Gary v. R C Fabricators Inc.

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM re 6 Motion to Dismiss, 10 Motion to Remand, and 22 Motion to Amend and Remand. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 6/13/2012. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
CONSTANCE GARY,
Plaintiff,
Civ. No. 12-208-RGA
Del. Super. Ct.
No. N11C-12-208 FSS

v.

R C FABRICATORS, INC.
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's Motion to
Remand, and Plaintiff's Combined Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and
Motion to Remand. (D.I. 6, 10, 22.) Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 30,
2012, in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County
raising claims under the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act, 19 Del. C.§ 710,
et seq., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Delaware
common law. Defendant removed the action to this Court on February 21, 2012.

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After review of Plaintiff's Combined Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint and Motion to Remand, the Court ordered her to advise whether she
intended to proceed with her federal claims or amend the Complaint and proceed solely

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on state claims. (D. I. 22, 26.) Plaintiff advises that she seeks to amend her Complaint,
proceed solely on state claims, and dismiss with prejudice the federal claims. (See D.l.

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27)

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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within twenty-one days after serving it or, if the pleading is one to

which a responsive pleading is required, twenty-one days after service of a responsive
pleading or twenty-one days after service of a Rule 12(b), whichever is earlier.
Otherwise, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave. Rule 15 provides that court should freely give leave to
amend when justice so requires.
The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings
to ensure that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chern. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1990).
Amendment, however, is not automatic. See Dover Steel Co., Inc. v. Hartford Accident

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and lndem., 151 F.R.D. 570, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Leave to amend should be granted
absent a showing of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Plaintiff is aware of the
consequences of dismissing her federal claims with prejudice. Accordingly, the court
will grant the Motion to Amend. The Clerk of Court will be directed to file the proposed
amended complaint attached at Exhibit A to Docket Item 22.
The federal claims in this case are being dismissed through amendment. The

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remaining claims arise under Delaware law, and those claims are before this Court due
to supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has

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dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."). An amendment to a

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complaint after removal designed to eliminate a federal question, however, will not
defeat federal jurisdiction. See Ching v. Mitre Corp., 921 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1990).
The district court in this situation has discretion to weigh the interest in exercising
jurisdiction alongside the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353 (1988). See also 28 U.S.C. §

1441(c). Among the factors the Court should consider is whether the plaintiff has
engaged in manipulative tactics by deleting the federal claims.
At this stage of the proceeding it does not appear that the plaintiff's Motion to
Amend and delete the federal claims is manipulative, in the sense of being a dilatory
tactic or an unwarranted expense. In addition, the Court finds that, because this case is
early in the litigation process, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness do not
balance in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. Moreover, only Plaintiff's State
law claims are pending and, therefore, remand is appropriate in the interest of comity.
The State law claims predominate, and the Court would not serve any federal interest
by retaining jurisdiction. Accordingly, the balance of factors point toward declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining State law claims. See CarnegieMellon, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7. Therefore, the Court will grant the Motion to Remand.

For the above reasons, the Court will grant the Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint and Motion to Remand (D. I. 22), will deny without prejudice
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (D.I. 6), and will deny as moot the first Motion to
Remand (D.I. 10). All federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's

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remaining claims, all of which arise under Delaware law, will be remanded to the
Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle County.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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