Taylor v. Phelps et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 3/28/13. (mdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ANTONIO L. TAYLOR,
Petitioner,
v.
PERRY PHELPS, Warden, and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELA WARE,
Respondents.
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Civil Action No. 11-988-GMS
Antonio L. Taylor. Pro se petitioner.
Gregory E. Smith. Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
t1. V"~ '2.-«
Wilmington, Delaware
,2013
Pending before the court is an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 ("petition") (D.L 3) filed by petitioner Antonio L. Taylor ("Taylor"), and the
State's motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred by the one-year limitations period
prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244. (D.I. 13) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the
State's motion to dismiss petitioner's petition.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 29, 1994, Taylor was arrested for menacing his girlfriend, Toni A. Young.
Taylor v. State, 685 A.2d 349 (Del. 1996). Upon his release on $500 bond and the condition that
he would have no contact with Young, Taylor returned to Young's apartment, where he had been
living prior to his arrest. Young was staying next door with her aunt, Carolyn McCray. Taylor
went to McCray's apartment and pleaded with McCray to let him speak with Young. McCray
refused, telling Taylor that Young did not want to talk to him. By cutting his way through
drywall, Taylor broke into Young's apartment, the locks of which Young had changed that day.
ld.
The next morning, on April 30, 1994, McCray called the Delaware State Police to search
Young's apartment for Taylor. !d. Police did not find Taylor, who was hiding under Young's
bed. As the police left, Young entered her apartment to get fresh clothes for herself and her
baby, of whom Taylor was the father. Taylor chased Young out of the apartment, and he stabbed
her. Four officers of the Delaware State Police witnessed Taylor stabbing Young. That
afternoon, Young died as a result of the wounds. As Taylor knew, Young was pregnant with
Taylor's child. ld.
In May 1995, a Delaware Superior Court jury convicted Taylor of: first degree murder
(intentional murder); first degree murder (felony murder); second degree burglary; three counts
of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony; and non-compliance with
conditions of bond. (D.1. 13) At the conclusion of a three day penalty hearing, the jury
unanimously found the existence of a statutory aggravating factor, and then split its
recommendation for a sentence of life or death by a vote of 6 to 6. On June 2, 1995, the Superior
Court sentenced Taylor to two terms of natural life without the benefit of parole, plus a total of
thirty-three years. Taylor appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Taylor'S
convictions and sentences. Taylor, 685 A.2d at 351.
Taylor filed his first motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61 motion") on May 27, 1998. A Superior Court Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the Rule 61 motion. The Superior Court adopted that
Recommendation and denied the Rule 61 motion on April 28, 1999. State v. Taylor, 1999 WL
462377 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that judgment
on February 23, 2000. Taylor v. State, 2000 WL 313501 (Del. Feb. 23,2000).
Taylor filed his second Rule 61 motion in October 2009, alleging that he is "actually
innocent" of felony murder under the Delaware Supreme Court's "reinterpretation" of the felony
murder statute in Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002), which was made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review in Chao v. State, 931 A.2d 1000 (Del. 2007) ("Chao IF').
The Superior Court denied the Rule 61 motion as time barred under Rule 61 (i)(l) and
procedurally barred under Rule 61 (i)(2) and (3). State v. Taylor, RK 94-06-0047-02 through
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RK94-06-0052-02 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2011). The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed that
judgment. Taylor v. State, 27 A.3d 552 (Table), 2011 WL 3590909 (Del. Aug. 16,2011).
Taylor filed the instant habeas petition in October 2011, alleging that he is "actually
innocent" of felony murder under the Delaware Supreme Court's "reinterpretation" of the felony
murder statute in Williams and Chao II
II.
DISCUSSION
A. One-Year Statute of Limitations
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDP A") was signed into
law by the President on April 23, 1996, and habeas petitions filed in federal courts after this date
must comply with the AEDPA's requirements. See generally Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
336 (1997). AEDPA prescribes a one-year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions
by state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.c. § 2244(d)(1).
Taylor's petition, filed in October, 2011, is subject to the one-year limitations period
contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 336. Taylor does not allege, and the court
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does not discern, any facts triggering the application of § 2244(d)( 1)(B). However, by alleging
that Williams and Chao II announced a new rule oflaw redefining Delaware's definition for
felony murder, Taylor does appear to allege that § 2244( d)(1 )(C) applies to his case, and that the
limitations period should begin to run from June 20, 2007 - the date of the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Chao II. This argument, however, is unavailing, because the Chao III
Williams rule was announced by the Delaware Supreme Court with respect to state law, not a
newly recognized federal constitutional right made retroactively applicable on collateral review
by the United States Supreme Court.
Moreover, to the extent Taylor's argument is that Chao II provides the "factual predicate"
for his habeas claims because it made the Williams holding retroactively applicable, thereby
providing a later starting date of June 20, 2007 under § 2244( d)( 1)(D), the contention is similarly
unavailing. Chao II and Williams cannot establish a factual predicate for Taylor's constitutional
claims, because they were not decisions rendered in Taylor's own litigation history and they did
not directly eliminate his legal status as a convict. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295
(2005)(holding that a notice of order vacating a federal prisoner's prior state conviction used to
enhance federal sentence triggers AEDP A's one year limitations period, provided petitioner has
shown due diligence in seeking the order); Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9 th Cir.
2005)(explaining that a state court decision clarifying or re-defining state law does not trigger §
2244(d)(l )(D) unless the petitioner was party to that case.). Thus, the one-year period of
limitations in this case began to run when petitioner's conviction became final under §
2244(d)(1)(A).
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(l)(A), if a state prisoner appeals a state court judgment but does
not seek certiorari review, the judgment of conviction becomes final ninety days after the state
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appellate court's decision. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1999);
Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed Taylor'S convictions and sentences on October 21, 1996, and he did not file a petition
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Consequently, Taylor's convictions
became final for the purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) on January 20, 1997. Accordingly, to comply
with the one-year limitations period, Taylor had to file his § 2254 petition by January 20, 1998.
See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(a), (e) applies to federal habeas petitions).
Taylor did not file his habeas petition until October 13, 2011,2 almost thirteen full years
after the expiration of AEDPA's statute oflimitations. Thus, the petition is time-barred, unless
the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably tolled. See Holland v. Florida, _ U.S.
130 S.Ct. 2549,2560 (201O)(equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)(statutory tolling). The
court will discuss each doctrine in tum.
B. Statutory Tolling
Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed application for state collateral review tolls
AEDPA's limitations period during the time the application is pending in the state courts,
including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the application is filed during AEDPA's
one-year limitations period. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000). In this
case, Taylor filed his first Rule 61 motion on May 27, 1998, approximately four months after the
limitations period had already expired. He filed his second Rule 61 motion in October 2009,
2Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, the court adopts the mailing date provided by Taylor
(October 13,2011) as the filing date. (D.1. 3 at 103); See Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758,
761 (3d Cir. 2003)(the date on which a prisoner transmitted documents to prison authorities for
mailing is to be considered the actual filing date).
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more than eleven years after the expiration ofthe limitations period, Thus, neither of Taylor's
Rule 61 motions statutorily toll the limitations period, Accordingly, the petition must be
dismissed as time-barred, unless equitable tolling is available.
C. Equitable Tolling
The one-year limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons in rare circumstances
when the petitioner demonstrates "(I) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)
some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Holland, 130
S.Ct. at 2562 (emphasis added). Equitable tolling is not available where the late filing is due to
the petitioner's excusable neglect. ld.; Miller v, New Jersey State Dept. o/Corr., 145 F.3d 616,
618-19 (3d Cir. 1998). Consistent with these principles, the Third Circuit has explained that
equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitations period may be appropriate in the following
circumstances:
(1) where the defendant (or the court) actively misled the plaintiff;
(2) where the plaintiff was in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting his rights;
or
(3) where the plaintifftimely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.
Jones, 195 F.3d at 159,' Thomas v. Snyder, 2001 WL 1555239, at *3-4 (D. Del. Nov. 28, 2001).
Here, Taylor alleges that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because he is
actually innocent of felony murder under the new definition of felony murder announced
Williams, and made retroactively applicable in Chao 11. Taylor's equitable tolling argument
appears to be two-fold. First, Taylor appears to be asserting that his free-standing claim of actual
innocence should per se act to equitably toll the limitations period. (D.L 16) Second, Taylor
appears to assert that the limitations period should be equitably tolled through June 20, 2007, the
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date on which the Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision in Chao II. The court is not
persuaded by either argument.
To begin, whether or not a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable on federal
habeas review remains an open question in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See House v. Bell, 126
S.Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006). As a general rule, a claim of actual innocence, if proven by new
reliable evidence, permits a court to review the merits of an otherwise defaulted claim; in other
words, an actual innocence claim is a gateway for excusing procedurally defaulted claims. Id.
Here, Taylor was charged with and convicted of felony murder for causing the death of his
girlfriend "during immediate flight" from the predicate felony of second degree burglary. He
now contends that his conviction should be vacated under Williams and Chao II because he was
not convicted of felony murder for causing the death of his girlfriend "in furtherance of' the
immediate flight from the commission of the predicate felony of second degree burglary.
Neither Chao II nor Williams directly addressed the "immediate flight therefrom" language in
the felony murder statute and, contrary to Taylor's assertion, neither redefined "felony murder"
to mean that a person cannot be guilty of felony murder when the murder occurs during the
"immediate flight" from the predicate felony. Consequently, Taylor's reliance on Williams and
Chao II does not constitute "new reliable evidence" of his actual innocence. Having failed to
present a viable claim of actual innocence, Taylor's actual innocence claim does not constitute
an extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes. See Teagle v. DiGuglielmo, 2009
WL 1941983, at *1 (3d Cir. Jun. 11, 2009).
Second, even if the court were to hypothetically accept Taylor's argument that the
limitations period should be equitably tolled through June 20, 2007 -- the date on which the
Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision in Chao II -- this tolling would not render the
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instant petition timely filed. Taylor did not raise the instant Chao II/Williams argument to the
Delaware state courts until October 2009, which was seven years after Williams, and
approximately two years after Chao II. Similarly, he waited more than nine years after
Williams, and more than three years after Chao II, to raise the instant claim in this court. Simply
stated, Taylor has not demonstrated that he exercised the level of diligence needed to trigger
equitable tolling.
And finally, to the extent petitioner's untimely filing was the result of a miscalculation
regarding the one-year filing period, such mistakes do not warrant equitably tolling the
limitations period. See Taylor v. Carroll, 2004 WL 1151552, at *5-6 (D. Del. May 14,2004).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the petition as time-barred.
III.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
When a district court issues a final order denying a § 2254 petition, the court must also
decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A
certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right" by demonstrating "that reasonable jurists would find the district
court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). If a federal court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court is not
required to issue a certificate of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of
reason would find it debatable: (l) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. Id.
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The court has concluded that Taylor's petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is time
barred. The court is persuaded that reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be
debatable. Therefore, the court will not issue a certificate of appealability.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the court will deny Taylor's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (D.1. 3)
An appropriate order will be entered.
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