Meconi v. United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 11/8/12. (maw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
PATRICK MECONI,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
) Civ. No. 12-1033-GMS
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UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE)
SERVICE (IRS), et aI.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Patrick Meconi ("Meconi") filed the instant complaint on August 14,2012,
seeking return of an estimated tax deposit he "entrusted to the Internal Revenue Services'
safekeeping." (D.L 2) Meconi proceeds pro se and has been granted leave to proceed informa
pauperis. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. §§ 1340 and 1346.
I. BACKGROUND
Meconi alleges that he made generous deposits with the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
for estimated taxes. Meconi states that it was not until 2010 that he was able to file the original
form 1040 returns for the tax years of 2004 through 2009, because he was caring for his spouse
who is afflicted with Alzheimer's. Meconi alleges that the 2004 through 2009 returns were
carried forward which resulted in a single refund in the 2009 tax year filing. Plaintiff alleges the
IRS caused confusion by scattering the six returns to six separate agents in IRS offices remote
from Wilmington, Delaware. Each of the six tax returns were modified. In addition, Meconi
alleges that the returns were incorrectly treated as 1040x amended tax returns and that the IRS
incorrectly determined that the original returns did not meet the requirements of26 U.S.C.
§ 6511(a). Meconi appealed the IRS determination and provided supplementary documentation of
financial disability allowed by 26 U.S.C. § 6511(h). The IRS determined that there was no basis
to allow any part of Meconi's claim. (See D.l. 2, ex. IRS Sept. 2, 2011 letter.) Meconi alleges
that the IRS: (1) performed a cursory review in making its decision; (2) did not hold a personal
conference as he requested; (3) failed to communicate with him in any personal meaningful
manner; (4) failed to comply with IRS documents; (5) and has mistreated him. Meconi seeks
return of his deposits and reimbursements for costs. Meconi has also filed a motion for this
matter to promptly proceed to trial. (D.l. 9.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis actions
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.
Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89,93 (2007). Because Meconi proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
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complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill,
878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant Meconi leave to
amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview
State Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 678. When determining
whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are
separated. Id The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may
disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Meconi has a "plausible claim for
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relief."} Id. at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege Meconi's entitlement
to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
III. DISCUSSION
The IRS is a named defendant. The nature of Meconi's action, however, is one against the
United States and its employees. For a federal agency to be amenable to suit, Congress must
authorize suit against it by name. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 514 (1952). Congress
has not authorized suit against the IRS with respect to suits of the type Meconi has filed.
Therefore, the IRS is not a proper party to this action. See In re Dye, 2000 WL 1202109 (D. DeL
2000), aff'd, 262 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 2001). Additionally, 26 U.S.C. § 7426 provides that the
United States should be substituted as a defendant when an action is improperly brought against
any officer or employee of the United States. Inasmuch as Meconi proceeds pro se, the court
finds that he has sued the United States and inadvertently named the IRS as the defendant party.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will substitute the United States for the Internal Revenue
Service as a party defendant and allow Meconi to proceed with his complaint. The court will deny
IA claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id.
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as premature, Meconi's motion for trial. (D.l. 9.)
An appropriate order will be entered.
_--,-tJ_()_v'_cr~._,2012
Wilmington, Delaware
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