Taylor-Bray v. Department of Services for Children, Youths and Their Families DE et al

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 2/11/14. (cla, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
SONJA L. TAYLOR-BRAY,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 12-019-LPS

v.

DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN, YOUTHS AND THEIR
FAMILIES DELA WARE,
Defendant.

Sonja L. Taylor-Bray, Harrington, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

Janice R. Tigani, Kevin R. Slattery, and Oliver James Aidan Cleary, Deputy Attorneys General,
Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Counsel for Defendant Delaware
Department of Services for Children, Youths and Their Families.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

February 11,2014
Wilmington, Delaware

I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Sonja L. Taylor-Bray ("Plaintiff'), formerly employed as a youth rehabilitation

counselor in facilities operated by Defendant Delaware Department of Services for Children,
Youths and Their Families ("DSCYF" or "Defendant"), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 and § 1983, as well as Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. § 2000, ef seq.,
alleging gender discrimination and unfair labor practices. (D.L 2) She appears pro se and has
been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (D'!.6) Presently before the Court are
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (D.L 18) and motion to compel discovery (D.I. 22).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motions.

II.

BACKGROUND
The allegations of the complaint are fully set forth in the June 8, 2012 Memorandum

Opinion and Order that screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The
original complaint named numerous defendants and raised several claims. Remaining are
Plaintiff s employment discrimination claims under Title VII against DSCYF, as all other
defendants and claims have been dismissed. (See D.1. 9, 10, 11)
Defendant answered the complaint on May 15,2013. (D.I. 14) On June 24, 2013,
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, opposed by Defendant. (D.I. 18) Next, on
August 2,2013, Piaintifffiled a motion to compel discovery, also opposed by Defendant. (D.I.
22) On September 12,2013, the Court entered a scheduling order that provides for discovery to
be completed on or before March 17, 2014 and for dispositive motions to be filed on or before
April 21, 2014. (See D.L 27)

1

III.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment a little over a month after Defendant

answered the complaint and prior to completion of discovery. Hence, the motion is premature.
In addition, Plaintiff did not provide support for her motion as she failed to cite
"particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the purposes
of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," and failed to "show[]
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an
adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A) & (B). "[T]he court is not obliged to scour the record to find evidence that will
support a party's claims." Perkins v. City ofElizabeth, 412 F. App'x 554, 555 (3d Cir. Feb. 11,
2011).
Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as premature
and without prejudice to renew.

IV.

MOTION TO COMPEL
Plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery on August 2,2013. (D.1. 22) According to

the docket, it was not until August 12,2013 that Plaintiff first engaged in the discovery process,
by seeking discovery from the Dover Police Department. (See D.1. 24) There are no docket
entries that reflect Plaintiff propounded discovery upon Defendant prior to filing the motion to
compel. Hence, the motion to compel is premature.
While not clear, it appears that Plaintiff seeks an answer to the complaint. Defendant,
however, answered the complaint on May 5, 2013. (See D.l. 14) To the extent that Plaintiff

2

seeks to obtain discovery from Defendant, she should comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As noted above, all discovery is (under the present scheduling order) to be completed
on or before March 17,2014.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs motions (D.I. 18,22) as premature.

An appropriate Order follows.

3