Taylor v. Phelps et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM - Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 12/26/13. (rwc)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

ANTONIO L. TAYLOR,

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Petitioner,
v.

PERRY PHELPS, Warden, and
A TTORN"EY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Respondents.

Civil Action No. 11-988-GMS

MEMORANDUM
I.

INTRODUCTION
In March, 2013, the court denied petitioner Antonio L. Taylor's petition for a writ of

habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after determining that his petition was timebarred. (D.l. 17; D.l. 18) Presently pending before the court is Tayor's motion to alter or amend
judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (DJ.19)

II.

ST ANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 59( e) is "a device to relitigate the original issue decided by the district court, and [it

is] used to allege legal error." United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003).

Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288. The moving party must show one of the following in order to prevail
on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of
new evidence that was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice. Max's Seafood Cafe v. Quinteros,
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). A motion for reargument and/or reconsideration is not

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appropriate to reargue issues that the court has already considered and decided. Brambles USA
Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F. Supp. 1239, 1240 (D. Del. 1990).

III.

DISCUSSION
Rule 59(e) states that a "motion to alter or amend ajudgment must be filed no later than

28 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The court denied Taylor's
petition on March 28, 20l3, (OJ. 17; OJ. 18), and the instant motion is dated April 7,2013.
(OJ. 19) Applying the prisoner mailbox rule to the date on Taylor's motion, the court concludes
that the instant motion is timely.
Nevertheless, Taylor's motion fails to warrant relief. Taylor contends that the court
erroneously construed the Delaware caselaw he cited to support his claim of actual innocence.
The court, however, considered Taylor's argument regarding the aforementioned Delaware
precedent when it considered Taylor's petition, concluded that the cases did not establish a viable
claim of actual innocence, and held that Taylor's meritless claim of actual innocence did not
justify equitably tolling the limitations period. In short, Taylor's instant argument does not
warrant reconsideration of the court's decision, because it merely asserts Taylor's disagreement
with the court's conclusion, and attempt to reargue issues already decided. Accordingly, the
court will deny Taylors's Rule 59(e) motion.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will deny Taylor's Rule 59(e) motion. In addition,

the court will not issue a certificate of appealability, because Taylor has failed to make a
"substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see United

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States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470 (3d Cir. 1997); 3d Cir. LAR 22.2 (2011). A separate order will be
entered.

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