In Re: Bishop et al.

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM ORDER Denying 13 MOTION to Strike (see Memorandum Order for further details). Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 11/6/2013. (nms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
INRE:
Bankruptcy Case No. 11-12338 (BLS)

BISHOP, et al.,
Debtors.
ROMIE D. BISHOP,
et al.,
Appellant,

Civil Action No. 13-977-RGA

v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION INC.,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This is an appeal from two related orders of the bankruptcy court. Appellant has filed a
Brief. (D.I. 8). Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss (D.I. 10) with a brief in support. (D.I.
11). Appellant has responded with a motion to strike the motion to dismiss. (D.I. 13). Briefing
on the motion to dismiss followed. (D.I. 14, 15).
The adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court alleged truth-in-lending violations (15
U.S.C. § 1641) against the defendants, in relation to Appellant's home, and sought damages.
The bankruptcy court held the matter in abeyance, as there was a Superior Court mortgage
foreclosure case pending against the same property. On March 4, 2013, the Superior Court, after
a bench trial, rejected Appellant's arguments that the assignments were "deficient and
fraudulent." (D.I. 11-1, at 12). The bankruptcy court subsequently held that those issues would
not be relitigated, and that the complaint did not otherwise state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. (D.I. 1-1 at 2, ~~ 4 & 5). The bankruptcy court denied Appellant's subsequent

motion for reconsideration. (D.I. 1-2).
In this appeal, the first thing I consider is Appellant's motion to strike. (D.I. 13). The
basis for this is that Appellees filed their motion to dismiss on August 13, 2013, but did not file
their corporate disclosure statement until August 14, 2013. The relevant rule states that the
corporate disclosure statement "must" be filed with the party's "first appearance, pleading, etc."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.l(b)(l). Appellees evidently did not comply with this requirement. The
purpose of the requirement is to provide timely notice to the judge of matters that may require
recusal as a result of the judge's financial interest. The Rule 7.1 disclosure in this case reveals
that Appellees have no parent corporation and that no publicly held corporation owns more than
10% of the stock. Thus, the one-day late filing is doubly harmless - harmless because its filing
revealed nothing that would affect recusal and harmless because it was one day late on a nonurgent matter. 1 Appellant's motion to strike (D .I. 13) will therefore be DENIED.
Thus, the briefs before me are Appellant's brief (D.I. 8) and Appellees' brief. (D.I.
11 ). Appellee's brief acknowledges Appellant's brief. (D .I. 11, at 4). Filing a motion to strike
does not act as a stay of the requirement to respond to a motion. Thus, the time for filing any
more papers has run out. Nevertheless, Appellant has not responded on the merits to Appellee's
brief. Perhaps that is as Appellant wants it. Nevertheless, in order to make sure there is no
misunderstanding, the Court will give Appellant an opportunity to respond to Appellee's brief, if
he so chooses, so long as the response is filed by November 27, 2013. To be clear, Appellant is
1

Appellant claims that the Court holds Appellees, who are represented by counsel, to a
more lax standard than it has previously held Appellant, who is pro se not only on this appeal but
on his earlier appeals. I have not reviewed the various orders I have entered dismissing
Appellant's various appeals, but I do recall that at least some of the dismissals were because of
jurisdictional defects caused by Appellant's missing deadlines. On those, I had no discretion.
The various orders speak for themselves, of course, but on other issues about which I had
discretion, I believe that I have taken Appellant's pro se status into account.

not required to file anything. The appeal will be considered ready for decision on November 28,
2013.

~k'lt;r3
ate

I