Helios Software LLC et al v. Awareness Technologies Inc. et al

Filing 192

MEMORANDUM ORDER re (177 in 1:11-cv-01259-LPS) (291 in 1:12-cv-00081-LPS) MOTION for Reargument filed by Helios Software LLC, Pearl Software Inc. is DENIED. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 3/5/14. Associated Cases: 1:11-cv-01259-LPS, 1:12-cv-00081-LPS (ntl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
HELIOS SOFTWARE, LLC and PEARL
SOFTWARE, INC.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

C.A. No. 11-1259-LPS

AWARENESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and
REMOTE COMPUTER OBSERVATION &
MONITORING LLC (d/b/a REMOTECOM),
Defendants.
HELIOS SOFTWARE, LLC and PEARL
SOFTWARE, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
C.A. No. 12-081-LPS

V.

SPECTORSOFT CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington, this 5th day of March, 2014:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs Helios Software, LLC and Pearl Software, Inc.
(collectively, "Helios" or "Plaintiffs") Motion for Reargument on or Reconsideration of the
Constructions of Real-time Terms (the "Reargument Motion"). (C.A. No. 11-1259 D.I. 177;
C.A. No. 12-081-LPS D.I. 291) By its Reargument Motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reconsider
its construction of certain "real-time" terms in its December 19, 2013 Memorandum Opinion and
Order. (See id. at 2) Plaintiffs' Reargument Motion is DENIED.

I.

LEGAL STAND ARDS
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1.5, a motion for reconsideration should be granted only

"sparingly." The decision to grant such a motion lies squarely within the discretion of the district
court. See Dentsply Int'/, Inc. v. Kerr Mfg. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d 385, 419 (D. Del. 1999); Brambles

USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 735 F.Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Del. 1990). These types of motions are
granted only if the Court has patently misunderstood a party, made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented by the parties, or made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.

See Shering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 293, 295 (D. Del. 1998); Brambles, 735 F.Supp.
at 1241. "A motion for reconsideration is not properly grounded on a request that a court rethink
a decision already made." Smith v. Meyers, 2009 WL 5195928, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2009);

see also Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F.Supp. 1109, 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
It is not an opportunity to "accomplish repetition of arguments that were or should have been

presented to the court previously." Karr v. Castle, 768 F.Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Del. 1991).
A motion for reconsideration may be granted only if the movant can show at least one of
the following: (i) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) the availability of
new evidence not available when the court made its decision; or (iii) there is a need to correct a
clear error oflaw or fact to prevent manifest injustice. See Max's Seafood Cafe by LouAnn, Inc.

v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.1999). However, in no instance should reconsideration
be granted ifit would not result in amendment of an order. See Schering Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d at
295.

II.

DISCUSSION
In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court construed the "real-time" terms as:

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Court's Construction

in real-time: "instantaneously or without perceptible delay."
Transferring data in real-time means that data is transferred
substantially immediately as events occur and delivered to the
recipient so that there is little or no perceptible delay.
real-time: "instantaneous or without perceptible delay"
real-time data: "data that is transferred instantaneously as external
events occur"
Receiving real-time data means that data transmitted from and
received at the local user computer is received at the remote
computer with little or no perceptible delay.

(D.I. 167 at 12) In its Reargument Motion, Helios argues that the Court erred in its construction
of the "real-time" terms in two aspects. First, Helios contends that construing "real-time data"
based upon statements made during prosecution about "transferring data in real-time" reflects the
Court's misapprehension of the prosecution history. (D.I. 291 at 3) Second, Helios argues that
the Court clearly erred by construing "real-time" as "instantaneous or without perceptible delay."
(Id.) According to Helios, this limitation was "drawn entirely from an extrinsic, non-technical

dictionary" and is contradicted by the intrinsic record.
A.

"Real-time data" may not be cached or stored data

In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court found that "data that has been cached or stored in

memory" is not "real-time data." (D.I. 286 at 13) Plaintiffs argue that in coming to this
conclusion, the Court improperly relied on prosecution history that related to transfer of data in
real-time, not "real-time data" itself. However, the Court looked at the intrinsic record as well as
expert testimony distinguishing between cached and real-time data and determined that cached or
stored data was something distinct from real-time data. (E.g., Pls. Expert Report on Validity if 35
("The '571 patent described a method of sending cached and real-time data to the monitoring
server.") (emphasis added). Moreover, as the Court noted in its Memorandum Opinion:
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During prosecution of the '571 Patent, the PTO rejected claims 1
and 2 for lack of novelty in light of U.S. Patent No. 5,809,250 to
Kisor. Applicants overcame that rejection by representing to the
PTO that Kisor taught communicating a "session file" and did not
teach "transferring data in real-time." Applicants defined "session
file" as including "information from stored files, i.e. prerecorded
files stored in a cache memory .... " Furthermore, when traversing
a non-obviousness rejection over U.S. Patent No. 6,438,695 to
Maufer, Applicants argued that Maufer only taught transmission of
data in real-time. Here, Applicants argued that transmission of
data in real-time was different from "storage of data prior to
transmission of said data to destination and law enforcement
computer.
(D.I. 286 at 13) It was not improper for the Court to look to prosecution history discussing
"transferring data in real-time" to help it construe the "real-time data" term. None of the "new
evidence" that Plaintiffs cite show that the Court misapprehended what was in the intrinsic
record.
B.

The "instantaneous" limitation is supported by intrinsic and extrinsic evidence

Plaintiffs next argue that the "instantaneous" limitation present in all the "real-time"
terms is not supported by the intrinsic record. (D.I. 291 at 3) Plaintiffs provide new evidence in
the form of Defendant's expert's testimony to suggest that "transfer of data in real-time" means
"transfer before events become obsolete, remote in time, or historical." (Id. at 8-9) However, the
Court did not look exclusively to external sources when it considered the "instantaneous"
limitation, but instead found support in the specification of the '571 Patent. The specification
discusses "mirror[ing] the communication to a monitor-computer" (' 571 Pat. 1:32-33); an

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ordinary understanding of the term "mirror" supports the "instantaneous" limitation. Plaintiffs
new extrinsic expert testimony does not alter this conclusion.

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