires a strict limitation-by-limitation analysis. See, e.g., Advanced Display

Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The case does not preclude
parties from arguing that if a claim limitation must be interpreted in a certain fashion to read on
the accused products, then-if interpreted that same way-the claim reads on the prior art. See

PD! Commc 'ns Sys., 522 F.3d at 1363 ("[I]t is the presence of the prior art and its relationship to
the claim language that matters for invalidity." (alteration in original) (quoting Tate Access

Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002))). Claims
are "interpreted and ... given the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement
analyses." Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001). "A patent may not, like a 'nose of wax,' be twisted one way to avoid anticipation and
another to find infringement." Id. (quoting Sterner Lighting, Inc. v. Allied Elec. Supply, Inc., 431
F.2d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1970)).
Micron has made out a prima facie case of invalidity. Dr. Walker has performed a
limitation-by-limitation anticipation analysis that merely relies on the claim interpretations that
follow from Plaintiffs' infringement theory. (See D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 at 67-76). This amounts to

26

prima facie "showing that each element of the claim at issue ... is found in a single prior art
reference," rather than simply an argument that the prior art is "identical, in all material respects,
to an allegedly infringing product." PD! Commc 'ns Sys., 522 F.3d at 1363. That is not the end
of the analysis, however. Plaintiffs' validity expert, Mr. Salmon, disagrees with Dr. Walker's
opinion. Specifically, Mr. Salmon contends that Annaratone "does not disclose anything about
the inverter transfer function of the circuit identified by Dr. Walker, let alone that the inverter
transfer function is 'skewed toward one of said first and second reference voltages."' (D.I. 1090

if 20).

Further, as to inherent disclosure, Mr. Salmon states that because Annaratone "does not

disclose sufficient information concerning the widths and lengths of the P-channel transistors
relative to the N-channel resistors," the skewing limitation is not a "necessary result" of
Annaratone. (Id.

if 21); see In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301

F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

(To establish inherency, the prior art must "necessarily function[] in accordance with ... the
claimed limitations."). Additionally, Mr. Salmon posits that Annaratone discloses no
information about the "square channel saturation current of the transistors." (Id.

if 22).

In short,

Mr. Salmon states that Annaratone does not anticipate the '949 patent.
Anticipation is a question of fact upon which Micron bears the burden of proof by clear
and convincing evidence. On summary judgment, the Court is not permitted to weigh the

testimony of the competing experts and draw its own conclusion. Mr. Salmon's anticipation
analysis cannot be disregarded. There are factual issues to be resolved. Therefore, Micron has
not shown there is no dispute as to whether Annaratone discloses, expressly or inherently, all the
limitations of the '949 patent. Summary judgment is denied.

G. '367 Non-Infringement

27

The asserted claims 11 of the '367 patent relate to a high speed "logic circuit." '367 patent
at 1:8-10. Specifically, the asserted claims require a "field effect transistor (FET) logic circuit,"
which the Court construed to mean "an electronic circuit that is capable of operating on digital
signals in accordance with a logic function." (D.I. 729 at p. 3); '367 patent at 9:1-2. Micron
argues that the accused circuits are "delay circuits" which do not perform a "logic function."
(D.I. 1043 at 32; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 iiii 82-83). Additionally, Micron argues that the U68A Design
ID does not contain "a complementary FET inverter ... serially connected between said first and
second potential levels" because the accused inverter is not connected between the two potential
levels identified by Plaintiffs. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 iiii 85-88, Ex. 26); '367 patent at 9:11-15.
Plaintiffs argue that the accused circuitry performs the "identity" logic function. (D.I. 1089 ii
59). Plaintiffs also contend that the accused inverter is not connected to veep!, and even if it
were, because vcc! and veep! are both power supplies, the inverter is connected to a second
potential level as required by the patent. (D.I. 1087 at 34; D.I. 1089 iiii 60-61; D.I. 1188).
The dispute concerning whether the accused products perform a "logic function" is one
of fact. Dr. Foty contends that the infringing circuitry is a "sub-section of the entire circuit" and
further, that "any delay introduced into the ... circuit will have no effect upon the digital
operation of the infringing circuitry." (D.I. 1089 ii 55). Dr. Foty also opines that the "identity
logic function"-a logical function which produces the same output as input-is "well-known in
digital circuit design." (Id.

ii 59). In response to an assertion by Micron that the identity logic

function is not a logic function at all, Dr. Foty provides the example of a buffer gate (along with
its truth table) and cites to an online digital circuits textbook. (Id.

11

ii 59, n.13; see D.I.

1043 at 32-

Plaintiffs allege that Micron products embodying four Design IDs infringe claims 1, 4, 5, 9, and 11 of
the '367 patent. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 20; D.I. 1043 at 31 ). Claim 1 is the only asserted independent claim.
'367 patent at 9:1-62.
28

33). From the opinion of Dr. Foty, a reasonable juror could conclude that the accused circuitry
performs a logic function. Therefore, there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.
The Court reaches the same conclusion with regard to the question of whether the
accused complementary FET inverter is "serially connected between said first and second
potential levels." In his infringement report, Dr. Foty identified gnd! and vcc! as the first and
second potential levels. (D.I. 1047, Ex. 25 at 25-26). Micron contends that the accused
complementary FET inverter is not in fact connected between those voltages, but is instead
connected between gnd! and veep!. (D.I. 1043 at 33; D.I. 1047, Ex. 5 iii! 85-88, Ex. 25 at 4-6).
With its summary judgment brief, Micron produced a declaration from Micron employee Jared
Adams, wherein Mr. Adams declared that vcc! and veep! had different voltages. (D.I. 1047, Ex.
26). Relying on this declaration, Micron argues that because vcc! and veep! have different
voltages, the load FET and complementary FET inverter are not connected to the same "second
potential level," as the patent requires. (D.I. 1113 at 18). Plaintiffs dispute that the
complementary FET inverter is connected to vccp!. 12 (D.I. 1188). Additionally, Dr. Foty states
that "the different labels do not actually tell us that 'vcc!' and 'veep!' are different voltages."
(D.I. 1089 if 61). Plaintiffs also argue that even if Mr. Adams is correct, a person having
ordinary skill in the art "would understand that [vcc! and veep!] are both power supplies and thus
constitute the same potential level, since the difference in voltage would not materially affect the

12

In response to the declaration from Mr. Adams, Plaintiffs sought access to the source code computer in
order to investigate the assertions made by Mr. Adams. (D.I. 1163 at 117-19). The Court granted this
request. (Id. at 148). After the inspection, Mr. Adams was deposed by Plaintiffs. At the deposition,
Plaintiffs asked Mr. Adams about an entirely new inverter, claiming that it was the "actual inverter" they
sought to accuse rather than the "represent[ative]" one depicted in Dr. Foty's infringement report. (D.I.
1185, Ex. A at 5; D.I. 1186, Exs. 2-3; D.I. 1188 at p. 3 (alteration in original)). Plaintiffs will not be
permitted to rely on this entirely new theory of infringement. Dr. Foty' s report indicates that
MH00013489 "represents the transistor-level structure" of the accused inverter in MH00013254. (D.I.
1047, Ex. 25 at 6). Plaintiffs cannot now change course and claim MHOOOl 12334 was the accused
inverter all along.

29

operation of the circuit." (D.I. 1087 at 34-35; D.I. 1089 iii! 60-61). From this back and forth, a
genuine factual dispute is apparent. Dr. Foty contends that, even if Mr. Adams is correct, the
variance in voltage makes no difference, opining that "[b]ecause 'vcc!' and 'veep!' are both
power supplies, the complementary FET inverter is connected to the 'second potential level."'
(D.I. 1089 if 60). In other words, Dr. Foty opines that the accused inverter is connected to the
same "second potential level" as the load FET, as required by the claim 1. '367 patent at 9:8-15
("a load FET ... connected between a second potential level ... and ... a complementary FET
inverter ... serially connected between said first and second potential levels"). Micron disagrees
with Dr. Foty. That disagreement must be resolved by the jury. I conclude that Plaintiffs have
presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the accused inverter
meets the claim limitation. Therefore, summary judgment is denied.
H. Indirect Infringement
"To prove induced infringement [under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)], the patentee "must show
direct infringement, and that the alleged [indirect] infringer 'knowingly induced infringement
and possessed specific intent to encourage another's infringement."' Toshiba Corp. v. Imation
Corp., 681 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting i4i Ltd. P 'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598
F.3d 831, 851 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Thus, liability under an inducement theory requires affirmative

acts inducing direct infringement and "proof the defendant knew the acts were infringing."
Commil USA, LLCv. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015); Tega! Corp. v. Tokyo
Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Micron states that "Plaintiffs' claim of induced infringement appears to be based on the
theory that Micron sells accused [products] to its customers abroad and encourages those
customers to import into the United States and use end products ... that incorporate Micron's

30

chips." (D.I. 1043 at 34). Micron argues that because "Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence that
Micron has ever encouraged its customers to import the customers' products into the United
States," Plaintiffs have failed to show the specific intent required for a finding of inducement.
(D.I. 1043 at 34). Micron misunderstands Plaintiffs' argument. Plaintiffs indeed contend that
Micron induced infringement through encouraging the importation of infringing products, but
Plaintiffs also argue that Micron encourages the use of the infringing products which, though not
sold in the United States, ultimately end up in the United States. (D.I. 1087 at 35). In other
words, Plaintiffs contend that certain infringing products end up in the United States without
ever being sold by Micron in the United States. For these "untaxed" products, 13 Micron
indirectly infringes by encouraging its customers to use the infringing products. (D.I. 1163 at
123-26). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that Micron induced direct infringement by assisting
customers with '"qualification' and 'validation' of the products," by "provid[ing] customers with
product samples, technical support and testing services in the United States," by providing
"technical notes (in English) that encourage the infringing use," by providing "quality assurance
services in the United States," by providing pre-production engineering samples, by providing
customers with Field Application Engineers, and by providing "product repair and replacement
services in the United States." (D.I. 1087 at 35; D.I. 1088, Ex. E ifif 477-82, 523).
Micron has not established that there is no genuine factual dispute as to whether it
actively induced infringement. "[W]hoever without authority ... uses ... any patented
invention[] within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention ...
infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement

Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1964) ("[I]t has often and clearly been held that unauthorized use,

13

The products are "untaxed" in the sense that because they were never sold by Micron in the United
States, they are not accounted for in Plaintiffs' direct infringement theory.
31

without more, constitutes infringement."). Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable juror could find that Micron's products infringe the '949 patent. (D.I. 1087
at 35). Micron does not dispute that it had pre-suit knowledge of the patents-in-suit. From this
knowledge, a reasonable juror could conclude that Micron "knew it was inducing users of [the]
accused products to infringe" the '949 patent. Tarkus Imaging, Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 2012
WL 2175788, at *4 (D. Del. June 14, 2012) (citing Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Further, Plaintiffs have evidence of specific actions undertaken by
Micron within the United States. From these activities a reasonable juror could conclude that
Micron actively induced acts of direct infringement. See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v.
Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (evidence of
technical support and on-site technical presentations in United States, among other things, were
found sufficient to deny summary judgment); Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics
GMBH, 150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 208 (D. Mass. 2001) ("[W]here use of a patented device constitutes
an infringement under§ 271(a), courts have found that the maintenance or repair of the device
likewise constitutes an infringement." (collecting cases)); Tarkus Imaging, 2012 WL 2175788, at
*4 (denying summary judgment where accused indirect infringer "advertised use of the accused
features of its products and provided users with instructions detailing how to operate the accused
products").
Plaintiffs have advanced evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that
Micron induced the infringement of the patents-in-suit. Summary judgment is therefore denied.
I. Plaintiffs' Motion on '853 Non-Anticipation and Indefiniteness

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on two issues: (1) the '853 patent is not anticipated by
certain prior art references, and (2) the '853 patent is not indefinite. (D.I. 1056 at 7-8). In

32

seeking summary judgment of non-anticipation, Plaintiffs argue the asserted prior art does not
disclose-expressly or inherently-the predetermined factor limitation, the asserted prior art
does not enable one of ordinary skill to make the claimed invention, and certain asserted prior art
does not actually qualify as prior art under § 102. As for the issue of indefiniteness, Plaintiffs
argue that a person having ordinary skill in the art "would understand the claims covered
finished products that meet the Predetermined Factor Limitation." (Id. at 20).
i. Anticipation

Micron argues that if Plaintiffs are permitted to use the algebraically-reduced expression
for K to prove infringement, claim 1 becomes "so broad that it captures additional prior art."
(D.I. 1082 at 7). Micron specifically contends that under Plaintiffs' infringement theory, prior
art references RCA, Hedenstiema, Proebsting, and products embodying the A 1OC design
anticipate the asserted claims of the '853 patent. (D.I. 1082 at 10-11). Of the prior art references
upon which Plaintiffs seek summary judgment of non-anticipation, Micron contends that only
the Steele reference anticipates "[w]hen the Court's construction of the claims is correctly
applied." (D.I. 1082 at 8). The Court has found that Plaintiffs' infringement theory fails to
create a genuine dispute of fact as to infringement, as it is inconsistent with the Court's claim
construction. Therefore, Micron lacks a basis to pursue its anticipation theory that relies on

RCA, Hedenstiema, Proebsting, and the Al OC design. Thus, there is no dispute as to whether
these references anticipate the '853 patent. 14 Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to summary
judgment of non-anticipation with respect to these prior art references.

14

In the briefing, the parties dispute whether these references are enabling and whether they actually
qualify as prior art. Since I understand that, following the Court's ruling as to infringement, Micron no
longer argues that these references anticipate, I need not reach these issues.

33

The Steele reference presents a different question. Micron contends that the Steele thesis
anticipates the '853 patent when K is properly calculated using Equation (37), rather than
Plaintiffs' algebraically-reduced expression for K. Plaintiffs argue that the Steele reference is not
prior art, that it is not enabling, and that the predetermined factor limitation is not anticipated.
Plaintiffs argue that the Steele reference does not qualify as prior art. (DJ. 1056 at 2930). Micron has advanced considerable evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude
that the Steele reference is prior art printed publication under § 102(b). The Steele reference is a
master's thesis. (DJ. 1083, Ex. 7 at 4). A declaration from the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS) states that the reference was publicly accessible by at least December 1, 1988. 15
(DJ. 1083, Ex. 6 at 2). Specifically, the reference was published in the Government Reports
Announcements and Index ("GRA&I") on December 1, 1988. (Id.). That issue "would have
been distributed to subscribers no more than one week after the cover date." (Id.). NTIS would
begin shipping any orders from its subscribers at that time. (Id.). The GRA&I itself confirms
the thesis was indexed by subject matter. (Id. at 3-5). Therefore, the Steele reference qualifies
as a printed publication under§ 102(b). See In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
2004); OKI Am. Inc. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2006 WL 2711555, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 2006).
Plaintiffs contend that the Steele reference does not contain enough information to
calculate the predetermined factor K, and therefore Steele cannot anticipate the '853 patent under
§ 102. I agree. "Anticipation of a patent claim requires a finding that the claim at issue 'reads
on' a prior art reference." Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also Titanium Metals Corp. ofAm. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (If"a claim

15

The '853 patent has an application date of March 21, 1990. Further, Plaintiffs assume for purposes of
this motion that March 21, 1990 also represents the date of invention. (DJ. 1056 at 8).
34

covers several compositions, the claim is 'anticipated' if one of them is in the prior art."). Here,
in order to anticipate, a reference need not have used Equation (3 7) in the design process, but
must disclose a buffer that has a scaling factor less than a predetermined factor, when that factor
is calculated using Equation (37). Since Steele does not disclose the requisite variables to
calculate K, it does not disclose the predetermined factor limitation.
When comparing Steele to the '853 patent, Dr. Walker's invalidity chart simply does not
address the (1 +Lc/aoLo) expression within Equation (37). (D.I. 1083, Ex. 4 at 214). Instead,

Dr. Walker opines that because "Steele does not include the interconnect capacitance in the
simulation net list, ... Steele discloses that the interconnect capacitance is negligible." (Id.). Dr.
Walker then concludes that (Le/ aoLo) is zero. (Id.

if 36).

The absence of information about

interconnect length is not a disclosure at all, much less a disclosure that the value is zero.
Further, Micron is trying to have it both ways. For purposes of non-infringement, Micron argued
it was improper to assume that because interconnect length was negligible in the accused
products, it could be treated as zero. 16 Micron now takes the position that because the Steele
reference does not discuss interconnect capacitance at all, the exact same expression can be
treated as zero. The Court agreed with Micron before and maintains that position now. Absent
some relevant disclosure in the prior art reference, Micron cannot, in calculating Equation (3 7)
for purposes of determining K, simply disregard certain variables. In order for Steele to
anticipate, the predetermined factor limitation must "read on" the Steele reference. See Atlas
Powder, 190 F.3d at 1346. Having failed to show that a prior art reference meets the

16

At oral argument, counsel for Micron stated that treating interconnect length as zero was "not a proper
substitution, because it is ignoring something that has a positive value indisputably, and then simply
treating it as zero .... [T]hat then is a ... non-use of Equation (37)." (D.I. 1163 at 18).
35

predetermined factor limitation, a reasonable juror could not conclude that the Steele thesis
anticipates.
For an additional independent reason, Micron fails to survive summary judgment on nonanticipation with respect to the Steele reference. Dr. Walker makes certain assumptions about
the l] value that appears in the following limitation, as construed:
the P-channel field effect transistor in each inverter stage having a channel which is wider
than the channel of the corresponding N-channel field effect transistor of each inverter
stage by a factor of l], the ratio of electron mobility in the N-channel field effect
transistors to hole mobility in the P-channel field effect transistors, such that the voltage
transfer function of each inverter stage is symmetrical.
(D.I. 729 at p. 2). Specifically, Dr. Walker concludes that lJ is "approximately" 2.5. (D.I. 1083,
Ex. 4 ~ 38). Dr. Walker justifies his arrival at this number in several ways. First, Dr. Walker
notes that the PIN ratio in the inverters is 2.59. (Id.). From this, Dr. Walker concludes that since
Steele "discloses that the rise time is approximately equal to the fall time for a given load," "the
inverters have a symmetric voltage transfer function," and therefore lJ is approximately 2.5.
(Id.). Second, Dr. Walker notes that the typical lJ range at that time (1988) would have ranged

from 2 to 2.5. (Id.). Third, Dr. Walker states that he corroborated this with Mr. Steele himself.
(Id.

~

40). For purposes of anticipation, the typical lJ range and the testimony of Mr. Steele are

irrelevant. See Calloway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that "every element of the claimed invention" must be described "express or inherently"
within "the four comers of a single, prior art document"); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc.,
523 F.3d 1323, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Since the reference contains no information about l], it
is not disclosed expressly. Inherent anticipation can be established when "prior art necessarily
functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed limitations." In re

Cruc~ferous

Sprout

Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Micron's inherency theory similarly fails. Dr.

36

Walker's conclusion about ri is not a necessary result of Steele; it is an assumption, and further,
is one subject to dispute. 17 Since Steele does not disclose a value for ri-and one cannot merely
be hypothesized for purposes of proving anticipation-Equation (3 7) cannot be calculated.
Therefore, Micron has not shown that Steele meets the predetermined factor limitation.
Micron has failed to carry its burden of producing clear and convincing evidence from
which a reasonable juror could conclude that the '853 patent was anticipated by the Steele
reference. Having concluded that the Steele reference does not contain every element of the
claimed invention, the Court need not address the argument that the Steele reference is not
enabling. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment of non-anticipation, with respect to the
Steele reference, is granted.
ii. Indefiniteness
Indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 if 2 is a question oflaw to be determined by the
Court. Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011). "[A] patent
is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent,
and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art
about the scope of the invention." Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120,
2124 (2014).
Micron contends that "the asserted claims of the 853 Patent are indefinite to the extent
that they are interpreted to encompass calculating K with equations other than Equation (37)."
(D.I. 1082 at 26). Specifically, Micron argues that if Plaintiffs are permitted to advance an

~ Mr. Salmon, in his reply declaration, states that "[ e ]quality of rise/fall time is not the same as symmetry

1

of an inverter transfer function," since the former is an AC characteristic, while the latter is a DC
characteristic. (D.I. 1124 ,-i 10). Further, Mr. Salmon states that since "Dr. Walker has failed to show
that Steele discloses proper capacitive loading conditions and equal propagation delay times, ... it is
improper to assume that Steele discloses a symmetrical inverter transfer function based on the disclosure
of equal rise and fall times." (Id.).

37

infringement theory using an equation "determined using only information about the finished
products," which excludes the desired rise time variable, the asserted claims are indefinite. (Id.).
The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs' infringement theory cannot be sustained. Since
the Court has rejected Plaintiffs' infringement theory, Micron no longer has a basis for pursuing
a claim of indefiniteness. Indeed, Micron explicitly argued during claim construction that if their
proposed construction of "predetermined factor" were not adopted, the claim would be
indefinite. (D.I. 677 at 80-81). The Court adopted Micron's construction, finding that K is
calculating using Equation (37). (D.I. 715 at pp. 3-5). The Court does not understand Micron to
now argue that the '853 patent is invalid when K is properly calculated using Equation (37), nor
likely could it. See Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing
judicial estoppel). Therefore, there is no genuine dispute that the '853 patent is not indefinite.
Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Micron's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement (D.I. 1037) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Micron's motion
for summary judgment of invalidity (D.I. 1039) is DENIED; Micron's motion for summary
judgment of no indirect infringement (D.I. 1040) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART; Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (D.I. 1055) is GRANTED IN PART

and DISMISSED AS MOOT IN PART. An appropriate order will be entered.

38