Ithaca Ventures k.s. et al v. Nintendo of America Inc. et al
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Gregory M. Sleet on 9/25/2014. (mdb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
ITHACA VENTURES k.s. and
ITHACA DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
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Plaintiffs,
v.
NINTENDO OF AMERICA INC. and
NINTENDO CO., LTD.,
C.A. No. 13-824-GMS
Defendants.
_______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
On May 9, 2013, the plaintiffs, Ithaca Ventures k.s. ("Ithaca Ventures")" and Ithaca
Development, LLC ("Ithaca Development") (collectively, "Ithaca" or "the plaintiffs"), initiated
the instant action against Nintendo of America Inc. ("NOA") and Nintendo Co., Ltd. (''NCL")
(collectively, "Nintendo" or "the defendants"). (D.I. 1.) Ithaca alleges infringement of U.S.
Patent No. 6,624,802 ("the '834 Patent").
(Id.
mf
22-26.)
Presently before the court is
Nintendo's Motion to Transfer this action to the Western District of Washington pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), (D.I. 10.), and Nintendo's Motion for Sanction pursuant to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.I. 16.) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant
Nintendo's Motion to Transfer and deny Nintendo's Motion for Sanctions as moot.
II.
BACKGROUND
As described in the Complaint and the parties' briefing, Ithaca Ventures is a limited
partnership organized under the laws of the Slovak Republic. (D.I. 1, ,-r 1.) Ithaca Development
is a limited liability company organized in the state of Delaware with its principal place of
business in Dallas, Texas.
(!d.~
2.) Ithaca Development is a subsidiary of Ithaca Ventures and
is the exclusive U.S. licensee of the '834 Patent at issue.
(!d.
~
2.)
Ithaca Ventures was
organized in Delaware on April 22, 2013. (D.I. 13, Ex. 2.) NCL is a Japanese corporation with
its principal place ofbusiness in Kyoto, Japan. (D.I. 1, ~ 3.) NOA is a Washington corporation
with its principal place ofbusiness in Redmond, Washington. (Id.
III.
~ 4.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court has "broad discretion to determine, on an
individualized, case-by-case basis, whether the convenience and fairness considerations weigh in
favor oftransfer." 1 Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995). The court
engages in a two-step inquiry. It first determines whether the action could have been brought
originally in the proposed transferee forum and then asks whether transfer would best serve the
convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as the interests of justice. Smart Audio Techs.,
LLCv. Apple, Inc., No. 12-134-GMS, 2012 WL 5685742, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2012). It is the
defendant's responsibility to demonstrate that transfer is appropriate at each step, Jumara, 55
F.3d at 879-80, and, "unless the balance of convenience of the parties is strongly in favor of
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should prevail." Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d
22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970).
IV.
DISCUSSION
a. The Propriety of the Transferee Forum
The court may only transfer an action to a "district or division where it might have been
brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The parties do not dispute that the plaintiffs' lawsuit could have
1
The statute provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
2
originally been filed in the Western District of Washington. As such, the court presumes venue
there would be proper and proceeds to the second step.
b. The Jumara Analysis
The court next must consider whether transfer to the Western District of Washington
would serve the interests of convenience and justice. In the Third Circuit, this requires an
individualized analysis, considering the various private and public interests guarded by
§ 1404(a). See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. To this end, the court does not apply any "definitive
formula" but, instead, considers each of these "Jumara factors" on a case-by-case basis. See id.
The private interests may include:
plaintiffs forum preference as maintained in the original choice; the defendant's
preference; whether the claim arose elsewhere; the convenience of the parties as
indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; the convenience of the
witnesses-but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable
for trial in one of the fora; and the location ofbooks and records (similarly limited
to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum).
Id. The public interests may include:
the enforceability of the judgment: practical considerations that could make the
trial easy, expeditious~ or inexpensive; the relative administrative difficulty in the
two fora resulting from court congestion; the local interest in deciding local
controversies at home; the public policies of the fora; and the familiarity of the
trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.
!d. at 879-80. The court addresses each of these "Jumara factors" in tum.
1. Private Interest Factors
a. Plaintiff's Forum Preference
The first private interest factor is the "plaintiffs forum preference as manifested in the
original choice." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Nintendo argues that Ithaca's choice of forum is
entitled to little weight because Delaware is not truly Ithaca's "home turf' and is a forum with
little connection to this case. (D.I. 11 at 5-6; D.I. 27 at 1-3.) Nintendo contends that Ithaca
3
Development's organization in Delaware mere weeks before filing this lawsuit demonstrates the
plaintiffs were trying to manufacture venue. (D.I. 11 at 5-6; D.I. 27 at 2.)
Ithaca instead argues that its choice to file this lawsuit in Delaware is entitled to
maximum deference, strongly weighing against transfer. (D.I. 20 at 6-7.) Specifically, Ithaca
points to the fact that Ithaca Development was organized in Delaware, making Delaware its
"home turf." (!d.)
Ithaca is correct that "a plaintiffs choice of a proper forum is a paramount
consideration ... and should not be lightly disturbed." See Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25. But this
general statement is not without exceptions. In particular, the court will afford "something less
than maximum deference" to the plaintiffs chosen forum where the plaintiff is not truly at home
in the forum state. See In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221, 1223 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
Moreover, while a company's situs of incorporation or organization will often
correspond to its "home turf," see Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d
744, 759 (D. Del. 2012), the court must examine closely the facts of each "to ensure that the
purposes of jurisdictional and venue laws are not frustrated by a party's attempt at manipulation."
See In re Microsoft Corp, 630 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The court agrees with Nintendo that Ithaca's forum choice should not be afforded
maximum deference. Even though Ithaca Development is organized under Delaware law, its
principal place ofbusiness being in Texas diminishes the plaintiffs' argument that it is at home in
Delaware. And Ithaca Development's organization under Delaware law mere weeks before
filing this lawsuit further undermines its position, suggesting to the court that its organization
here was motivated significantly by the instant litigation. See In re Microsoft Corp, 630 F.3d at
1365 ("The only added wrinkle is that [plaintiff] took the extra step of incorporating under the
4
laws of Texas sixteen days before filing suit. But that effort is no more meaningful, and no less
in anticipation oflitigation, than the others we reject."); see also id. at 1364 ("[It is a] fallacious
assumption[] that this court must honor connections to a preferred forum made in anticipation of
litigation and for the likely purpose of making that forum appear convenient."
In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that Ithaca's forum selection is entitled to
some degree of heightened deference, but not to "paramount consideration." See Shutte, 431
F.2d at 25; see also In re Link_A_Media, 662 F.3d at 1223.
b. Defendant's Forum Preference
The next private interest factor to consider is Nintendo's forum preference. See Jumara,
55 F.3d at 879. In this case, Nintendo clearly prefers to litigate in the Western District of
Washington, the District where NOA operates its principal place ofbusiness and headquarters.
This factor weighs in favor of transfer, although this factor is only given limited weight. See
Intellectual Ventures, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 759 ("Under Third Circuit law, [a defendant's]
preference for an alternative forum is not given the same weight as [a plaintiffs] preference.");
CNH Am. LLC v. Kinzenbaw, No. 08-945(GMS), 2009 WL 3737653, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 9,
2009) ("While a defendant's preferred venue is a factor that the court considers, it is not
sufficient to displace the plaintiffs own choice of venue.").
c. Whether the Claims Arose Elsewhere
The third private interest factor the court must consider is "whether the claim arose
elsewhere." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. "[A]s a matter of law, a claim for patent infringement
arises whenever someone has committed acts of infringement, to wit, 'makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention' without authority." Cellectis S.A. v. Precision Biosci., Inc., 858
F. Supp. 2d 376, 381 (D. Del. 2012) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)); see also Smart Audio Techs.,
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2012 WL 5865742, at *7. Accordingly, where the defendant in a patent infringement action
operates on a national level, this factor is often neutral.
Ithaca argues that this factor should be neutral here because Nintendo's accused
infringing products are sold throughout the United States-"The national scope of the infringing
activity makes this factor neutral." (D.I. 20 at 8 (citing Personalized User Model LLP v. Google,
Inc., No. 09-525-JJF, 2009 WL 3460767, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 27, 2009).)
Nintendo argues that this factor weighs in favor of transfer because NOA develops and
markets the accused infringing products from Redmond, Washington, within the Western
District of Washington.
(D.I. 11 at 7).
The court has recognized that "[t]o some extent,
[infringement] claims ar[i]se where the allegedly infringing products [a]re designed and
manufactured." ChriMar Sys., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 11-1050-GMS, 2013 WL 828220, at
*5 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Smart Audio Techs., 2012 WL
5865742, at *7). Here, the accused infringing products were designed and manufactured in
Japan, but NOA marketed and developed the products from Washington. Beyond sales of the
accused products, no activity relating to the products takes place in Delaware. (D.I. 11 at 7.)"
Even though the products are not designed or manufactured within the District, see
ChriMar, 2013 WL 828220, at *5, they are marketed from Washington, which ultimately will
bear on Ithaca's claims of induced infringement and willful infringement. (D.I. 1,
~~
24--26.)
These claims implicate the defendants' knowledge and intent, and therefore "arise" where the
products are marketed. The court finds this factor weighs slightly in favor transfer.
d. Convenience of the Parties
The court must also determine whether the proposed transferee forum would be more
convenient for the parties. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. In this assessment, the court weighs
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several considerations, including: "(1) the parties' physical location; (2) the associated logistical
and operational costs to the parties' employees in traveling to Delaware (as opposed to the
proposed transferee district) for litigation purposes; and (3) the relative ability of each party to
bear these costs in light of its size and financial wherewithal." Smart Audio Techs., 2012 WL
5865742, at *7 (internal quotation omitted).
Thus, the court is tasked with assessing the
"convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition." See
Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
Nintendo suggests that litigating in the Western District of Washington is more
convenient. Specifically, Nintendo argues that Delaware is not convenient for any party, and the
Western District of Washington is significantly more convenient for Nintendo. (D.I. 11 at 7-9.)
NOA is at home in the transferee District, and representatives. from NCL will be able to work
effectively from the Redmond, Washington office to minimize disruptions while traveling for
litigation.
(!d.)
Moreover, several of Nintendo's anticipated witnesses are also already in
Washington. (!d.) Nintendo argues that Ithaca has no contact with Delaware, making it equally
convenient for it to litigate in the Western District of Washington as in Delaware.
Conversely, Ithaca argues that Nintendo has failed to demonstrate a physical or financial
burden that would make litigating in Delaware burdensome. (D.I. 20 at 9-10.) Ithaca notes that
Nintendo's financial resources outweigh those of Ithaca, thus minimizing any burden for
Nintendo to travel. (!d. at 10.) Ithaca argues that its primary witnesses, the two inventors ofthe
'834 Patent, both live in Munich, Germany, and it is more convenient to travel from Munich to
Delaware than Washington. (!d. at 9.)
The court agrees that Delaware is not a convenient forum for any of the parties. Ithaca's
argument that it is more convenient for its witnesses to travel directly from Munich to
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Philadelphia is not persuasive. (Id.) The witnesses already have to travel a great distance just to
appear in Delaware. The court does not suggest that an additional few hours on a plane is
irrelevant, but it does find that Ithaca's witnesses will be inconvenienced regardless of the forum.
Similarly, Ithaca Development's principal place of business is in Dallas, thus requiring it to
travel a substantial distance itself. In contrast, it is significantly more convenient for Nintendo to
defend in the Western District of Washington because NOA is physically located there. See
Smart Audio Techs., 2012 WL 5865742, at *7. Several ofNintendo's anticipated witnesses are
there. While it is true that Nintendo will require witnesses and representatives from NCA to
travel from Japan, it is slightly more convenient for them (as opposed to Ithaca's witnesses)
because they would be able to work from NOA's headquarters in Redmond.
At the very least, it is equally inconvenient for the foreign parties and witnesses on both
sides to litigate anywhere in the United States, whereas, for the domestic parties, it ts
significantly more convenient to litigate in the Western District of Washington.
It ts
unreasonable to subject all parties .to an inconvenient forum when a forum exists that would
significantly reduce the burden of at least one of the parties. See In re Nintendo Co. Ltd., 589
F.3d 1194, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (ordering transfer where evidence and witnesses were closer to
the transferee district, whereas the venue chosen by the plaintiff had "few or no convenience
factors"). The court finds this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
e. Convenience of the Witnesses
The next Jumara factor is "the convenience of the witnesses-but only to the extent that
the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora." 55 F.3d at 879.
The parties focus on a single witness, Sandy Hatcher, a former NOA senior licensing
manager. Nintendo expects her to be a testifying third-party witness. Nintendo argues that Ms.
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Hatcher lives within the subpoena power of the Western District of Washington but outside the
subpoena power of the District of Delaware, thus weighing in favor of transfer. (D.I. 11 at 9.) In
contrast, Ithaca argues that (1) Nintendo has not demonstrated why Ms. Hatcher's testimony
would be important, and (2) there is no reason to believe that Ms. Hatcher would not voluntarily
testify or that she would not cooperate with Nintendo. (D.I. 20 at 12.) Ithaca further argues that
this Jumara factor focuses on multiple "witnesses"-not a single witness. (Id. at 13.) Ithaca
contends this factor is neutral.
The court finds that Ms. Hatcher would have relevant testimony on the way the accused
products were marketed. The court also notes that Nintendo need not prove that Ms. Hatcher
"may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora." See Joao Control & Monitoring Sys.,
LLC v.. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-cv-1479 (GMS), 2013 WL 4496644, at *5 (D. Del. Aug. 21,
2013). Ithaca "overstates the moving party's burden of demonstrating that a third-party witness
will be unavailable or unwilling to travel to Delaware. . . . [I]t is enough that likely witnesses
reside beyond the court's subpoena power and that there is reason to believe that those witnesses
will refuse to testify absent subpoena power." See id. at 6. Ms. Hatcher is not subject to
Delaware's subpoena power, whereas she is subject to Washington's power. Moreover, she is no
longer employed by Nintendo, thus providing some reason to believe that she will refuse to
testify. See id. Nonetheless, because Nintendo has only identified a single third-party witness,
the court finds this factor only minimally favors transfer.
f.
Location ofBooks and Records
Finally, the court accounts for "the location ofbooks and records (similarly limited to the
extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum)." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.
Nintendo asserts that this factor favors transfer because the "majority of [corporate]
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documents ... [and] [c]ertain technical documents" are located in the Western District of
Washington.
(D.I. 11 at 9-10.)
Nintendo contends that these documents are relevant to
questions ofboth direct and induced infringement. (D.I. 27 at 7.) In response, Ithaca argues that
(1) the bulk of the relevant books and records are in Japan; (2) the corporate documents in
Redmond concerning sales and marketing are not the "crux" of the case; and (3) Nintendo has
made no showing that it would be a burden to produce these documents in Delaware. (D.I. 20 at
13-14.)
In consideration of the parties' arguments and the relevant law, the court agrees with
Nintendo on this point. "In patent infringement cases, the bulk of the relevant evidence usually
comes from the accused infringer. Consequently, the place where the defendant's documents are
kept weighs in favor of transfer to that location." ChriMar, 2013 WL 828220, at *6 (quoting In
re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). Ithaca's argument that this factor is
neutral because not all of the books and records are in Washington is unpersuasive. The court
will not disregard convenience where it can be found, simply because the circumstances are not
ideal.
Furthermore, Ithaca has alleged induced infringement, thus making the corporate
documents in Redmond probative.
Finally, although modem technology makes the task of
transporting electronic evidence far less onerous, the court must nevertheless accord at least
some weight to this factor. See In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d at 1224; In re
Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1998; Smart Audio Techs., 2012 WL 5865742, at *9. As such, this factor
weighs slightly in favor of transfer.
2. Public Interest Factors
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The parties do not dispute two of the public interest factors: enforceability of the
judgment and the familiarity of the presiding judge with the applicable law. As such the court
excludes these factors from its analysis and considers them neutral.
a. Practical Considerations
Jumara instructs that courts should look to "practical considerations that could make the
trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive." 55 F.3d at 879. Nintendo provides substantially the
same arguments offered in support of its position on the private "convenience of the parties"
factor. (D.I. 11 at 10-11.) Ithaca provides no arguments of its own why Delaware would be
more practical but, rather, counters that Nintendo's arguments should be disregarded (D.I. 20 at
14.)
The court agrees with Ithaca. Because the practical considerations factor is a "public
interest" factor, "at least some attention" must be paid to the public costs of litigation. ChriMar,
2013 WL 828220, at *7. Because neither party addresses the broader public costs of proceeding
in one district or the other, the court finds this factor neutral. See id.
b. Court Congestion
The court also considers the "relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting
from court congestion." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Nintendo cites Federal Court Management
Statistics to show that the District of Delaware is significantly more congested than the Western
District of Washington. (D.I. 11 at 11-12; D.I. 13, Exs. 3, 4.) According to the most recent
statistics cited by Nintendo, the District of Delaware has 660 pending cases per judgeship, which
is the 15th most of any district in nation. When these cases are weighted to take into account
time and complexity, the District of Delaware has the 2nd most cases of any district in the
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nation. (!d.) In comparison, the Western District of Washington has the 17th most weighted
cases of all districts. (!d. Ex. 3.) Regarding time from filing to disposition, the District of
Delaware is 8 months compared to 6.2 months for the Western District of Washington. (!d. Exs.
3, 4.) For time from filing to trial, Delaware is 32.3 months compared to 19.3 months for the
Western District of Washington. (!d.) Nintendo argues that these statistics definitely establish
that the District of Delaware is more congested, resulting in increased administrative difficulty. 2
Ithaca characterizes the difference in the time to disposition between the districts as
"marginal." (D.I. 20 at 15.) Moreover, Ithaca argues that the District of Delaware actually
handles patent cases, specifically, more efficiently than the Western District of Washington.
Ithaca argues that the time from filing to trial for patent cases is 2.03 years in Delaware, versus
2.19 years in the Western District ofWashington. 3 (!d.)
This District's large caseload has not, in the past, been a sufficient justification for
transfer. See Intellectual Ventures, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 759-60; Human Genome Sci., Inc. v.
Genentech, No. 11-082-LPS, 2011 WL 2911797, at *10 (D. Del. July 18, 2011). However,
increased times from filing to disposition and trial are important faCtors that do influence the
court's calculus. Although Nintendo's statistics would be more convincing if they were specific
to patent cases, the court finds Ithaca's statistics even less compelling, as they come from an
article published back in 2010. As demonstrated by the Federal Court Management Statistics,
the District of Delaware's docket has changed substantially in recent years. The court finds this
factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer.
c. Local Interest in the Litigation
2
The court notes that, in the time since the instant motion was filed and briefed, the statistics have been
updated, but there have been no material changes in these figures. See Federal Court Management Statistics, U.S.
COURTS (June 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Federa1CourtManagementStatistics/district-courts-june2014.aspx.
3
Ithaca cites Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401,418 (2010).
12
The transfer analysis requires that the court examine "any local interest in deciding local
controversies at home." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Nintendo argues that the Western District of
Washington has an interest in resolving the case because it involves a local business, NOA,
which is headquartered within the district. (D.I. 11 at 12.) Ithaca rejects Nintendo's argument as
having any bearing on this factor.
The court agrees with Ithaca.
A district does not have a local interest in resolving
litigation simply by virtue ofhaving one of the parties present there. To hold otherwise would be
to give undue weight to the location of the parties, which has already been accounted for in the
private interest factors. This is especially true for patent infringement cases.
[P]atent litigation does not constitute a local controversy in most
cases. Patent cases implicate constitutionally protected property
rights. The resolution of patent cases is governed by federal law
reviewed by courts of national (as opposed to regional) stature.
Moreover, to characterize patent litigation as "local" undermines
the appearance of neutrality that federal courts were establish to
provide and flies in the face of the national (if not global) markets
that are affected by the outcome of these cases.
Helicos Biosciences Corp. v. Illumina, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 367, 375 (D. Del. 2012). Thus, this
factor is typically neutral in the context of patent litigation because patent issues usually "do not
give rise to a local controversy or implicate local interests." TriStrata Tech., Inc. v. Emulgen
Labs, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 635, 643 (D. Del. 2009). Nintendo has not suggested that the
circumstances in this case involve particularly local issues. Therefore, the court finds the "local
interest" factor to be neutral.
d. Public Policy
Finally, the court must consider the "public policies of the fora" in weighing the propriety
of transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Ithaca argues that Delaware businesses are encouraged to
use the Delaware courts as a forum for resolving disputes. (D.I. 20 at 16 (citing Intellectual
13
Ventures, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 760).) Nintendo counters that neither forum has a controlling
public policy in this case. (D.I. 27 at 6.)
The court agrees with Nintendo. Although it is true that "[t]he public policy of Delaware
encourages the use by Delaware corporations of Delaware as a forum for resolution of business
disputes," this policy would not be served in the instant case. See Intellectual Ventures, 842 F.
Supp. 2d at 760 (alteration in original). First, whereas all the parties in Intellectual Ventures
were incorporated or organized in Delaware, here only Ithaca Development is organized in
Delaware. Second, the strength of this general public policy statement is greatly diminished
here, where Ithaca Development has no ties to Delaware, and its organization in Delaware was
purely for litigation purposes. Instead, there is an overriding public policy throughout the federal
court system to discourage parties' attempts to circumvent the jurisdictional and venue laws. See
In re Microsoft Corp, 630 F.3d at 1364. The court finds that there is no relevant public policy in
either forum, so this factor is neutral.
3. Transfer Analysis Summary
Considering the Jumara factors as a whole, the court concludes that the defendants have
met their burden of demonstrating that the interests of justice and convenience strongly favor
transfer. Only Ithaca's forum preference weighs against transfer and, as the court explained
above, that preference does not warrant maximum deference in this case. Ithaca's attempt to
manufacture venue by organizing in Delaware just before filing suit mitigates the weight of its
choice of forum. In contrast, several factors counsel in favor of transfer.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court will grant Nintendo's Motion to Transfer (D.I. 10)
this action to the Western District of Washington pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Having
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granted the motion to transfer, the court denies Nintendo's Motion for Sanctions as moot. 4
Dated: September1-2.__, 2014
4
Nintendo should pursue its motion for Rule 11 sanctions before the transferee district court. See One on
One Basketball, Inc. v. Global Payments Direct, Inc., No. 13-2020 (CKK), 2014 WL 1617707, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr.
23, 2014) (declining to rule on defendant's motion to dismiss after granting motion to transfer). Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the transferor court ceases upon entering an order changing venue. Cf Glasstech, Inc. v. AB Kyro
OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussing transfer in the context of multi-district litigation, under 28
U.S.C. § 1407).
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