Paoli v. Stetser et al
Filing
77
MEMORANDUM ORDER: 1. The Defendants' Objections to the Report and Recommendation (DI 73 ) are SUSTAINED; 2. The Report and Recommendation (DI 11 ) is ADOPTED IN PART and REJECTED IN PART; 3. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DI 52 ) is GRANTED; 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. CASE CLOSED. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 11/10/2014. (mdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
__________________________________________
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CHRISTINA PAOLI,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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C.A. No. 12-66-GMS-CJB
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TROOPER STETSER, et al.,
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Defendants.
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__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Pending before the court are Magistrate Judge Burke’s Report and Recommendations (“the
R&R”), dated July 11, 2014 (D.I. 72), and the Objections filed by defendants Trooper Ashley
Stetser, Corporal Kimberly Layfield, Trooper Joshua Rowley, Corporal Troy Ralston, Corporal
Carlisle, Trooper James O’Neil, Corporal Matthew Warrington, Sergeant John Barnett, Sergeant
Michael Whaley, Lieutenant Kenneth Hardy, Captain Glen Dixon, and Delaware State Police
Troop 7 (collectively, “the Defendants”), on July 28, 2014. 1 (D.I. 73.) For the reasons below, the
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Plaintiff Christina Daum (previously Christina Paoli (“Paoli”)) filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Answer
to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” on August 15, 2014. (D.I. 74.) The court is uncertain for what
purpose Paoli submits this briefing, but, in any event, Paoli’s submission is untimely. The majority of the brief appears
to be objections to the R&R. The deadline for objections to the R&R was July 28, 2014. To the extent that the brief
is a response to the Defendants’ Objections, the deadline was August 14, 2014, pursuant to Rule 6(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court recognizes that Paoli is proceeding pro se, thus entitling her to leniency in certain
matters. See Thompson v. Target Stores, 501 F. Supp. 2d 601, 603–04 (D. Del. 2007). Nonetheless, she is still obligated
to follow the procedural and substantive rules that govern litigation in federal court. See McNeil v. United States, 508
U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse the mistakes of those who proceed without counsel.”); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (“[E]xperience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.”); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (“At the end of the day, [pro se litigants] cannot flout procedural rules—they must
abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”).
Paoli argues that her brief was not untimely because she did not receive any mail until August 4, 2014. (D.I.
74 at 27–28.) This is not a sufficient justification. The R&R was mailed to Paoli’s address of record on July 11, 2014.
Paoli has frequently changed her mailing address during the pendency of this lawsuit without expressly notifying the
court will sustain the Defendants’ Objections, and adopt the remaining unchallenged portions of
the R&R (D.I. 72.) Thus, the court grants the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in full.
(D.I. 52.)
II.
DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Burke recommended that the court grant the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to all Defendants except Trooper Joshua Rowley (“Rowley”).
(D.I. 72 at 44–49.) The Defendants’ contend that Magistrate Judge Burke erred and that summary
judgment is proper with respect to Rowley. (D.I. 73.) The Defendants do not object to the
remainder of the R&R.
Specifically, the Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Burke failed to credit information
possessed by Rowley that did not conflict with Paoli’s version of events. The Defendants contend
that the undisputed facts show that Rowley received a call from dispatch indicating that Paoli was
located in the north parking lot. The Defendants argue that Magistrate Judge Burke improperly
discounted this information because of a non-material discrepancy in the parties’ testimony
concerning when Paoli placed a call from her phone. Moreover, the Defendants argue there was
no justification for Magistrate Judge Burke discrediting Rowley’s sworn testimony that he could
hear movement from within the mobile home. The Defendant’s maintain that Rowley “had reason
to believe” that Paoli was inside the mobile home, or he, at worst, made a reasonable mistake as
to the existence of probable cause. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). Thus, the
Defendants argue, there was no constitutional violation.
In the alternative, the Defendants argue that Rowley was entitled to qualified immunity.
Magistrate Judge Burke did not address the Defendants’ arguments on qualified immunity because
Defendants or the court, despite several orders from Magistrate Judge Burke instructing Paoli to do so. (D.I. 30; D.I.
70; D.I. 76.) The court does not consider Paoli’s submission.
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it was not properly raised before him.
(D.I. 72 at 47 n.27.) The Defendants’ argue that
consideration of Rowley’s qualified immunity defense at this stage is not improper and supports
summary judgment.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The magistrate judge filed his Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the pending objections, therefore, are dispositive and the
court’s review is de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court may
accept, reject, or modify the recommendations of the magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
The court also may receive further evidence or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions for proceedings. Id.
IV.
DISCUSSION
After having reviewed the record in this case, the R&R, the parties’ submissions, and the
applicable law, the court finds that the magistrate judge committed legal error in reaching his
determination that summary judgment as to defendant Rowley was not appropriate. As to the
remainder of the R&R, the court agrees with and affirms the magistrate judge’s recommendation
that summary judgment be granted for the other Defendants.
A. Rowley: March 7, 2011, Arrest
In the R&R, the magistrate judge found that the record did not support Rowley’s contention
that he possessed “reason to believe” that Paoli was located within the mobile home when he
entered the vehicle to execute the arrest warrant. (D.I. 73 at 3–5.) In Payton, the Supreme Court
announced: “[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when
there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 603. As explained by
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Magistrate Judge Burke in the R&R:
[A]n arrest warrant supported by probable cause had been issued
with respect to the March 7, 2011 arrest, and Defendant Rowley was
acting pursuant to that warrant when he entered Plaintiff’s motor
home without a search warrant. Thus, resolution of this claim turns
on whether Defendant Rowley was permitted to do so under the
circumstances.
(D.I. 72 at 44.)
There has been disagreement amongst the circuits as to the meaning of “reason to believe,”
as stated in Payton, specifically whether it announces a probable cause standard or something less
demanding.
United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Payton is not
explicit . . . about whether courts should apply a ‘probable cause’ or ‘reasonable belief’ standard
to the question of whether a suspect is in the residence, or whether there is a difference between
the two.”). The magistrate judge noted that the Third Circuit has not yet definitively weighed in
on this question, see Williams v. City of Phila., 454 F. App’x 96, 98 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011); Veal,
453 F.3d at 167 n.3, but ultimately applied the traditional probable cause standard and determined
that the Defendants had failed to establish (on the current record) that Rowley possessed probable
cause to believe that Paoli was inside the mobile home when he entered. Thus, the magistrate
judge recommended that summary judgment be denied as to Rowley. 2
The court finds that under either standard, the Defendants have shown that Rowley
possessed a sufficient quantum of evidence to give a reasonable person reason to believe that Paoli
was within the mobile home. First, Rowley asserts that the police dispatcher had indicated that a
call from Paoli had been traced to the north parking lot, where the mobile home was in fact parked.
Both parties acknowledge that Paoli made a call to police dispatch. What is disputed is when the
2
The magistrate judge’s decision was informed by a district court decision from the Western District of
Pennsylvania, which found the rule announced in Payton “is properly understood as a reflection of the ‘probable cause
standard.’” See Adams v. Springmeyer, No. 11-790, 2014 WL 1785341, at *11 (W.D. Pa. May 5, 2014).
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phone call took place and how long it took for the police to arrive. Paoli argues that twenty-five
minutes elapsed between her call and when the police showed up. The magistrate judge thus found
that Paoli’s testimony “paints a contradictory factual picture,” (D.I. 72 at 46–48). The court,
however, does not find this factual dispute to be material. 3 The facts show that dispatch instructed
Rowley to search the north parking lot, where the mobile home was parked. The police “had set
up a perimeter on the property,” (D.I. 54 at A-34), thus whether or not Paoli was
contemporaneously on the phone in the area is not critical to Rowley’s reasonable belief that Paoli
was within the mobile home.
Second, although it agrees that there is a genuine dispute over whether the windows and
doors to the mobile home were closed and whether Rowley could see in, the court finds that the
magistrate judge incorrectly discredited Rowley’s uncontroverted testimony that he could hear
movement coming from inside. The magistrate judge stated: “[T]his set of facts (as to all windows
and doors of the motor home being closed and locked), if believed, would also make it more
difficult for Defendant Rowley to have heard any movement inside the motor home.” While it is
true that the court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party at the
summary judgment stage, the court finds that this was not a reasonable inference for the magistrate
judge to make, in the absence of any evidence (or even any argument from Paoli) to the contrary.
Thus the record shows that Rowley responded to the north parking lot, the location from
which Paoli had made a recent phone call to police. There, Rowley heard movement coming from
a parked mobile home. Putting aside whether Rowley actually saw Paoli inside, the court finds
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The court is also not convinced that the factual disagreement is as readily apparent as the magistrate judge
made it out to be. Rowley indicated that dispatch was on the phone with Paoli about fifteen to twenty minutes after
she fled from the apartment complex. Paoli indicated that the police did not enter her home until twenty-five minutes
after the phone call to dispatch. Thus, Rowley and Paoli are speaking to separate time frames. Rowley did not indicate
how much time elapsed after speaking to dispatch before he entered the mobile home. (D.I. 54 at A-34.)
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that Rowley possessed sufficient evidence to give him reason to believe that Paoli was inside the
mobile home, even under the more exacting probable cause standard. See Solis-Alarcon v. United
States, 662 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[E]ven with the more demanding ‘probable cause’ test . . .
the reasonableness inquiry here is whether [reasonably prudent] agents could reasonably believe
that [defendant] lived at the house (and so would likely be present there in the morning).” (citing
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))). Thus there was no constitutional violation, and summary
judgment is appropriate. 4
Although it finds no constitutional violation, the court will also address the Defendants’
argument that Rowley is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The magistrate judge did not
reach this question because the Defendants did not assert the defense at the time: “Defendant
Rowley did not raise a qualified immunity defense with respect to this claim. Therefore, the Court
does not analyze whether Defendant Rowley is entitled to qualified immunity for the claim.” (D.I.
72 at 47 n.27.) In their Objections, however, the Defendants contend that a qualified immunity
defense may be raised at any time. The court agrees. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 158 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and generally must be included in a
responsive pleading or may be considered waived. Although it is true that parties should generally
assert affirmative defenses early in the litigation, there is no firm rule. Thus, affirmative defenses
may be raised at any time, even after trial, so long as the plaintiff suffers no prejudice.”) The court
finds that Paoli would not be prejudiced by the court’s decision to entertain the Rowley’s qualified
immunity defense at this stage. Qualified immunity was previously submitted as a defense to
several claims against other Defendants, and Paoli has never once addressed the merits of the
4
The magistrate judge found that the “sparse record” was a factor in his decision to deny summary
judgment. (D.I. 72 at 48–49.) While a factually richer record certainly would have aided the court in evaluating
Rowley’s “reason to believe,” the court finds that the facts in the record were sufficient.
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defense. 5 In addition, the court finds it unnecessary and inefficient to recommit the matter to
Magistrate Judge Burke to decide the question when the court already has sufficient information.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (explaining that timely rulings on questions of
qualified immunity help avoid “costs and expenses” of litigation); Curry v. Best, No. 08-11476BC, 2008 WL 2950107, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2008) (ruling on defendant’s qualified immunity
defense, even though it was not previously considered by the magistrate judge).
“The general rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide government officials with
the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183 (1984)). The Supreme Court has provided a two-prong approach for evaluating
qualified immunity claims: (1) “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a
violation of a constitutional right”; and (2) “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at
the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)
(citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). The court may decide the question of whether there was a
“clearly established right” without first determining if a violation occurred. See id. at 236.
“Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right.” Id. at 232 (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.)
The court finds that Paoli’s asserted constitutional right—Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures—was not clearly established in this case. Although
there is no requirement that there be a “case directly on point” for a right to be clearly established,
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
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The Defendants first asserted the qualified immunity defense in its summary judgment briefing. (D.I. 53.)
Paoli did not address the merits in her brief in opposition. (D.I. 65.) Furthermore, although it is not properly before
the court, Paoli’s most recent briefing also does not address qualified immunity. (D.I. 74); see supra note 1.
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Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011). As described above, the Third Circuit has never
squarely interpreted the import of the “reason to believe” standard outlined in Payton. See Veal,
453 F.3d at 167 n.3 (discussing Payton, 445 U.S. at 603). It is unclear, even to the judiciary, how
much evidence an officer must possess before entering a defendant’s property to execute an arrest
warrant. Indeed, Magistrate Judge Burke acknowledged that “[i]t is not entirely clear” how to
interpret Payton. (D.I. 72 at 45.) The court finds that Rowley could not have violated a clearly
established right on March 7, 2011, when the law remains unsettled even still.
Moreover, “[q]ualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make
reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Assuming a violation did occur, the court finds no evidence to suggest that Rowley was
“plainly incompetent” or knowingly violating the law. There was a valid arrest warrant for Paoli’s
arrest. Rowley followed the instructions offered by dispatch and his superior officers in responding
to the north parking lot and ultimately entering the mobile home to apprehend Paoli. The
magistrate judge commented that “[t]he issue is a close one.” (D.I. 72 at 47.) The court finds that
Rowley’s actions were a reasonable exercise of judgment, within the “breathing room” provided
for government officials. See Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5.
The court finds that Rowley did not commit a constitutional violation when he entered
Paoli’s motor home to execute the arrest warrant. Alternatively, the court finds that Rowley is
entitled to qualified immunity, as the right at issue was not clearly established. The court disagrees
with the magistrate judge’s recommendation that summary judgment be denied, and grants
summary judgment as to claim against defendant Rowley for the March 7, 2011, incident.
B. Remaining Claims
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Magistrate Judge Burke recommended that the court grant summary judgment as to all of
the remaining claims against the Defendants (including the additional claim against Rowley for
events that took place on July 21, 2011). There are no objections properly before the court
concerning the balance of the R&R. The court adopts the remaining recommendations put forth
in the R&R.
V.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Defendants' Objections to the Report and Recommendation (D.I. 73) are
SUSTAINED;
2. The Report and Recommendation, dated July 11, 2014, (D.I. 11) is ADOPTED IN
PART and REJECTED IN PART;
3. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 52) is GRANTED;
4. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this case.
Dated: November _!Q_, 2014
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