Braun v. Bolton et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Richard G. Andrews on 9/30/13. (mdb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
BRENDA LEE BRAUN,
Plaintiff,

v.

Civ. No. 13-1093-RGA

RICHARD BOLTON, et aI.,
Defendants.

Brenda Lee Braun, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

30,

2013
September
Wilmington, Delaware

Plaintiff Brenda Lee Braun filed this action alleging sexual harassment. She
appears pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (0.1.2). The
Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
On March 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed a nearly identical case in this Court, Braun v. Bolton,
Civ. No. 13-445-RGA. On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff advised the Court that she had moved
to Pennsylvania. On May 3,2013, Civ. No. 13-445-RGA was dismissed, and Braun
was given leave to amend. She failed to amend, and the case was closed on May 30,

2013. (See Civ. No. 13-445-RGA at 0.1. 7.) In the meantime, on May 20,2013,
Plaintiff filed a new action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, and on June 13, 2013, an order was entered to transfer the case to this
court. See Braun v. Bolton, Civ. No. 13-3195 (E.D. Pa.).
Apparently, Plaintiff rented from one, or all, of the Defendants. Braun alleges
that: (1) Defendants sexually harassed her; (2) one Defendant sexually assaulted her
and pulled a gun on her; (3) a second Defendant threatened her with bodily harm; and
(4) a third Defendant treated her like a "slave." (0.1. 3 at ,-rIlI.C.) Because Plaintiff was
sleeping on the floor, on February 8, 2013, she asked Ms. Bolton's daughter if she
could sleep in their motor home, and Plaintiff was told she could. Later, Plaintiff was
told that she had to move out and that if she called the authorities Defendants would
"do bodily harm to her." (ld.) Plaintiff found a new place to live but Defendants "still
tried to cause [her] problems." (ld.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants kept all her belongings, gave her belongings to
other tenants, took money from her, and refused to give her rent receipts. She seeks

payment: (1) of all money borrowed from her; (2) for all her clothes that were given
away; (3) for all her clothes that were destroyed; (4) for all crafts and supplies left at the
premises; (5) for food in the amount of $173.00; (5) for three weeks rent; and (6) for
court fees, filing fees, attorney's fees, and moving fees. Plaintiff also seeks a
permanent non-contact order. 8ecause Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her pleading is
liberally construed and her Complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma
pauperis actions that are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). The Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,229 (3d Cir. 2008). An action is frivolous if it "lacks an

arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(8)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is
"based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or
delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to § 1915(e)(2)(8)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However,
before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court

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must grant Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint, unless amendment would be
inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.
2002).
A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere
conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When determining whether dismissal
is appropriate, the Court conducts a two-part analysis. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d CiL 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are
separated. Id. The Court must accept all of the Complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,
but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11.
Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the Complaint
are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211. In
other words, the Complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief;
rather, it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. Id. A claim is facially plausible
when its factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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The civil cover sheet states that this Court has jurisdiction due to a federal
question and check-marks the boxes "Jones Act-Personal Injury" and "All other Federal
Question Cases" with the added statement "sexual assault & stealing & giving away my
belongings to other tenants." (D.1. 1, Civil Cover Sheet.) Liberally construing the
Complaint, as the Court must, it may be that Plaintiff raises a personal injury claim
based upon diversity of citizenship or that she attempts to raise a claim under the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which prohibits housing
discrimination on the basis of gender. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise claims under state law, it is unclear whether
diversity jurisdiction exists over those claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Diversity
jurisdiction requires diversity of citizenship among the parties and that the amount in
controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332{a). The Complaint indicates that
Defendants are citizens of the State of Delaware. The court is unable to discern from
the allegations, however, the amount in controversy. "As a general rule, [the amount in
controversyJ is determined from the good faith allegations appearing on the face of the
complaint." SpectacorMgmt. Grp. v. Brown, 131 F.3d 120, 122 (3d Cir.1997). Asthe
complaint does not allege adequately al/ege the amount in controversy, it is not clear
whether the Court has diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims.
With regard to a potential claim under the FHA, the statute provides that it is
unlawful "[tJo discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). In addition, it is unlawful under

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the FHA "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or
enjoyment of' any right protected by the act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Courts have recognized that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
that may violate either § 3604 or § 3617. See, e.g., Hall v. Meadowood Ltd. P'ship, 7 F.
App'x 687,689 (9th Cir. 2001): DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.

1996); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993); Shellhammer v. Lewal/en,
770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Courts have determined that sexual
harassment is actionable under the FHA given that Title VIII shares the same purposes
as Title VII (wherein a plaintiff may bring a hostile work environment claim), sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination, and there is overwhelming precedent that
recognizes a hostile housing environment claim. See Brillhart v. Sharp, 2008 WL
2857713, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 21,2008) (citation omitted).
To make out a claim for discrimination resulting from a hostile housing
environment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination
because of her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the
discrimination detrimentally affected a term, condition, or privilege of housing; (4) the
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability, if alleged. See Andrews

v. City of Ph ilade/phia , 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.1990); see a/so Brillhart, 2008 WL
2857713, at *9. The Complaint is deficiently pled as it fails to state a claim under the
FHA.

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For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for want of
jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an
Amended Complaint to cure any pleading defects.
An appropriate order will be entered.

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