In Re: New Century TRS Holdings Inc.

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM ORDER - affirming the Bankruptcy Court's Orders. The appeal is dismissed. ***Civil Case Terminated. Signed by Judge Sue L. Robinson on 3/25/13. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re:
NEW CENTURY TRS HOLDINGS, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation, et aI.,
Debtors.
ANITA B. CARR,

Chapter 11
Bank. No. 07-10416(KJC)
Adv. No. 09-52251 (KJC)
Jointly Administered

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Appellant,
v.

ALAN M. JACOBS, as liquidating trustee
of the New Century Liquidating Trust,
Appellee.

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Civ. No. 12-288-SLR

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MEMORANDUM ORDER
At Wilmington this 25 th day of March, 2013, having reviewed the papers
submitted in connection with the above captioned appeal:
IT IS ORDERED that the above captioned appeal is dismissed and the orders of
the bankruptcy court are affirmed, for the reasons that follow:
1. Standard of review. This court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the
bankruptcy court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). In undertaking a review of the issues
on appeal, the court applies a clearly erroneous standard to the bankruptcy court's
findings of fact and a plenary standard to that court's legal conclusions. See American
Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp., 197 F.3d 76,80 (3d Cir. 1999).
With mixed questions of law and fact, the court must accept the bankruptcy court's
"finding of historical or narrative facts unless clearly erroneous, but exercise[s] 'plenary
review of the [bankruptcy] court's choice and interpretation of legal precepts and its

application of those precepts to the historical facts. '" Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro
Commc'ns, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 642 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A.
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981)). The district court's appellate
responsibilities are further informed by the directive of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which effectively reviews on a de novo basis bankruptcy
court opinions. See In re Hechinger, 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Telegroup,
281 F.3d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 2002).
2. Background. In April 2007, New Century TRS Holdings, Inc. ("TRS
Holdings") and its affiliates (collectively, "debtors"1) filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ("bankruptcy court") in
Bank. No. 07-10416(KJC) (the "bankruptcy proceeding"). See In re New Century TRS

1Debtors are the following entities: New Century Financial Corporation (flkla New
Century REIT, Inc.), a Maryland corporation; New Century TRS Holdings, Inc. (flkla
New Century Financial Corporation), a Delaware corporation; New Century Mortgage
Corporation (flkla JBE Mortgage) (d/b/a NCMC Mortgage Corporate, New Century
Corporation, New Century Mortgage Ventures, LLC), a California corporation; NC
Capital Corporation, a California corporation; Home123 Corporation (flk/a The Anyloan
Corporation, 1800anyloan.com, Anyloan.com), a California corporation; New Century
Credit Corporation (f1k1a Worth Funding Incorporated), a California corporation; NC
Asset Holding, L.P. (flk/a NC Residual II Corporation), a Delaware limited partnership;
NC Residual Corporation, a Delaware corporation; NC Residual IV Corporation, a
Delaware corporation; New Century RE.O. Corp., a California corporation; New
Century RE.O. " Corp., a California corporation; New Century RE.O. III Corp., a
California corporation; New Century Mortgage Ventures, LLC (d/b/a Summit Resort
Lending, Total Mortgage Resource, Select Mortgage Group, Monticello Mortgage
Services, Ad Astra Mortgage, Midwest Home Mortgage, TRATS Financial Services,
Elite Financial Services, Buyers Advantage Mortgage), a Delaware limited liability
company; NC Deltex, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and NCoral, L.P., a
Delaware limited liability partnership. (bankruptcy proceeding, 0.1. 8254 at 1 n.1)
"Debtors" also include New Century Warehouse Corporation (a/k1a Access Lending), a
California corporation, which filed its voluntary chapter 11 petition on August 3, 2007.
(ld.)

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Holdings, Inc., 407 B.R. 675 (D. Del. 2009). On October 5.2009. appellant Anita B.
Carr ("appellant") commenced Adv. No. 09-52251 (KJC) ("the adversary proceeding") by
filing a complaint against the debtors asserting claims for: (1) fraudulent conveyance;
(2) violation of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; (3) fraudulent misrepresentation and
negligence; (4) violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; (5)
violation of the Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.; (6) violation of
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 12 U.S.C. 2605; and (7) quiet title to real
property. See Adv. No. 09-52251(KJC); In re New Century Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL
1792544 (Bankr. D. Del. May 10, 2011). The claims arose out of a loan transaction
between the appellant and debtor Home 123 Corporation that took place on or about
January 25, 2006. Id. The property has since been the subject of a foreclosure sale.
3. On November 10, 2009, appellee trustee Alan M. Jacobs ("appellee") filed a
motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
opposed by appellant. Id. In addition, in the bankruptcy proceeding, appellant filed an
unliquidated unsecured claim against the debtors on August 24, 2009 ("proof of claim"),
and a motion to consider her claim timely filed. (Bank., 0.1. 9975) On January 20,
2010. with the consent of appellee. the bankruptcy court entered an order granting the
motion to consider appellant's proof of claim as timely filed. (Bank., 0.1. 10017)
4. Appellant and appellee entered into a settlement on or about October 5. 2010
wherein appellee agreed to pay appellant a settlement sum of $60.000 "in full and final
satisfaction of the causes of action and any other claim(s) that [appellant] may have
against the Debtors or the Trust." In re New Century Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 1792544.

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The settlement sum, paid to appellant, was consideration for the full and final
settlement of all claims appellant had against the trust and the debtors through
appellant's release of the debtors, the trust, the trustee, the plan advisory committee,
and their respective retained professionals of and from "any and all claims, damages,
actions, suits, causes of action, rights, liens, demands, obligations and/or liabilities."
Id.; see also (Adv., 0.1.

3,11 5)

The settlement agreement further provided that, to the

extent a dispute arose between the parties at any time after the full execution of the
settlement agreement, "the Parties consent and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of
this United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware in front of the Honorable Kevin

J. Carey to resolve such dispute(s)." Id. at 11 7. On November 2,2010, in accordance
with the terms of a settlement agreement, appellant filed the notice of dismissal of the
adversary proceeding with prejudice. In re New Century Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL

1792544. The adversary proceeding was closed on November 3, 2010, and its closing
was docketed in the bankruptcy proceeding on the same date.

5. On December 13,2010, appellant filed a request to stay the dismissal and for
evidentiary hearing. Id. On March 9, 2011, appellant filed a motion for an order to
show cause. (Adv., 0.1. 65) An evidentiary hearing was held on April 20, 2011, and on
May 10, 2011, the bankruptcy court denied the request for stay. In re New Century
Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 1792544. The adversary proceeding was reopened and
closed the same day, May 11, 2011. On May 18, 2011, appellant timely filed her first
motion for reconsideration, denied by the bankruptcy court on December 7,2011. See
In re New Century Holdings, Inc" 2011 WL 6097910 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 7, 2011).

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Appellant timely filed a second motion for reconsideration on December 14, 2011,
seeking reconsideration of the December 7, 2011 order. On December 15, 2011,
appellant filed a notice of appeal of the order denying the first motion for
reconsideration. See In re New Century Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 38974 (D. Del. Bankr.
Jan. 9, 2012) (noting that the appeal was not effective entry of the order disposing of
the second motion for reconsideration). On January 9, 2012, the bankruptcy court
denied the second motion for reconsideration. In re New Century Holdings, Inc., 2011
WL 1792544. Appellant timely filed an amended notice of appeal on January 17, 2012.
(See 0.1. 1)
6. Appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) whether the bankruptcy
court lacked the constitutional authority to adjudicate appellant's claims, and whether
the bankruptcy court erred by submitting proposed findings and conclusions;
(2) whether the bankruptcy court erred in failing to grant appellant due process;
(3) whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to apply the current law to the matters
with NCLT (i.e., New Century Liquidating Trust); (4) whether the bankruptcy court erred
in its application of the 2008 global orders for relief from stay, abused its discretion,
erred by its reinterpretation of the 2008 global orders for relief from stay in 2011, and
whether the 2008 global orders for relief from stay are contrary to law on their face;
(5) whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to acknowledge new evidence of
"robo-signing," "robo-notary," and other fraudulent acts subsequent to settlement;
(6) whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to fairly examine the parameters of the
settlement agreement and settle the dispute, and whether the bankruptcy court erred by
ignoring legal detriment and fraud; (7) whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to

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advise appellant that it may have a conflict of interest, and should the bankruptcy judge
have recused himself; and (8) whether the bankruptcy court is prejudiced against
homeowners. Portions of issue 2 and issues 3,7, and 8 were not raised by appellant in
her request to stay the dismissal and for evidentiary hearing, the motion for an order to
show cause, or in either of the motions for reconsideration and, therefore, are not
properly before this court. Appellee's counter-statement raises two issues on appeal:
(1) whether the bankruptcy court properly denied appellant's first motion for
reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); and (2) whether the bankruptcy court
properly denied appellant's second motion for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e).
7. Authority of bankruptcy court. "[T]he district courts of the United States
have 'original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.'" Stern v. Marshall,
_U.S._. 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2603 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)). District courts
have original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of "civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in title 11 cases, or related to those cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). Congress has
divided bankruptcy proceedings into three categories: (1) those that "aris[e] under Title
11"; (2) those that "aris[e] in" a Title 11 case; and (3) those that are "related to a case
under title 11." Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2603 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)). Congress has
authorized the district courts to "refer any or all such proceedings to the bankruptcy
judges of their district." Id.
8. A bankruptcy judge's authority varies depending "on the type of proceeding
involved." Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2604. The bankruptcy code identifies sixteen types of

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core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). "Bankruptcy judges may hear and enter
final judgments in 'all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in cases under
title 11.'" Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2604 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)). "Parties may appeal
from "final judgments of a bankruptcy court in core proceedings to the district court,
which reviews them under traditional appellate standards." Id. at 2603-04.
9. This matter falls within the ambit of § 157(b)(2)(B), and the parties do not
dispute that this is a core proceeding. 2 Appellant, however, relies upon Stern, supra, to
argue that the bankruptcy court had no authority to adjudicate her claim of "fraudulent
inducement of settlement. In Stern, the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court
"lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim
that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof of claim." Stern, 131
S.Ct. at 2620. Having considered Stern and its progeny, the court adopts the narrow
construction of Stern and its holding, that is, that Stern is restricted to the case of a
"state-law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor's proof
of claim" as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Stern, 131 S.Ct. at 2620.

2Approval of a settlement is "core" to the bankruptcy code. See In re WorldCom,
Inc., 347 B.R. 123, 138 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding jurisdiction to approve
settlement agreement); In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that
matters involving the implementation of the parties' settlement agreement was within
bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction). Stern, 131 S.Ct. 2594, and its narrow limit on
bankruptcy court jurisdiction does not extend to the compromise and settlement of a
claim which is "indisputably property of a debtor's estate." In re Ambac Fin. Group, Inc.,
457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (overruling Stern v. Marshal/-based
objections and approving settlement and release of claims under Fed. R. Bankr. P.
9019); see also In re Madoff, 848 F.Supp. 2d 469, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that
Stern did not impact the bankruptcy court's authority to approve a settlement
agreement).

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10. Here, the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between appellant and
appellee that initially resulted in dismissal of Adv. No. 09-52251 (KJC) and settled all
claims. 3 (Bank., D.1. 10244; Adv., D.1. 52, 63) The terms of the settlement agreement
provide that the parties "consent and subject themselves to the jurisdiction" of the
bankruptcy court to resolve disputes, to the extent a dispute arose subsequent to
execution of the settlement agreement. (Adv., D.1. 63) In addition, appellant, in her
request for dismissal dated November 1, 2010, stated, "should any disputes or other
discrepancies or any portion of the settlement be deemed unenforceable, or unlawful,"
the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction to address those matters. (ld. at D.1. 52)
Finally, during the April 20, 2011 evidentiary hearing, appellant acknowledged that the
parties consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in the settlement
agreement. (Bank., D.1. 10466 at 71)
11. The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 and § 157(a); the parties' dispute was a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(1) and (b)(2)(B). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. The bankruptcy court has the constitutional authority to enter the orders
appealed by appellant. Appellant's challenge to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
determine issues related to settlement of the adversary proceeding is an integral part of
the whole appeal. Therefore, the court rejects appellant's position that the bankruptcy
court did not have authority to enter orders with regard to settlement issues.

31n Stem, the court observed that a creditor can be held to have agreed to the
court's jurisdiction by filing a proof of claim. Stem, 131 S.Ct. at 2608.

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12. Settlement. Appellant and appellee entered into a settlement agreement on
October 5, 2010, and appellant was paid the agreed settlement amount. Appellant filed
a notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice on November 2, 2010 in accordance with
the settlement agreement. The adversary proceeding was closed on November 3,

2010 in accordance with the notice for voluntary dismissal and its dismissal was
docketed in the bankruptcy proceeding. On December 13, 2010, appellant filed a
request to stay dismissal of the adversary proceeding contending that she had obtained
new evidence that demonstrated appellant made false representations to induce her to
enter into the settlement agreement (Le., fraudulent inducement to settle). The
bankruptcy court treated the request to stay as a motion to reopen the adversary
proceeding. On March 9, 2011, appellant filed a request for a show cause order for the
court to require the appellee to show cause why the bankruptcy court should not issue
an order staying all proceedings based on documents notarized by certain individuals
employed by the debtors and, further, ordering the appellant to produce "notarial
journals." At the April 20, 2011 evidentiary hearing, the parties appeared and
presented evidence.

13. Standard for fraudulent inducement to settle. In resolving the issue of
fraudulent inducement to settle, the bankruptcy court applied Delaware state law. The
parties do not dispute that Delaware state law governs the analysis. 4 Under Delaware

4While appellant cites to California law, she does not assign error to the
bankruptcy court's choice of law and in construing the release in the settlement
agreement in accordance with Delaware law. The bankruptcy court noted that.
alternatively. appellant gained no advantage had California law applied. In fe New
Century TRS Holdings, Inc .. 2011 L 1792544, at *4 n.6.

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law, to state a claim for common law fraud, a party seeking rescission must
demonstrate: (1) a false statement or misrepresentation; (2) with the knowledge the
statement was false or made with reckless indifference to the truth; (3) the statement
induced the plaintiff to enter the agreement; (4) the plaintiff's reliance was reasonable;
and (5) the plaintiff was injured as a result. Rohm and Haas Elec. Materials, LLC v.

Honeywelllntem'l, Inc., 2009 WL 1033651 (D. Del. Apr. 16,2009) (citing Lord v.
Souder, 748 A.2d 383, 402 (Del. 2000)).5
14. Appellant challenges the bankruptcy court's application of the law to the
facts to find there was no fraudulent inducement to settle and, therefore, denied the
motion to reopen. As this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, the court
applies plenary review of the bankruptcy court's interpretation of legal precepts and its
application of those precepts to the facts. See Mel/on Bank, N.A., 945 F.2d at 642.
Appellant asserts that the bankruptcy court erroneously decided not to set aside the
settlement nor to reopen the adversary proceeding when it: (1) failed to acknowledge
the new evidence and other fraudulent acts subsequent to settlement; (2) failed to
examine the parameters of the settlement agreement and settle the dispute; and
(3) ignored legal detriment and fraud.

5The bankruptcy court cited California law to conclude there was no
misrepresentation by appellee. In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 2011 SL
1792544, at * 4 (quoting Wilke v. Coinway, Inc., 257 Cal. App. 2d 126,64 Cal. Rptr. 845
(Cal. App. 1 Dist.1967) (UA fraudulent misrepresentation is one made with the
knowledge that it is or may be untrue, and with the intention that the person to whom it
is made act in reliance thereon."). Given the similarity of the law, the outcome is the
same when applying either Delaware or California law.
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15. The evidence adduced at the hearing does not support appellant's
contentions that she was fraudulently induced to enter into the settlement agreement.
More specifically, at the time the settlement agreement was signed, appellant's
concerns regarding the assignment and authenticity of signatures were raised and
discussed by the parties; i.e., any issues regarding the validity of the assignment were
known to and asserted by appellant prior to signing the settlement agreement. (Bank.,
0.1. 10466 at 64-68) Moreover, there is no evidence that appellee made any
representations in this regard to appellant that he knew to be untrue or that were, in
fact, untrue. (Id. at 74-75, 78-87) In sum, because the nature of her fraud claims were
well-known to appellant at the time she signed the settlement agreement, there is no
basis for a claim of fraudulent inducement to settle. Therefore, the bankruptcy court
properly denied appellant's motion to reopen, as well as the request for a show cause
order.
16. Motions for reconsideration. Following entry of the May 10, 2011
memorandum and order, appellant filed her first motion for reconsideration to consider
new evidence and to prevent manifest injustice. The purpose of a motion for
reconsideration is to "correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence." Max's Seafood Cafe ex reI. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d
669,677 (3d Cir. 1999). "A proper Rule 59(e) motion ... must rely on one of three
grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new
evidence; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest
injustice. Lazaridis

V.

Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N. River Ins.

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Co. v. C/GNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). The denial of a
motion for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, but underlying legal
determinations are reviewed de novo and factual determinations for clear error.
Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc.

V.

Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 2010).

17. In appellant's first motion for reconsideration, she contended that: (1) new
evidence became available that points to mortgage and bankruptcy fraud; (2) the
bankruptcy court should have stayed dismissal of the case; (3) the bankruptcy court
ignored the fact that it was being used to conceal assets; and (4) the bankruptcy court
denied her right to due process when it did not reopen discovery as to fraud in the
settlement agreement. In addition, she sought clarification of the 2008 global relief
order as to her ability to pursue claims for fraud against the debtors in another venue.
The bankruptcy court denied the motion. Unhappy with denial of the first motion for
reconsideration, appellant filed a motion to vacate, alter or amend memorandum on
reconsideration and order on reconsideration and request for judicial notice (Adv., D.1.
93, 94, 96) In her second motion for reconsideration, appellant again sought relief on
the grounds of new evidence, fraud and misrepresentation in inducing appellant into the
settlement agreement, and manifest injustice and equitable grounds for relief. 6
18. 2008 global relief order. In 2008, the bankruptcy court entered a global
relief order to address the innumerable motions to lift stay being filed in bankruptcy
proceedings and to relieve estates from incurring unnecessary costs in connection with
such motions. The global relief order terminated the automatic stay to permit lenders to

SThe bankruptcy court analyzed the second motion for reconsideration under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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add the debtors or the trust as defendants in non-bankruptcy court actions seeking to
adjudicate the debtors' or trust's interest in real property, usually in foreclosure
proceedings. See In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 60197910, at *4
(8ankr. D. Del. Dec. 7, 2011). Appellant contends that the bankruptcy court erred in its
application of the global relief order for relief from stay, erred in its 2001
reinterpretation of the global relief order, and that the global order is contrary to law.
Appellant sought clarification of the global relief order in her first motion for
reconsideration, relying upon a decision from the United States District Court for the
District of Hawaii, Uy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 WL 1235590 (D. Haw. Mar. 28,
2011).
19. The bankruptcy court clarified that the global relief order was not designed to
allow, and does not permit, parties to pursue claims against the debtors or the trust for
monetary damages. (8ank., D.1. 10491) It further noted that Uy has caused some
confusion, since the complaint at issue in that case included claims for monetary
damages. See In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 60197910, at *4 n.8.

In the instant matter, the global relief order did not terminate the automatic stay to
permit claims for monetary damages against the debtors or the trust, but was designed
to allow plaintiffs to add the debtors or the trust as defendants to complaints seeking to
determine the debtors' or trust's interest in particular real property. Id. at 4. The court
finds no error by the bankruptcy court. Indeed, the issuing court is in the best position
to provide guidance and clarify orders should the parties require it. See re New Power
Co., 438 F.3d 1113, 1119 n.5 (11th Cir. 2006); Matter of Chicago, Rock Island and

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Pacific R. Co., 860 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1988); Amzura Enterprises, Inc. v. Ratcher,
18 F. App'x 95,107 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).
20. Due process. Appellant contends that the bankruptcy court violated her
right to due process throughout the proceedings. She first contends her due process
rights were violated because the bankruptcy court failed to enter a final order.
However, the order denying the second motion for reconsideration is a final order. See
In re Brown, 409 F. App'x 591, 592 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (denial of a Rule 59(e)
motion for reconsideration is a final order). Next, appellant contends error occurred
when the bankruptcy court failed to resolve what she terms the "settlement agreement
dispute." In ruling upon appellant's motion to stay dismissal of the case, the bankruptcy
court resolved all disputes surrounding the settlement agreement.
21. Appellant further asserts that violations of her right to due process occurred
when she was not allowed to proceed with discovery or to present certain evidence by
reason of the denial of discovery. Discovery was stayed in the adversary proceeding
pending resolution of appellant's proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding. The
parties, however, agreed that discovery would take place under the contested matter,
and the parties ultimately resolved all issues through settlement. The bankruptcy court
properly found that appellant was not denied due process by going forward
consensually on all issues as an objection to her proof of claim while the adversary
proceeding was stayed. Finally, appellant contends her right to due process was
violated when the bankruptcy court entered its December 7,2011 decision without
benefit of the "briefing binder." It is evident in reading the December 7, 2011

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memorandum on reconsideration that the bankruptcy court considered all filings
submitted by the parties. This assignment of error is without merit.
22. Despite the settlement agreement, appellant's motions for reconsideration
sought, in essence, a determination by the bankruptcy court of the underlying merits of
appellant's claims. Such determinations are not made upon reconsideration. With
respect to the bankruptcy's court decisions denying the first and second motion for
reconsideration, the court finds that appellant has not presented any controlling case
law, evidence, or information that the bankruptcy court overlooked which would change
the conclusions reached by the bankruptcy court. Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536
F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).
23. Conclusion. For the reasons explained, the bankruptcy court's orders are
affirmed, and the appeal therefrom is dismissed.

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