Scott v. Division Family Services

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM - Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 6/27/13. (rwc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRlCT COURT

FOR THE DISTRlCT OF DELA WARE

JUANITA SCOTT,
Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

) Civ. Action No. 13-660-GMS

v.

DIVISION FAMIL Y SERVICES,
Defendant.

)
)
)

)

MEMORANDUM
The plaintiff, Juanita Scott ("Scott"), filed this lawsuit alleging defamation and
discrimination. (D.L 2.) She appears pro se and was granted permission to proceed informa
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1915. (D.L 6.) The court now proceeds to review and screen
the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. BACKGROUND
Scott filed an emergency ex parte order for guardianship of two individuals. While not
clear, it appears that she filed the matter in the Family Court of the State of Delaware in and for
New Castle County. The matter was denied and Scott seems to state that she appealed the matter
to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Scott names as a defendant the Delaware Division
of Family Services.
Scott alleges that she was required to take an intelligence test and, when she did not pass
it, was labeled with "mild mental retardation" and found "not capable" of taking care of children
without the assistance of another adult. Scott disagrees with the decision. She alleges the
decision is the result of discrimination and is defamatory. Scott seeks $40,000 for her suffering.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis actions
that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court must accept all factual
allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff.

Phillips v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89,93 (2007). Because Scott proceeds pro se, her pleading is liberally construed and her
complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).
An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly
baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 at 327-28; Wilson v. Rackmill,
878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989).
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before
dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant Scott leave to
amend her complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. l\1ayview

State Hosp., 293 FJd 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

2

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The

assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." Id. at 678. When determining
whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are

separated. Id. The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may
disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Scott has a "plausible claim for relief."!
Id. at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege Scott's entitlement to relief;

rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged
- but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2».

III. DISCUSSION
Scott checkmarked boxes on the complaint to allege discrimination by reason of race,
color, and national origin. However, the conclusory allegations do not rise to the level of
discrimination. Nor does the complaint speak to Scott's race, color and/or national origin. After

JA

claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are
'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitlement to relief. '" Id.

3

thoroughly reviewing the complaint, the court draws on its judicial experience and common sense
and finds that the allegations are not plausible on their face.
Moreover, it is clear in reading the complaint that Scott's main claim is her dissatisfaction
with the State Court's ruling in not granting her guardianship to two individuals. To the extent
Scott seeks review and rejection of Delaware state decisions, the claims fall under the purview of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, therefore, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction. 2 To the extent
the guardianship action remains pending in State court and has not yet reached final resolution,
the court must abstain by reason of the abstention doctrine as defined in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), which has been extended to civil cases and state administrative proceedings. See

Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982); Huffman v.
Pursue Ltd, 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
Finally, because the complaint fails to state a federal claim, the court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over Scott's supplemental defamation claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367; De Asencio v. Tyson

Foods. Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003).

IV. CONCLUSION
The court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
In light of the nature of Scott's claims, the court finds that amendment would be futile. See Alston

2The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District o/Columbia Court 0/Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Because the doctrine divests the court of subject matter
jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time by the court sua sponte. Des;'s Pizza, Inc. v. City Qf
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411,419 (3d Cir. 2003); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77
(3d Cir. 2003).
4

v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d
Cir. 2002); Borelli v. City ofReading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).
An appropriate order will be entered.

'--,

~~
,2013
Wilmington, De aware

'Z?a

5