Coppedge et al v. US Bank National NA

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 7/25/2014. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

JAMES COPPEDGE & KRISHA JOHNSON,
COPPEDGE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as
Trustee for BAFC 2007-3 assignee ofMortgage
Electronic Registration System, Inc., as nominee
For American Home Mortgage,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 12-cv-00051-GMS

MEMORANDUM

I.

INTRODUCTION
The case arises out of a proceeding brought by the Plaintiffs, James Coppedge and Krishna

Johnson Coppedge (the "Plaintiffs") in Delaware Superior Court against the Defendant US Bank
National Association (the "Defendant"). (D.I. 1 at 1.) In that proceeding instituted on June 17,
2011, the Plaintiffs sought the discharge of their debts associated with their mortgage held by
Defendant. (!d.) On September 15,2011, the Delaware Superior Court granted summary judgment
to Defendant because Plaintiffs' objections to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment did
not create a dispute of fact or undermine the Defendant's legal conclusions. (!d. at 58.) Plaintiffs
appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which denied Plaintiffs' appeal on December 19th, 2011
and then denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reargument on January 1Oth, 2012, stating that "it is
manifest on its face that the appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are
controlled by settled

Delaw~re

law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there

was no abuse of discretion." (!d. at 59.) The case before the court stems from the February 2011
foreclosure action filed by Defendant against Plaintiffs. (D.I. 1 at 46.) The mortgage in question
was entered in to on February 13, 2007. The Defendant sought "the principal sum of the amount
remaining on the Mortgage with interest from September 1, 2008 together with reasonable counsel
fees, late charges, and costs." (!d. at 4 7.)
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a "Permission to Appeal Order from the Supreme
Court of Delaware and Stay Injunction Pending Appeal." (D.I. 1 at 1.) They sought to have this
court deny with prejudice the Defendant's Motion for Writ of Execution and Ejection from the
property at 52 Barkley Court, Dover, Delaware made in Delaware State Court. (!d. at 3.) The
Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant's failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in
the Delaware Superior Court and that the Defendant failed to produce the "Original Note to Show
Proof Claim." (!d. at 2.) Presently before the court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the action
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.I. 17.) For the reasons that
follow, the court will grant the defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint for

failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For a complaint to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court "requires more than labels and conclusions," or "formulaic recitation of
a cause of action's elements." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). The
complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face." !d.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). Under Twombly,
the court engages in a two-step analysis of the plaintiffs complaint to determine whether dismissal
is appropriate. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

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First, the court must separate the factual and legal elements of a claim. See Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as
true but may disregard any legal conclusions. !d. at 210-11. "The Federal Rules do not require
courts to credit a complaint's conclusory statements without reference to its factual context,"
however, so conclusory factual statements may be struck from consideration. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 686. After paring the complaint down to the non-conclusory factual allegations and taking those
allegations as true, the court must then determine whether the facts permit "the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." !d. at 678. As long
as the claim is not implausible, the court should not grant a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion. See !d.

IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Failure to State a Claim Upon which Relief May Be Granted.

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because a United
States District Court cannot review the decisions of a state's highest court. (D.I. 16 at 3.) The
Defendant urges that "only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision
of a state's highest court." (!d.) As a result, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a claim for which relief can be granted by this court.
The Plaintiffs' response never addresses the jurisdictional question. Instead, the Plaintiffs
assert that their mortgage debt has been discharged. (D.I. 17 at 2.) Plaintiffs further argue that the
"debt collector [Geoffrey G. Grivener, Defendant's attorney] has failed to produce a contract
between us and the alleged bank ... " (!d. at 4.) In addition, the Plaintiffs allege various violations
of their constitutional rights resulting from Mr. Grivener' s actions on behalf of US Bank. (!d. at
3and10.)

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Title 28 of the United States Code Section 1257(a) provides that "final judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court ... "28 USC § 1257(a) (2012). Interpreting this statute, federal courts have
applied the so-called Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to limit review of state court decisions to the
Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction; as "federal district courts are courts of original
jurisdiction" they "have no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial
proceedings." Coppedge v. Beaumont, 2010 WL 2382944, at *3 (D. Del. June 11, 2010). Thus,
unless a separate federal question is raised, all federal courts but the Supreme Court lack
jurisdiction). The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine explicitly precludes district courts from hearing such
cases. !d.
The court agrees with the Defendant that the Plaintiffs are "state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by the state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005) ("Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise

override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal
courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions." Indeed, Plaintiffs should
know that district courts cannot hear such claims, as this court dismissed a similar attempt by one
of the Plaintiffs, in 2010, to have the district court review a Pennsylvania state court's foreclosure
proceedings on a Pennsylvania property formerly owned by one of the Plaintiffs. See Coppedge
v. Beaumont, 2010 WL 2382944 at *3 ("Allowing Coppedge's claim to proceed against the

defendants would allow him to use the federal courts to appeal a state court judgment and, thus,
would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine"). The only difference between the cases is the

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location of the property. The necessary result remains the same; the court cannot hear Plaintiffs'
claim. !d. Thus, the court must grant Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
B. Failure to Prosecute.
In addition, the court notes that the Plaintiffs failed to prosecute their case. Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41 (b) permits a defendant to move for dismissal if a plaintiff fails to prosecute
an action. To determine whether dismissal is appropriate, courts will weigh six factors, known as
the Poulis factors. See Stubbs v. Bank of Am. Corp., 283 F.R.D. 218, 221 (D. Del. 2012) (citing
Poulis v. State Farm Fir and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)). The six Poulis factors
are:
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary
caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history
of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party was willful or in bad faith; ( 5) the
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of other
sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
!d. A court may appropriately dismiss the case even if all the Poulis factors are not met. !d. (finding
dismissal appropriate when three Poulis factors were satisfied).
The first Poulis factor is automatically satisfied when a plaintiff represents himself. !d. To
find prejudice, a plaintiffs failure to prosecute must interfere with the defendant's trial preparation
efforts. !d. A court may find 'willful conduct' if the plaintiff engages in "intentional or selfserving behavior." !d. Further, courts have generally found that it is inappropriate to impose
sanctions other than dismissal on pro se plaintiffs. !d.
In this case, the first, fifth, and sixth Poulis factors are satisfied. As the Plaintiffs are pro
se they are, therefore, per se responsible for maintaining their action. (D.I. 17 at 1.) Further, the

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Plaintiffs appear to have limited financial resources, simultaneously facing foreclosure and
bankruptcy. (D.I. 16 at 3; D.I. 17 at 3; D.I. 18 at 2.) Rather than inducing Plaintiffs to speed up
the prosecution of their case monetary sanctions may serve only a punitive purpose. Finally, the
case lacks any merit as it is a claim barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Coppedge, 2010
WL 23 82944, at *3. Three of the Poulis factors are satisfied. As a result, the court will dismiss
Plaintiffs' claim for failure to prosecute. See Stubbs, 283 F .R.D. 218, 221.
C. Improper Service of Process.
Finally, the Plaintiffs failed to properly serve the summons and complaint on the
Defendant. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that a summons must be served on a
defendant within 120 days after a plaintiff files a complaint. Service must either be personal or on
a party authorized to receive process on the defendant's behalf. See Petrucelli v. Bohringer and

Ratizinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d Cir. 1995); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). Courts have found that service
on an unauthorized party is tantamount to a failure to serve the party. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at
1304.
The 120-day limit will be extended for "an appropriate period" if a plaintiff "demonstrates
good cause for the failure to timely serve the defendant." !d. at 1305; Himmelreich v. United States,
285 Fed. Appx. 5, 7 (3d Cir. 2008). Good cause will not be found if the attempt at timely service
was "half-hearted and dilatory." McCurdy v. Am. Bd. Of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d
Cir. 1988). Even if there is no showing of good cause, other factors may justify an extension, such
as change of address, a showing of diligence, or a reasonable belief by a pro se plaintiff that process
was properly served. See Himmelreich, 285 Fed. Appx at 7-8. If process is not served within 120
days, the court should either dismiss the claim without prejudice or order service occur within a
specified time. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).

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Rather than serving the defendant or its representative, Plaintiffs served Defendant's
former attorney, who was not authorized to receive service. Indeed, the court explicitly ruled that
the party Plaintiffs attempted to serve was not an authorized party. (D.I. 15 at n. 1; D.I. 16 at 2, 4,
6.) Plaintiffs neither attempted to serve the defendant again nor requested a time extension to
properly serve the Defendant. As the Complaint was filed January 18, 2012, more than 120 days
had passed, and after the court found that Plaintiffs had not properly served the Defendant,
Plaintiffs did not make an effort to remedy the error. Their failure to even attempt to serve the
Defendant again demonstrates a lack of diligence. See Himmelreich, 285 Fed. Appx at 7-8.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court will grant US Bank's Motion to Dismiss.

Dated July

_12, 2014

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