Braun v. Bolton et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION re 2 Complaint. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 5/3/2013. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
BRENDA LEE BRAUN,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civ. No. 13-445-RGA

RICHARD BOLTON, et al.,
Defendants.

Brenda Lee Braun, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

J,

May
2013
Wilmington, Delaware

A&w.~~
Plaintiff Brenda Lee Braun filed this action alleging sexual harassment. She
appears prose and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (D. I. 4). The
Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Apparently, Plaintiff rented from one, or all, of the Defendants. Braun alleges
that Defendants sexually harassed her and that Defendant Richard Bolton sexually
assaulted her and was always asking for sex. Braun also alleges that Defendants John
Bolton and Richard Bolton harassed and threatened her and gave away her belongings
when she was not on the property.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants treated her like a "slave" and required her to
sleep on the floor. When Plaintiff asked to sleep on a motor home bed, there was a
"big scene and uproar and threatening done by the Bolton family." On February 8,
2013, Plaintiff was told that she had to move and Defendants refused to return "her
money and belongings." When she went to retrieve her property on February 20, 2013,
she was only given a few personal belongings, and Defendants refused to return the
remainder of her property. A state trooper who was present advised Plaintiff to take
Defendants to civil court for her belongings. Plaintiff seeks $12,900 in compensatory
damages plus costs. Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally
construed and her Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma

pauperis actions that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions). The Court must accept all factual allegations in
a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F .3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). An action is frivolous

if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as
frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless"
or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court
must grant Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint, unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hasp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining whether dismissal
is appropriate, the Court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are

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separated. /d. The Court must accept all of the Complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. /d. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the Complaint
are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578
F.3d at 211. In other words, the Complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief; rather, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. /d. A
claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully." /d. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent
with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of 'entitlement to relief."' /d. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
The civil cover sheet states that this Court has jurisdiction due to a federal
question. Liberally construing the Complaint, as the Court must, it appears that Plaintiff
attempts to raise a claim under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of gender. See
42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. Under the FHA, it is unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of ... sex." 42
U.S.C. § 3604(b). In addition, it is unlawful under the FHA "to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of' any right
protected by the act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

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Courts have recognized that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
that may violate either§ 3604 or§ 3617. See, e.g., Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P'ship, 7 F.
App'x 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2001); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1996); Hance v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993); Shellhammer v. Lewallen,
770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985). Courts have determined that sexual harassment is
actionable under the FHA given that Title VIII shares the same purposes as Title VII
(wherein a plaintiff may bring a hostile work environment claim), sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination, and there is overwhelming precedent that recognizes a
hostile housing environment claim. See Brillhart v. Sharp, 2008 WL 2857713, at *8
(M.D. Pa. July 21, 2008) (citation omitted).
To make out a claim for discrimination resulting from a hostile housing
environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination
because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the
discrimination detrimentally affected a term, condition, or privilege of housing; (4) the
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability, if alleged. See Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.1990); see also Brillhart, 2008 WL
2857713, at *9.
The Complaint is deficiently pled as it fails to state a claim under the FHA.
Indeed, it fails to meet the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, the
Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an
Amended Complaint to cure any pleading defects.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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