Bridgeforth v. United States Department of Labor et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 5/3/13. (cla, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

OTIS MICHAEL BRIDGEFORTH,
Plaintiff,

v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, et aI.,
Defendants.

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) Civ. Action No. 13-120-GMS
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MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Otis Michael Bridgeforth ("Bridgeforth"), filed this lawsuit on January 22,
2013, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging employment discrimination and seeking review of
unemployment benefits rulings. (D.L 2.) He appears pro se and was granted permission to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.L 4.) The court proceeds to review
and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915(e)(2).
I. BACKGROUND
Bridgeforth was rehired by the defendant Shoprite Supermarkets Human Resources
during the month of July 2012. Due to his current and past physical impairments, Bridgeforth
applied for a position as a part-time housekeeper. On August 23, 2012, the defendants Shoprite
Supermarkets Corporate Headquarters, Shoprite Supermarkets Human Resources, and Shoprite
Supermarkets, Inc. (collectively "Shoprite defendants") terminated Bridgeforth's employment.
Bridgeforth alleges that the Shoprite defendants agreed to discriminate against Bridgeforth based
upon his race, sex, religion, and disability.

Bridgeforth filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") against Shoprite, EEOC Charge No. 846-2013-08129 alleging age
discrimination. (D.1. 2, ex.) Bridgeforth was advised that, because he was only twenty-nine, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, was inapplicable, and the EEOC could not
legally investigate a claim of age discrimination. The complaint states that the EEOC granted
Bridgeforth leave to file this lawsuit, but there is no right-to-sue letter attached to the complaint.
Bridgeforth applied for unemployment compensation. He alleges that the defendants the
United States Department of Labor ("USDOL"), its Newark (Pencader) and Wilmington,
Delaware offices, and its employees, Mrs. Soto, Margie Perry, and Andrew Morrison
(collectively "Department of Labor defendants") agreed to deny his unemployment claim. It
appears that Bridgeforth has misnamed the defendants. Exhibits attached to the complaint
indicate that Bridgeforth sought unemployment insurance benefits from the Delaware
Department of Labor ("DDOL"); not the USDOL. Bridgeforth seeks compensatory damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and
actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (informapauperis
actions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to apro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d
Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Bridgeforth proceeds pro se,
his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held

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to less stringent standards than fonnal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v.

Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's
pen and refused to give it back).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant Bridgeforth leave
to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The
assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals ofthe
elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 678. When
detennining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v.

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UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements ofa

claim are separated. Id. The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must detennine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Bridgeforth has a "plausible
claim for relief."l Id. at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege
Bridgeforth's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id.
"[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2».

III. DISCUSSION
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Bridgeforth filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bridgeforth, however, may
not recover against the Shoprite defendants or the Department of Labor defendants under that
statute. When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him
of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988). The Shoprite defendants are not state actors. In addition,

the Department of Labor and its offices are not persons and, as described by the complaint, none

A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id.
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of the Department of Labor individual defendants are state actors. They are described as federal
actors.2
Therefore, the court will dismiss the § 1983 claims as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
B. Sovereign ImmunitylEleventh Amendment
To the extent that Bridgeforth asserts claims against the USDOL, its branches, and
employees in their official capacities, the claims fail. The United States cannot be sued without
its express consent, and express consent is a prerequisite to a suit against the United States. See
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).

To the extent, Bridgeforth intended to name as defendants the DDOL, its branches, and
employees in their official capacities, again, the claims fail. The Eleventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution protects an unconsenting state or state agency from a suit brought in
federal court by one of its own citizens, regardless of the relief sought. See Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Hence, as an agency of the State of
Delaware, the DDOL is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See e.g. Evans v.

2A claim against a federal defendant is governed by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
ofFed. Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court created a
federal tort counterpart to the remedy created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as it applies to federal officers.
To state a claim under Bivens, a claimant must show (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation of the right was caused by
an official acting under color of federal law. See Mahoney v. Nat 'I Org. For Women, 681 F.Supp.
129,132 (D. Conn. 1987) (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978». All
claims against the Department of Labor defendants will also be dismissed on other grounds. See
~~ III.B. and IILD, infra.

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Ford, 2004 WL 2009362, *4 (D. Del. Aug. 25, 2004) (dismissing claim against DOC, because
DOC is state agency and DOC did not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity).
In addition, "a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from
a suit against the State itself." Will v. Michigan Dep't ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(internal citations omitted); Ali v Howard, 353 F. App'x 667, 672 (3d Cir. 2009) (unpublished).
Accordingly, § 1983 claims for monetary damages against a state, state agency, or a state official
in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id.
The US DOL, the DDOL, their branches, and employees in their official capacities are
immune from suit. Therefore, the court will the claims against them pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

C. Employment Discrimination
Bridgeforth alleges that the Shoprite defendants agreed to discriminate against him based
upon his race, sex, religion, and disability. See Sarullo v. Us. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797
(3d Cir. 2003) ("[A prima facie case of discrimination] requires a showing that: (1) the plaintiff
belongs to a protected class; (2) he/she was qualified for the position; (3) he/she was subject to
an adverse employment action despite being qualified; and (4) under circumstances that raise an
inference of discriminatory action, the employer continued to seek out individuals with
qualifications similar to the plaintiffs to fill the position.").
The claim is deficiently pled. Bridgeforth does not set forth the statutes under which he
proceeds. Nor does the complaint allege facts to support the elements of employment
discrimination. For example, the complaint makes no mention of Bridgeforth's race, religion or

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the type of disability (other than to refer, generally, to current and past physical impainnents).
Finally, the complaint alleges in a conclusory manner, without supporting facts, that the Shoprite
defendants discriminated against Bridgeforth. The complaint does not meet the pleading
requirements of Iqbal and Twombly and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Accordingly, the court will dismiss the employment discrimination claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because
it appears that Bridgeforth may be able to cure his pleading deficiencies, he will be given leave to
amend the employment discrimination claims against the Shoprite defendants. 3

D. Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Bridgeforth alleges that the Department of Labor defendants agreed to deny his
unemployment insurance claim. Bridgeforth sought unemployment insurance benefits through
the DDOL. It appears that Bridgeforth seeks review by this court of the finding that he untimely
filed his appeal from the decision ofthe Referee to Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board and
the detennination of excessive earnings.
To the extent Bridgeforth seeks a review of the decisions denying him unemployment
benefits, his remedy is to appeal to the Delaware Superior Court, and then to seek review by the
Delaware Supreme Court. See 19 Del. C. § 3323; Power v. Hanley, 1997 WL 1737096, at *1
(Del. Com. PI. Jan. 3, 1997). The complaint does not indicate if Bridgeforth has sought review.

3Bridgeforth indicates that the EEOC granted him "leave to file a lawsuit." The receipt of
a federal right-to-sue letter indicates that a complainant has exhausted administrative remedies
which is an "essential element for bringing a claim in [federal] court under Title VII." See
Anjelino v. New York Times, 200 F.3d 73,93 (3d Cir. 1999); but see Ray v. Kentes, 285 F.3d 287
(3d Cir. 2002) (the failure to exhaust is an affinnative defense and should not be the basis of a
sua sponte dismissal). Upon amendment, Bridgeforth should attached the document from the
EEOC (i.e., the right-to-sue letter) that granted him leave to file this lawsuit.
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Under the Younger abstention doctrine, a federal district court must abstain from hearing
a federal case which interferes with certain state proceedings.4 Younger further provides that
federal courts are prevented from enjoining pending state proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. s Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,437
(1982). The doctrine applies to proceedings until all appellate remedies have been exhausted.
Huffman v. Pursue Ltd, 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975); see Reinhardt v. Commonwealth ofMass.
Dep't ofSoc. Services, 715 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Abstention is appropriate only
when: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings
implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity
to raise the federal claims. Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010). It appears
that there are on-going state proceedings. Also, Delaware has a compelling state interest in
providing unemployment compensation to its citizens who are out of work. Finally, Bridgeforth
may raise any federal claims he may have before the Delaware State Court.
Moreover, it is not within this court's purview to review State unemployment benefits
decisions. Federal district courts are courts of original jurisdiction and have no authority to
review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923); see Power v. Department ofLabor, 2002 WL 976001 (D. Del. May 3, 2002).

4The court may raise the issue of Younger abstention sua sponte. 0 'Neill v. City of
Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
5The abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), provides
that federal courts are not to interfere with pending state criminal proceedings. The Younger
doctrine has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass 'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Huffman v. Pursue Ltd, 420 U.S.
592 (1975).

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Assuming, arguendo, that this case has been resolved by the Delaware Supreme Court, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies as this is a case "brought by [a] state-court loser []
complaining of injuries caused by the state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). Allowing Bridgeforth's
claim to proceed against the Department of Labor defendants would allow him to use the federal
courts to appeal a state court judgment and, thus, would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 415; District ofColumbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).
Accordingly, the court will dismiss all claims against Department of Labor defendants for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine or, in the alternative,
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court will dismiss all claims against the Department of Labor
defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Younger abstention doctrine or, in the
alternative, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and on the basis of sovereign and Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). In addition, the court will dismiss the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Finally, the court will dismiss the
employment discrimination claims against the Shoprite defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Bridgeforth will

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be given leave to amend his employment discrimination claims against the Shoprite defendants.
An appropriate order will be entered.

J.i~

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,2013
Wilmingto ,Delaware

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