Miller v. Little et al

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Leonard P. Stark on 09/29/14. (etg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

J0 I-IN E. MILLER,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civ. Ko. 13-388-LPS

CAPT. BURTON, et al.,
Defendants.

John E. Miller, James

Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, IJ ro Se Plaintiff.

Ophelia Michelle Waters, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department ofJustice, Wilmington,
Delaware. Counsel for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

September 29,2014
Wilmington, Delaware

STARK, U.S. District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
PlaintiffJohn E. ::VElier ("Plaintiff') filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983 alleging

~violations

of his constitutional rights.! Plaintiff, an inmate, is housed at the J ames

Vaughn

Correctional Center ("VCC") in Smyrna, Delaware. Plaintiff appears pro Je and has been granted
leave to proceed informa pauperiJ. (D.I. 5) Plaintiff has filed two motions to amend, opposed by
Defendants. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the Motions
to Amend.

II.

MOTIONS TO AMEND
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (D.I. 11) alleges retaliation by Defendants in the form of a

transfer to a higher security level following his filing of grievances and a civil lawsuit against
correctional officers. Plaintiff has filed two motions to amend. The first motion to amend (D.I. 18)
seeks to add claims against C/O Christi Pierce ("Pierce") and C/O Shannon Corbett ("Corbett") for
taking Plaintiffs property, specifically legal work and a pair of sneakers. The second motion to
amend (D.I. 20) seeks to add John Doe members of the Institutional Base Classification Committee
("IECC") and

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allege retaliation by the IECC in blocking Plaintiffs return to a lower security level,

all for the purpose of teaching him a lesson for collecting evidence of wrongdoing by correctional
officers. Defendants oppose the second motion to amend on the grounds that amendment is futile.
(D.I. 21) More particularly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have "legitimate statutory or

!Pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a
federal right and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. See WeJt
1). Atkim, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
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constitutional entitlement" to any particular custodial classification. 2 (Id. at ~ 13)
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party may amcnd its pleading once as a matter of coursc
within twenty-one days after scrving it or, if tlle pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or nvcnty-one days after service of a
Rule 12(b), (c), or (f) motion, whichever is carlier. Otherwise, a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leavc. Rule 15 provides that thc court
should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.
The Third Circuit has adopted a liberal approach to the amendment of pleadings to cnsure
that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Dole v. An'o

Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484,486-87 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Amendment, howevcr, is not
automatic. See Dover Steel Co., Inc. v. Hartford Ac'ddent and Indem., 151 F.R.D. 570,574 (RD. Pa. 1993).
Leave to amend should be granted absent a showing of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive
on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deftciencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prcjudice to the opposing party by virtuc of the allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc." FOJ71an v. DaI)iJ, 371 U.S. 178,182 (1962); See alJo Gran!). Stqflord, 226 F.3d 275,
291 (3d Cir. 2000). Futility of amendment occurs when the complaint, as amended, does not statc a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See In re Burlington Coat Fadory Su: Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,

1434 (3d Cir. 19(7). If the proposed amendment "is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is
legally insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to amend." HarriJon BelJerage Co. v. Dribetk

Importers,

Im~,

133 F.RD. 463,468 (D.NJ 1990).

2Defendants ask the Court to deny the second motion to amend or, in the alternative, to
reassert the motion to dismiss. (D.1. 21 at \Vherefore Clause) The Court docket does not indicate
that Defendants have flied a motion to dismiss in this case.
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III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Personal Property

The Court will deny the motion to amend (D.I. 18) to add the claims that Plaintiffs property
and sneakers were taken by Pierce and Corbett in violation of his right to due process. A prisoner's
due process claim based on random and unauthorized deprivation of property by a state actor is not
actionable under § 1983, whether the deprivation is negligent or intentional, unless there is no
adequate post-deprivation remedy available. See Parratt 1). Tqylor, 451

othergrounds ry, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hudson

1J.

.S. 527,542 (1981), overruled on

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Plaintiff has

available to him the option of filing a common law claim for conversion of property. Inasmuch as
Delaware law provides an adequate remedy for Plaintiff, he cannot maintain a cause of action
pursuant to § 1983 and, therefore, amendment is futile. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535; Nil:holson v.

Carrol/, 390 F. Supp. 2d 429, 435 (D. DeL 2005).
B.

Legal Work

The Court will grant the motion to amend (D.I. 18) to add a claim that Plaintiffs legal work
was wrongfully taken by Pierce and Corbett. Prisoners must be allowed "adequate, effective and
meaningful" access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,822 (1977). "Many courts have
found a cause of action for violation of the right of access stated where it was alleged that prison
officials confiscated and/or destroyed legal materials." Zili(h v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 695 (3d Cit.
1992) (citations omitted).
C.

Retaliation

The Court will grant the second motion to amend (D.I. 20) to add a retaliation claim against
John Doe members of the IBCe. Defendants are conect that Plaintiff does not have "legitimate
statutory or c011Stitutional entitlement" to any particular custodial classification. However, in the

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retaliation context, "[g]overnment actions, which standing alone, do not violate the Constitution,
may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a de site to punish an
individual for exercise of a constitutional right." Mitchell v. Horll, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cit. 2003);

See also WilliatJlJ 1', Mryers, 165 F. App'x 201 (3d Cit. Feb. 3,2006) (inmate alleged he was fired from
his prison kitchen job in retaliation for filing grievances against his supervisor); Jefftrson v. Wolfe, 2006
WL 1947721 (\VD. Pa. July 11,2006) (denying motion to dismiss claim that inmate's right to free
speech was violated when he was fired from prison job for writing poems regarding injustice in
courts and was then issued allegedly false misconduct reports). Here, Plaintiff alleges that a transfer
to a lower security level was blocked in retaliation for Plaintiff's collection of evidence of wrong­
doing by correctional officers.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the first motion to

amend (DJ. 18) and will grant Plaintiff's second motion to amend (D.L 20). Plaintiff will be given
leave to file an amended complaint that contains the claims as set forth in the amended complaint
(D.L 11), that is, the taking of legal materials claim and the IBCC retaliation clain1.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

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