Triplett v. Amar et al
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION - Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 7/29/13. (rwc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
DELRON TRIPLETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. No. 12-537-LPS
MR. AMAR, et aI.,
Defendants.
Delron Triplett, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware, Pro Se
Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
July 29, 2013
Wilmington, Delaware
-f ~~,
s~~ U.S. Distri
I.
.
Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Delron Triplett ("Plaintiff'), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights.! Plaintiff, an inmate, is housed at the Howard R.
Young Correctional Institution in Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff appears pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed informa pauperis. (D.!.4)
II.
BACKGROUND
On March 23,2012, Plaintiff slipped and fell as he was exiting the court and transit van
and injured his back. Plaintiff was handcuffed and shackled. He alleges that Defendants
Correctional Officers Amar ("Amar") and Ince ("Ince") did not assist him. Plaintiff names
Warden Phil Morgan ("Morgan") as a defendant because he "oversees all officers to make sure
they are doing their job and his two officers were not." (D.I. 2) Plaintiff seeks compensatory
damages.
III.
LEGAL STANDARDS
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis actions
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informa pauperis actions). The Court
must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Phillips v.
County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, his
IPursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiffmust allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, "however inartfu1ly pleaded, must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94
(internal quotation marks omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; see also Wilson v.
Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d
Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took inmate's pen and refused to
give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a
complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the
screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must grant Plaintiffleave to amend his
complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). When
determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a two-part analysis. See
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal
elements of a claim are separated. See id. The Court must accept all of the complaint's well
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pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. See id. at 210-11. The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. In other
words, the complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; rather, it must
"show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id. A claim is facially plausible when its factual
content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts
that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" [d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
IV.
DISCUSSION
A.
Slip and Fall
Plaintiff alleges that Amar and Ince failed to assist him when he exited a van and, as a
result, he slipped, fell, and was injured. Plaintiff raises a negligence claim.
The Supreme Court has held that prison authorities' mere negligence in and of itself does
not violate prisoners' constitutional rights. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-30
(1986). Indeed, claims of negligence, without a more culpable state of mind, do not constitute
"deliberate indifference." See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't a/Carr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 n.2
(3d Cir. 2001); Bacon v. Carroll, 232 F. App'x 158, 160 (3d Cir. Apr. 30,2007) (slip and fall
claim amounts merely to negligence); Denz v. Clearfield Cnty., 712 F. Supp. 65, 66 (W.D. Pa.
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1989) (no Eighth Amendment violation based on slippery floor in prison cell, despite prison
official's alleged knowledge of the hazard).
Plaintiffs allegations that Amar and Ince did not assist him do not reflect the deliberate
indifference required to impose liability under the Eighth Amendment. The claim is nothing
more than negligence. For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the claim as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
B.
Respondeat Superior
Morgan is named as a defendant based upon his supervisory position. Supervisory
liability cannot be imposed under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.2 See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662; Monell v. Department o/Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362 (1976). '" A[ n individual government] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat superior. ", Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Purpose rather than knowledge is required
to impose liability on an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent
responsibilities. 3 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. "Absent vicarious liability, each Government
2In Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged supervisory officials violated his rights because one official
was the "principal architect" of the policy, and another was "implemental" in adoption and
execution of the policy. See 556 U.S. at 669. The Supreme Court found the allegations facially
insufficient. See id. at 676 (quoting Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515-516 (1888), for
proposition that "[ a] public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position
wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or
servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official
duties")).
3In light of Iqbal, it is uncertain whether proof of personal knowledge, with nothing more,
provides a sufficient basis to impose liability upon a supervisory official. See Bayer v. Monroe
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official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct." Id.
Facts showing personal involvement of the defendant must be asserted; such assertions
may be made through allegations of specific facts showing that a defendant expressly directed the
deprivation of a plaintiff s constitutional rights or created such policies by which the
subordinates had no discretion but to apply the policies in a fashion which actually produced the
alleged deprivation; e.g., supervisory liability may attach ifthe plaintiff asserts facts showing that
the supervisor's actions were "the moving force" behind the harm suffered by the plaintiff. See
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1117-118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-87;
City ofCanton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Carr. Inst.for
Women, 128 F. App'x 240 (3d Cir. Apr. 11,2005) (not published).
Plaintiff alleges that Morgan failed to oversee his officers "to make sure they are doing
their job." There are no allegations that Morgan violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, that he
expressly directed the deprivation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, or that he created policies
wherein subordinates had no discretion but to apply them in a fashion which actually produced
the alleged deprivation.
The claim against Morgan is frivolous. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Cnty. Children and Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009)
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v.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Amendment is futile.
An appropriate Order follows.
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