Wharton et al v. Danberg et al
Filing
90
MEMORANDUM OPINION re pending motions. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 9/30/15. (ntl)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
PHILIP A. WHARTON, JOSEPH
ROUNDTREE, JAMES MADDOX,
and LAMAR CORREA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
C.A. No. 12-1240-LPS.
ROBERT COUPE, CARL C.
DANBERG, and REBECCA
MCBRIDE,
Defendants.
Stephen A. Hampton, GRADY & HAMPTON, L.L.C., Dover, DE.
Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Michael F. McTaggart, Scott W. Perkins, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE
Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
September 30, 2015
Wilmington, Delaware
f ~t
S~ U.S. Distri
Pending before the Court.are (1) a Motion for Class Certification, filed by Plaintiffs
Philip A. Wharton, Joseph Roundtree, James Maddox, and Lamar Correa ("Plaintiffs") (D.I. 58);
(2) a Motion to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class ("Motion to Strike"), filed by ·
Defendants Robert Coupe, 1 Carl C. Danberg, and Rebecca McBride ("Defendants") 2 (D.I. 59);
and (3) a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants (D.I. 74). For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and grant
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motion
to Strike.
. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are· individuals who have spent time in the custody of the Delaware Department
of Correction ("DDOC"). (See D.I. 64 at 1) Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves
and "all others similarly situated," alleging injury resulting from "the practice of the [DDOC] of
over-detaining inmates and by the Defendants' deliberate indifference to the effect of the DDOC
practice of over-detention on the rights of inmates." (D.I. 1 at 1; D.I. 64 at 1)
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and damages on behalf of themselves and their proposed
class of"past, current, or future Delaware inmates" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Fed. R. Civ. P.
1
Pursuant to an agreement by the parties, the Court ordered that "[ c]urrent Commissioner
of the Delaware Department of Correction ('DDOC') Robert Coupe is substituted only as a
defendant for former Commissioner Carl Danberg for the purpose of Plaintiffs' claims seeking
injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the DDOC. Defendant Danberg remains a
defendant .with respect to the legal claims raised against him by Plaintiffs." (D.I. 88 at 2)
2
All claims against foimer Defendant Cathy Escberich were dismissed; she is no longer a
party to this action. (See D.I. 88 at 1)
1
23, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 3 (D.I. 77 at 1) Plaintiffs also allege violations
of 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105. (See D.l. 64 at 20-21, 23; D.I. 83 at 2) Plaintiffs define the
proposed class as follows:
(a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be
incarcerated in any Delaware prison from October 1, 2008,
forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be
released within 12 hours of the time that a court order has been
forwarded to [Central Offender Records ("COR")] releasing the
person, or is not released by midnight of the day his or her sentence
has ended.
(D.I. 77 at 1) COR is a division of the DDOC that is "primarily responsible for calculating
offenders' sentences and release dates. This unit houses and controls all active and inactive
institutional and probation/parole offender records." (See D.I. 64 at 7) "[T]he general activities
at COR include calculating offender sentences and preparing releases as ordered by the Court."
(Id.)
Defendants are current or former officials at the DDOC or COR. Defendant Robert
Coupe is the current Commissioner of the DDOC. (D.I. 88 at 2) Defendant Carl C. Danberg was
Commissioner of the DDOC from the beginning of the alleged class period (October 1, 2008)
through "early 2013." (See D.l. 64 at 2; D.I. 75 at 4) Defendant Rebecca McBride is the current
Director of COR. (D.I. 75 at 4-5)
According to Plaintiffs, "[a]n inmate or detainee who has had his bail posted, had a judge
order unsecured bail, or had a judge order that they be released without bail, still cannot be
released until the judicial order has been processed by COR. Release orders from the Courts are
3
Plaintiffs seek class certification pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b )(3). (D.I. 84 at 57) Plaintiffs previously asserted claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but
subsequently dropped these claims. (See D.l. 83 at 2; 88 at 1)
2
transmitted to COR by fax machine." Subsequently, "a COR employee will fill out a check list
on a computer screen to determine whether any reason remains to continue to hold the offender
in custody." (Id.)
If all of the checklist information is satisfactory, the COR
employee checks off the appropriate preprinted instructions to the
receiving room staff to do such things as verify the identity of the
inmate by photograph, return the inmate's property, and have the
inmate sign any bail or bond papers that need to be signed prior to
releasing the inmate. A similar checklist exists for an inmate or
detainee for whom the reason for the incarceration has expired.
However, that checklist also requires the COR employee to review
the current active legal section to ensure the accuracy of sentence
calculation and release date.
(Id. at 7-8)
Plaintiffs allege various deficiencies at COR, including (1) COR is only open during
certain hours (limiting the responsiveness of COR to releases received after-hours), (2) COR is
inadequately staffed, (3}COR employees "frequently den[y] receiving ... release orders,"
(4) COR employees are frequently unresponsive to phone calls by bail bondsmen, family and
friends of inmates, or even the inmates themselves, who are detained past their release dates or
past the dates when their sentences expire, and (5) COR frequently delays processing release
orders for more than 12 hours. (D .I. 64 at 8-11) Defendants dispute the aforementioned
allegations. (See generally D.l. 75, 81)
LEGAL STANDARDS
I.
Class Certification
"Class certification is proper only 'if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis,
that the prerequisites' of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 23 are met." In re Hydrogen
3
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the S. W. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). Pursuant to Rule 23(a), the Court may certify a class only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), a party seeking class certification
must satisfy one of Rule 23(b)'s additional requirements. See Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.,
391 F .3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[P]arties seeking class certification must show that the action
is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(l), (2), or (3) .... "). Plaintiffs here seek certification under
Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). (D.I. 84 at 4) Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is permissible where
"the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the
· class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is permissible
where "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and ef:fi.Ciently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
II.
Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of
4
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). An assertion that a fact cannot be - or,
alternatively, is - genuinely disputed must be supported either by citing to "particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," or by "showing that the materials cited do
not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(A) & (B). If the
moving party has carried its burden, the nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court will "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475
U.S. at 586; see also Podobnik v. US. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating
party opposing summary judgment "must present more than just bare assertions, conclusory
allegations or suspicions to show the existence of a genuine issue") (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;" a factual dispute is
genuine only where "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "If the
5
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted." Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986) (stating entry of summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"). Thus, the "mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's position is insufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment; there must be "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find"
for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
DISCUSSION
I.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification
"Rule 23(a) ensures that the named plaintiffs are appropriate representatives of the class
whose claims they wish to litigate. The Rule's four requirements - numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequate representation- effectively limit the class claims to those fairly
encompassed by the named plaintiffs claims." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2550 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading
standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with
the Rule - that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are infact sufficiently numerous
parties, common questions oflaw or fact, etc." Id. at 2551 (emphasis in original).
"The crux of this case is commonality - the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that 'there
are questions oflaw or fact common to the class."' Id. at 2550-51 (quoting Rule 23(a)(2)).
Plaintiffs' claims "must depend upon a common contention" which "must be of such a nature
that it is capable of classwide resolution - which means that determination of its truth or falsity
6
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Id. at
2551.
Plaintiffs have failed to prove sufficient commonality among the claims of their proposed
class members. Defendants argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that at least some of the alleged
over-detentions were caused by court errors or delays. (See D.I. 75 at 7-10; D.I. 77 at 17) For
example, release papers for Plaintiff Joseph Roundtree were, according to Defendants (and
without dispute from Plaintiffs), processed "promptly" upon receiving them, although "Family
Court in New Castle may have delayed in sending" the release papers. (See D.I. 75 at 7)
Because Plaintiffs appear to concede that some of the alleged over-detentions were
caused by court errors (see D.l. 71 at 7) (arguing court errors could be minimized, but not
necessarily eliminated), rather than errors that could have been controlled or prevented by
personnel at the DDOC, it would be improper to certify a class of every inmate who has been or
will be over-detained for more than 12 hours past a release date or past midnight of their sentence
terminations. Plaintiffs are suing only DDOC officials in this case. ·If the Court were to certify
Plaintiffs' proposed class, and if the proposed class were to prevail on the merits, it would
impute liability to Defendants for actions of non-parties - actions that Defendants had no control
over. Thus, there is no "common contention" for Plaintiffs' proposed class, the truth or falsity of
which would "resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
. stroke." Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
Because Plaintiffs have failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), the
Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification (D.I. 58). In light of this ruling, the
Court will deny as moot Defendants' Motion to Strike Certain Members of the Purported Class
7
(D.I. 59).
II.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
A.
Sovereign Immunity
Defendants contend that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' claims against
Defendants in their official capacities. (D .I. 75 at 14-15) The Eleventh Amendment forbids suits
in federal courts against a state absent "unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to
federal jurisdiction." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.l (1985).
Consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protects state
officials from liability if the suit is such that "the state is the real, substantial party in interest."
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984); see also Hawaii v. Gordon,
373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) ("[R]elief sought nominally against an [official] is in fact against the
sovereign ifthe decree would operate against the latter."). Plaintiffs specified in their Amended
Complaint that "[a]ll Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities." (See D.I.
64 at 23) (emphasis added) To the extent Plaintiffs are suing Defendants in their official
capacities, the Court determines that such claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
B.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs are barred from recovering damages by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. (See D.I. 75 at 2)
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil
damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct. To be clearly established, a right must be
sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
8
understood that what he is doing violates that right. When properly
applied, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law. We do not require a case
directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants contend that there is no clearly established right to be released within a
specific period of time, let alone the 12-hour period proposed by Plaintiffs. (D.I. 75 at 16)
Plaintiffs respond by citing analysis from a District Court's opinion, Banks v. York, 515 F. Supp.
2d 89, 115 (D.D.C. 2007), for the proposition that "the law regarding over-detention and Section
1983 liability based on supervisory inaction was clearly established by early 2006" and that
"there is ... a substantial body of law recognizing that over-detention violates the Constitution."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; collecting cases involving over-detention). 4
Because the Court will resolve Defendants' summary judgment motion on other grounds,
discussed infra, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiffs have proven that there is a
clearly established right for prisoners to be released within 12 hours of court orders or by
midnight on the date their sentences terminate.
C.
Plaintiffs' Claims Under 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105
Plaintiffs allege violations of 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105. (See D.I. 64 at 20-21, 23; D.I. 83
at 2) These code sections address the duties of Delaware State Courts, not DDOC officials. See
4
Banks resolved a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion for summary judgment, and did
not address potential violations in light of a complete factual record. Moreover, the Court in
Banks gave weight to the fact that the District of Columbia - the Defendant in the Banks case had a history of over-detention violations, including a series of "injunctions and settlement
agreements." Id. at 115. Plaintiffs have pointed to no similar history in Delaware.
9
generally 11 Del. C. §§ 2104-2105; see also 11 Del. C. § 2101 ("Purposes of this chapter") ("It is
the purpose of this chapter to reform the system of bail in the various courts of this State and to
empower and equip the courts to utilize a system of personal recognizance or an unsecured
personal appearance bond ... pending a final determination of the court . ... ")(emphasis
added). These Sections do not set out any duties ofDDOC officials. Therefore, the Court will
grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiffs' claims under§§ 2104 or 2105,
since Defendants are being sued in their capacities as DDOC officials. 5
D.
Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs assert claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. However,
Plaintiffs do not cite any case law for the proposition that they may bring claims under both
Amendments challenging the same conduct. Plaintiffs' claims concern their conditions of
confinement and alleged failures by Defendants to ensure timely release. As such, the claims fit
squarely within the Third Circuit's over-detention and Eighth Amendment analysis. See
generally Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs' proposed class, quoted
above, includes prisoners who have been or will be over-detained in prison; it is not directed at
individuals who have only suffered more generalized deprivations of liberty that might be
addressed under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis. In similar circumstances, the Third Circuit
has applied the "more-specific-provision rule" to hold that Fourteenth Amendment claims need
not be addressed separately from Eighth Amendment claims. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.
Ctr., 621F.3d249, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) ("Because these allegations fit squarely within the Eighth
5
Danberg is currently a judge on the Delaware Court of Common Pleas, a position he has
held since early 2013. (See D.l. 75 at 4)
10
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and Uill;lSual punishment, we hold that the
more-specific-provision rule forecloses [Plaintiff]'s substantive due process claims."). For the
foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect
to Plaintiffs' Fo{irteenth Amendment claims. 6
E.
Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment Claims
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against every person who, under color of state
law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected," another person to a deprivation of a federally protected
right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well-recognized that. government officials may not be
held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory ofrespondeat superior. Rather, state actors are
liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct. With this
principle in mind, we have previously identified two general ways
in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional
acts undertaken by subordinates. First, liability may attach if they,
with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the
constitutional harm. Second, a supervisor may be personally liable
under§ 1983 ifhe or she participated in violating the plaintiffs
rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge,
had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate' s
unconstitutional conduct. "Failure to" claims - failure to train,
failure to discipline, or, as is the case here, failure to supervise are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice
liability.
6
Plaintiffs contend that "[b]y continuing to allow DDOC employees, including COR
employees[,] to refuse to respond to inmate requests for paperwork concerning their
over-detention, Defendants have denied, and continue to deny[,] Plaintiffs' access to the courts
and to deny [sic] Plaintiffs' due process, in violation of their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment." (D .I. 64 at 25) The Court finds that, while this may appear to be a standalone
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs' allegations clearly focus on prisoners who
have been over-detained, regardless of why such prisoners were over-detained (for example,
because of insufficient responsiveness to inmate requests). Again, then, by application of the
more-specific-provision rule, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims.
11
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2014) rev 'don other grounds sub
nom ..Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks
omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' conduct falls under the first of the
abovementioned categories ofliability (policy or practice liability). (See generally D.l. 64)
Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants are liable under the second category.
Under the applicable Eighth Amendment analysis, Plaintiffs' burden is to demonstrate
that "(l) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that
unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or
took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem
was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection.
between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention." Montanez v.
Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 25, 2010) .
. With respect to the first requirement from Montanez, the Court cannot say at this time
that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants had knowledge of the over-detention problem
and the risk that unwarranted punishment was being inflicted. There are genuine disputes of
material fact as to whether Defendants were aware of what might be found to be general
disorganization and incompetence of DDOC personnel and whether Defendants were aware of a
significant risk that unwarranted punishment might be inflicted on prisoners. Thus, even though
Plaintiffs have failed to tie Defendants' awareness of these problems to any specific policies or
actions of Defendants, Plaintiffs have adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that Plaintiffs have met the first requirement.
Regarding the second requirement from Montanez - deliberate indifference - the Court
12
determines that no reasonable factfinder could find that Defendants were deliberately indifferent
to the risk of Plaintiffs' over-detention. Plaintiffs make a series of vague allegations against
Danberg7 and McBride, arguing that each of them knew about the general problem of overdetention but did nothing about it. (See generally D.I. 64 at 18-20, 22-26) Even assuming that
existing policies at the DDOC created an unreasonable risk of Eighth Amendment injury,· there is
insufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Defendants were indifferent.to that risk. To the contrary, the record shows that each of the
Defendants worked to improve the DDOC and COR to address over-detention issues.
As noted in Plaintiffs' own submissions, former Commissioner Danberg was praised as
being "the first member of [former Governor] Minner[' s] administration to ever step up and
accept responsibility for a problem [related to erroneous prisoner releases], acknowledging it
exists and telling us what he is trying to do to fix it." (D .I. 61-3 at PA 184) The undisputed
record shows that Danberg created COR with an eye toward improving prisoner release
processes:
[Danberg] coordinated efforts with the bureau chief and
Cathy Escherich and the union relating to_ the business change,
because it was a huge business change for the department in the
centralization of records. We met with legislators in discussion
with the centralization of records, chief justices from the different
courts. So he played a pretty active role in forming discussions and
communications and coordinating those through the union, which
central offender records staff are a part of.
7
F or purposes of Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the Court will interpret the
general allegations against Danberg discussed hereinafter as being directed to Coupe, who is the
current Commissioner of the DDOC. (See D.I. 88 at 2)
13
The centralization of records was initiated in order to
centralize our business practices so that we were uniform and
consistent in getting the calculations done, releases done, the legal
processes done, and that the actual process procedure would be
handled in a uniform manner.
(See McBride Deposition, D .I. 60-1 at 246-4 7) These are not the actions of someone who is
"deliberately indifferent" to a problem. On the record before the Court, one can only conclude
that Danberg worked to address over-detention issues, and that he was not deliberately indifferent
to them.
Likewise, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence indicating that McBride is or was
deliberately indifferent to the over-detention problem. As she stated at her deposition - and
without dispute from Plaintiffs - COR processes between 16,000 and 18,000 releases a year.
(D.I. 60-1 at 249) "The administration of a system of punishment entails an unavoidable risk of
error. In the case of punishment through imprisonment, those errors may result in harms to
inmates. Elimination of the risk of error in many instances would be either literally impossible or
unfeasible because prohibitively costly." Sample, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). Given
the number ofreleases handled by COR each year, it is unsurprising (though of course
unfortunate) that errors occur and that prisoners are sometimes over-detained. Evidence that
some incidents of over-detention occurred is not sufficient, by itself, to show that McBride was
deliberately indifferent to such incidents. To the contrary, McBride demonstrated throughout her
deposition that she was intimately familiar with COR's procedures, including training procedures
intended to improve handling of prisoner releases, and she actively worked to improve processes
at COR to prevent and address problems of over-detention. (See, e.g., D.I. 60-1 at 239, 248-52)
Regarding current Commissioner Coupe, Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence whatsoever
I
14
suggesting that he is or was
deliberat~ly indifferent
to the over-detention problem. In fact, the
only reference to Coupe in Plaintiffs' summary judgment brief shows that Coupe was not
deliberately indifferent to the over-detention problem. (See D.I. 77 at 13) ("In 2013, Bureau
Chief Kim Wheatley was pushed by Commissioner Coupe to have COR form a 'special unit' to
speed up the daily bail releases.") As with the other Defendants, the record supports only a
finding that Coupe was trying to improve the DDOC, and COR specifically. Thus, the Court will
grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants in light of Plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence
of deliberate indifference.
Regarding the third requirement from Montanez, and as an independent basis for granting
summary judgment in Defendants' favor, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have pointed to no causal
connection between any actions or policies attributable to Defendants and the harm suffered by
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs point to COR's hours of operation (see D.I. 77 at 2), general
unresponsiveness to requests on behalf of inmates (see id. at 4), and alleged understaffing (see id.
at 5), but Plaintiffs make no attempt to connect any of these alleged deficiencies to Plaintiffs'
specific harm or even Defendants' conduct or policies. As such, the Court finds that no
reasonable jury could find a causal connection between Defendants' actions or policies and
Plaintiffs' harm.
Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect to Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims.
15
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification (D.I. 58), deny as moot Defendants' Motion to Strike (D.I. 59), and grant
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 74). An appropriate Order follows.
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?