Eppley et al v. University of Delaware et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 1/12/2015. (mdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
JENNIFER EPPLEY and
DARYL EPPLEY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE,
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, and
ROLF VAN DE KERKHOF,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 13-cv-99 (GMS)
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MEMORANDUM
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs, Jennifer Eppley ("Ms. Eppley") and Daryl Eppley ("Mr. Eppley")
(collectively, "the Eppleys"), filed a Complaint (D.I. 1) against the University of Delaware, the
Board of Trustees 0f the University of Delaware, and Rolf Van de Kerkhof (collectively, "UD"),
on January 17, 20 l3. (Id.) In their Complaint, 1 the Eppleys allege that UD failed to honor an
athletic scholarship agreement made by the then-coach of the field hockey team, Carol Miller
("Coach Miller"). (D.I. 11 at~ 72.) On September 3, 2014, following completion of discovery, 2
1
The Eppleys' Complaint lists six counts-(!) Title IX; (II) Violation of Due Process Rights; (III) Negligent
Misrepresentation; (IV) Fraudulent Inducement; and (V) Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;
and (VI) Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Physical Injuries. Count II was dismissed as to all defendants by the
court on May 23, 2013. (See D.I. 9.) The Eppleys' Answering Brief (D.I. 25) does not address counts V or VI and
are thus waived. See Glover v. City of Wilmington, 966 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2013) (finding that
plaintiff waived claim by "failing to address it in her responsive brief to [defendant's] motion for summary
judgment.").
2 Counsel for the Eppleys, Charles Snyderman, requested additional discovery in the body of the Answering
Brief to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See D.I. 25 at 4.) Discovery closed on August 1, 2014.
Despite ample opportunity, and with no stated reason for their failure to do so, the Eppleys served no discovery
requests and noticed no depositions before the deadline. It was not until August 22, 2014, that the Eppley's filed
Notice ofa Rule 30(b)(6) deposition for an uncertain date. (D.I. 19.) On August 22, 2014, prior to filing their Notice,
."Mr. Snyderman requested defendants' counsel agree to an extension of deadlines. (See D.I. 26, Ex. A.) Counsel for
. the defendants did not agree to Mr. Snyderman's request. (Id.) While the defendants' deposition of the Eppleys
UD filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) Motion for Summary Judgment (D.I. 20),
asserting that the Eppleys' allegations are meritless because the scholarship at issue was
guaranteed for only one year as is evidenced by the contract the Eppleys both signed. (D.I. 21 at
6.) Presently before the court is UD's Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.I. 20.) For the reasons
that follow, the court will grant UD's motion.
II.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in this case are Jennifer Eppley and her father, Daryl Eppley. Ms. Eppley
played on her high school's field hockey team and was recruited by various universities to play
field hockey during her final years of high school. (D.I. 1 at if 10-12, 16.) Members of the UD
field hockey coaching staff first reached out to Ms. Eppley in December, 2008. (Id.) On June 8,
2009, Ms. Eppley and Coach Miller had an email exchange regarding her participation in an
upcoming UD field hockey camp. (Id.
if 14-15.)
Under National Collegiate Athletic Association
(''NCAA") rules, July 1, 2009 was the earliest date that college coaches were permitted to contact
high school athletes for recruiting purposes. (Id.
ii 18.)
Coach Miller contacted Ms. Eppley on
July 1, 2009 and left her a message expressing a desire to have Ms. Eppley play on UD's team.
(Id.)
occurred after the close of discovery, the court is confident that the delay was caused by Mr. Snyderman's lag in
scheduling rather than the result of any dilatory tactics by the defendants. While the court often grants extensions,
Mr. Snyderman's complete failure to comply with the scheduling order or to provide a Rule 56(f) affidavit is fatal to
his request and viewed by the court, at best, as an egregious oversight. See Dowling v. City ofPhiladelphia, 855 F.2d
136, 139-40 (3d Cir. Aug. 26, 1988) ("This Court has interpreted Rule 56(f) as imposing a requirement that a party
seeking further discovery in response to a summary judgment motion submit an affidavit specifying, for example,
what particular information is sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not
previously been obtained."); Koehnke v. City ofMcKeesport, 350 F. App'x 720, 723 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 2009) ("A party
that cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition may-and, indeed, must-show by affidavit, how evidence
of such facts would preclude summary judgment.") (quoting Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.
2002)); see also Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that party's failure to conduct
expert discovery within given period imposed "obligation to provide the court with a record which affirmatively
demonstrates, with specificity, diligent efforts on his or her part and unusual circumstances which have frustrated
those efforts.").
2
In September 2009, during Ms. Eppley's "official visit" to UD, Ms. Eppley and her parents
had a meeting with Coach Miller in her office. (Id.
if 20.) Ms. Eppley asserts that during this
meeting, in the presence of both of her parents, Coach Miller orally offered Ms. Eppley "a
scholarship which she said would be 35% in [Ms. Eppley's] first year, 75% in year two, and 75%
or more in years three and four." (Id.) Mr. Eppley sent an email to Coach Miller on September
24, 2009 for clarification regarding Ms. Eppley's scholarship. (D.I. 22, Ex. I); see D. Eppley Tr.
at 37:3-7. In her response, Coach Miller clarified that "Jenn will be guaranteed to receive the same
or greater (not less than) percentage of scholarship for years 3 and 4 that she is receiving for year
2." (D.I. 22, Ex. I.)
On January 21, 2010, Ms. Eppley received a letter from Coach Miller informing her that
she had been selected to receive an athletic scholarship to the University of Delaware. (See D.I.
22, Ex. A.) The amount, duration, conditions, and terms of the award offered to Ms. Eppley were
set forth in writing in an Athletic Grant-In-Aid document (the "GIA Contract") enclosed with the
letter. (See id., Ex. B.) The GIA Contract offered Ms. Eppley a grant in the amount of $11,512.90
(equal to 35% of the tuition and fees that would have been owed that year by an out-of-state
student) for the period beginning August 31, 2010 and ending May 28, 2011. 3 (Id.) The GIA
Contract was signed and dated by Jennifer and Daryl Eppley on February 3, 2010. (Id.) On the
same day, the Eppleys signed a National Letter of Intent ("NLI"). (Id., Ex. E.) The NLI includes
the following language above the Eppleys' signatures, "[m]y signature on this NLI nullifies any
agreements, oral or otherwise, which would release me from the conditions stated within this NLI."
(Id.)
3
In addition to the specific date range listed on the GIA Contract, the following line instructs that "[a]ll
grants, by N.C.A.A. regulations are awarded for a period of one year only." (D.1. 22 at Ex. B.)
3
During Ms. Eppley's first semester, Coach Miller announced her retirement and left the
UD field hockey program. (D.I. 1 at ii 36.) Rolf van de Kerkhof ("Coach Rolf') was hired as the
new head field hockey coach shortly thereafter. (Id.
ii 37.) The Eppleys assert that the number,
length and intensity of practices were increased dramatically under Coach Rolf. (Id.
ii 40.)
On March 21, 2011, Coach Rolf informed Ms. Eppley that based on her performance, her
scholarship was going to be reduced to 20% during her second year on the team. 4 (Id.
ii 47.) Ms.
Eppley subsequently received a letter from Student Financial Services formally notifying her that
her athletically related financial aid was being reduced for the 2011-2012 years to 20%. (Id.
Ms. Eppley filed
~
ii 49.)
appeal and attended an administrative hearing in an attempt to have her
scholarship amount increased. (Id.
iMf 54-60.) Ms. Eppley contacted Coach Miller by email prior
to her appeal hearing. (D.I. 22, Ex. H.) Ms. Eppley explained Coach Rolfs decision to cut her
scholarship and stated that Coach Miller could help her in the appeal process "by letting the
committee know that my financial aid this year is to be 75% of a full scholarship." (Id.) Notably,
Coach Miller informed Ms. Eppley that "[a]n email from me stating that I would· have renewed
your scholarship will not have any validity in your hearing." (Id.) In a written decision the hearing
Board stated that it "finds that the reduction of Ms. Eppley's grant-in-aid for the 2011-2012
academic year was justified and appropriate, and on that basis denies Ms. Eppley's appeal." (D.I.
1 ii 60.) Ms. Eppley resigned from the field hockey team prior to receiving the hearing Board's
written decision. See J. Eppley Tr. at 86:1-14.
4
Coach Rolf advised Ms. Eppley that her base scholarship for the following academic year would be reduced
from 35% to 20%, but Coach Rolf provided Ms. Eppley an opportunity to increase her scholarship to 40% if she met
certain performance goals. (See D.I. 21 at 11; D.I. 22, Ex. G at P0035-36.)
4
III.
STANDARDOFREVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material
fact exists. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. ·v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.10
(1986). A fact is material if it "could affect the outcome" of the proceeding. Lamont v. New
Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011). There is a genuine issue "if the evidence is sufficient to
permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. When determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the district court must view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw inferences in that party's favor. See Wishkin v.
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). If the moving party is able to demonstrate an absence
of disputed material facts, the nonmoving party must then "come forward with 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(e)).
Importantly, the mere existence of some evidence in support of the nonmoving party will
not prove sufficient for denial of a summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Rather, the nonmoving party must present enough evidence to
enable a jury to reasonably find for it on that issue. Id. Specifically, the party opposing summary
judgment "must present more than just 'bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions' to
show the existence of a genuine issue." Podobnik v. US. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir.
2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 4 77 U.S. at 325). Thus, a nonmoving party asserting that a material
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fact is in dispute must support this assertion by: "(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations, ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing
that the materials cited [by the opposing party] do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute
.... " See
FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(c)(l). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on
an essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to
._.
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