Maynard v. Hastings et al

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 1/14/13. (maw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

MICHAEL W. MAYNARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
SAM HASTINGS, et aI.,
Defendants.

)

)
)
)
) Civ. Action No. 12-732-GMS
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Michael W. Maynard ("Maynard"), a former inmate who was housed at the
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center ("VCC"), Smyrna, Delaware and the Sussex Correctional
Institution ("SCI"), Georgetown, Delaware, filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. l (D.!. 3.) He proceeds pro se and has been
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Maynard was incarcerated when he filed the
complaint. The court proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and § 1915A.

I. BACKGROUND
Maynard alleges excessive force, denial of medical care, violations of his right to due
process, and retaliation. On June 12,2010, Maynard was housed at the SCI. While he was
eating dinner an altercation ensued between Maynard and the defendant CIO Sam Hastings
("Hastings"). Hastings pepper-sprayed and assaulted Maynard, and the defendants John Doe #1

lWhen bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

("Doe # 1") and John Doe #2 ("Doe #2") joined in the assault. Maynard lost consciousness.
When he regained consciousness, an unknown prison guard sought to have Maynard examined
by medical personnel. Maynard suffered a broken nose, chipped teeth, hearing impairment,
chemical bums, and numerous bruises and abrasions to his face. The defendant Nurse Jane Doe
("Nurse Doe") made a visual determination that Maynard did not require medical attention. (D.I.
3, ~~ 21-34.)
Following the assault, Maynard was transferred and placed in a "Psych Observation" cell
for approximately ten days. While there, he continued to request medical care. On June 15,
2010, the defendant Lt. CIO Blades ("Blades") served Maynard with disciplinary charges for
assaulting staff. Blades indicated on the write-up that Maynard was guilty without asking
Maynard whether he chose to plead guilty or not guilty. Blades did not ask Maynard ifhe wanted
to present evidence, call any witnesses, or confront his accusers at a disciplinary hearing. In
addition, Maynard did not receive a hearing on the charges within 72 hours of being informed of
the write-up as required by Department of Correction ("DOC") regulations. Following his
release from Psych Observation, Maynard was transferred to the VCC and placed in the Security
Housing Unit ("SHU") in punitive isolation for 90 days. He was then transferred to the SHU
disciplinary segregation unit where he was housed at the time he filed the instant complaint. (Id
at ~~ 35 -41.)
Upon his arrival at the VCC, Maynard submitted numerous sick call slips. He was seen
by the defendant Dr. Desrosier ("Dr. Desrosier") who scheduled him for an x-ray and referred
him to an ear, nose and throat specialist. On January 31, 2011, Maynard was seen by the
defendant Dr. Ramsey ("Dr. Ramsey'), an outside medical consultant. Dr. Ramsey found

2

substantial hearing loss. In addition, he referred Maynard for physical therapy at the vee.
Maynard became. agitated during his second appointment with Dr. Ramsey and, as a result, Dr.
Ramsey refused to provide further treatment to Maynard. Dr. Desrosier scheduled Maynard for
physical therapy on March 1, 2011. The physical therapist determined that Maynard was faking
his injuries based upon x-ray findings and concluded there was nothing wrong with Maynard
based upon his observations. Subsequently, Maynard has not been scheduled for additional
physical therapy. Maynard alleges that Dr. Desrosier would not schedule any more
appointments, and refused to treat his injuries or make referrals to those who could treat his
injuries. In addition, Maynard alleges that the defendant Medical Director Leslie Sexton
("Sexton"), who is in charge of medical care and arranging medical care outside the prison, failed
to provide Maynard with care despite being placed on notice that he was being denied care. (Id.
at ~~ 42-55.)

After Maynard submitted several grievances regarding the lack of medical care,

his psychiatric medication was arbitrarily withheld. Maynard alleges he was not given the
medication in retaliation for submitting the grievances, although he was told the medication was
discontinued because he stopped taking it. (Id. at ~~ 56-57.)
Maynard seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive
damages. Because Maynard is no longer incarcerated, to the extent that he seeks injunctive relief
related to his incarceration, the issue is moot.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

3

u.s.e. § I9I5(e)(2) (in forma pauperis

actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The
court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most
favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008);

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Maynard proceeds pro se, his pleading is
liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94
(citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a
court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably merit less legal
theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327­

28; Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67
F .3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an
inmate's pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on
12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)).
However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court

4

must grant Maynard leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hasp., 293 F.3d lO3, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[tJhreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id at 678. When
determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v.

UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 2lO (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements ofa
claim are separated. Id. The court must accept all ofthe complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Maynard has a "plausible
claim for relief.,,2 Id at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege Maynard's
entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id "[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

2A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id

5

III. DISCUSSION
A. Due Process
The gist of Maynard's due process claim is that Blades sUbjected him to disciplinary
confinement without due process oflaw. A prisoner facing the loss of a legally cognizable
liberty interest following disciplinary proceedings has a due process right to certain procedural
protections, including the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,566-67 (1974). This due process right, however, is not triggered
unless the prison "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472, 484 (1995).
Here, Maynard was placed in disciplinary confinement for 90 days as a result of his
alleged misconduct. There are no allegations that the conditions he faced in disciplinary custody
amounted to an "atypical and significant hardship" under Sandin. Moreover, our appellate court
has held that this type of confinement does not constitute an "atypical and significant hardship."

See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (fifteen months in segregation was
not an atypical and significant hardship); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002)
(seven months in disciplinary confinement did not implicate a protected liberty interest).
Because the facts do not give rise to a protected liberty interest, Maynard's due process
claims necessarily fail. Therefore, the due process claims against Blades will be dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1).

B. State Actor
Dr. Ramsey, a consulting physician, is named as a defendant. To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege "the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws

6

of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327,330-31 (1986». To act under "color of state law" a defendant must be "clothed with the
authority of state law." West, 487 U.S. at 49. Dr. Ramsey is a private physician who provided
Maynard medical care. The allegations in the complaint do not lead to the conclusion that Dr.
Ramsey is "clothed with the authority of state law." See Reichley v. Pennsylvania Dep 'f of
Agric., 427 F.3d 236,244-45 (3d Cir. 2005); Biener v. CaUo, 361 F.3d 206,216-17 (3d. Cir.

2004).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the claims against Dr. Ramsey as frivolous pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § I 915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915(A)(b)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will dismiss the claims against Blades, and Dr. Ramsey,
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Maynard will be allowed
to proceed with excessive force claims against Hastings, Doe #1, Doe #2; medical needs claims
against, Nurse Doe, Dr. Desrosier, Sexton, Unknown Physical Therapist; and a retaliation claim
against Unknown Prison Psychiatrist.
An appropriate order will be entered .

...Jt:M.,. '~

Wilmington,

,2013
elaware

7